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I Chapter Seven 
I 
The Moral Ideals 
This chapter will continue the survey of Grote's ethical writings 
by reference to his analysis and scheme of the moral ideals. The next 
chapter will examine his criticisms of the mode of utilitarian 
argument dominant at the time. Interesting and important elements of 
Grote's work on moral value and evaluation, on the genesis of virtue 
and various virtues such as-benevolence, honour and on the formation 
and evolution of character will have to be omitted in deference to the 
central theory of moral knowledge and of the correct theory of moral 
lif 
It may help to summarize briefly the key analytic points in 
Grote's moral theory that we have met so far and to anticipate what is 
to come in this chapter. Grote, we have seen is opposed to ethical 
naturalism. Ethics is the study of what ought to be and not what is. 
In addit,. on he is opposed to any kind of ethical reductionism. 
Secondly, Grote is Clear that the nature and content of our ethical 
ideals are knowable, knowable through the ordinary thinking process 
and independent of the need for revelation, purely rational 
intuitions, of the types posited by the rationalists and*Schelling, or 
any other assumptions or beliefs not normally involved in ordinary 
thinking and knowledge. Thirdly, Grote considers the moral ideals to 
be imaginative judgements, of facts expressible in statements,. that 
are flanked by psychological, social and legal facts below and 
ontologically higher facts above. While abstract in character the 
ideals can be explained by relating'--them to these lower and higher 
f acts. 
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What we will now see is that fourthly, the moral ideals are 
products or emanations of our human nature. * Happiness is an ideal 
that grows from the sentient-side of our nature, Right from the active 
side of our nature, and the Good from our fundamental propensity to 
want. All other ideals are sub ideals of these three primary ideals, 
all'of which have independent value. Fifthly, Grote neither accepts 
nor rejects consequential or teleological ethics on one side nor the 
non-consequential, axiological, deontic or intuitionistic ethics on 
the other. Moral ideals,. values and actions are valued or binding 
both for the purposes they serve, in particular the promotion of good 
(rather than happiness) and for elements within themselves, 
independent of consequences, because they are the right things to be 
done. Sixthly, Grote posits not one final end or ideal in relation to 
which all the other ideals are subordinated as' means or parts, but 
suggests that moral life involves a plurality of ideals all of which 
are different yet related, ordered but often in conflict, and each of 
independent value. Finally, Grote considered that this analysis 
provides a sound base from which a comprehensive and effective attack 
on utilitarian ethics can be launched. These last four points can now 
be elaborated and appraised. 
Firstly, how do the moral ideals relate to man's nature? 
argument presented is complicated but its outline is very simple. The 
moral and political ideals are from one side an image or reflection of 
ontologically higher facts which which are the real objects of our 
existence. They are on the other side our guesses at what we feel 
ought to be to make coherent and satisfactory what is in the world. 
The ideals are the aims and purposes we posit to satisfy the want that 
is basic to our nature, they are the telos or goals of thought and 
action, the fulfilment of which would dampen the fire5 of want. The 
ideals however, are really only abridgements or clear statements of 
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what we know more intimately through our moral feelings, opinions and 
observations of our shared moral life and rules of conduct. The 
ideals, as Grote says, are midway between these lower moral facts and 
the ontologically higher facts revealed by our wants and should not be 
detached from either. Terms like right and good do not refer to 
natural qualities, nor to qualities of non natural objects but are 
'descriptive adjectives applicable to actions' or various kinds of 
feelings (1876,240). We should remember this when considering the 
following definition and scheme of the moral ideals. 
One final piece of advice on method is given by Grote at 'the 
outset in the form of two maxims: His advice is 
'that by converting one ideal into another', or interpreting one 
by another, we make no step, and get no further forward in 
knowledge: the other, that where we do advance in knowledge by 
fixing an ideal, or converting it into something partaking of 
fact, observation and experience, we must bear in mind that it 
loses its ideal character... ' (1876,38). 
Grote is hinting that there are a plurality of moral ideals. that 
must be kept distinct, and that moral reductionism is in the ena 
fallacious. We can'show how the facts of life suggest, relate to or 
help fix our ideals but we cannot explain, ideals in naturalistic 
language. In intellectual life the two great ideals striven for are 
the truth and knowledge. In practical life there are three distinct 
major ideals and several sub ideals that involve one or other major 
ideal in its application to one or other particular aspect of 
practical social life. The three major ideals are the counter-notions 
of the two sides of human nature, our sentient and active selves, and 
the parent of each want. The ideal that corresponds and responds to 
our sentient self is happiness (eudaemonia) or 'what we desire'. The 
ideal that corresponds to our active nature is the right (the summum 
faciendum) or 'what I'should do' that which 'should be done'. The 
ideal that responds to our basic want is the good (the summum bonum) 
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'the desirable' or 'what we should desire'. 
All primary ideals are grounded in our actual' natures, and our 
actual'experiences and practices, yet all three entail imperative 
claims. All three ideals have value and imperativeness independent of 
what mere experience tells us. The ideal corresponds to but 
transcends and realizes the actual. Tt is to illustrate and support 
this claim that Grote devotes several chapters of the Treatise but 
especially chapter three. We may explore the ideals of happiness and 
the rýght within the context of the two sciences of Eudaemonics and 
Aretaics and then tackle the good and the sub ideals. 
Happiness and Eudaemonics 
Eudaemonics may, Grote insists, be studied in a non ideal manner, 
studying types of pain and pleasure, their sources and their effects 
on human behaviour such he calls 'hedonics'. But eudaemonics, and 
utilitarianism in particular, has usually been, or become in its 
development, 'exceedingly ideal'. Human beings in everyday life 
conclude from observation that certain events cause pain or . pleasure, 
that we ought to have' pleasure or avoid pain, or that we ought to 
promote the happiness'of others'or not inflict pain upon them. In so 
doing they enter into the realm of the purely moral, the ideal and the 
imperative. 'Most forms of utilitarianism have indeed been ideal 
though Bentham fails to'recognise the move from 'reference to the 
actual to reference' to the ideal according to Grote, and Mill is 
inconsistent, on occasions appearing to attempt the reduction of the 
ideal to a factual statement about . personal psychology and 
preferences. Ideal utilitarianism, in choosing as its ideal the 
imperative claim that we ought to promote happiness, appears to John 
Grote to be founding itself, on an intuition, on an a prior'. i. 
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judgement, an argument previously made by Herbert Spencer and Spencer 
1851,22-23; later made famous be Grote's student Henry Sidgwick in. 
0 The Methods of F-thics', (Grote 1876,20; Spencer 1851,22-23; 
Sidgwick 1907,373-390,418-422). Grote wishes to explore the 
arguments for treating happiness as an ideal and to evaluate its 
rational claim to be the ultimate. moral ideal, to be the summum bonum. 
Happiness in its non ideal form is merely a succession of 
pleasurable sensations, but in its ideal form it is far more general. 
In the hands of Aristotle and his followers, happiness was so general 
as to be consistent with the ideal of the good; Happiness meant 'all 
that man wants', the 'Ultimately desirable' or the 'ideally perfect 
human state' (Grote 1870,74-75,330-331,353; 1876, xi, 39). But 
once we try to define happiness,, to conceive it, to give it form and 
meaning, to fix it, then it loses its imperative power, its 
self-evidence, and its general appeal (Grote 1876,40). In addition 
when we ask if we want. or ought to have happiness in one of these 
narrower senses, such as a surfeit of pleasures over pains for the 
sentient self, then 'it is misleading to say all that man wants is 
happiness. He wants much else besides' (Grote 1870,330-331). 
Specific accounts of happiness usually work from mans capacity to 
experience pleasure and pain, to be sentient. Happiness is the ideal 
that is suggested by the feeling of want (felt want), the absence of 
something actually desired. But he notes later that some forms of 
happiness, such as gratification, arise from the pure satisfaction of 
want as a fact, ever when sentient experience may be denied (Grote 
1876,283-284). 
Working from a partial account of human nature, a partial account 
of mind and of body (stressing only the sensory nerves), happiness 
turns out to be only a limited ideal, that does not account of all our 
wants, aims or our values. That human beings do not always act to 
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produce happiness in a specific sense is regularly argued by Grote and 
he notes that when the-utilitarian is confronted with these cases he 
then shifts to widen his notion of happiness to embrace the other 
ideals as parts of or means to happiness. Such a move Grote considers 
illegitimate because if taken to an extreme' the argument for 
utilitarianism becomes a truism or tautology, we ought to do what we 
ought to do. If the argument is not taken so far the evidence of 
support for alternative moral theories is effective (1670,64-69; 
1876,195). Much of the issue of the imperativeness of happiness 
itself and of such counter ideals as the good, the right and the just 
then reverts to an argument about the meaning of the word happiness. 
Here Grote is most interesting. Happiness turns out to be 
indefinable or 'flies all description' (Grote 1876,298-299). The key 
reason is not just that people, do experience different sensations from 
the same stimuli, nor that we 'cannot enter into the sensations of 
others, but that people mean different. things by the word (Grote 1870, 
267-269). This is evident when we look at'maxims of or for happiness 
such as 'happiness lies 'in ýcontentment' 'for Grote notes that the 
oppo - site is equally true, that 'happiness lies in effort', in 
striving, in encouraging desires even when success eludes us. Grote 
proposes a new subject"6f Amphilology to discuss the many-sidedness 
and absolute indefinability of this and similar concepts (Grote 1876, 
300; 1870,26-28; 38-43,327,331,347). Likewise as happiness'cannot 
be adequately defined, nor a common meaning produced, neither can 
happiness be adequately quantified or calculated (Grote 1870 230 
1876t 229-237,299,309-310). Problems of'how'and to what extent we 
can distinguish the quantity of pleasures "as distinct from the 
q- ualities is another burdensome task for the utilitarian (Grote 1876, 
45-57). 
Happiness then, can be an ideal -in moral I discourse. It can refer 
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either to the ultimate end of life as with Aristotle, the summum 
bonum, or as with John Mill and the Philosophical Radicals, to 
something more specific, the ideal state of satisfaction of a sentient 
being. Even in this latter sense, happiness is a worthy and 
imperative ideal. But being partial, reflecting only one side of a 
many-sided nature, the ideal of happiness in whatever form it takes, 
must take its place alongside others which are not only independently 
valuable and imperative,. but which are more valuable, more imperative 
and ultimately more comprehensive and absolute (Grote 1870,257-258; 
1876,39). 
Much of Grote's discussion of happindss and his objections to its 
being taken as the sovereign or only ideal, can be left for the 
discussion of his critique of utilitarianism, but two major novelties 
can be pointed to here. The first is Grote's attempt to found an 
observational science of happiness on grounds independent of those of 
Bentham. This first appears in Chapter XII of the Treatise. Grote 
identifies three kinds of pleasure (and happiness), (1) those of 
well-feeling (or welfare) produced by satisfaction or contentment, (2) 
those of active pleasure, pleasures of disturbance, (3) those of 
gratification, the pleasures associated with achieving after activity 
(disturbance) what we want (Grote 1876,275-326). Grote notes that 
these pleasure rise in a scale of value, passive and undisturbed 
pleasure,, being less compelling-than the pleasures of doing and then 
both falling short of achievement. He also notes that we could 
experience pure 'gratification even if our entire sensory system was 
defunct., Not evertall pleasures are purely sensory (ibid, 283). 
Samuel Alexander was later attracted by Grote's distinction 
between pleasures' of gratification and of enjoyment but would not go 
so far as allowing fe 1, el I ingý of gratification if all the other 
sensations (organic sensations) connected with eating were destroyed 
7 
(Alexander 1889,215). Grote notes the near impossibility of 
developing a 'comparative hedonometry' as suggested by Paley aM 
Bentham and ends the chapter by expressing the 'universal fallacy of 
experience' lying at the heart of any attempted source of pleasure. 
It arises 
. where we conclude the degree in which pleasure does please, from 
the degree in which it has pleased. For by 'does please', we 
really mean, not that, as a fact, it pleases now, or at such a 
time, or any number of times, but that 'it Is its nature to 
please: * the universality of the proposition is something not 
given by experience' (Grote 1876,289). 
This is one version, but an important version, of the fallacy of 
induction. The second novelty is to argue that, except in the 
abstract philosophy of. Aristotle and the Utilitarians, nobody 
practically treats _happiness as an end. In Chapter 
XIII Grote argues 
that human motives are numerous and complex, and the objects and 
purposes arrived at are similarly pluralistic., Happiness is not what 
we aim at as the end result of action, it is, a by product of living, 
of doing things, including doing our duty, or just performing a task 
well. As Grote puts it, 
-'The error of modern utilitarianism as to 
happiness seems to me 
to arise from an imperfect notion of the manner in which 
happiness, deserving to be called such, belongs to life in 
general' (ibid 292). 
Here Grote, without quoting any authority, sides-with Carlyle on 
the issue of work and launches a measured but effective attack on the 
assumptions of laissez-faire political economics. Adam Smith, Bentham 
and Mills considered pleasure to be the only possible rationale for 
work. 
I and that labour is (so far as it goes) a pain or evil undergone 
for the sake of it' (ibid 294). 
On this assumption Grote considers that few people would ever get 
6ff their chairs, let above build a 'high economical civilization'. 
Working from assertions about man's active, wanting and creative 
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nature Grote concludes that, 
'There exists in man-an impulse "to the exercise of his faculties, 
or so far to labour, as well as to enjoyment, ana a capacity of 
rational improvement which suggests, to him that it is better to 
exercise these faculties in the production of what will be useful 
and enjoyed than in savage pursuits like war' (ibid 295). 
Happiness may lie, in working, not just as a result of work. John 
Ruskin, William Morris and Thomas. Carlyle were to make such a gospel 
of work and, such a critique of- political economy famous in mid 
Victorian Britain. 
. 
Grote concentrates on other critiques of the laissez faire view 
in regard to its assumptions about happiness. Firstly,, political 
economy to operate efficiently and logically must never create total 
happiness and extinguish all, want but continually 'make men feel new 
wants, that is, to put an end, to their contentment: content is 
stagnation' (Grote 1876,301). Grote does 'not take up the Stoic and 
aesthethic ideals of contentment as his goal with its recommendation 
that we can improve happiness by reducing subjective wants as an 
alternative to capitalist logic. Rather he sI tresses that to satisfy 
man's whole nature more effort must be attributed to identifying and 
satisfying the essentially moral wants and desires, while appreciating 
activity or labour also as valuable in itself as well as valuable in 
the terms of its products or the satisfaction of wants (use value). 
Grote produces a critique of the limited perspective of the 
classical economist, which mirrors later ideas about 'conspicuous 
consumption'. 
'The moral philosopher is in fact as much concerned to encourage 
desires and aspirations, as the political economist to encourage 
wants. The helplessness, listlessness, undesiringness, which 
characterizes the moral being of so many, is exactly analogous to 
the economical condition of well-satisfied, unwanting barbarians. 
Few people desire anything of themselves: they COPY their 
neighbours, desire something, wealth for instance# simply because 
everyone else'does' (ibid 303-304). 
Two other logical prerequisites for capitalism worry Grote. 
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Firstly, the demand that men consider themselves as 'individuals', who 
will only 'work for themselves' and not for other's good,. This 
encourages conflict and competitiveness between peoplei. Secondly, 
the belief that poverty is a. necessity to motivate individual activity 
and appears to be a necessary concomitant to capitalist society (Grote 
1870 197,326 ). 
Next, Grote recognizes the massive imbalance and asymmetry 
between want and need on one side, and wealth distribution on the 
other, and he notes that, 'the happiness of the society is measured by 
the degree to which they do'so balance' (ibid 337). To the values of 
his age and class Grote 'notes that the encouragenientý of self 
dependency is a good thing, because 
'The common life is thus the better for all the self-interested 
industry and talent which makes the fortune of individuals', 
But like several other of his Cambridge contemporaries, he felt a 
moral disgust at this process and recommended some form of Christian 
Socialism based on 'mutual help' (ibid 336),. Happiness was not to be 
regarded as the only end possessing moral value in society; neither 
could happiness be explained or reduced to considerations of the 
sensory experience of pleasure and pain. To allow an economic system 
to operate unrestrained in the pursuit of these goals willnot satisfy 
man's nature, his aspirations and wants. Modern capitalist society 
and modern political economy were viewed as -a new kind of 
barbarianism, and wealth a goal beckoning man and society to their 
peril. 
III 
The Right and Aretaics 
Aretaics is the science of virtue which arises from the active 
element in our nature and its ontological underpinning'in the fact of 
want, the fact that we want to do'something as much as we want to feel 
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something. The restlessness or ennui associated with the want of 
something meaningful or purposeful to do is not satisfied by sentient 
pleasures but only by actions that fulfill or achieve the ends set. 
The ultimate end of our active self is-found in those events and 
actions, which we ought to do, must or should do, the practically and 
concretely imperative, the ultimately imperative, the summum faciendum 
(Grote 1876, . 34-36). We, can explore these by looking at what we mean 
or what is entailed when we make moral statements. In everyday life 
Grote considers that 
, 
the question in regard to the conduct of our life', is, not so 
much what shall I do, simply, as what'should I, do, involving a 
presumption, or, if you like to call it so, an a priori belief, 
on our part, which we may variously express, as by saying, that 
there-exists in such a manner as matter of abstract thought can 
exist, a course of life which is adapted for us, which belongs to 
us, which there is reason we should choose:... This ideal course 
of conduct is that which I shall give the name of 
. rightness"(Grote 1876,34). 
The ideal of the good, refers-to, the more general-ideal of 'what 
is ultimately desirable,,, and so answers the even more general 
question, 'what shall I aim at?, The ideal. of the right is firstly 
more specific. It asks, - what particular actions should 
I do? 
Secondly, the right is more imperative, instead'of 'shall I do',. or 
what-'would I find desirable', it refers to, a categorical imperative 
or what 'I should, must or ought to do? Thirdly, as already statedt 
the right is more immediate to us, it arises-earlier in our thinking, 
it is more natural to us to ask the specific and more -concrete 
question, then the more general and abstract questions answered by 
happiness and the good. 
The ideal of right was to the Greeks the Summum Faciendum, that 
which must be done. As Laird noted, Grote placed this ideal above the 
good and all other moral ideals and this put him in the same school as 
Hegel before and Sir David Ross later (Laird 1926 ix-x; 1935 169, 
265,310). The right is the deedworthy, the good is the choiceworthy, 
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the former is the first ideal (1876,35,103). 
Grote is here engaging in some very sophisticated linguistic 
distinctions and definitions that contribute to the building of a 
complete system and scale of moral ideals. This sort of enterprise 
may seem very alien to modern ethics with its concentration on 
everyday usage, meanings and with practical problem solving. But 
Grote did not ignore these later concerns altogether his distinction 
reflect ordinary language usage and its postulates. Grote recognised 
the value of ordinary language analysiS*and-applied it to the notions 
of right and wrong can be seen through- examination of On Glossary 
(1874,162-169). 
He aimed additionally to solve by clarification two of the 
biggest problems areas of nineteenth century ethics. Firstly1the 
question of whether the, moral ideals of right, good, duty, justice, 
virtue, benevolence and others have a moral value independent of their 
felicific consequences. ' SecOndly, to adjudicate between the four great 
philosophical claims for sovereign 'status being made for various 
ideals of the time, happiness claimed by the utilitarians, duty by the 
deontologists the right claimed by the Kantian and Hegelian idealists, 
and self realization, self improvement or self-perfection claimed by 
the emergent English idealists. 
Grote is going to argue for the independent value of the three 
primary ideals of the right, the good and happiness and their 
derivative values, the useful, the natural, the just, fairt virtuous 
and benevolent. But he prioritises, along with Hegel, the cause of 
the right, and its two daughters, duty or objective right, and virtue 
or subjective right. Self 'improvement, 'we-will see. is a universal 
feature of'all moral ideals and actions and is hence a general 
everyday moral imperative. Self realisation is not a specific ideal 
it is the general imperative of all moral and political conduct. The 
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narrow ideal of perfection or love of excellence is a sub-idea of 
virtue and not of major moral significance. 
In his attempt to produce such a scheme of independent morality,. 
William Whewell had incurred John Stuart Mill's wrath. On right, Mill 
noted that Whewell was either trapped in a vicious circle of defining 
0 right' as 'what we must do' and . 
*what we must do' as 'right', or else. 
escapes into the Hobbesist trap of identifying both right and duty in 
terms of the established law of the day (Mill 1965a, 196-199). On 
occasions Grote seems close to the former error defining right as that 
which is 'choiceworthy, fit proper, desirable' and on occasions simply 
as 'what we should do' (1870,134-5; 1876l 35-37). But Grote 
recognised the error involved here and considered that his own 
formulation, avoided both tautology and insignificance (1870,134-135; 
1876,195-196). This was because right in his formulation involved a 
strict prescription that specific duties be. performed and did not rest 
on the general identification of right with being generally good# 
preferable or desirable. Right involved a categorical imperative and 
not an imperative contingent or dependent upon felicific consequences 
(1870,119-133,192-195). Secondly, Grote relates right both to the 
ideal and to its embodiment in everyday and actual practice, language 
and opinion. Right is embodied in custom and guides it; Custom 
contains the results of past practice, language and social controversy 
as well as the result of intellectual speculation and debate. Right 
is the actual and the ideal. 
Referring, as it does to that which is specific, imperative and 
immediate to us, that which is right should be more easily located in 
regard to the'lower moral facts, and so in fact it is to. Grote. Right 
is the general descriptive term used to cover all cases where an 
action is imperative and such occasions are always associated with a 
feeling that the action must be performed or foregone. But right has 
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no necessary connection with feelings of pleasure or happiness in the 
short term at least. Doing the right may involve self sacrifice. 
Secondly right and promotive of happiness are not synonymous as 
utilitarians generally argue. Grote deals with this primarily in the 
Examination but the argument reappears in the Treatise (Grote 1870, 
100-112,135-138,206-207,267-272; 1876 78-80,292). He argues that 
the word right etymologically has no reference to happiness, and on 
the other hand that it carries a different meaning in both general use 
and in dictionaries. The very existence of a vocabulary for 
discussing right is indicative to Grote that it refers to something 
other than 'productive 'of happiness' otherwise the language of the 
former would have collapsed into that of the latter (1870,267-268). 
In the absence of such a collapse how are we to know that right means 
conducive to happiness? Finally on týis theme, Grote argues that 
while it may be morally virtuous to promote happiness it is neither a 
duty nor necessarily right-to promote happiness (1876t83). qertainly 
an acts moral value does not come necessarily from their conduciveness 
to happiness (1870,120). 
A third similar feeling of lower fact is that of conscience. 
Conscience to Grote is not however a faculty, but a feeling of 
sensitiveness that accompanies choices or actions, which have 
reference to social conventions,. religious, moral or legal laws. 
Conscience is both self-condemnation and an 'imagination of the 
judgement of others condemn. ing us' also for the non-performance of 
specific and imperative actions (1870,170). It is 'the idea of it 
law opinion and . right] within us... ' (1876,156-165,338). This we 
will see is very similar to Maurice's theory of I concience which was to 
emerge from these Cambridge lectures of the late 1860's (Maurice 
1872). The feeling then does not make the act right, but the facts to 
which it pertains, i. e. that public opinion, moral convention, or the 
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law demands an action from us (1876,126-127). It is the same with 
the feeling of fairness. ' The feeling is a, useful corollary of the 
choice to do what is right or just. The feeling however does not 
constitute what is right, and what is right may be, so even in the face 
of a feeling of fairness (1876,216-217). 
At the next level we encounter that which, is useful or 
beneficial, This often indicates what has moral value but not 
necessary. When we describe an action as right 'we add something to 
the notion 
., 
of its being useful' (1876,80). We are however on 
stronger, ground when we reach the level of custom, common opinion and 
habit. Grote, as Pucelle notes, sometimes treats custom and opinion 
as a constraint on morality, but more usually as an incarnation of 
ideals. 
'It. 
represents 'a general level and mean of. morality' or 
'corresponds to, a minimuml made to be exceeded' (Pucelle 1955, 
17-86). Lasson Jokes at Grote's expense - of 
his typically English 
attitudes 
'He clearly perceives the inability of. the form of law to express 
morals actions, but as a positive regulator for the guidance of 
particular individuals he returns to the father-confessor, in the 
guise of the*general climate of opinion; and is an authentically 
English manner, 'respectability' in maintained as to be the basis 
of morality. The moral ideals are presented, but he makes no 
attempt to distinguish Right from custom or morality' (Lasson, 
1876,53). 
Lasson is however wrong on this last point. Grote clearly sees 
that , 
'To a certain extent, the notion of right or moral conduct which 
presents itself to the mind is that it is acting as others do, 
according to the, 
-'general 
feeling, custom, or - opinion. (1876,419). 
Etymologically he also notes the two words, the 'accustomed' and the 
'right' 'were very, closely associated'. But as with the above 
instances the fact of a sensation or, feeling (in this case of public 
opinion 
, 
or custom recommending an act) may indicate, but not 
necessarily'determine, that that act is right. In fact Chapter XVIII 
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on the 'Relation of Individual to Custom' is devoted to showing the 
limits to cpstom's ability to chart the right in a detailed fashion. 
The main analysis, of Grote's theory of custom will be left for 
the chapter on Social and Political Theory but here we can note the 
central difference between custom and right. Firstly, Grote notes 
that there are two arguments to be considered, the first that 'custom 
witnesses to rightness' the second, that custom 'constitutes' right. 
Against the first argument is adduced evidence that in most societies, 
and even in Christianity, custom is often rightly treated as 'the 
witness to the wrong, not to the right'. Against the second Grote 
recognizes opposition 'on the ground that morality or rightness is 
just not in the customary or commanded, but in the individual and 
free. Determination from without and self determination from within 
are not the same, but opposite. We make our own rightness: (1876, 
420-421). The feelings appropriate to command arguments are those of 
a belief in an 'independent rightness', the feelings attached to the 
right is a belief in 'ones self', it is an assertion of freedom. In 
both cases the 'conscientious' person is to consider' sacrifice of 
individual judgement of right to custom and opinion, but 
'the person who does not preserve his individuality of thought 
against it is a traitor to it' (1876,423) 
Grote considers that individual judgement and custom need only 
rarely conflict. Right is what we choose whether, customary or not, 
but custom is a useful 'guide'. Anyway 
'The individual asserts his judgement, not in exception or 
Opposition to the general judgement, but independentlY of it'. 
We are now at the gates of Grote's theory of liberty which I shall 
leave to the next Chapter, but we can note here Grote's commitment to 
the idea that, without freedom of choice , even a legally right act 
has no moral value (1876,459). His general principle for balancing 
freedom and custom is, 
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'that each individual will do well to respect general opinion, 
but must not be afraid to differ from it, sometimes, because,. in 
the particular instance, he thinks it wrong, sometimes, because- 
he thinks it interfering and importunate' (1876,431 .... On this issue see Grote 1900,271-283). 
The strength of custom then is only as a guide and not a 
determinant of right. Right is a primary ideal and right acts are 
unconditionally imperative. Obedience to custom, or respectability, 
is only a subsidiary virtue and is only ever conditionally imperative. 
Customs, we shall see have great moral social and historical 
significance to Grote being, (as they were to Burke) the embodiment of 
.a vast result of human intelligence and effort' which 'represents a 
kind of mean temperature of earthly virtue, slowly we hope rising, and 
such as may be raised this gradually by human effort', (1870, 
357-358). Custom and tradition to Grote, like Oakeshott later, is 
neither ignorant nor blind, but full of the embodied wisdom of past 
generations. Attention must be given both to the maintenance and 
defence of 'custom in'so far as it embodies social concepts of right, 
and equally to the reform of custom is so far as it does not. 
Practical and philosophical idealism are metho ds for reforming-and 
upgrading custom and opinion to make them purer embodiments of right. 
Above custom in the scale of moral knowledge is awareness of law 
and the feeling that the law ought to be obeyed. This raises the 
question of whether right involves merely obeying the law? This 
argument was not tackled in depth by Grote and his'analysis can wait 
until later but broadly his answer is similar to that on'custom. Law 
generally is the embodiment of the will, reason and choices of 
individual's in society. I In one reSp'ect it is the abridgement or 
rationalization of custom, to use Oakeshottian and Weberian terms 
respectively, and in another Hegelian sense it is a 'definite and 
complete expression of a public spirit' and' an embodiment of the 
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standards of an age (1876,236,396). In this sense law is 'analogous 
to usage and custom' in respect both to the relationship with right 
and to its general character (1870,139-140). Law hence in its 
attempt to modify the feelings and preferences of citizens, in 
determining the natural conduct between them in regard to rights and 
duties, and in embodying the rightful authority of the citizenry can 
be said to be a witness to right (1876; 88-93,222-239,502-504; 
1870,140-158). 'But Grote, firstly, recognized that the law may not 
for various reasons embody this opinion, wisdom and custom of the age, 
a view expressed not only in the two moral texts but also in the 
essays on Lushington's judgement and the critique of the New 
Educational Code (Grote 1876,213-217; 1862a; 1862b). Secondly, 
Grote recognized that law itself needed to be reformed to reflect 
public' standards of right (1870,42; 1876,228,234). Thirdly, Grote 
considered the Hobbist theories that right was constituted by law and 
the right can be reduced to might, to be largely mistaken (1876s9.0-96l 
420; '1874,162-6; 167-168; 1870, ' 158,339). 
Finally, and crucially, while Grote considered philosophy, like 
law and custom to,, be'an attempt, to fix the content of right, he also 
considered the ideal to be a pale reflection of a higher fact, of a 
universal non historical right and moral law (1876,361-363; 
1901,317). This idea he inherited not only from Plato but also from 
the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth, Clarke and Price, from, 
_the 
Stoics 
and especially Cicero and more recently from William Whewell. It had 
been attacked_by Mill in his famous critique of Whewells moral 
philosophy (Mill 1965a, 196-199). Grote says that it is, a higher 
moral law that codifies right, that it is a product of imagination and 
is ideally as, against actually imperative upon us. (1870,206-207). 
The higher moral law has two -forms, the moral law and God's 'general 
government' of all intelligent beings (1876 221,224 237-239, 
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516-519; 1870,82-83). 
, 
It is known to us through the I common 
. 
feelings of human nature', through conscience which may reflect guilty 
knowledge of the breach of the actual or the ideal law, or through our 
intelligence, reason, volition or thought (1870,3,155; 1876, 
190-193,139-140; 22_2 237; 516-519). The moral law is ideally 
imperative 
'first of all, from a sympathy with it, a perception of the truth 
and meaning ... next, from the feeling how important it 
is that 
there should be general law of human observance... and finally, 
from the dread of punishment. (1870,206-207). 
The moral ideal of right then inhabits a realm between the lower 
facts of feelings, opinions, customs and laws and the higher facts, 
. an ideal or imagination'. The notion of 'the right' or that which 
should be-done, and other kindred notions, belong to, and imply 
0a middle region between fact of observation or experience on the 
one side,, and, poetry, sentimentalism, the, region of beauty and 
sublimity, on the other' (1876,362). 
In another pl. ace Grote writes that 
'If we want to express anything'so abstract as the ideally right, 
we must do it through the medium of some metaphor (as it is 
frequently called) or, more properly, through the medium of 
something different from it, nearer to us, and less' abstract' 
(1876,153). 
We have seen above that the device chosen was the analogy of the 
right with the true, the point being that neither may yet be known 
absolutely, but that the assumption or belief that some absolute 
standards do exist or can be reached is a presupposition of our life, 
our thought and our activity. But there is no logical reason 'to 
hinder its attainment' (1876,387). Grote considered that the very 
notion of rightness 'suggest to us one thing right as to be done, as 
against wrong, or not to be done... ' but in practice the matter of 
recognition and choice is complicated and hence 
'Rightness and goodness of action is not a thing which can be 
decided absolutely' and hence it is 
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'its being under the circumstances the best, that makes it the 
absolutely-right for the doer at that time' (1876,122-123). 
Short of Platonic knowledge of the ideas of good and right, 
Grote, like Aristotle hovered between advocating the best possible and 
the best practical as the everyday guide to public virtue. 
IV 
The Good 
In the Examination of 1863, Grote made a clear distinction 
between two kinds of moral theory, 'the morality of duty and 
rightness' and 'the morality of consequences' (1870,192-193). The 
ideal of the good, or the summum bonum is the ultimate ideal of 
consequential morality, while the right is the ultimate ideal of the 
morality of duty or aretaics. But it is happiness, ' the particular, 
one sided and derivative ideal, which is usually treated as the ideal 
par excellence of consequential morality as expressed in the theory of 
utilitarianism. To facilitate the detachment of the good from the 
eI udaemonic, Grote treats it is an ontological ideal rather then an 
epistemological ideal, one based upon our existential view of human 
nature. Whiie this sensive side of our nature is realised in the 
ideal of happiness, and the active side in right, good realizes and 
satisfies our real being as signified by our real wants (1876,22-25). 
This can be represented in a simple diagram. 
Happiness Good Right 
Sensitivity 
(f eeling) 
ActivitY 
(acting) 
Want 
(wantihg) 
Fig 1: The Primary Ideals 
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The strategy here seems to be like that of a prime minister 
elevating a difficult colleague to the upper chamber of parliament 
where he can do less harm,. so leaving the issues and forces less 
muddied and confused. The real battle between the two moralities of 
the day, intuitionism and utilitariarism was between the proponents of 
right and happiness as the ultimate ideals. The, notion of the good 
was a vague and troublesome colleague which challenged occasionally 
for allegiance, which confused adherents of both parties and which 
offered little in, the way of either philosophical or practical help. 
To elevate the good above right and happiness, to the status of 
titular monarch, to the ephemeral status of the end of all life, the 
reason of being', left the 'right, like the prime minister as 
sovereign. However the analogy is not quite right for Grote's 
overriding aim was not victory, for intuitionists and independent 
morality over their rivals but the reconciliation of the conflict 
through the eclectic procedure of unity into a coherent whole, the 
partial truths, of each__system. The good, as an ideal, is elevated not 
to be exiled but to allow for a peaceful reconciliation or 
accommodation below as, it were a Constitutional balance between 
Monarch, Prime Minister and Parliament. As Grote argues 
'There is no kind of necessary contradiction between the morality 
of consequences ... and even the highest and most 
intuitive 
doctrine of an absolute distinction between right and wrong. In 
fact, for a true morality we want the doctrine of consequences, 
considered in this light, to aid us against arbitrary 
distinctions between right 'and wrong ... 
* (1876,79-80). 
The 'good' is I the most elevated of ideals to Grote, but takes a 
secondary role to 'right' in everyday life because it is less specific 
and concrete and less immediately imperative. Ultimately what we want 
is 'what should be', 'what is choiceworthy', and 'desirable* (1876, 
34-35,103,122-3,182-3 As Grote puts it, and De Burgh and Laird 
agree, the good is the 'to be won' not 'the to be done', it may be the 
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ultimate ideal but not the immediately and practically imperative 
(1876,83; De Burgh 1938,44-45; Laird 1926 ix-x; 1935,169,265, 
310). The good is what it is 'well should be' rather than what 'must 
be' or 'is' (1901,296-299). To call something good is of course to 
recommend or prescribe the act or thing or feeling but'not to insist 
that it is a categorical imperative, Similarly to say something is 
good is to say that it is desirable in the sense of capable of, worthy 
of or even ought to be desired. But to say something is right or is a 
duty is to say much more, it is. to. imply that it ought to be done and 
vice versa. 
*Hence we have no buSines's" to say, that because a thing is 
desirable for us, therefore it is what we ought to do' (1876, 
82). 
Finally, with right, and its sub-ideal of duty we find that we are 
less free in our choices, we are in fact bound to some extent to do 
something for some other person or people. When right says we 
ought' or 'should' do something duty says we 'must' (1876,83-85). 
The use of good only advises us it does not categorically prescribe. 
Starting from the Aristotelian theory of teleology, the good is 
the ultimate telos or purposes of life. The starting point, the sign 
and instigator of the good is want. Want, if we remember, is a fact 
of our being. It is a sign of incompleteness of being and a call for 
something as yet non existent to come into being. Man as an active 
creature has powers, as a sensive creature he has feelings of want and 
satisfaction of want, but want itself is a 'call'for the exercise of 
their powers' to human beings. It is- man .s general nature as 
wanting' - which suggests the ideal of 'perfect realization and 
fulfillment of our being, the summum bonum', or the good (1876,24). 
The good is simply the telos of all life, as'Aristotle described it, 
and the 'reason for being' as Plato had summized. It has general and 
not particular application (Sidgwick 1907,3-4,105-1061 109-113). 
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That the 'good' and 'want' are logically and conceptually related 
has more recently been affirmed by Elizabeth Anscombe, using the 
analogy of the relationship between truth and judgement with good and 
want. Her conclusion is that 
'Goodness is ascribed to wanting in virtue of the goodness (not 
the actualisation) of what is wanted, whereas truth is ascribed 
immediately to judgements, and in virtue of what actually is the 
case. But again, the notion of 'good' that has to be introduced 
into an account of wanting is not that of what is really good but 
of what the agent conceives to be good; what the agent wants 
would have to be characterisable as good by him, if we may 
suppose him not to be impeded inarticulateness' (Anscombe 1963, 
76). For elaboration see (Hudson 1970,317-320). 
But little note was taken at the time or since of Grote's 
suggestive analysis. Both Thomas Hill Green and Bernard Bosanquet use 
the want and good hypothesis in later works but Grote's own work in 
this area seem to have had little-pronounced influence (Green 1884, 
90-119, Bosanquet 1918,46-63). 
Proceeding in Platonic language the ideal of good is the moral 
equivalent of the intellectual ideal of 'seeing things as they are' or 
seeing reality' or- 'real being' (1876,66). Using Platonic 
assumptions of there being a reason for everything in the world, Grote 
concurs that 
'the good is the reason of being, that which, in , -the contemplation of being, we look for, that to which we look 
through being, that which being suggests.: to us... ' (1876,66). 
The good is the end of reasonable action, and good is the reason for 
being,, good presumes, as it did for the Greeks a reason in the world 
and a unity (Nettleship 1963,221-229). As with right there is an 
analogy of good with truth, or at least that one side of truth which 
presumes an objective universal standard of reality. 
As with right the good is rarely known clearly- and absolutely. 
Certainly it cannot be explained in terms of or reduced to another 
ideal and as we shall see later, certainly -not happiness 
(1870, 
119-122). As good is the Supreme ideal, it is sensible to speak of 
23 
pleasure, happiness, honour, generosity, usefulness, justice and even 
right as good; but not valuable because good, -and not good because 
productive of happiness, justice or honour (1870,121; Bosanquet 
1918,50-51). Supremacy to Grote does not entail sovereignty, the 
value of secondary ideals are not derived from the superior ideals. 
The good is rather the first ideal amongst equals. Experience cannot 
help us define the good for as Grote summarizes 'experience may tell 
us what man' desires, ' but no 'possible experience can tell us what 
goodness is, or as I have expressed it, what man should do' (1870, 
84). Nor is, good revealed to us by divine revelation or simple a 
priori intuition, though Grote adheres to the belief that 'God is 
Good' and considers good like all other moral ideals to have value 
independent of felicific consequences (1870,79-81). The Good is 
known as are all ideals through the ordinary knowing process discussed 
in'chapter five above. Its character, shape and content emerge by a 
process of distinction as reflective mind distinguishes and clarifies 
the confused world of immediate sensory and conscious experiences. 
Climbing the scaled knowledge of the good requires an application of 
the'imagination, the rational scrutiny of a priori assumptions or 
postulates of existing conclusions and practices, an attempt to make 
all this coherent in a final stage of judgement and theorising and of 
checking this knowledge of the ideals and higher facts against the 
lower facts of our sensations and feelings the realities of the social 
world and the relational facts of our existence. Knowledge of the 
good, like all moral knowledge is an intellectual voyage of discovery. 
One way to recognize a good action to Grote is that it appears 
fit, choiceworthy or proper. This may seem to attach goodness to acts 
and not to actors at the first sight but not on closer examination. 
The action that is fit or proper for us is one that suits or fits the 
facts of the situation, our social positionj and our intellectual 
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assessment of what this entails. As we shall see in the next chapter 
this is built upon a sound relational theory of morality and society 
derived from Henry Maine and later to gain prominence in the work of 
F. H. Bradley. Another helpful guide is to look at the issue of 
whether actions are for the self or others. Grote is clear and 
largely consistent here arguing against Bentham and Sidgwick that the 
only actions of moral concern are for others. His moral position is 
one of unremitting support for moral altruism, self realization and 
the ethics of self sacrifice. 
'Broadly, setting aside the very large mass of action in life 
which must, from the nature of things, be devoted to the care of 
ourselves, and which I have said, we may call of no mordl 
account, action beyond this may be considered good if for the 
benefit of others; not good if for our own beneftt when it might 
be for theirs; not good if for the injury of others; good or 
meritorious if for our own loss,, rather than theirs' (1876,242) 
It will be seen that action for the self that does not detract 
from action for others may be moral if it promotes moral self 
realization or self-perfection, and may be moral where apparently 
selfish actions, such seeking as self advancement at work, can be 
shown to have rewards for a wider group of others, as might -be the 
case when, self help relieves others of the burden of looking after the 
actor. In true Victorian fashion he writes 
'It is better to labour himself, which does them good toot than 
to cease from labouring. The common life is thus the better for 
the self-interested industry and talent which makes the fortune 
of individuals' (1876,336). 
In both cases society at large are moral gainers from the self 
orientated actsl the acts have other regarding elements that make then 
moral. Pure self sacrifice or moralistic self denial Grote like Hume 
sees as amoral (1876,312-3). 
Some arguments, very typical of later English idealist moral and 
political philosophy, emerge in this context. Firstly., Grote argues 
that the self of significance in moral life is not an individual or 
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private self but a social self. As we have seen this results from 
shared experience, shared activity and a shared identity premised upon 
participation in a common language. man we have seen is from the 
first a social being 'he lives from the first in community, and has in 
reality no independence in his happiness... '. Even self subsistence 
requires that we secure 'a place -in the general system of mutual 
help'. Hence 
'We may say that the good of human life is the purpose or end of 
human action; but we must not interpret this to mean, that the 
good of his own life is the purpose or end of the action of the 
individual. 
, 
Life is lived by man in conjunction: society is a 
part of human nature. Rational personality makes each individual 
independent, so far as self-determination and responisbility go; 
but want and the power of mutual help bind them together: and 
answering to this objective fact, is the subjective fact of 
sympathy' (1876,335). 
After noting the debilitatory effect to individuals, and society 
in promoting the good arising from the fact that, 
'there is a vast amount of wealth and power, and a vast amount of 
want and need over against them: and these two sides do not as 
they should correspond and fit together... ' 
Grote gets to the central points. ' The reason or logic Of society's 
organization should be to meet and satisfy all human wants, from the 
physical to the moral, and to this'effect, 
*Thýe essence of morality consists to a great extent, in our being 
able, in such of our actions as can be free, to take it from 
ourselves and to give it to others' (1876,337). 
There are then four moral duties that can 'and do lead to the 
promotion of the morally good, or common good, firstly, to take care of 
our selves, secondly, to take care and develop our moral selves, 
thirdly, to do no wrong and finally 'the indefinite and higher one to 
do all the good that we can'. I All, includi , ng the first two, are 
however duties to others and not the self. 
'Care for ourselves to a certain extent is nec ssary for being e 
able to do anything for others. Want of care for ourselves is 
simply laying upon others the burden for caring for us. Care for 
ourselves or what is apparently so, is often, as we have seen, 
26 
indirectly a care and provision for others. But care for 
ourselves to the prejudice of care for others is selfishnesp, one 
great root, as we have seen, of immorality and evil' (1876,338). 
On the great social issue of the day, the morality or not of 
laissez faire capitalist development, Grote then seems decided in 
favour of moral reformism. In so far as the motivations and effects 
are selfish, capitalism is an, evi. l. In so far as they are altruistic, 
in so far as the. 
_motives and practices really serve 
to promote the 
well being and moral development of others, capitalism is a moral 
good, That the economic system fails to match wealth and power to 
obvious human want and, need is a moral scandal and an economic 
failure, a theme to which we will return in the next chapter. Grote's 
reformism however stops, as does Green's, at the point where some 
believed that man could be made good by public action, such as by law 
or education. -Grote's view is that good is a feature of actions, and 
the motives or habits that give rise to action are not the sole source 
of the goodness concerned, A good action may be performed without a 
moral motive or even with a-less than virtuous motive (1876,456-463). 
The goodness of motives and, habits are questions-of virtue and 
character-respectively. But as regards. to good, _ 
-'The real reason for doing them is - 
first, and foremost objective, 
on their own account, not subjective, on account of any effect 
they may have on us' (1876,458). 
Compulsion, whether by law or education,, fails to be moral 
however not because the acts may be performed for the wrong motive, a 
feature of both Kantian. and Greenian ethics, but because the choices 
were not free and gave no scope for the exercise of moral judgement 
and the developmenE of moral excellence, perfection, or self 
realization (1876,121-123). This takes us back to Grote's theory of 
education as facilitating the self development of intellectual 
potential. He writes 
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'It is not our nature to be virtuous, it is our nature to learn 
virtue; and to learn virtue rather than vice, in the same way in 
which (though in fact sight itself is a matter of learning just 
as virtue is) it is our nature to learn to see things rightly, 
rather than wrongly and different from what they' are' (18761 
460). 
Good. Perfection and Self Realization 
At this point we may take upa point raised by Carritt in his 
famous book The Theory of Morals (Carritt 1928,44-48). Carritt was 
one of a number of philosophers in the first three decades 'of the 
twentieth century whose preference for epistemological realism and 
intuitionism led*then to examine and analyze Grote's Treatise on the 
Moral Ideals, and the Exploratio Philosophica. The group included 
apart from Carrittg John Laird, Samuel Alexander, W. G. De Burgh, C. D. 
Broad, Roy Sellars and George Davies Hicks (Laird 1926, IX-X; 1935, 
169,268,310; Alexander, 1906,157-168,218,244; De Burgh 1938, 
44-45,70,54 1927,441 227; Broad 1930,12; 1952,54; Sellers 
1920,257-259; Hicks 1938,, 124). The attraction was, apart-from 
Grote's general independence from the schools of philosophy of the 
day, a general acceptance, or belief in an, objective external world of 
things and values, that could, be known by some cognitive process. But 
the group generally ignores Grote's idealist epistemology and ontology 
in which the objective world is one of objective mind and knowing is a 
process of human mind meeting the mind embodied, in the objective 
world. 
Laird-and De Burgh both congratulate Grote for his clear 
distinctions between the right, the good, the optimific, and the 
obligatory, and his argument, for the independent and objectively moral 
status of the moral ideals. Carritt argues generally that while in 
the Treatise 
'The manner is dry, the analysis of. fundamental ideas is 
admirably searching'. 
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Carritt objects to two arguments he claims to find in the Treatise. 
Firstly, that Grote advocates as the ultimate good the pursuit of the 
perfection of self or others, and secondly, that he treats the 
rightness- and goodness of actions as completely independent of 
consequences good simply for their self sacrifice or for self 
reduction (Carritt 1928,44-46; 53-56). The second argument has 
already been dealt with. Grote does often express the claim that 
morality is to do with self sacrifice, but he considered self 
sacrifice to be good only when it promoted and was conducive to the 
common good (Sidgwick also rejects perfection as the ideal, 1907, 
7-11,492-495). 
Consequences as well as motives and obedience to rules have moral 
value. Next, the passage quoted by Carritt which suggests that an 
action without useful consequences could still be morally right or 
good needs to be qualified by the context. Grote is not saying that 
consequences of acts ire morally neutral or irrelevant, and he 
specifically denies this point on several occasions. His point is 
that while consequences may on occasions be relevant and actions 
should in general be useful the goodness that arises from doing ones 
duty, being just, generous or whatever are always of value. 
Consequences alone are not the determinants of moral value and they 
must take their place as a criteria of moral value alongside the 
rightness, goodness, dutifulness, justness and whatever of actions 
(1870,74-76,121-122 1876,1 68-81. ). In the language of aretaics and 
eudaemonics he writes that moral action 'should be done' firstly, and 
secondly be 'useful'. Usefulness covers only a 'portion' of what is 
morally right or good (1870,119-125). Grote only speaks of the value 
of non-felicific activity in purely hypothetical terms and with the 
admission that his hypothesis is an abstraction (Grote 1870,110-111). 
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To the major point the simple reply is that while Grote does 
treat the pursuit of perfection, self cultivation, or moral 
excellence, as he calls it, as a worthy moral activity and ideal, this 
is only a secondary moral ideal derivative from the right (1876 341, 
356; 1870,113). Only in the most general sense as a quality of 
'living well' is it part of the ultimate ideal (Grote 1870,109-113). 
In addition he does not, as we have seen already, condone moral 
meddling in the lives of others to promote their perfection as 
suggested by Carritt, and in one place particularly condemns the aims 
and means of this practice (1876,426-4). In the same chapter he 
reiterates the point that while morality involves social self 
development, thatý this is only 'exceptionally, the business of life' 
and certainly not a justification for regular social interference 
(1876,428-432). 
In addi-tion in the chapter devoted to the intellectual elements 
of virtue, 
1 
Grote specifically notes that there are two forms to the 
moral principle of benevolence, a sense of duty and a love of 
excellence. The latter' is only one part of benevolencet and 
benevolence only one aspect of moral rightness and goodnesst the 
motivational or subjective element, which takes second place to 
, objective considerations 
(1876,71,139-144,148-161). Finally Grote 
could as easily be described as a deontologist as a perfectionist. On 
numerous occasions Grote considers moral life in terms of obeying the 
law, love of and doing ones duty (objective) and the love of and 
striving for excellence or virtue (1876,105,340). The latter is 
only the most abstract of the three moral maxims all of which are 
related and related to right and good. Grote's answer to Carritt can 
be found in a lengthy quotations from the Examination 
'A more and exclusive morality of utility may thust it appears to 
me, exist with 'just the same degree of truth and advantages as a 
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more and exclusive morality of self-command, self-cultivation, and 
generosity... if either claims to occupy the whole field, and to 
represent the whole fact as to human morality, it is so far false 
and wrong' (1870,122-123). 
Grote did however set great store by the notion of social self 
realization or as he called it self improvement, and to moral 
excellence and progress, and he devoted chapters to this in both the 
Treatise and the Examination. At a general level Grote wished to 
challenge the positivist and utilitarian theorist's claims to be the 
I philosophy of progress', and to explain that the idealist element in 
all philosophies, and idealism in particular, make the best claim for 
this, title. While his theory of progress can be left for discussion 
until chapter nine his general idea of moral progress may help here. 
Two ideas 
-of progress are rejected 
by Grote. First the idea implicit 
in evolutionary theory of the ZOOCOSM the idea of a universal 
progress of nature, and the simple positivist historical idea of an 
inevitable progress of civilization accompanying the progress of 
scientific knowledge (*1865, *xvii; 1870,173,, 279ý-316,359-360; 1901# 
231). 
In their place Grote provides a moral and historical theory of 
progress through self improvement. In this, progress is not 
naturally, divinely or historically determined, neither inevitable nor 
impossible. Progress, by which he means, the, intellectual, moral and 
economic improvement of man, if it exists at all 'does not come of 
itself* but 'is the result of human effort'. Man makes efforts after 
his ideals and to satisfy wants and in so doing. may succeed in 
producing his own improvement and 'will not improve unless he does' 
(1870,284). Grote in fact, as we shall see, was not optimistic about 
the realities or prospects of human progress, prefering to muse over 
the 'sort of general level to which man in society attains' (1876, 
398). Science, and material progress represent no mark nor guarantee 
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of real progress, and human elevation in some areas has been matched 
by descent to barbarism in others (1870,334-335; 1876,496-499). 
But still Grote did hold in a typically idealist fashion that the 
I work and business of the collective human race, it seems to me, 
is self improvement; for the sake of the glory of God, if we 
take a religious view, for its own sake, if we do not' (1870, 
351) 
and this point is echoed in the Treatise (1876,355-357). But is self 
improvement or perfection an independent ideal? The pursuit of 
excellence cr honour most certainly is, according to Grote, but self 
improvement or perfection is treated rather as a characteristic 
feature attaching to the pursuit and achievement of the moral ideals 
as a whole and not a separate ideal 
'What then is improvement? The utilitarian answers that it is 
-increase 
in human happiness, and therefore utilitarianism is the 
true morality of progress and affords the only real test of 
progress. But important as it is the utilitarian consideration 
of conduciveness to happiness, it'is not the only one which we 
must take into account. Man is in a better state (by which I 
mean a state more ideally to be desired for him), if he is 
happier, for one thing; but besides this, if he- desires worthy 
objects and more worthilly employs his powers, if he is more 
faithful, more fa*lr, more mindful of services rendered him, more 
kind and more loving' (1870,316). 
In general then, Carritt's claims aboutthe general character of 
Grote's philosophy, as one of moral perfectionism, seem misjudged, and 
if he is, like Green a proponent of social self realization, it is 
like Green, within the context of the realization of all the ideals of 
moral life, and especially the right and the good. In addition we may 
remember that this talk of want and the good, about self development 
and self realization, want,, purposes and flourishing ' re-emerged 
several decades later (Hudson 1970,317-320; Warnock 1967,52-70). 
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V 
The Sub-Ideals 
We may now look at the scheme for the sub-ideals of morality, but 
saving detailed discussions of both duty, justice and equality for the 
next chapter on social and political theory. 
Very simply each of the primary ideals discussed above have, 
according to Grote, some related sub-ideals. Each sub-ideal is a 
concept that-is considered by human beings to embrace a crucial aspect 
of their everyday lives and practices - the lower facts, and which 
they assume in their actions and practices to have at least some 
reason, purpose or objective quality - some reference to the higher 
facts. The sub ideals are elements of the primary ideal characterized 
by or mixed with some fundamental feeling, fact of life or some 
practice or institution in society. The number of possible 
sub-ideals, Grote claims, which people 
may form as to the-conduct of their life is of course endless' 
(1876l 37). 
But he charts the next tier of major ideals - all, of which are nearer 
to the lower psychological, social and historical facts. 
In simple order of appearance above, happiness the third ideal 
has one major sub ideal, the pleasurable, the ideal of ethical 
hedonists as against utilitarians. The right or the-primary ideal has 
as-its sub-ideals, subjective virtue, objective duty and justice 
including fairness (1870,103-106; 1876,37,85,339,342,439). 
Virtue in turn has as sub-ideals, conscientiousness or love of duty, 
perfection or love of excellence, and others like generosity and 
benevolence (1870,110-113; 1876 37-39l 341). Duty inAts turn has 
one even more concrete versions or sub ideal, the natural ideal, the 
belief that there are some universal actions and feelings appropriate 
to the nature' of all human beings . or all natural life (1876,36). 
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Finally the second ideal in term of morals, but the first in terms of 
logic, the good or the summum bonum, has only one major sub-ideal. 
specified, the useful with its sub versions of useful. to self and 
useful to others (1876,68-69,103,106). This can be represented by 
.a 
diagram. 
Happiness Good Right 
Pleasure Useful Virtue Justice Duty 
Benevolence Generosity Per ection Conscienciousness Natural 
Sentient Want Active 
Fig II: Grote's Scheme of the Moral Ideals 
Pleasure as such is a limited ideal that appeals because of our close 
proximity to the every day sensations of pleasure or pain experienced 
in life. As an ideal however it is formulated as a maxim that we 
ought to pursue pleasure and we ought to avoid pAin, with the egoistic 
and altruistic versions. As we shall see Grote considered this 
primary ideal of hedonism to have few practical or philosophical 
merits. 
Virtue is the subjective ideal of the right and is given massive 
coverage in both the Treatise and the Examination, being analyzed with 
a skill and dexterity lost to modern participants in the conversation 
of moral philosophy (1876,20). Virtue differs from duty in terms of 
subjectivity, its having more freedom and its being higher in terms of 
worthiness because there is an 
. outgoing of it beyond what moral necessity, ... prompts; 
a free 
moral resolution to apply the extended reason and view,... to the 
benefits of others' (Grote 1870,99: see also 1876,339). 
Indeed in the Examination Grote treats this mixture of freedom and the 
intention of acting for the happiness of others as the essential 
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features explaining the moral value of virtue. 'The very idea of 
virtue, (or say philanthropy) the very mention of the word, implies a 
supposition of acting for the happiness of others .... It 
is a freely 
chosen 'moral overflow of our nature' and 'It is just because, as many 
would tell us, no man can be required to act otherwise than for his 
own happiness, that it is virtue to do so' (Grote 1870,99). 
As a result of this freedom of choice on virtue, there is a 
prerequisite for rational decision making, for rational 
self-government in the moral actor, and for a capaci*ty to exercise the 
will (1870,111). Alongside freedom the other key characteristic of 
virtue is its upward tendency or 'aspiringness', and hence the usual 
metaphor that is applied to virtue is high or low (18701 111-114; 
1876,343-345,358-359). But this is only a vague notion and 
generally whereas the performance of duty may be more or less measured 
by the gap between a valid claim and an action, virtue is to be judged 
above by 
. 
'purpose, the principle and the motive' (1870,99-100). No 
real measure is possible, for if with virtue there are no absolute 
requirements, no particular imperatives or rules of conduct demanded, 
as there is with duty, there can be no calculation of the level of 
virtue reached. As Grote so eloquently puts it, after speaking of the 
freedom and self sacrifice marked by virtue, 
'And to speak of rules and measures of anything which has this 
origin seems absurd. The frame of mind which would lead to the 
consideration how has it ought to go, would, one would think, 
have precluded the existence of it at all' (Grote 1870,99) 
So while right and duty are specific, particular, imperative and hence 
measurable in terms of performance and achievement, virtue is non 
specific, general, superogatory and not measurable either by fixed 
standards or ideas of performance. 
But in the Treatise Grote asks us to accept that virtue has an 
I understood meaning, that virtue is a fact in the world, that 
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some men practise it, and others understand the practice: I 
shall consider what, as a matter of fact, men do think or feel 
about this other fact, virtue' (197G 104-105) 
Then, as with duty, justice and other ideals he starts with the 
experiental facts, works upwards through feelings, dispositions, 
thoughts and public practices towards the ideal and then onwards to 
the ontological reality. The study here he calls 'experimental or 
observational aretaics. The three experiences , senses or feelings 
that first acquaint us with virtue are, a feeling of benevolence, a 
sense of duty and a love of excellence. Indeed he writes 
'Virtue is benevolence more or less stimulated by and regulated 
by the accompanying senses of duty and love of excellence'. 
These three senses however are active, they indicate purpose or 
ideals and higher facts. In addition they involve a Kantian type 
concern to put oneself in the position of others and vice versa. The 
purpose is the good of others, the only true moral purpose. The key 
consideration is to put oneself in the position of others (1876,105). 
Any consideration other than the good of others is amoral (1870, 
100-101; 1876,105,116,135,204-206). Self-regarding action to 
Grote is morally neutral, unless it has the effect of relieving others 
of pain or promoting their well being. Incidentally at this point 
Grote introduces an old Socratic argument that troubled Leslie 
Stephen, F. H. Bradley and A. Bain later, that man by nature has no 
ill will, he can never knowlingly do wrong. This is the reverse side 
of the claim to a universal attribution of good-will or benevolence to 
all human beings (1876,106-107,187,240-257,261,314,459-461; 
Bradley 1883,415, Bain 1883,60-65,562). The claim amounts to the 
rather tautological logical argument that apparent ill-will is a 
mistaken good-will, so envy is mistaken admiration for another mixed 
with a personal feeling of personal abhorrence or failure. 
Misabsorbed or mishandled want may lead to envy and jealousy and so on 
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(112-113). The argument applied to history had been rejected by 
Grote's friend Fenton Hort. in 1856. 
'While the aweful fact of sin is staring you in the face you 
cannot weave theorise for the future that will hold water, except 
by the German dodge of reforming sin into a less kind of 
necessary good, which is the devil' (Hort, 1896,326). 
Grote was later to get support from Bradley and Bosanquet on the 
case for the absence of pure malevolence in human nature, they 
defended him from Bain's evidence for pure ill will concerning satire, 
teasing and voyeurism surrounding punishment. Individuals he argues, 
may suffer pleasure or pain from doing or watching malevolent actions, 
and hence malevolence is as natural as benevolence to mankind 
(Basanquet 1918,88-125). Bradley expresses his support for the 
I excellent remarks made by Mr Stephen and Professor Grate,... ' and 
argues in their support that humans have natural empathy with the pain 
of others and a similar 'feeling of wrong'. Wrong doing arises, 
Bradley conceives, either from misidentification of what is right, or 
from a desire to promote justice following'reforms to the logic of 
comedy and voyeurism. Bradley, the famed cat hunter of oxford, goes 
so far as to concede that even a cat cannot be credited with 
Ia knowledge of the pain it inflicts, or with the idea of 
prolonging life to lengthen torture. Add the desire for play to 
the appetite for slaughter, and all is explained' (Bradley 1883, 
415-416). 
This capacity for virtuous action, and incapacity for malevolence 
reflects both Grote's Christian belief in the rightness and innate 
moral order of the universe and his basic theory of human nature and 
ontology that considers mans want to indicate and to be satisfied only 
in the morally good or right. In fact all virtuous feeling though 
indicating right, are only subjective 'signs' of what is objectively 
right independent of t hese suggestions (Grote 1876,241,458). 
Subjective virtuous feelings are not by themselves the central concern 
of ethics 
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'Virtues, vices, feelings, dispositions, habits, all these are 
abstractions; men or character, ie men as concerns their moral 
beings, are the realities which in ethics we have to do with' 
(Grote 1876,474). 
Similarly Grote objects to the idea that virtue is merely a 
product of education and gets its value from its wide public 
acceptance and functional attributes. To argue the former is 
equivalent to considering knowledge to be a chance accident of sense 
data experience, and truth to be a product of relative experience 
(Grote 1870,208-209,1876). Virtue is learnt but it is not this 
which gives it its meaning and value (1876,459-463,471). To argue 
the latter is to mistake a valuable by product of moral activity for 
its real purpose. Still at the level of sentiments or feelings Grote 
goes further and warns us elsewhere about the mistake of 
misassociating moral dispositions with moral truths. This error, that 
led to the school of 'Moral Sense, and Moral Sentiments' philosophy 
associated with Butler, distracted moral philosophy from the 
explanation of moral reality and moral knowledge proper (1870,195, 
199-206,261-264; 1876,118-120,140-142,163-164,343-345). 
Virtuous moral feeling, Grote argues, can be divided into two 
sorts, those that are natural or permanent, and those that are 
occasional (1876,110-114). The latter depend on the relationship we 
have with others, either by circumstance or position. 
'All human kindly affection is discriminative, that is it 
attaches itself to some individuals in distinction from others' 
(1876,131). 
There may be general natural feelings but virtues are always 
particular to a practice (1876,131-134). Social relational facts we 
see here affect our subjective moral dispositions, later we shall see 
how crucial they are in indicating and determining the moral ideals 
and facts of life. But now we can see that the moral feelings and 
sentiments imply higher social facts, those of relationship which in 
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turn indicate to us the nature and content of our duties (Grote 1870, 
145; 1876,110,114). A contemporary defence of this identification 
of virtue with a social practice see (MacIntyre 1981,174-181; 
Bernstein 1986,121-127). 
The moral value of virtuous activity is judged, as I've said, by 
several criteria according to Grote, by 
purposes, the principle, and the motiveo (Grote 1870,99). 
The same point that there is a plurality of sources of moral value 
appears later in the same book (1870,119-122). As we shall see later 
he was utterly opposed to the reduction of virtue to happiness and 
considered Mill to be in a state of considerable confusion when he 
tried to argue that the value of virtue lay in its being both a 
I means' to happiness and as an end in itself (Mill 1910,33-35, Grote 
1870,125-128). Mill fares no better with duty, justice or any other 
moral ideals (Grote 1870,105-108). As the effect or outcome is of 
secondary importance to Grote then measurement of virtue is 
technically impossible. Again where purpose is of moral consideration 
it must cover the well being of others, either in the form of 
usefulness or generosity (1876,116). The principles of virtue are 
again numerous, and Grote deals with several, concentrating or those 
of freedom, self control, aspiringness and transcendence of happines 
(1876 135-165,340,342-345,358-359). But three dominate and infact 
become almost sub-ideals of virtue, conscientiousness, indicated by 
conscience; perfectionism or love of excellence; and dutifulness or 
love of duty (1876,37-39,103,139-165; 1870 113). These ideals we 
shall look at shortly, only noting here that they are not good in 
themselves but only in relation to purposes and the realization of 
what is entailed in moral relationships and what is objectively right. 
Finally on virtue Grote compares his position to that of 
Aristotle (1876,448-449) 459); Plato, the stoics and the Medieval 
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Church (123-125), Hobbes (459), and Butler (140,163). Tn practice he 
decries tables of virtues in favour of a hoped for reconciliation of 
the dictates of reason, feeling and objective right, in the form of 
the general 'standard of our country and age' (Grote 1876,395). 
(Though a table can be found of vices (1876,244-257)). History to 
Grote is a great distiller of right and virtue. Like Burke, for Grote 
time is a test, the base level of customary sediment contains great 
wisdom and virtue, which after generations becomes the sea-level, the 
high plateau and even the mountainous goals of virtue and right. 
Hence one metaphor used is that virtue is a high plateau of 
achievement rather than the seashore of life (1876,400), but in 
another he considers it to be a 'mean level' (1876,396). Another 
scale is introduced which recommends as a base level of virtue, 'doing 
one .s duty'; as a mean, 'conforming to the social standard of our 
country and age'; and a higher level of exemplary and superogatory 
action. But he. concludes that 
I with almost all, respect for the ordinary level of virtue is the 
precondition of higher virtue: our highest mountains will rise 
from a high table-land, not from a low sea-shore' (1876,400). 
We must return to this idea of everyday customary standards and 
practices as a guide to right in the next chapter. 
The sub ideals of virtue, conscientiousness, or love of duty and 
love of excellence need not be given an extended examination. But on 
the first it should be noted that Grote held conscience to be the 
general name given to the capacity for being conscientious. 
Conscience is the idea of right as embodied in law and duty, within 
us (1876,193,338). Conscience is nota unique God-given faculty nor 
simply a product of education and socialization, but is a feeling in 
which the social moral self reminds itself of its duty or what is 
worthy or expected. Conscience is a kind of 'moral memory' but the 
content is a reflection again of our society, its practices and 
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ideals, especially its legal and moral laws (1876,140,164,188-193; 
1870,170). Conscience is only an indicator of right and should not 
be followed slavishly. It is part of our moral imagination in which 
we try in a quasi legal sense, alternative dispositions and potential 
actions. 
Love of excellence is again valuable as a disposition but is not 
a good in itself, and for this reason Carritt's suggestion that Grote, 
advocates moral perfectionism is mistaken (Carritt, 1928 vii, 46, ). 
Excellence has little value if not attributed to performance of a 
service to others and for the purpose of realizing right. Like Hume, 
Grote had no time for the monkish, the priggish, or the purely 
aesthetic life, out of step with the social context. Grote's chapter 
on the 'Genesis of Virtue: Its Intellectual Elements, Principle' 
links conscientiousness and excellence together with a discussion of 
man's 'sociality', the reality of his co-sentience', his 
co-activity', and above all his 'co-intelligence' (Grote 1876, 
148-150). Co-agreement in moral judgements he likens to that in 
purely cognitive judgements between observers that, for instance, a 
tree is green. Through joining subject! sjudgements or thinking 
rightly, we try to ascertain what is right or is there, right 
thinking. The active equivalent is acting rightly in an attempt to 
realize the ideal of right activity in a social context. This is 
perfectionism (1876,148). Courage and honour are two examples of 
this love of excellence and desire for perfection. Grote is anxious 
to look both ways, firstly, to uphold their value and novelty, and 
secondly, to warn of their dangers and possible corruptions arising 
from the rivalry they engender. In the end love of emMence demands 
a socially informed self respect, which turns into rules of conduct we 
freely impose upon ourselves (1876,158-162). 
The other sub-ideals of right, justice and duty I shall leave for 
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chapter nine on social and political theory. Both however lie between 
the lower facts, the feeling and dispositions of fairness and 
obligation, the embodied social facts of our relationships and legal 
positions, and the higher facts they all signify and indicate - 
absolute right. As with the other ideals we must examine all levels 
but as absolute right is so hard to grasp except by imagery and in the 
imagination, our best guide we shall see will be the embodiment of 
absolute right in the objective standards of the age, in customs, 
roles, offices and above all laws. Grote produces in 1864 the sort of 
theory of duty that is to surface with such power in 1872 is the 
chapter 'My Station and its Duties' in Ethical Studies written by 
F. H. Bradley. But with him the inspiration was the relational social 
theory and the historical theory of the Liberal Anglican historians. 
The one sub-ideal of duty, the natural, can however detain us. 
The word natural as used in both everyday and specific philosophical 
contexts is a persuader word, it serves to legitimate that to which it 
is a predicate. The word has numerous meanings, as an opposite to the 
divine, to the conventional, to the artificial as well as to the 
generally undesirable. But in the nineteenth century, claims to 
natural dispositions, feelings and actions were legion especially 
amongst romantic writers such as Bronte, Carlyle, Wordsworth and 
Coleridge. Grote cuts through the confusions to harness the natural 
for a singular purpose - to refer to a universal ideal as against the 
normally specific and relational ideals that we encounter in life. If 
the norm is that 'that which is virtuousfor us, our dutY, right and 
good is defined by our position -or place in the relational social 
order', there is little place left for the universal or for the human 
motive in general. The ideal of the natural is simply what we all as 
human beings owe to each other, not as citizens, relatives, employees 
or friends, but as human beings relating to other human beings (1876, 
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36). Natural law and natural right, to Grote, are generally 
abstractions which arise from the attempt to transcend our social 
nature and to define this general human state of being with others 
(1876 221,237-238). Grote is generally silent on this ideal, a 
reflection of his low estimation of its importance. 
Finally, we come to the ideal. of the good and its sub-ideal, the 
useful. It is tempting to see this derivation as a mischievous and 
calculated philosophical insult and challenge to the utilitarians for 
whom utility, in the form of happiness, is the ultimate ideal, and a 
moral equivalent or synonym for the right and the good. Now utility 
is not only a sub-ideal, but a sub-ideal of the good and not even 
happiness. Grote's argument for this classification and derivation is 
linked to the whole moral system and is indeed a fundamental part of 
it (Grote 1876,34,51,68-81,103,116). His argument is that a 
morally good act is one that is useful in the most general sense, (and 
in more specific senses productive of happiness and even pleasure). 
Usefulness, happiness and pleasure also usually indicate or signify 
the morally valuable, and in fact actually do so in practice. Yet it 
is not because moral acts are useful, or productive of happiness or 
pleasure alone, that they are right or good. Grote is here taking the 
first but not the second step in the defence of utilitarianism later 
found in G. E. Moore's, EthiCs (Moore 1966,44-45). Rather it is 
because the useful is productive of good (or perhaps even happiness 
and right) that it is morally valuable (Grote 1870,79-84,119-133; 
1876,68-81). The laissez faire capitalist system is efficient at 
producing satisfactions for felt wants and is useful. But the virtue 
of its usefulness lies in its production of good, or what is the same 
thing, the satisfaction of real want. This reverses the utilitarian 
moralists order of priority and their moral logic, it is one basis for 
the challenge to utilitarianism and capitalism. 
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vi 
The Oriqins of Moral Value 
Grote raises the whole issue of the origin of all moral value in 
Chapter VI of the Treatise. His argument is that moral value arises 
in part from the purposes indicated and served by moral actions and in 
part by considerations more intrinsic to the actor and the motives and 
feelings from which he or she acts. With the former the ultimate 
purpose is not utility or even happiness in a narrow sense but 
includes to Grote realization of moral purpose as a whole, including 
the good and the right. That independently valued moral qualities are 
also useful or productive of happiness is to Grote nothing unexpected 
or exceptional and he argues that it is not this production that alone 
gives them value. With the latter, we encounter a difficult, and 
highly contentious argument which takes us close to the intuitionist 
arguments that Grote had encountered at Cambridge. However I hope to 
show that Grote's final position on moral value falls short of a 
commitment to intuitionism and is comparable with an idealist ethical 
theory. For Grote moral value lies not only in the consequences 
served but in obedience to rules and principles (objective right) and 
purity of motive and intention (subjective right). His ethical theory 
is thus an eclectic mixing of Millian utilitarianism, Kantian and 
Hegelian idealism, of considerations of consequences, duty and motive. 
Two important points then need to be understood before we 
proceed. Firstly, as suggested above, moral value derives from both 
consequences and non consequential sources, and secondly, Grote's 
system of the moral ideals is largely a descriptive scheme and not a 
deductive moral system as is the case with utilitarianism. The 
argument that consequences, and in particular both the usefulness and 
felicific consequences of actions, account for only part of the moral 
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value of actions appeared in an unsystematic form in the Fxamination 
of 1862 (Grote 1870,121-126). While the argument was meant to 
reconcile intuitionist and utilitarian claims for the origin of moral 
values, in practice Grote recognised that his claims would be seen as 
a direct challenge to the dominant utilitarian creed and hence wisely 
resisted the temptation to publish until a clearer case could be made 
for his own position. 
Among the different characters which an action may have, it seems 
clear that its being good as honourable or generous, good as 
right (the nature of which goodness I shall speak of in a moment 
in treating of duty), good as useful, are different 
ideas: 
.... 
(Grote 1870,121-122). 
In Chapter Six of the Treatise Grote writes 
'the utilitarian view of morals may be said to be that which 
considers actions to be of value in the universe, in the last 
resort, solely in respect of their usefulness i. e. 
productiveness of good, however the meaning of the word 'good' 
maybe afterwards determined' (Grote 1876,69-70). 
Grote notes that usefulness is one genuine source of moral value, but 
adds at this stage only the value that attaches to worthiness of 
motive, 
; there are two kinds of moral value, one corresponding to each of 
those ideals; the value of usefulness or result, and the value 
of worthiness of feeling (so we will at present call it) which 
has gone towards the result or been expended for it'... (Grote 
1876,72). 
Motives are of two sorts virtuous or deontic, superogatory or 
imperative, optional or bound, and hence aretaic value divides into 
that which follows from benevolent motive (virtue) and that from 
obedience to moral commands (duty) (ibid, 76-78). 
These latter he calls aretai c worth or merit. Now concentration 
by intuitionists and Kantians on the aretaic argument has according to 
Grote sometimes distracted further attention from the consequential. 
Adherence to usefulness as a major source of moral value is legitimate 
but does not and need not imply a submission to utilitarian accounts 
of useful. For a start as we have seen the useful implies the good, 
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not happiness. Secondly, moral use or purpose refers to the variety 
of ideals realized, not the purely prudential results of an action 
which Grote considered to be of not only little, but to be of no moral 
consequence (Grote 1870,121-124 1876,70-21). Thirdly, as we shall 
see, any attempt to measure happiness, usefulness or pleasurable 
outcomes of actions is doomed to failure, for both logical and 
practical reasons. 
But what about the argument for some non consequential value to 
moral acts, what is the aretaic merit or worth of an action? The 
argument as it appears in the quotation above looks as if it is to be 
a species of the action theory viz that actions are to be judged by 
a) ieasons given for them, the motives of the actor his purposes, and 
b) the principle or rule*s upon which he or she operates. Indeed 
elsewhere this argument is stated though not widely elaborated (Grote 
1870,100). Desirableness of the end and worthiness of motive 
intention and principle upon which one acts, together account for 
moral goodness (1870,131-133). If this was Grote's only alternative 
argument for source of value to consequences his position would be 
little different to that of Green later (Thompson 1887, xi ). But 
Grote has some major supportive arguments. Moral value he argues is 
to be judged in regard to four circumstances or issues 
'it is in the mutual play of these four considerations, viz, the 
promotion of happiness, the foregoing of happiness, thought of 
ourselves, thought of others, that the circumstances of moral 
action lie' (Grote 1876,71). 
As we have seen the first and third are only of moral consideration, 
that is of moral value if the happiness is for others and not inerely 
ourselves. Actions that merely promote happiness, or worse still, 
happiness for ourselves are of 'imperfect moral value'. Tndependent 
moral value is something to do with the other two elements, the 
foregoing-of happiness for the good of others. The argument that not 
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causing pain to others was a premiss of aretaic value was encountered 
earlier and this new formulation can be seen as the reverse side of 
the coin. In both versions what we are directed to in moral acts is 
not only the consequences but the dual considertion that one could and 
should (1) sacrifice oneself (2) for the good of others (not just 
their happiness). The point being made is that moral value lies in 
being virtuous, doing ones duty or doing what is right or demanded of 
us by law, (even when this fails to produce happiness for others or 
oneself) because of the element of self sacrifice and the benevolent 
motive behind the act. In both cases the choices are moral not 
prudential. In addition in both cases we act or desist from acting in 
consideration of other ideals than happiness, usefulness or pleasure. 
In both cases we do what it is fit or proper we do, what is right 
rather than what is merely useful or practical. 
The moral value of this self sacrifice or doing of what is fit or 
proper arises from the relationship it has to the active side of our 
nature. Life, is as much about doing as it is about feeling, it is 
about using our unique powers to realise our unique wants as 
creatures, 
'but the action, ie the employment of the power, is good in 
itself, as well as in its result for the supply of the want which 
makes its usefulness' (1876,72). 
Doing, or trying to do, that which helps others or is simply our duty 
is valuable independently of the actual consequences. Put bluntly 
Grote seems to be saying that the exertion of effort after moral goals 
or in conformity to rules, like doing our duty is valuable in itself. 
In the Examination he puts it as follows 
'We may express this if we like it by saying that there is 
enjoyment in the action itself: but if we do, we must give up 
the idea of the character or value of actions being measured only 
by the end' (Grote 1870,108). 
Moral value lies in struggling to find out what we. should do and 
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doing it irrespective of considerations of personal happiness, 
(Thompson 1884, xxxix; Grote 1*870,110- 112). This is the true 
aretaic worth of the action and 
'there is no free action, I shall call it, or real action, 
without the readiness to forego happiness and the disposition to 
transcend self* (1876,73). 
He adds 
'if it is useful, it has the double value: if its fails of being 
useful, or, through error of view, goes wrong in this particular, 
it may have its own value, and the question whether it has 
depends on other considerations than those of usefulness' (1876, 
. 73-74). 
In an interesting metaphor Grote describes moral life as 'a 
mutual action of moral beings for each other's happiness' but 'only an 
interchange not, like commercial interchanges, with a desire of 
getting as much as possible for oneself* (1876,75). One must prize 
happiness and plac e 'a very high estimation of the value of life so 
far as the other is concerned'. But so. far Grote's argument looks 
lame and could be largely accommodated by an altruistic utilitarian 
like Mill who considered the happiness of others rather than the self 
to be of ultimate moral significance. Similarly after reading Grote's 
critique of the monkish virtues of self abnegation for no ultimate 
purpose we might find it odd to find him here placing great stress on 
self sacrifice. Only in the idea that moral value may lie in 
conformity to rules and principles and in realizing moral purposes 
other than happiness and utility, namely the right, the good, the 
obligatory, just and the virtuous, do we have a major contrast to the 
altruistic utilitarian. 
But Grote goes beyond this in another attempt to explain aretaic 
value. Human motive is above all free and aspiring, human beings 
freely seek to improve themselves. In the Examination be had stated 
the point clearly. 
48 
'Upon the whole, it may perhaps be considered that there are two 
chief sources from which virtuous action derives its moral value 
independently of its consequences: one of , 
these is connected 
with the free will of man, the other with his aspiringness or 
upward moral tendency' (Grote 1870,111). 
Three terms are used to describe this. The desire for the 
'high', lofty or meritorious; I effort' to rise up to this aspiration, 
and the desire for the 'elevation of character' (See also Grote 1870, 
112-115). While recognizing 'love of excellence' or 'perfectionism' 
to be a sub-ideal of the right, Grote here elevates it into the ideal 
that best explains the aretaic value of acts. Moral value we have 
seen lies in the usefulness of outcomes, but independently it lies in 
doing an act; doing it for a moral purpose (a) for others not self, 
(b) to realize good and right as well as happiness; being prepared to 
make self sacrifices and to be generous to others; and in trying to 
excel, to aspire to realize oneself as a moral being. But in this 
last point Grote is close to Green and Bradley, for self sacrifice and 
self realization are being considered as both a universal part and 
vital element in all of our moral lives (Grote 1876,76-78). 
We should remember here what was argued about human nature in 
Chapter Six. One side is dominated by feelings, another side by 
impulse to action. one side is individual another social. one side 
is emotional, the other rational. one side is fixed in nature or 
habit, another is open to improvement by education or self direction 
or elevation. Grote's point seems to be that actions gain moral value 
as they pass from being impulsive or reflexive to being reflective and 
freely chosen, as they pass from being individual to being social, 
from being emotional to being rational, from being natural and 
habitual to being socialized and rationally chosen. Moral value lies 
in part in rising above what we are, just as intellectual value lies 
in progressing beyond what is unknown, believed or partially known to 
what is known, known for certain, or known to be true. In this widest 
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sense social self realization or improvement is the one universal 
feature of all our moral ideals (Grote 1870,308-303). It has the 
status to Grote of being the secular equivalent of setting before us 
'the glory of God' as the object of all human action , 'the work and 
business of the collective human race' (Grote, 1870,333-334,351). 
But this presentation is unsatisfactory if we mean by self realization 
perfection for now a sub ideal, already highly qualified in terms of 
moral value, seems to be confused with that most general of element 
which bestows moral value on all acts and to all the other moral 
ideals. Grote seems on occasions near to conflating perfection, 
excellence, progress, self improvement and self realization. 
In the end Grote's central chapter on moral value is inconclusive 
and unclear. The unfinished nature of the manuscript may account for 
this but I think not. Grote needed to engage the proponents of 
ethical intuitionism and idealism in critical debate but he has only 
given us an eclectic rehash. We are left wondering why a pure motive 
or conformity to a rule or principle gives moral value to an act. The 
argument that 'sacrifice has been made', 'the good of others promoted' 
and 'moral improvement achieved' seems somewhat circular. But Grote 
was working on the problem at the time of his death. Mayor records a 
217 page manuscript entitled 'Honestarianism and Utilitarianism' 
finished on June 5,1866 (Grote 1900, xi). 'Honestarianism' chosen in 
preference to 'dulcedinarianism', was to be a science of 'the worthy 
or honourable' and was to be the 'antithesis' of utilitarianism, a 
landmark in the production of a coherent synthesis (Grote 1870, 
222-223; 1876,21-22,58). With this manuscript we may be in a 
better position to judge the coherence of Grote's own theory of moral 
values. 
What is left of interest in this chapter are some suggestions 
from his own ethical theory that account for moral value. Firstly, 
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the re-affirmation of ideals and purposes of moral value other than 
pleasure, happiness and usefulness (1870 258-259). Secondly, the 
reassertion that man's nature is as much fulfilled in acting and doing 
as in sensing and feeling. Thirdly, the claim that the effort to do 
or act is of value even when the results are not. Fourthly, the 
assertion, which is compatible with Mill's version of utilitarianism, 
that happiness in general (or the good for others not the sel f) is the 
only happiness of moral value. Fifthly, the argument that the other 
side of moral value to usefulness, is being worthy, that is being done 
from a worthy feeling or motive. Sixthly, Grote argues that some 
moral value. arises from an act being freely chosen by an actor, that 
it is his or her act, an act of moral self disclosure. Seventhly, the 
argument that the ultimate and universal mark of moral value is social 
self realization, self development, improvement or progress as he 
variously described the point has some value. Finally, but of 
ultimate importance, Grote returns to the idea of some actions being 
fit or proper for us to do. Moral value lies in doing what we ought 
to do, what it is right 
I we should do, not because we conceive it to be the action which 
will be most for our own happiness, though constantly with the 
concomitant feeling (or as I have expressed it, faith and trust) 
that it will be so'. (Grote 1876,78-79). 
A quotation from the Examination may reinforce these later 
points. After denying that a selfish act is wrong because it fails to 
promote happiness, he gives the right answer, 
'But the reason why it is wrong is because action natural in this 
manner is not the action proper for you, and 50 far as you fail 
to feel that it is not, you feel on the other hand that you are 
not what you should be. You are conscious: you are free: you 
see what wants doing, and you feel yourself more or less able to 
do it: you are not bound like animals to the care of your own 
existence, by restriction of consciousness and consequent want of 
freedom: you can enter into the worth of others and their 
capacity for enjoyment as well as your own: you have impulse to 
action and power for it: and you must surely feel yourself more 
a man, feel that you live more, in proportion as you. can spread 
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your action beyond your own benefit to embrace theirs' (1870, 
101). 
In brief, Grote is asserting that when describing moral actions 
'in calling it right and proper we add, something to the notion 
of it being useful... ' (187G, 80) 
This extra something is pluralistic but it means that actions 
themselves have value independent of consequences. This extra 
something we can glean from the rest of Grote's system but ultimately 
it refers also to the higher facts presumed or postulated every time 
we use moral language. When we call an act right or wrong what is 
postulated or assumed is that there is a standard available, even if 
not yet known clearly or agreed upon. Moral discourse presumes not 
just rules but ultimate standards. Moral value lies as much in doing 
our best to conform to these imaginary standards as in promoting 
useful consequences, and the imagined standards or moral laws are more 
knowable than the useful consequences of actions. 
We can now elaborate the second argument, that Grote's systems of 
the moral ideals is descriptive and classifactory not prescriptive and 
deductive. There are, according to John Grote, three primary ideals 
and a host of secondary ideals. All the primary ideals have a 
distinctive origin, a distinctive character and level of 
. 
imperativeness. The primary ideals and secondary ideals do not get 
their character or imperativeness from any one primary ideal under 
which they are classified. To think so would be to mistake Grote's 
intentions in classsifying the ideals. His system is merely a 
typology, a classificatory system, not a derivatory system and 
certainly not a deductive system from one single primary ideal or 
value. Hence pleasure does not get its value as an ideal because if 
realised it promotes happiness, and duty, virtue and' justice do not 
get their value because they promote right. Rather pleasure is 
related to happiness because both reflect our sentient nature. 
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Virtue, justice and duty are classified under right, because they are 
each, like right, immediate, practical and imperative and because they 
are all generated from the active side of our nature, from our desire 
'to do' rather than to 'feel'. 
Grote's classificatory system then is fundamentally different 
from that of the utilitarians for whom there is only one primary ideal 
of ultimate value and all the secondary ideals deriving their value 
because they promote or lead to the primary ideal. Justice, virtue 
and duty are good because they are part of, or are, a means to 
happiness and for no independent reason. Their value is dependent 
upon consequences, as Whewell put it, wheras the values of the various 
ideals in Whewell's and Grote's own scheme are independent of 
consequences or any other primary ideal. 
We can now summarise the argument produced so far, before turning 
to Grote's critique of utilitarianism and a conclusion on the nature 
of his own position or ethical issues in philosophy. We should 
briefly note Grote's conclusion on the value of the moral ideals. 
This formally appears in Chapter Six of the Treatise but evidence of 
its assumption lies throughout his moral writings. Moral activity we 
have seen is occasioned not only by the presence of sentient or felt 
want, but by want as a fact of our being, and the human experience of 
restlessness and the urge to do and achieve things. Moral realization 
can. therefore only partly be found in happiness and its sub ideals, it 
desires, and achieves realization also in doing what is right and 
ultimately in achieving what is good. In the end the summum bonum, 
the ultimate end is the good, but the primary and practical end or 
goal and arena for self realization is in doing the right, in 
virtuous, just and obligatory activity. Some areas of our moral life 
may be concerned with the pursuit and production of happiness, but 
others, often the most immediate and si gnificant, are concerned with 
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the right and the good. Like Laird, Carritt, Ross and others of the 
later intuitionists, Grote considered these primary ideals to be each 
of independent value. Like Hegel before him Right was the primary 
ideal, the good something more abstract and general, and happiness of 
much less significance. 
The moral value of the ideals cannot be determined by either 
observation and induction or by intuition and deduction. The ideals 
lie between a reýlm known by observations of experience and a higher 
realm only indicated by our reason and imagination. Identification of 
the content of our ideals and the comparative value we attach to them 
is in a large part a product of- experience, education and social 
practice. But the whole of our moral life, like the whole of our 
intellectual life is premised upon, presumes and postulates beliefs. 
But what is crucial here is that these beliefs are not intuitions, in 
the sense indicated by Schneewind, that is a religious belief we just 
have to accept or reject. Nor is it an intuition in the alternative 
sense of an a priori insight. 
The belief is only an intuition if we give it the very different 
sense implied H. L. A. Hart, Phillipa Foot, Peter Winch and Michael 
Oakeshott later, that is a presupposition, presumption or postulate of 
. everyday 
thought, language and practice (Hart 1970; Foot 1967, Winch 
1970, Oakeshott 1980). Intellectual life to Grote presumes that there 
is a truth to be known, which even if not yet known is actually used 
as a criteria for the making of judgements. Moral and practical life 
for its part presupposes that there is something that is right to be 
done independently of what is actually done or even actually wanted, 
and this, even when not clearly known or agreed upon, acts as a rule 
or standard for actual life. The higher beliefs are practical 
postulates, and may also be seen as religious beliefs and ontological 
realities indicated by our experience, our objective rights and 
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duties, and signified by the content of the ideals our imaginations 
have fixed, altered and re-fixed over the ages and through our lives. 
Grote did not want his readers to rely on religious belief alone as 
the foundation of knowledge (Grote 1870,102,115,201,214-220,308, 
333,349,356; 1876,65,111,342,356-7,374-5,377,393,462, 
469-70,484; 1901,38-40,58,72). Nor did he ask for submission to 
a priori axioms or principles, known by intuition. Moral ideals, like 
intellectual truth*, are created in the process of thinking and 
acting. They are struggled towards, groped after, constantly being 
refined in the imagination. 
This intellectual process is primordially social, our thinking is 
social thinking our intelligence is a co-intelligence, our ideals are 
social ideals, our duties, rights and virtues are fundamentally 
social. Intellectual truth we saw is a social agreement, and so is 
the morally right and good. The historical and practical discoveries 
of man have been distilled into customs, traditions and habits of 
opinion and practice, and codified, as we shall see into laws, duties 
and rights. What is real in moral life is a rough indicator therefore 
of what is rational and what is for that time an agreement on what is 
right. 
That we are free is another postulate of moral and practical life 
and the characteristic of moral, as distinct from legal activity is 
that individuals decide for themselves within the confines of the 
social discourse and practice. Grote's patient attention to the 
perplexities of moral decision making is explained not by subjectivist 
and individualist assumptions, but'by the existential realization that 
moral life presupposes active, choosing individuals, working with 
other similar beings and within a society at any time exhibiting a 
moral vocabulary and a moral practice. Moral thought and activity 
to 
Grote is participation in a pre-existing practice, its maintenance 
55 
reproduction and its modification. Each effort of the moral 
i1nagination he considers to be an effort to contribute to moral 
discourse and knowledge. Each individual decision, like each 
society's ethical system, is a contribution to the human endeavour to 
fix, and at the same time to grope for, the right. 
Moral value for each ideal depends upon several considerations 
not one. Yet alternatively there is no system of morality, of the 
sort posited by Whewell, that nicely locates each ideal in a settled 
order (Grote 1876,238-239,394; Sidgwick 1963,99). As with all 
knowledge, growth is a faltering process or gradual clarification via 
distinction and judgement. That our creative knowledge will recognize 
and realize a picture or puzzle coming out, or a mind meeting our mind 
is a conclusion Grote comes to, but he refuses to clarify, delineate 
or settle this order. Moral knowledge is for humans to create, but 
moral reality is posited as what we may also discover. What we can 
say for certain is that there is a world of unique and unconditional 
moral statements about what ought to be, as distinct from what is, and 
that these can be understood and known as well as challenged, argued 
about and refined. Each ideal captures some aspect of our moral 
nature, our moral existence and our moral experience. 
In his generally unappreciative review of the Treatise, Henry 
Sidgwick discusses in detail only two points, the first Grote's 
distinction between pleasures of 'disturbance' and 'undisturbance', 
and Grote's refusal to answer the key questions concerning the nature, 
of the desirable, the unconditional ought (Sidgwick 1877,242-243). He 
quotes Grote as positing the right questions about relationship 
between the ideals but concludes that he fails to give them a proper 
answer. He quote Grote as follows, 
'The desirable, or the 'to be desired', is a much more 
complicated notion. Has it, or has it not, the former ideal 
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mixed with it? Is the 'to be desired; in any way that which 
. ought' to be desired? or is it 'the desired' with appeal to 
human feeling and human history? or is it 'the reasonably 
desired' pointing to some other ideal still for its 
interpretation' (Grote 1876,35). 
But Grote did indeed answer these questions. The good or the 
desirable is too general for practical moral life and needs the right 
or 'should do' to activate and direct it. The 'good' implies 'ought' 
but the choice is free while that of right is categorical. The 
desirable cannot be reduced to either what is actually or, 
psychologically desired or what we are taught to desire. Finally, the 
desirable does point to the ought to be desired, the right as the 
primary, ultimate or absolute ideal, and our moral knowledge indicates 
this. Grote did relate the ideals, he did set them in order and 
priority and carefully explains their similarities and differences. 
But Grote's system is only a schema and not a deductive system in 
which all the ideals are derived from one sovereign end or ideal in a 
fashion required by Mill and Sidgwick. This was intentional and not 
an oversight on Grote's part, he -differed on this substantive 
philosophical point not only with Mill and Sidgwick but with Whewell 
as well. The ideals, both primary and secondary do not get their 
value and meaning from one superior ideal, certainly not happiness. 
Rather each has a unique value and place in a complex scheme. Each of 
the three primary moral ideals has a distinctive character according 
to Grote. Firstly they differ as to their bases, between, sentience, 
want and activity, secondly they differ in degree of abstraction, 
lessening in abstraction as we move from the good, to happiness and to 
right, and finally they differ in degree of imperativeness. Happiness 
we saw is merely 'what we desire', the good is what is the 'desirable' 
or 'What we should desire', while the right is 'what I should do', 
what 'should be done', carrying practical prescriptive connotations, 
being unconditioned and imperative. The secondary ideals like 
57 
justice, virtue and duty are derivative from the primary ideals but 
even then not in the sense in which justice and virtue are derivative 
from happiness in utilitarian ethics. Justice and virtue are good to 
utilitarians only as part or a means to happiness. To Grote they are 
unique ideals, with their own meaning, principles and carrying their 
own entailments. They are classified under right only because they 
fit under the catagories of being active ideals, being concrete and 
practical and being highly imperative. 
vil 
Grote and Intuitionism 
The above painstaking elaboration of Grote's theory of the moral 
ideals serves three specific purposes, one to show how unique are his 
insights, two to reveal the base from which he attacks utilitarianism, 
and three, to show how different are his. ideals to those of the 
intuitionists. We might elaborate this last point before looking at 
the critique of utilitarianism leaving the case for Grote's 
originality until the conclusions to this thesis. Intuitionism was 
not one doctrine but a name given to a c. ollection of ethical and 
epistemological doctrines that became popular in European thought from 
the seventeenth century. Epistemological intuitionsts in Britain 
tended to adopt either of two positions, either that many truths are 
known a priori (Whewell), a derivative of Cartesian Logic, or that our 
knowledge is based on immediate rather than mediate experience (Reid, 
Stewart, Hamilton). Grote we have seen rejected suppositions 
concerning pure a priori knowledge. A priori axioms are cases of 
reflective knowledge not intuition. Knowledge of judgement emerges 
from knowledge of acquaintance and is separable only in degree on a 
scale. Secondly, while Grote like Ferrier considered immediate 
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experience and knowledge to be the basis or kernel of all knowledge, 
he saw it both as unclear, unformed and indistinct knowledge, and 
considered that judgement and reflection was needed to convert it into 
knowledge per se. There is certainly no immediate or direct a priori 
knowledge. 
Grote conformed to neither of the above modes of intuitional 
epistemology, his position was, as I have argued, essentially 
idealist. Grote indicates his distance from intuitionism on several 
occasions, as when he notes that intuitionism has many forms and then 
adds 'though what these who use the word mean by it, is rather their 
business than mine' (Grote 1870,47). Statements of opposition to 
intuitionist epistemology are easy to find in the Exploratio (Grote 
1865,22; 1876,47,57). Intuititionism is described as an 
. abstraction' based on the mistaking of our feeling of certainty about 
a thing for knowledge of its independent existence (Grote 1900, 
100-101). Its adherents usually mistake immediate experience for 
cognitive judgements, often running together these original 'feelings' 
with the claim that what they indicate are necessary truths (Grote 
1865,122,216; 1900,154-155). Whewell in particular is attacked 
for both defending 'necessary truths' and setting them up in an 
antithesis to ordinary or 'contingent truths' (Grote 1865 216-220; 
235-237 ). More specifically Grote rejects the need for 'pre-Baconian 
assumptions' as necessary to ground all knowledge, and while he 
subscribes to Kantian categories as preconditions for knowledge he 
portrays these as emerging within the cognitive process and not prior 
to experience (Grote 1865,106-124; 1876,154-161; 1900,217-219, 
297,307,315-318). 
In ethics the question of Grote's intuitionism is more pertinent 
as recently two of the most important cointributors to the study of 
Victorian Cambridge, Sheldon Rothblatt and Jerome B Schneewind have 
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labelled Grote as an ethical intuitionist, and other writers have left 
this interpreiation unchallenged (Schneewind 1974,1977; Rothblatt 
1968). Ethical intuitionists may take up one or more of several basic 
positions, which are not necessarily compatible. These are that (1) 
there is a human faculty which 'facilitates direct apprehension of 
moral ideals and virtues, (2) that these are intuitively known without 
reference to experience or to the calculation consequences. (3) that 
there are some moral truths or axioms that are self evident, necessary 
and a priori, (4) that there are a plurality of distinct and 
independent moral ideals all of which have unique moral value, (5) 
that our ordinary common sense beliefs or immediate moral judgements 
are a reliable guide to these ideals, and (6) that these ideals refer 
to an independent and universal moral reality and order independent of 
our particular personal and social experiences. Other moral positions 
are also often confused with this as I indicated earlier, arguments 
for a unique moral sense, -from conscience, moral causistry and 
theology and even moral idealism. 
John Grote associates himself with few of these positions, and 
where he does, he does not do so from an intuitionist epistemology, 
nor from intuitionist assumptions about a unique moral faculty, moral 
sense, conscience reliable immediate insights, common sense, or divine 
revelation. On the last, Scheenwind notes that Grote's philosophy 
-takes him 
'to a point at which we feel a need for the truths religion alone 
can give' (Schneewind 1977,119). 
But Grote repeatedly rejects any help for his arguments that may come 
from religion and asserts and re-asserts that he rests his case on 
grounds that philosophy alone can produce and defended. We must not 
for instance base our knowledge on either Descartes' assumption of 
God's consciousness, or Berkeleys' idea that God's mind makes our 
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consciousness of the world possible. Philosophically we must work 
only from. the supposition of our own consciousness (Grote 1900,35-42, 
71). Again Grote was both a philosopher and a deeply religious 
thinker. The activities were different but complementary. Religion 
and philosophy were different but the truths they discover were 
compatible. Philosophy is human thought but Grote had faith that it 
was compatible with the thought and mind of God. Human mind should 
not be constrained by belief in faith for this reason. Tn particular 
Grote's belief in a harmonious moral order, equivalent to the belief 
in an ordered physical universe is not grounded upon religious faith 
or revelation for Grote, but is, *as I have argued, presented as a 
postulate of all moral and intellectual thought and practice, an 
assumption without which the practices of science and philosophy or 
one side, and moral and political life would be impossible (Grote 
1870,348-9). This is a case of what Albert Weale was later to call 
reflexive theory' not theology or intuitionism (Weale 1983,17-18). 
Grote's moral position also differs significantly from that of 
William Whewell, for whom dependent or utilitarian morality is 
separated from independent morality and rejected as totally 
inadequate. To Grote, as we shall see, the morality of consequences or 
dependent morality has moral meaning and value, as does the claim that 
moral ideals have some value independent of consequenres. Mill and 
Whewell are presented by Grote as each grasping one part of the truth, 
utilitarianism and intuitionism are abstract or partial-systems. The 
truth is that moral value lies in part in consequences and in part in 
an independent sphere of worth. 
John Grote is diametrically opposed to the first three 
propositions of intuitionism noted above. There is no unique moral 
sense or moral faculty; all moral knowledge requires some element of 
both experience and reason or reflection; and there are no purely 
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necessary or a priori moral truths of the kind positpd by Whewell 
(Grote 1870,195,199-206; 1876, Ch V, V1, XV; 1865,30-32; 1900, 
304-305). 
There is some agreement between Grote and those of the 
intuitionists who agree with 4,5, -and 6 above, but 4 is compatible 
with other moral philosophies as well as intuitionism ie idealism; 5 
is turned by Grote into the simple claim that our customary opinions 
distil and embody both individual historical and social reason; and 6 
is supported using an objective and absolutist idealist not an 
intuitionist or theological ontology. Grote's absolute moral facts 
are in principle knowable (unlike those of Hamilton and Mansel, ) are 
knowable by ordinary intelligence without need for intuition and/or 
revelation (as with Whewell) and require a massive, and as yet 
unsatisfactory, operation of the imagination, beloved of idealist 
philosophers from Coleridge to Hegel. Grote was clear that there is 
some truth in the empiricist claim that all knowledge is contingent 
upon experience and acquired by induction. So too there is some truth 
in the opposed claim that all knowledge comes from the mind and can be 
reached by a deductive procedure (Grote 1865,1870 170, ch XVII 1876 
57 ). The ideas that moral knowledge is either grounded on experience 
or on intuition he sees as not only false but a false dichotomy, the 
utilitarianlintuitionist controversy he considers to be a source of 
wonder for the grandeur of its irrelevance and misconception (Grote 
1870 56-57 275; 1876 74-76,79, Both Mill and Whewell were guilty 
of abstraction and hence ultimately irrelevance, taking one part of 
the truth, one side of the case and expounding it as the totality of 
truth (1876,54-56). 
Even the concept of intuition is a source of confusion according 
to Grote arising from the existence of a plurality of Uses which are. 
often confused together (1865 22; 1870,260-278; 1876,47; 1900 
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217-219). To help shortcut the argument Grote coins the term 
intuitivist and intuitivism to describe the narrow position of the 
Whewellians and to exclude from consideration all of these other 
doctrines that Mill had so incorrectly labelled as intuitionist. 
Mayor and later Leslie Stephen recognise the originality of this 
formulation as it allows us, as Grote puts it, to separate what Mill 
confounds, intuitionism proper, the school of moral sentiments; the 
school of duty; the rational and juristic moral schools; and the 
idealists (Grote 1870,261). Grote specifically separates the 
subjective schools of moral sense and moral sentiments which Bentham 
once labelled and attacked as intuitionists, from the rational 
intuitionists who work on the premise of some 'simple and native 
intellectual vision' (Grote 1870,262). The former view Grote notes 
was as inductive as utilitarianism, relying as it did on psychological 
evidence of our senses and feelings (1870,261-264). The latter 
schools are truly intuitionists in sharing some a priori beliefs about 
moral reality though Grote notes with obvious delight. that if the 
utilitarian principle of morality is not purely psychological it is a 
priori and deductive, a point to which we will return (1870,268-269, 
275-277; 1876,79). Grote concedes that in terms of some uses of 
intuition he can subscribe to the theory, but not all and then on 
close examination these are the ones that are compatible with ethical 
idealism. But an the central point about a belief a some 'simple and 
native intellectual vision' in both epistemology and ethics, Grote 
must be excluded from subscription. The only native vision is the 
immediate experience that needs judgement for elaboration. In the end 
he treats both sides of the epistemological and moral controversy of 
the age with disdain, keeps aloof, and looks for a solution partly in 
linguistic disarmament, in an eclectic unification and more completely 
in anidealist synthesis (1865,30-32; 1876,47,48-53,57,120; 
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1900,168-170,180). 
- Contemporary opinion was divided on Grote's affiliation to 
intuitionism. The Westminster Review were not confident but hazarded 
that 
'his mode of speculating bears strong resemblances to that of the 
Intuitive Moralists' (Westminster Review 1870,42). 
John Llewelyn Davis, in a better position in Grote's own college to 
know, wrote 
'Mr Grote is hardly an 'intuitive' moralist, of the school 
opposed to Mr Mill: if one were to remark that it is difficult 
to say wh3t he is, that is an impression which he would have been 
very willing to produce' (Llewelyn Davis 1870,92). 
Davis comments that while Grote's position is nearer to that of 
the utilitarians than the intuitionists, the uniqueness of Grote's 
view lies in his founding duty and virtue on a 'doctrine of 
relations'. This observation, as we shall see in the next chapter is 
correct, but since this doctrine is most readily associated with 
F. H. Bradley and idealist ethics in the nineteenth century this must 
tempt us to classify Grote's ethics like his epistemology, as 
fundamentally idealist. But both Grote's editor J. B. Mayor and his 
student Sidgwick also resisted the temptation to label Grote, though 
whether from inability, lack of judgement or good sense remains to be 
argued. For now I feel Mayor's claim that Grote was an eclectic, and 
Sidgwick's observation that Grote not only had no system, but 
unsystematically produced 'a collection of sketches' without order or 
coherence must be treated with suspicion. Grote in my view was not a 
dogmatic idealist. He was not a. utilitarian and shared only a few 
opinions with intuitionists which were also compatible with idealism. 
Grote's philosophy is genuine first order philosophy, an original 
voice in the philosophical conversation, working from within an 
intuitionist dialogue but struggling towards a position recognizable, 
as and sometimes self consciously called, idealist. 
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Circumstantial evidence for the intuitionist interpretation comes 
from two quarters, firstly, the Cambridge context and secondl-y the 
popularity of Grote's epistemology and moral philosophy with later 
intuitionists. But in Chapter I argued that the Cambridge context 
contained both idealist and an intuitionist currents of thought, a 
point well make by Cannon (Cannon 1964). Grote I will argue had more 
in common with the former group. The second argument has some basis 
as Grote's work is not only used but used appreciatively by Henry 
Calderwood, T. R Birks, F. D. Maurice and E. F. Carritt all of whom could 
be identified as intuitionists. The case would be stronger if a case 
could be made for treating twentieth century realism as a modified 
version of intuitionism, on the grounds that both theories argued for 
a direct or immediate cognition of reality, uncluttered and 
undetermined by both sensory experience and reflective judgement. 
Unfortunately neither case is convincing. Calderwood and Birks' 
usage is highly selective, neither identify Grote as an intuitionist 
and generally treat him as an interesting oddity. A case for F. D. 
Maurice as an idealist will be made later. Carritt's support is 
highly qualified and indeed hostile on occasions. Finally, while many 
realists such as Alexander, Laird, Broad, Robinson, Sellars, Perry and 
Davies Hicks have used Grote, the differences between realism and 
intuitionism are more significant than the similarities. Tf a strong 
case is to be made for Grote as an intuitionist it must turn on 
predominantly internal textual evidence and to this we will return 
again later in chapter ten. But one unexpected source of support for 
the idealist interpretation of Grote comes from i. B. Schweeind himself. 
While on most occasions he identifies Grote as an 'intijitionist', and 
a 'moralist' in one place he agrees that on several crucial beliefs, 
and arguments 
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'His development of them anticipated in many ways the absolute 
idealism of the generation after him' (Schneewind 1968a, 391). 
One last circumstantial point may complete this argument for now. 
During the first three decades of the twentieth century three major 
moral philosophers all produced new intuitionist arguments that sound 
in retrospect very Grotian, G. E. Moore, H. A. Pritchard and David 
Ross. As William Hudson writes 
'These writers contended that actions, as well as consequences, 
can have intrinsic value. They can be in themselves right or 
wrong, obligatory or otherwise, such as it is our duty to do, or 
to refrain from doing' (Hudson 1980,93) 
To Pritchard and Ross, as with Grote and Bradley earlier and 
Searle and Foot later, many moral imperatives or conclusions follow 
from statements about situations, descriptions of moral facts about 
relationships, because moral conclusions are embodied in statements 
about them and in the facts they pertain to. That I ought to promote 
the welfare of my children is not justified by the consequences but by 
statements about the facts of my relationship with them, my wife and 
the wider-community. The actions of caring for children are morally 
right, and are obligatory independently of references to consequences. 
This argument, later associated with neo intuitionists, but originally 
associated with Bradley, is at the heart of John Grote's social theory 
and his account of duty. 
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Chapter Eiqht 
Grote's--Critique of Mill's Utilitarian-Moral Philosophy 
I 
The voyage we have charted began in 1862 when Grote, after sending the 
manuscripts for the Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy to the 
printers changed his mind and determined instead to state the moral 
and then the epistemological and ontological foundations upon which 
his critique of utilitarian philosophy was founded. These foundations 
have now been revealed to contain an essentially idealist epistemology 
that supports an eclectic moral system, which links a firm belief in a 
plurality of independent and objective moral ideals (right, good, 
happiness, virtue, justice, duty, the natural, the useful, the 
pleasant), to an idealist epistemology stressing the role of moral 
imagination, a relational social and historical theory stressing the 
positivq-or sociologically factual basis to our ideals, and to an 
observational study of our sensations, feelings and moral psychology. 
In such work Grote could have claimed, like his mentor Whewell, to 
have provided not just a criticisur but a viable alternative to the 
whole philosophical system of Mill and the Philosophical Radicals. 
Indeed he could claim to have sketched the outlines for an original 
moral philosophy in Britain, a native British idealism. But at this 
point the critique of utilitarianism needs to be spelt out and its 
implications examined. 
The Examination is perhaps the most widely known about and read 
of Grote's published works and there is recent evidence of an informed 
recognition of its merits. One of the best scholars of Victorian 
intellectual history has written that 
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'John Grote's Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, 
Cambridge, 1870, is a tough-minded and difficult criticism, well 
worth study' 
and later that 
'John Grote's Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, 
Cambridge, 1870, (is) probably the most meticulous philosophical 
scrutiny' (Schneewind 1965,348; 1969, xiv). 
As we shall see in the final chapter, I diverge from Schneewind in the 
general characterization of Grote's moral philosophy as 'completely 
consonant' with that of Whewell and the other 'Cantabrigians', and of 
the specific identification of him as an 'intuitionist' (Schneewind 
1974,387-389; 1977,117-121). But I concur with the general 
judgement of the 
I quality' of Grote's mind being, 'acute, probing, rather narrow 
and technical, keen to find flaws and mistakes' 
and I note that as early_ as 1965 Schneewind had recognized and 
attached some significance to Grote's writing (Schneewind 1976,35-54; 
1977,121; 1965,31-32). A more recent and more sustained assessment 
of the Examination can be found, by Anthony Quinton in his Utilitarian 
Ethics which complement his interesting comments on Grote's 
epistemology already noted above (Quinton 1973,82-87f 1971,21). 
Quinton's appraisal is fair and scrupulous, treating Grote with the 
seriousness he has far too long been denied, and he produces an 
argument that takes us to the heart of the philosophical debate over 
utilitarianism. This al'so supports the judgement of another of Mill's 
recent editors, that the Examination is both 'penetrating and subtle' 
(Acton 1973, XIII). 
However the nineteenth century responses to the Examination were 
more impressive both for their quality and quantitYt which makes it 
surprising that more research did not take place into the author's own 
philosophical position. Two'long reviews appeared by Henry Sidgwick 
in 1871, one each in the Cambridge University Reporter and The Academy 
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(Sidgwick 1871a, 182-183; 1871b, 197-198). In 1870 a rigorous and 
complimentary sixteen page review appeared in the Contemporary Review 
written by a Trinity fellow and a Christian Socialist John Llewelyn 
Davis (Llewelyn Davies 1870,81-96). Finally an anonymous reviewer 
produced a detailed fourteen page review on behalf of the 
Philosophical Radicals for the Westminster Review (Westminster Review 
1871,41-53). Lengthy commentaries on Grote's criticisms appeared 
later in two of the books of T. R. Birks, the successor to Frederick 
Maurice in the Knightbridge Chair at Cambridge (Birks 1873,1874), and 
in several other popular textbooks (Calderwood 1874; 1895; Edgworth 
1877,25,33,39,50-51). An especially appreciative review of 
Grote's criticisms which also endeavour to explain the positive 
position from which it is launched can be found in J. R. Thompson's 
Dictionary of Philosophy which has been widely used since, 
supplemented by a more recent review in the Encyc2opaedia of 
Philosophy by Jerome B. Schneewind (Thompson 1887, xxxix - xi; 357, 
397-398,4 33; Edwards and Pap 1967,392-393). But the most telling 
assessments come from a close allie of the Philosophical Radicals, 
Alexander Bain. In his essays and books on Mill, Bain speaking from 
first hand knowledge of all parties to the dispute and of George Grote 
and Mill in particular wrote, 
*By far the best hostile criticism of utilitarianism that I am 
acquainted with is the posthumous volume of Prof. John Grote. 
It will there be seen what havoc an acute, yet candid and 
respectful opponent, can make of his theories of happiness. Many 
of those strictures I consider unanswerable. Prof. Grote also 
makes the 'most of Mill's somewhat exaggerated moral strain, and 
his affectation of holding happiness in contempt; "doing without 
it" if need be' (Bain 18801 92; 1882,115). - 
The Examination remained a key text for the Cambridge moral 
science tripos until 1891 and was recommended to oxford students as 
late as 1878 by A. M. Stedman as 'able, but written in an exceedingly 
dry style' (Stedman 1872,258,307). It would have been hard for any 
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of the moral science students at Oxbridge from 1870 to the end of the 
century to have avoided contact with this potent academic offering of 
John Grote. 
My intentions have to be limited in this section to providing a 
summary of Grote's major objections to John Stuart Mill's essay on 
'Utilitarianism' of 1862. The scope and detail of the criticisms and 
evaluation of utilitarianism of Mill and of Grote themselves warrant a 
full length study but the general historical and descriptive character 
of this thesis precludes detailed critical evaluation, and the desire 
to reconstruct John Grote's own positive contribution to philosophy 
make reconstruction of his negative critiques of alternative positions 
of secondary importance. Two other preliminaries will also have to be 
foregone and made amends for by reference to alternative sources. The 
first is a detailed account of John Stuart Mill's own ethical 
philosophy and the second is a historical survey of the debate and the 
criticisms made of both Mills work and that of his utilitarian 
predecessors especially David Hume, William Paley, Jeremy Bentham, 
James Mill, Malthus and Ricardo, and George Grote. The first is well 
provided for in the texts by Alan Ryan, H. J. McClosky, and R. T. 
Halliday and others, though for our purposes the short survey I find 
most authoritative is that by Jerome B. Schneewind in his 
introduction to Mill's Ethical Writings (Ryan 1970,1974; McClosky 
1971; Halliday 1976; Schneewind 1965) (1). The second is still not 
adequately covered beyond the point of the James Mill, Bentham and 
Macaulay debate of 1830 covered by Jack Lively and John Rees (Lively 
and Rees 1978). A series of older histories cover major contributions 
from the utilitarians with little regard to the contributions of 
opponents and the ensuing debates (Halevy, 1952; Stephen 1900 
Albee 1957; Plamenatz 1958). The text that comes nearest to 
reconstructing the debate over utilitarianism is part one of 
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Schneewind's book Sidgwicks Ethics and Victorian Horal Philosophy 
which can usefully be supplemented by other essays by himself, 
A. J. M. Milne, S. Rothblatt, and more significantly A. Quinton (Schneewind 
1977,1976,1965,1970,1974; Milne 1967; Rothblatt 1968; Quinton 
1973). (2). Finally, wherever arguments for an ethical position have 
already been adduced above I will state positions here without 
elaboration or repetition. The philosophical positions on most issues 
in the Treatise and the -Examination are almost identical and 
references to ýoth have been used when elaborating Grote's own ethical 
theory. 
There are two starting points for an adequate account of Grote's 
Examination, the text itself. and the context. The context of major 
significance was the one assumed by Mill and his supporters and many 
of their opponents, that is the paradigm of a final battle to 
establish the correct methods and an ultimate principle for the moral 
sciences. More immediately the context is the debate that looked like 
a battle between the Cantabridgians and the Philosophical Radicals 
already spoken of above. The controversy between the two forces was 
of long standing, and the banners for each party had been handed down 
and held high by eminent champions on each side. On the side of the 
Radicals were the figures noted above though forefathers were 
regularly appropriated, including Thomas Hobbes, Richard Cumberland, 
Francis Hutchinson, John Gray and several Frenchmen including the 
Marquis de Condercet and Claude Adrien Helvetius. Frederick Maurice's 
successor to the Knightbridge Chair,. the dour Thomas Rawlinson Birks 
saw the Cambridge line' and pedigree as including 'Bacon, Milton, 
Clarke, More, Cudworth, Hartley, Rutherford, Waterland, Paley, 
Coleridge, Whewell, Grote and Maurice' (Birks 1874l 181). But Birks 
considered that 
71 
'It is natural for me to avoid ground they have too lately 
traversed and to begin with the ethical controversy, of which 
Cambridge and Westminster have been the two immediate centres 
during the last eighty or ninety years' (1874,1). 
The Cambridge debaters he studied were Adam Sedgwick, William 
Whewell, John Grate and Frederick Maurice and he provides the 
following historical, and philosophical insights, 
'A posthumous Examination, by Prof. Grote, of Mill's 
Utilitarianism, appeared in 1870, and is like a closing act in 
this long continued controversy, which began with the appearance 
of Prof. Sedgwick's Discourse, forty years ago. There is a 
striking contrast between its beginning and its close. That 
brief Discourse was marked by eloquence and fervour, high and 
noble instincts, vivacity and brilliance of thought, but verges, 
in part, on the looseness which often attends strong feeling and 
impassioned declamation. The Examination is conspicuous for 
searching analysis, comprehensiveness, and candour, and bears 
more resemblance, as composed s'hortly before the author's death, 
to the calm and quiet beauty of a sunset sky. The first attempts 
to cut boldly through the knots of ethical controversy with a 
keen and polished blade, like Excalibur, that sparkles and 
flashes in the sunlight. The last seeks to untie them partially, 
and thus to retain unbroken and uninjured, with a cautious and 
gentle hand, the whole tangled and complex strain of rival moral 
principles and apparently conflicting ethical theories' (Birks 
1874,12-13). 
Despite the florid language and Birks dating errors, (the four year 
error between the date of composition and the authors death), the 
major insight is valid. John Grote did try to cut through the old 
controversy, he did try to bring about its termination and that 
through an act of eclectic reconciliation, and he did so as Quinton 
puts it, in a *consistently gracious tone' that was to contrast with 
the 'abusiveness of most of Mill's critics' (Quinton 1973,83). 
All three points are worth reinforcing. Firstly Grote proceeds 
with little or no reference to old controversies and old 
controversialists. Sedgwick's Discourses and Whewell's criticisms Of 
utilitarianism in both his Lectures and the Elements are studiously 
avoided. Grote was intent on providing a fair and rigorous 
philosophical appraisal of Mill's essay at a time when he hoped the 
dust of battle had settled. He intended to keep his criticism 
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primarily philosophical and he reduces arguments about and from the 
positions of theology and personal criticism to an absolute minimum, 
though both allies and enemies seemed intent on restoring them 
(Llewelyn Davies 1871,93-96; Westminster Review 1871,53). In 
addition it might be noted that Grote eschews the most conventional of 
all methods for debunking utilitarianism, the reductio ad absurdio, 
the taking of practical examples that seem bound to lead the 
utilitarian into inconstistency or to force him to reject or denounce 
every moral opinion. The otherwise hostile reviewer for the 
Westminster complements Grote for using this device only once and for 
using reliable historical information and not hypothetical argument 
(Westminster Review 42,54; Grote 1870,316-318). The absence of 
antagonistic and hostile criticism of the person is also a 
characteristic of the Examination noted by the same reviewer, and many 
others including Quinton and Birks Llewelyn Davies writes, 
'Professor Grote is never carried by controversial warmth #to 
unfairness. He is always courteous and gentle, always anxious to 
correct dogmatism in himself, as in others, by appeals to the 
complexity and mysteriousness of the world with which moralists 
have to deal. And, in the same spirit of* reverence for the 
actual truth of things, he takes pains to be accurate in 
expression'as in thought. His style, though involved and 
cumbrous, is that of a thinker who realises distinctly what he 
means, and endeavours to convey his meaning in terms which shall 
not be liable to be misunderstood' (Llewelyn Davies 1871,83). 
All this is unsurprising, Grote had publicly stated his own objection 
to unfair and personalized literary criticisms in an early essay and 
he had personally witnessed the terrible effects of Mill's barbs on 
Whewell and Sedgwick and the assaults from his Cambridge colleagues on 
both John Mill and his own brother. John Grote complains of the 
'harshness of dispute', and he adds that 
'The "odium ethicum' is even more unreasonable than the odium 
theologicum', (Grote 1870,9). 
and calls for a 'jus belli* and a 'cessation' of hostilities. 
Alexander Bain wrote of the response to Mill's essays on Whewell and 
73 
Sedgwick that 
'John Grote thought that in this and in the 'Sedgwick' article, 
Mill indulged in a severity that was unusual in his treatment of 
opponents. I could not for my part, discover the difference. 
Yet it is no wonder, as he (Mill) told me once, that he avoided 
meeting Whewell in person, although he had opportunities of being 
introduced to him' (Bain 1880,83-84). 
Whewell for one overcame his personal hurt in a letter to Mill of 1865 
and John himself placated his brother after the attack by Richard 
Shilleto on his History of Greece (Romily 1855, Vo122,88(b); 1862, 
Vol31,142; Grote 1851). Unfortunately what Grote hoped would be seen 
as a quality recommending his work was seen by some, especially 
Sidgwick. as a negative value. Grote's patient criticisms, his 
eclectic method, his unwillingness to impose a deductive or purely 
inductive system were interpreted by the latter as 'perplexing 
prolixity', 'sudden small cavil', 'lax syncretism', 'languid 
oscillation between different principles', 'lack of appreciation of 
systems', 'no system' and even 'unsystematic thought' (Sidgwick 1871a 
1871b). Grote's careful style however is I have argued was indicative 
of what was to become the distinctively Cambridge style of philosophy. 
Finally in writing the Examination Grate was trying to perform a 
task later to be repeated with differing degrees of popular acclaim by 
Henry Sidgwick and George E. Moore, the tasks of reconciling, 
harmonizing ahd synthesising the ethical theories of utilitarianism 
and intuitionism (Sidgwick 1907, XV-XXI; Moore 1903,1912; Grote 1870 
122-124,177-178; Hudson 1980,24-45t 74-104). The nature of Grote's 
reconciliation we will come to later, but we must take seriously the. 
claims that he was anxious to avoid argument from a fixed position, 
that he aimed neither. to defend an existing or to promote a new 
philosophical school. Rather be desired to reconcile a plurality of 
first principles into 'a syncretic'philosophical harmony (Grote 1870, 
112). 
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ii 
The level of understanding of Mill's text, and support for the 
arguments, motives and style of Mill's philosophy surprised the 
reviewer for the Westminster. He recognised correctly that Grote was 
'deeply impressed' by Mills ethical writing, he recognized that Grote 
saw 
not only that happiness is the necessary result of all right 
action and virtuous action, but that in the abstract it is the 
only proper end; goodness and justice, though stated to be 
independent of happiness, being nevertheless wholly employed 
about its production'(Westminster Review 1871,42). 
Indeed this author and other reviewers note that Grote, especially in 
his appendix to Chapter IV of the Examination on 'The Utilitarianism 
Which is Common to all Moral Philosophy', agreed that this ethical 
philosophy had purchase on moral truth. Grote's level of agreement 
with utilitarianism however went well beyond this, and well beyond 
that conceded by any other of its external critics. Briefly stated 
Grote's agreements with 'old' utilitarianism ethics are as follows: - 
(1) a) All reasonable action is aimed at some good (1870,66, 
301,80), (b) Consequences of action are a primary source 
of moral value (ibid,. 30-31,58-59). 
(2) a) By good is meant someones enjoyment or satisfaction 
(1879,80)1(b) All action ought to be useful in some sense. 
(3) Happiness defined as eudaemonia, the generally desirable 
end of life, living well, the good life is the summum 
bonum, but only with the truth of a tautology or truism 
(1870,31,58,64-65,69,72-73 106). 
(4) Happiness, whether defined as above, or as welfare or 
simple pleasure and absence of pain is an ideal of great 
moral value, a primary ideal (ibid 32t 123). 
(5) All actions should, in so far as is possible and 
desirable, promote happiness (ibid 68,74-51,177-8). 
(6) 'Virtue or -right action is the great source of human 
happiness' as are all their elements such as benevolence, 
honour, courage, justice and duty (18701 1). 
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-(7) Psychologically happiness and even pleasure are desired 
by everybody (ibid, 107). 
(8) There is a great need for a closer study of happiness and 
pleasure, an 'observational eudaemonics' that would study 
such things as elements of both and the human capacities 
for them (1870,236-237 ; 1876,14,275). 
(9) A scientific study of pleasures and pains, including the 
measuring and comparing of pleasures is hypothetically 
possible and may in some cases be useful in practical life, 
this could be called the study of hedonics or hedonology. 
(1870, XXI, 180-182,345; 1876,14) (3). 
(10) There is much room for reform and improvement both-in 
personal and social life, and many social rules and 
institutions could do with reform. Utilitarian analysis 
could be useful in the context of this exercise. It may 
help promote improvement and progress (1870, ChXVI-XX). 
(11) Old utilitarianism does not necessarily lead to 
a) a godless society (1870,238-91 256-7) 
b) consequences conceived as immoral by either 
religious or conventional social criteria 
C) impracticability. 
d) dangerous social and political consequences. 
As well as sympathising so heartily with the' old utilitarian ethics 
Grote was also readily aware of how far John Stuart Mill had gone in 
revising and modifying the old utilitarian ethics. While commentators 
argue over the extent and implication of Mill's critique of 
Epicurianism and Bentham and of his modifications to the utilitarian 
philosophy, almost all consider these modifications to be central and 
extensive, at least on occasions during his life (Birks 1874,12-14; 
Stephen 1900,304-308; Albee 1901,204-209; 262-267; Plamenatz 
1958,123-124,134,144; Schneewind 1965,17-27; Britton 1969, 
46-50; McCloskey 1971,56-58; Ryan 1974,101-103,105,110-111; 
Quinton 1978,38-39; Halliday 1976,32-40t 60-64; ). 
Albee's view is the most moderate claiming that in Mill's essay 
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* we find little that is strictly new, but much to confirm us in 
the opinion that the partial divergence from the Utilitarian 
method, which had been so noticeable in some of Mill's previous 
ethical writings, was not a matter of chance... ' (Albee 1901, 
265). 
Plamenatz goes to the other extreme arguing that 
'There is not much left of Benthamite Utilitarianism when John 
Stuart Millhas completed his defence of it. What is left, is 
strictly speaking, not utilitarianism at all, but a kind of 
naturalistic ethics that it would be misleading to call a variety 
of hedonism' (Plamenatz 1958,144). 
Schneewind supports Mill's own version of what he had done, published 
in Mill's Autobiography, namely that the essay on 'Utilitarianism' was 
'A reworking of utilitarian moral philosophy, showing how it 
could overcome objections and incorporate the main positive views 
of its critics-, was an essential part of his (Mills) programme' 
(Schneewind 1977,166). 
John Grote believed the modifications were fundamental and 
extensive, that they were a response to external criticisms, that they 
were made by importing ideas from alien systems and then pretending 
the new elements were a natural and normal part of, and were 
compatible with old utilitarianism. They were also a major 
improvement on the old system. 'Neo-utilitarianism' as Grote calls 
Mill's revised version of the 'old utilitarianism' doctrine, in its 
attempt to remedy defects in the latter, produces some novel arguments 
and elements. Anthony Quinton argues that Grote considered Mill's 
essay to have been a 'radical departure' from old utilitarianism in 
two ways, by revising the definition of -happiness to 
include the 
quality and quantity distinction, and in providing the new account of 
the moral motives which stress sociality and sympathy (Quinton, 1973 
86-87). The Westminster Review state three modifications noted by 
Grote, the introduction of the quality and quantity distinction, the 
desertion of assumptions of universal selfishness in favour of 
I 
universal sociality, altruism and the urge to promote the general' 
happiness, and the new weight given by Mill to the validity and 
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practical value of traditional moral rules. Grote in fact considered 
Mill to have modified old utilitarianism-in many ways the most central 
of which are as follows: - 
(1) Mill widens his definition of utilitarianism happiness 
and pleasure to ensure that they are not a synonym for 
hedonism, or the desire for physical pleasure. and the 
absence of pain (Grote 1870,16,17-20). 
(2) The new definition incorporates qualitative differences 
in pleasures and allows less of the latter to take priority 
over more of the quantitatively measured pleasures. 
Aesthetic and spiritual pleasures are incorporated into the 
account of happiness (Grote, 1870,20,145-58). 
(3) Mill makes it plain that the happiness-to be aimed at by 
individuals and the government is not that of the self but 
the general happiness of all or universal happiness (Grote, 
1870,16,123-124; 274) 
(4) Both in the above and in his psychological and 
ethnological studies, Mill is seen to transform 
utilitarianism from being egoistic, as it was in its 'old' 
formulation, to being both 'ideal' and 'altruistic' (Grote 
1870,3-6; 175-179; 1876,78-80). 
(5) Mill is praised for modifying the theory of associational 
psychology explicit in the works of Bentham and James Mill 
to allow new springs of 
* 
action to be basic to man's nature 
and others to be so ingrained by habit that human nature 
would be unidentifiable without them, eg sympathy, love of 
excellence, self improvement, love of virtue (Grate 1870, 
16,21-22,234). 
(6) Mill deprioritizes the external sanctions of penalty and 
education, and stresses against Bentham the crucial role of 
internal sanctions e. g. sympathy and conscience. This is an 
advance inthe theory of obligation (Grote 1870,21-22, 
(7) The 'old utilitarian' theory of justice had been modified 
by introducing new and refined standards by Mill namely 
impartiality, disinterestedness and egalitarianism, though 
support for the latter has to be qualified (Grote 1870, 
148-159). 
(8) Mill is recognized as having moved a great deal to allow 
some moral value as well as practical value to be given to 
conventional moral rules, or his theory of the role of 
secondary moral rules (Grote, 1870,22-24). 
(9) Mill is seen to have improved the old Epicurian system by 
introducing elements from' both stoicism and Christianity 
(Grote 1870,24-25,62,63g 77-78). 
(10) Mill's style rises above that of the 'practical I, and the 
'business like' reformer that was Bentham. There is in him 
78 
'the spirit of a genuine philosopher distrusting 
considerably both of these (old utilitarianism and 
positivism), and extending much beyond them, but 
endeavouring to make the best of them, and importing into 
them much that is alien to themselves' (Grote 1870,11). 
Now this last point leads to the most pervasive criticism to 
abound in the Examination. Grote considers that Mill has bought these 
improvements at a high cost, including the desertion of many positions 
inimical to the old utilitarian ethics. Mill's essay is an attempted 
eclectic mixing which produces a system that is incoherent, and in 
which some important questions are missed and others wrongly answered 
(Grote 1870,15-17). Mill's whole Chapter II on the meaning of 
utilitarianism is presented as a case of a 'pseud6 refuting 
description', defending utilitarianism by radically altering its 
definition. The new system was philosophically flawed but above all 
it was 'heterodox*, 'alien' and 'incompatible' with the old, and 
especially; Benthamite utilitarianism. 
'Deeply impressed with the writer's ethical work, he has been led 
to inquire whether such ideas and sentiments as are there 
expressed are the proper outcome of Utilitarianism as defined by 
his predecessors, and the great aim of the work now before us is 
to show that they are not, but that Mr. Mill, whilst believing 
himself to bq a Utilitarian, is too good for his creed, and 
unconsciously argues against the school he seeks to support' 
(Westminster 1871,42). 
"His general thesis is this: the Utilitarian Philosophy, Qua a 
philosophy, owes its success to the recognition and incorporation 
of other elements than those which its formal statement includes' 
(1871,43). 
'Grote considers Mr Mill to be heterodox to his school... ' (1871, 
53). 
Plamenatz by implication then, is siding with Grote, on the issue of 
the extent of John Mill's modifications to old utilitarian ethics. 
While considering the case for Mill's proof being 'naturalistic', 
Grote sides with Sidgwick and Rashdall later, in believing its 
character to still remain 'ideal'. Some of these points are 
recognized by the Westminster's reviewer 
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We can spell out the general argument of the Examination as 
follows (1) *old utilitarianism', by which Grote meant the philosophy 
represented by 'Paley and Bentham', had a partial grasp of the truths 
of morality, (2) Mill's 'neo utilitarianism' is an improvement upon 
and makes up for some defects in the old utilitarian philosophy noted 
both by John Mill himself in earlier essays and in the essay of 1862, 
(3) these improvements are bought by importing elements from other 
alien moral systems, and while the new system is an improvement it is 
both (4) 'heterodox* and incompatible with 'old utilitarianism' and is 
(5) still fatally flawed, being partial and abstract (1870,29); 
superfluous (avoiding central problems) (1870,28), incoherent (the 
new and old elements are incompatible) (1870,150-151); and still 
dogmatic (1870,7-9,232,245-249); and hence (6) suggestions for 
remedying these defects as well as arguments pointing them out need to 
be made so that they can be transcended and a better eclectic system 
provided. 
We can now turn our attention to the fourth, fifth and sixth 
points above and concentrate upon the two texts concerned. Although 
Grote is not totally happy with any of Mill's improvements to the old 
utilitarian system, he is not content simply to point out heterodoxy 
or to repeat old arguments, but rather enters into a long and complex 
critical engagement with Mill's essay. The Examination can be said to 
have a three part structure to fulfil this endeavourl firstly chapter 
one to nine provide a detailed exposition and critique of Mill's text# 
the second part from chapters ten to fourteen examines Mill's methods 
and the utilitarian psychology generally, the third part, from 
chapters fifteen to twe nty one, provide a placing of Mill's ethics in 
its wider philosophical and historical context, dealing as it does 
with its development, and its claims to be practical, scientific and 
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above all a morality of progress. Grote states his own primary 
substantive and particular purposes to be 
ýto show that, though virtue or right action is the great source 
of human happiness, still the fact that it is so does not of 
itself constitute its virtue, or explain what we mean when we use 
that term' (Grote 1870,1). 
He argues that besides this he has two secondary purposes, one to show 
that any sort of moral or social improvement can be attained only by 
defining, making imperative and acting upon moral ideals and second to 
show that ethical reductionism is bound to fail (Grote 1879,1-4): 
the other is tQ show that utilitarian ethics can never 'settle the 
question, whose happiness it is that we are to try and 
produce... '(Grote 1870,4-5). In short utilitarianism has an 
inadequate theory of virtue and duty. My own structure will be to 
examine Grote's charges that Mill's revisions to utilitarianism fail 
to make that system satisfactory, leaving to one side the arguments 
against the utilitarian claims that their system is practical, 
scientific and progressive. ' We shall save our judgement on*whether 
Grote proves his case for the heterodoxy* of Mill's version of 
utilitarianism until we have examined these other arguments. These 
arguments can be taken roughly in the order they appear in the 
Examinations. Section III a) arguments about happiness and pleasurer 
including the elements of pleasure, the quality and quantity 
distinction b) arguments concerning the proof of the utilitarian 
first principle c)arguments about the*distribution of happiness, and 
the principles of virtue, duty and justice. Section IV will contain a 
short summary of Grote's critique of Mill's methods as preached and 
practiced in 'Utilitarianism'. 
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III 
Part One 
a) Havpiness 
The questions relating to the meaning, charactert psychological 
structure, means to and value of-happiness were the first major issues 
Grote confronted in the Examination and Grote's arguments on this 
score are seen by both Quinton and the reviewer for the Westminster as 
the central ones. Grote's arguments are however more complex than 
either of the above imagine. Firstly, Grote wishes to establish from 
the start that moral philosophy is the study of what we ought to do 
and not what we do or desire to do. He insists that we must always 
separate the ideal element in moral questions from the positive and 
actual to separate 'idealism' as he calls it from moral 'positivism' 
(Grote, 1870,1-4). In all utilitarian arguments to date, but 
especially in Mill's essay, the two have become confused 
'Utilitarianism endeavours to a great extent to take a middle 
place, as to moral science, between positivism and idealism, (if 
we use the latter term to express the assumption of an ideal or 
something beyond experience). Professing to keep to fact and 
observation, it understands by the name of "happiness' something 
which it (really) not only shows that men try to gain, but 
assumes it is desirable they should. This therefore is with it 
an ideal ... * (Grote 1980,3). 
Whether the confusion is in fact a fallacy we shall explore when 
examining Mill's 'proof of utility', Grote is however anxious to show 
that all moral philosophies, 
'to have any value, must begin with assuming that there is 
something imperative upon us to do, or desirable for us to do; 
must begin, that is, with an ideal: if it does not make this 
assumption, its real course is the exceedingly unphilosophical 
one of beginning with describing what man does do, and then, by 
degrees and unauthorizedly, altering its language and speaking of 
this as what he should do Or ought to do' (Grote 1870,3-4). 
Either way Mill's ethics exhibit a system which has the 'merits, if 
merits they are to be so called, of. neither' positivism nor idealism, 
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being neither truly scientific nor being philosophical, being neither 
truly inductive nor deductive, a posteriori or a priori. Mill's 
system is, in short, incoherent. 
Grote, as we shall see, considers Mill to be closer to idealism 
than positivism. He treats happiness as what we ought to pursue in 
life, not just what we do pursue,. and Grote considers it unlikely that 
someone as astute as Mill would commit what Moore later calls the 
naturalistic fallacy (Grote 1870,64,175-180). However by importing 
idealistic elements, and in particular by admitting not only one 
fundamental 'a priori' intuition, but many, he deserts the positivist 
and Benthamite utilitarian ground. The fundamental intuitions 
imported by Mill into utilitarianism are that a) man 'ought' to 
regulate his conduct to promote happiness, b) that happiness has 
I qualities' as well as *quantities'; c) that man has a fundamental 
desire to promote social well-being and hence that the 'general 
happiness' is what we ought to desire, and d) that virtue is a part 
of happiness and e) that a just distribution is one that is 
disinterested, impartial and egalitarian (Grote 1870g a)1-4, 
46,177-182,267-273, b)19-21,35-36,49-52, c) 21-24,62-63,69-72, 
98,274; d) 99-100,125-126; e) 93-100,188,191,273-274). Grote 
recognises that Mill admits that first principles are not capable of 
proof but he notes that on all the above issues Mill smuggles value 
judgements into otherwise descriptive or empirical propositions or 
arguments, and gives the impressions that the value judgements he has 
made above have some legitimate empirical grounding. 
One small cavil I have with Quinton can be m, ýntioned here. He 
recognises - that Mill 'hovers' between idealist and positivist 
conceptions of happiness, but then he writes 
'In fact, I think it is fairly clear that Mill takes happiness to 
be the former: actual or realized happiness, in other words, as 
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against (perhaps mistakenly) expected happiness' (Quinton 1973, 
85). 
In fact this is a conflation of ýdeal with actual or realized 
happiness, and positivist with expected happiness, when the two sets 
of conceptions or dichotomies are very different. 
We have seen already that Grate considered happiness to be a 
possible and desirable moral ideal, but it was only one amongst a 
plurality of ideals, all of which derive their value from several 
sources including their felicific consequences (Grote 1870,31, 
109-119,125-127,177-178,258-259). Grote argues throughout the 
Examination that Mill assumes, but does not admit explicitly, the 
existence of these other primary ideals and sources of moral value. (4) 
Mill's system is also considered to fail because it appears to take 
only happiness as ideal, reducing virtue, duty, perfection, justice 
and good and right to the status of means to it or parts of it. 
Mill's system is hence accused of being partial, abstract, one sided 
and reductionist (Grote 1870,29,31,69,72,105-110,176-178). 
While happiness is expected to attend the performance of right, good, 
just and virtuous acts, Grote's point is also that Mill still fails to 
see that it is not this phenomenon on which alone gives them moral 
vcLL%39-his argument is 'back to front' (Grote 1870,107-116; 192-193). 
The wide variety of moral terms in use are evidence to Grote of the 
plurality of ideals in moral reality. In addition they allow moral 
arguments to take place and for reasons to be given for preferring or 
recommending particular courses of action (Grote 1870,268-9; 
Sidgwick 1979,181-182). Sidgwick notes that Grote's identification 
of this problem of obtaining an adequate account of 'ought' and of the 
plurality of moral notions ýwas the first full discussion of it to be 
published'. 
Grote we have seen accuses Mill of defending utilitarianism by 
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regularly redefining the concepts of *happiness' and 'utilitarianism' 
and of adopting which ever meaning allows defence of the theory in 
each particular argument. Grote accuses Mill of using the term 
utilitarianism in five different senses during his essay. Mill uses 
the term to refer to 1) universal utilitarianism or the universal 
agreement of all philosophers that happiness ought to be produced by 
actions, 2) philosophical utilitarianism which argues that only the 
production of happiness gives moral value to acts; 3) old 
utilitarianism which is unideal, hedonistic and egotistical 
(4)neo-utilitarianism, the use of the term to refer to a reformed 
system that transcends the limitations of (2) and (3) and adds other 
alien elements eg qualities of pleasure; and 5) practical or 
reforming utilitarianism referring to the practice rather than the 
philosophy of the Philosophical Radicals (Grote 1870,58-61). 
Happiness is sometimes defined as 1) quantifiable pleasure and absence 
of pain; 2) on other occasions it is extended to cover what is 
qualitatively more worthy 3) on yet other occasions it is a general 
state of contentment or welfare, and 4) finally it indictes" a purely 
ideal futuristic state, a synonym for right or the good or summum 
bonum (Grote 1870,31-32,74-75,350-352). The Greek and 
Aristotelian notions of happiness as living well and the later 
Epicurian, Benthamite and Millian views are compared and contrasted 
(1870,347-347). The objection is not just that Mill is inconsistent 
but that he is misleading. 
ýWe came round in this respect to what I have said before, namely 
that though, if we are to give a meaning to the term happiness, 
we may mean by it all that man wants, yet if we suppose the word 
happiness to have an independent meaning of its own, it is 
morally misleading to say-that all that man wants is happiness' 
(Grote 1870,330-331). 
Either way there is a problem, if happiness is synonymous with right 
and good, then Mill's famous formulation that 
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. actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness' 
is little more than a tautology. If happiness means something else, 
namely pleasure and the absence of pain, then we have an argument that 
is neither self evidently true or true by empirical observation and 
induction (Grote 1870,267-268; Sidgwick 1977,181-182). 
The question of the definition of happiness i. e is happiness the 
actually desired or the ideally desirable, (that which ought to be 
desired), as we shall see, is crucial to the argument in the proof 
proposed by Mill. 
Chapter One of the Examination is however not dev oted to any of 
the above tasks but to a discussion of the elements that go into that 
general state called happiness, or 'What does happiness -consist 
in? ' 
The general argument here is*that Mill's arguments are superfluous. 
That is, Mill tries to defend happiness as the ultimate ideal from the 
objection that it 
cannot furnish a proper role of human conduct on account. of the 
imperfect manner in which, after all, happiness can be understood 
and described' (Grote 1870,27). 
But instead of tackling the problem he merely shifts between 
different definitions of happiness. Hence, 
'I have called utilitarianism, in what follows, superficial 
because instead of facing the real questions, it rests so much on 
mere prudentialisms' (Grote 1870,28). 
That is Mill tells us about several means to happiness, he tells us to 
prefer contentment to agitation, and spiritual to physical pleasures, 
he stresses mental cultivation, and the pleasures of virtue and 
benevolence. But he does not tell us what is or what constitutes 
happiness (Grote, 1870,36-37). In addition Mill's procedure here is 
just one more example of the common practice in the history of moral 
philosophy; 
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'in which philosophers with a certain degree of confusion as to 
whether they were giving the meaning of 'should be', or 
describing the kind of conduct (as' distinguished from other 
conduct) to which the term was applicable have explained 'well' 
or 'should be' in the phrase which I have given' (Grote 1870, 
350). 
Mill, we are told, confuses the explanatory philosophical role with 
the prescriptive practical endeavour. 
Grote shows how hopelessly narrow is the view of human nature 
posited by Mill and the utilitarians. He points out the many sided 
and complex character of human natures, the existence Of contradictory 
traits and elements (for which the study of Amphilology is invented), 
Grote notes the two truths that happiness lies in contentment, and yet 
also in right dissatisfaction and the desire to strive for the 
satisfaction of want (Grote 1870,40-41). Mill's descriptions of the 
sort of circumstances that might make happiness attainable in real 
life are no substitute for an adequate definition of happiness, an 
account of the true elements of happiness, and of the problems 
involved in grasping this Protean entity (Mill 1910,11-15; Grote 
1870,40-44). Grote writes 
*the attempt to grasp action in one summary view is like trying 
to grasp water or to grasp Proteus - we only change the place and 
form of the difficulty' (Grote 1870,163), 
Grote himself provides both here and in the Treatise some valuable 
insights into the human moral psyche and the human condition, 
stressing above all else the insecurity of human happiness in the face 
of the vicissitudes of life, and the apparent paradox that as 
happiness is so hard to envisage, and so elusive to grasp in practice, 
it is best achieved by pursuing other goals (Grote 1870 55-56, 
316-317,327). Human happiness was the likely by- product of just 
doing what we want and what we ought and must dot it is an expected by- 
product of everyday acting, thinking and being in the world. Attempts 
to calculate rationally how we can achieve the nebulous state of 
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happiness are therefore not only likely to prove impossible but may 
well turn out to be counterproductive(1870,229-230l 236-7). This 
argument in fact reflects the central 'anti-rationalistIC'character of 
Grote*s moral thinking. Like Oakeshott later he considers that 
'The mass of human life consists of action or behaviour not aimed 
at an end or fixed by a rule, but resulting from our general 
manner of thinking and acting (Grote 1870,131). 
States of happiness and of pleasure Grote also considers to be hard to 
measure and ultimately noncommensurable and incomparable. Grote is 
also concerned that as a reforming system utilitarianism is 'Janus 
faced' allowing endlessly different moral rules and other means to 
happiness to be advocated none of which can guarantee to satisfy the 
end idealized (Grote 1870 284-285). 
Grote recognizes that it is natural for man to want happiness and 
he notes that it is equally true that we want the happiness of others, 
we want the good and the right which are 'other' related. As he puts 
it 
'Human nature is to a certain degree utilitarian itself, but it 
is a very bad disciple of utilitarian philosophy' (Grote 1870, 
332). 
The false psychology arising from Mill's associationalism also comes 
in for regular attack, on the grounds that Mill seems to consider that 
education, habit and external manipulation are the basis for creating 
both personal behaviour and that of whole groups (Grote 1870,168-169, 
206-208, ). One other point is of interest here in separating Whewell 
and Grote. In opposition to the utilitarians Whewell had set up the 
faculty of reason as the psychological guide to the right and the 
good. Mill had correctly objected to this and so too does Grote. 
Reason he considers to have no agreed meaning, it variously refers to 
a faculty, a way, of thinking and to a purposeful account of an action. 
Reason is ambiguous and hence gives little authority (Grote 1870, 
186-190). Just as Butler's psychology of conscience is destroyed by 
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denial that man had such a distinct faculty, so Whewell's psychology 
of ethics is similarly destroyed. T he key argument is that just as 
conscience is only of value when it indicates to us what is imperative 
or right, so reason is right only when it indicates the right or the 
good, 
, it is not reason itself, but the information, so to call it, of 
which it is the organ, which is the force really acting upon us; 
that it has no authority at all as reason, but simply as right 
reason' (Grote 1870,190). 
The point being that while pure education. and socialization cannot 
-account for our discovery of moral values as the utilitarians 
suggested, nor can immediate rational a priori insight. We need to 
know how to gain moral knowledge. 
*But what ethics ought somehow to tell us, is how reason should 
apply to the information it possesses, in order to be able to 
judge what should be done' (Grote 1870,190). 
As is usual, Grote ends the argument by attempting to reconcile the 
ethics of consequence to the ethics of rule and reason, which also 
allows him to suggest a reconciliation between Mill and Kant of a type 
later popularized by Sidgwick (Grote 1870,125-133,191-195,275-277; 
Sidgwick 1963, XVII-XXI). As we have seen above the moral value of an 
act lies in its 'desirableness of end' and in its 'worthiness of 
principle or motive' measured by its motive, the effort expended and 
its conformity to a rule of right (Grote 1870,132). 
b) The-Ouality and Ouantity Distinction 
The introduction into utilitarianism of differences in kind between 
pleasures by John Mill is usually explained by his need to respond to 
those critics of the doctrine who saw it as a 'pig philosophy', that 
sets its ideal too low at the level of physically quantifiable 
pleasures, and therefore underestimates the more lofty pleasures and 
values of aestheticism, spiritualism, culture and learning. The 
argument adduced by Mill is that even Epicurians placed mental 
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pleasures over sensation, and that it is 
% quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the 
fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more 
valuable than others* (Mill 1910,7). 
that a small quantity of higher pleasures may be more desirable than a 
large quantity of lower pleasures, the criteria being the test of 
I preference' by a person 'competently acquainted with both', Intensity 
and duration and the other quantitative scales are not alone the major 
criteria for measuring pleasures. 
The arguments launched against Mill by Grote are astute and 
generally accurate. Firstly the introduction of this distinction is 
novel, and it is unwitting evidence that Mill recognizes the original 
defect of utilitarian ethics, (as pointed out by Whewell) (Grote 1870, 
15,19-20). Secondly Mill equivocates on the distinction causing 
further confusion in the reader's mind. After stating clearly that 
the differences are in kind, he retreats to suggest that 'higher' 
rather than 'lower' is the same thing as 'more' rather than 'les. s' 
'He endeavours to mend the old utilitarianism 
of pleasure to quantity, but immediately 
saying in effect this quality is quantit,, 
different manner, namely, not by definite 
Bentham's method, but by human experience and 
such analysis' (Grote 1870,47). 
by adding quality 
neutralizes this by 
y estimated in a 
analysis, which was 
testimony without 
If the neutralization is effective then the old criticism of 
utilitarianism on this issue are valid, if the qualitative novelty 
stands then Mill's position is heterodox. This heterodoxy has two 
bases, firstly Mill has produced a new intuition and a criteria of 
worth or value, and secondly he has undermined Bentham's whole scheme 
and scale of pleasures, and along with that all possibility of 
objective arithmetic measurement and comparison (Grote 1870t 46-47, 
49,52l 53-54). 
The incompatibility of the new distinction with the old is 
positively asserted (Grote 1870,47,50, ). Next we have to consider 
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Mill's criteria for evaluating quantity and for comparing amounts of 
both, the argumerkt from 'preferability' or 'relative preferability* as 
Grote calls it. Grote's first objection is that Mill does not tell us 
whether the evidence given by the competent authority is testimony in 
a legalistic sense or opinion (Grote 870,47). The first is 
descriptive, the second involves an estimation of worth with the 
implication that a reason could be given why the preference was 
preferred. This begs the question of what this worth is and what 
reasons would be considered relevant. Secondly Grote argues that 
qualities of pleasure may only be compared if we 'not only introduce 
Stoic elements, but migrate bodily to Stoicism' (Grote 1870,53). 
Thirdly Grote rejects the analogy of an expert judging two pleasures 
with a scientist, say a chemist, judging two fluids. Judging 
pleasures is far more complicated, pleasures are always mixed with 
. something from ourselves', they are subjective rather than objective, 
and in addition pleasures are interwoven with each other and with 
other elements in our physical and moral lives (Grote 1870,. 53-55). 
Again all human beings have their own experience or scale of 
preferences, even the competent judge, and his scale may not be 
compatible with that of other people. Agreed scales of pleasure seem 
to be a hypothetical and practical absurdity. 
*I cannot understand a happiness for everybody, after we have 
gone beyond our universal wants of meat, drink, and shelter, and 
till we arrive at a sphere where pleasures may be of a temper and 
nature which at present we cannot enter into. I cannot 
understand a general scale of pleasures, in which so many marks 
will be given to drunkenness, so many to love of the fine arts, 
so many to something else, according to the experience of those 
who have tried more than one of them' (Grote 1870, -55). 
And even if a comparative science was practical it would still not 
have any moral-implications (Grote 1870,345). 
The comparison of the happiness of whole societies is as 
impossible as the comparison of the pleasures of individuals. So 
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*If he finds a Turkish happiness in'quiescence and inertia, opium 
and the. sight of dancing girls, I cannot see who is to gainsay 
him: nor can I see how Mr Mill's test of comparison, the 
judgement of intelligent people who have tried different alleged 
kinds of happiness, is ever to be applied' (Grote 1870,317-318). 
Grote himself suggests a much better democratic optionf 'the general 
suffrage' as the criteria for evaluating and measuring preferences for 
a whole society (Grote, 1870,56). But in a small appendix to Chapter 
IV, not intended for publication, Grote is also seen to add a third 
possible criteria of worth other than quantity and quality, and a 
third criteria to add to comparative preferability by an expert, and 
the general suffrage. This is the 'high' and 'low* scale of 'divine 
happiness' using the Creator as the judge of preference. But the 
argument is not developed and it serves only to point out that other 
intuitional criteria in addition to quality may be added (Grote 
1870l 83). 
That these criticisms hit home is evidenced in the Westminster 
Review critique which admits that Grote's chapter contains 'many gbod 
remarks'. However the reviewer defends Mill with two unsupported 
assertions, one that 
'Mill does not postulate such unanalyzable differences of quality 
as being necessary to the justification of the standard of 
utility... ' 
and the other that Mill's differences are likely to be accountable for 
in terms of 'differences of the accompanying mental states'. The 
reviewer concludes that there is no incompatibility between the 
qualitative distinction and utilitarianism generally and Bentham's 
version in particular (Westminster Review, 1871,43-44). While 
admitting Grote's arguments against scientific. measurement and 
compatibility have . much real force' the optimistic reviewer retreats 
to the last stronghold the claim that 
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'though the work is a delicate one, no one doubts its possibility 
even now in its principal features' (Westminster Review, 1871, 
44). 
Sidgwick in his two reviews is more positive. The Cambridge 
University Reporter's review states that Grote's criticisms are 
entirely destructive of Mill's system as he expounds it', and the 
second states that Grote puts the 'dilemma more clearly' than Lecky; 
adding the point that if Mill prefers pleasures because 'higher', 
'better' or more 'dignified' his position is no different to that of 
some of his opponents, including the school of moral sense (Sidgwick 
1871a, 183; 1871b, 197). Llewelyn Davies is happy to repeat Grote's 
criticism leaving appraisal to his readers, while Quinton correctly 
describes Grote's critique as 'neat' and Mill's arguments as 
. unfortunate' (Quinton 1973,84). Together Grote's arguments against 
Mill on the distinction are in my judgement decisive and written as 
they were in 1861 as Mill's essays in the Fraser's Magazine were 
published it seems his arguments were original and uninfluenced by 
other reviews, though several did appear during the latter part of 
that year. (5) The general thrust of the criticism, that Mill is in a 
double bind, in philosophical trouble whichever way his distinction 
about quality and quantity is interpreted, has become commonplace 
through reproduction by Sidgwick and Moore (Sidgwick 1907,129; Moore 
1903,78). 
c) The Proof 
Contemporary scholars are no more agreed on what Mill was doing in his 
famous Chapter Five of Uti2ltarlanism than the first generation of its 
critics. Nor are Mill's own statements of his intentions absolutely 
clear and unequivocable. What we can assert with some confidence is 
that Mill was trying to show that his version of utilitarianism was 
superior to the alternative intuitionist philosophies of the day by 
showing that some sort of argument and evidence could be produced to 
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support the claims to priority of the greatest happiness principle. 
The intuitionist philosophies on the other hand lacked in his view any 
kind of reasoned support, relying on self evidence for authority, and 
in addition they asserted the value of several unprovable principles 
while the utilitarians asserted only one. Perhaps the only point of 
recent agreement we can start with is that made by Schneewind, that in 
providing some sort of reasoned support for the utilitarian first 
principle 'A greater mare's nest has seldom been constructed' 
(Sidgwick 1965,31). 
My procedure is to explain Grate's analysis of Mill's proof 
passing only the minimal amount of adjudicatory comment. The thrust 
of my own assessment is largely historical, and I limit myself here to 
noting the originality of Grote's arguments, their re-appearance later 
and their centrality to a continuing debate. The five versions of 
utilitarianism that Grote finds in Mill's essay are expounded at the 
beginning of Grote's Chapter before the analysis proper begins, 
presumably*to show how difficult proof would be to Mill. Which 
version of utilitarianism is he is trying to prove valid? Mill's own 
neo-utilitarian version had according to Grote injected at least two 
alien elements into traditional utilitarian arguments, that man is a 
social creature with naturally social sentiments, and that he desires 
not his own but the 'general, or social good' (Grote 1870,60-63). 
Mill will need therefore to demonstrate in any kind of proof not only 
that mankind ought to act to promote 'happiness' but the 'general 
happiness', and to show that this is as natural or more natural than 
the desire to promote one's own. Mill has raised his own highjump bar 
by redefining the utilitarian philosophy. In passing, Grote notes 
that Mill in fact uses words like social and general as legitimatory 
or persuader words, or 'moralizing' words as Grote actually calls 
them. Grote suspects that Mill still believed the doctrine which 
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considered social motives and altruistic feelings to be secondary 
results of education, training and habit, but had put a gloss on this 
by using the language of 'societarianism' (Grote 1870,60-63). 
One preliminary precedes the central part of the chapter. Mill's 
own conditions for a proof are spelled out, with the author 
recognizing that this was not a . 
'proof in the ordinary meaning of the 
word', that in fact 'the subject does not admit of it, but that while 
the proof given may appear to be 'obvious', it was really a matter 'to 
be decided' on the 'evidence' which 'must be impartially consulted'. 
This leads Grote to worry about what is to come because, 
'I seem to trace in it the same 
to which I have drawn attentii 
happiness: the desire namely 
experience and observation what 
taking account of an ideal, 
first, upon the positive, which 
(Grote 1870,64). 
proceeding on the part of Mr Mill 
on in the case of quality of 
to put that upon the ground of 
does not belong to it, and while 
to attempt to build it, from the 
will bear no such structure' 
The unholy figment is the conflation of fact and value positions and 
arguments, what Moore is later to label the 'naturalistic fallacy'. 
But Grote does not rush to argue that Mill actually commits this 
error. Rather after pointing out the nature of the error, he shows 
how Mill by equivocating on the meaning of such words as happiness, 
pleasure, desire and desirable presents a veneer of consistency and 
coherence. But as with the argument on quality above, Mill is also 
shown to be in a double bind. Either he does try to provide an 
empirical, and inductive proof by reducing 'the ought to be desired' 
to the 'is desired', thereby committing a major logical blunder, or 
else his argument in the proof is not a real proof, in the 
conventional scientific sense of proof. If the latter is the case, 
Mill's utilitarianism is either based on an intuition, making it no 
better than any other intuitionist doctrine, or upon an 'a priori' 
statement, a mere tautology, providing an artificial proof that 
depends for its effect on forcing the usual meanings of happiness, 
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pleasure, desire and two uses of desirable into conformity by mere 
definition. 
That Mill did commit the naturalistic fallacy in his proof that 
happiness is the sole end of moral value is at first scoffed at by 
Grote. 
'But surely he cannot mean that it is solved by laying down, as a 
supposed fact of observation, that what men really desire is that 
which is pleasant to them' (Grote 1870,64) 
And we must remember that Grote has recognized Mill's separation 
of an art and a science of morality and his denial that 'first 
principles' can be proved, the first in the Exploratio and the second 
above (Grote 1865,196; 1870,63). 
Yet in this chapter and elsewhere, Grote gets close to implying 
that Mill did mean to prove that we could reduce an ought statement to 
some empirical statement about what people desire and find pleasant, 
and that, vice versa, ought statements can be induced from 
observations of an empirically testable kind. 
'Such inductiveness therefore as there is in utilitarianism, and 
which distinguishes it from other systems whose method is 
intuitive, must consist in the fact that the supposed proof of 
the utilitarian principles (that right action is that which is 
conducive to happiness) is a proof by way of observation, not by 
way of a priori judgement: and also in the fact, that our idea 
of what is happiness is a matter of observation', (Grote 1870, 
261) 
Earlier he had written 
*And Mr Mill must also remember that, in his proof of 
utilitarianism, he does not at all prove it in. the sense and to 
the extent which he would here give to it. For happiness there 
is considered as identical with 'the desirable', and this, 
however when moraliZed (in Mr Mill's language) it may include 
whatever is desired by all or any... ' (Grote 1870,87). 
Yet this is not Grote'-s argument at this point. Rather he tells 
us what Mill would 'need to do if he was to give a real proof of the 
utilitarian maxim. Then he tells us what Mill does prove, and simplY 
shows how far short of the former the latter falls. To argue his case 
Mill 
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'has to prove that 'happiness', as the ideal summum bonum of man, 
is the one thing which ought to regulate his conduct (as he calls 
it, the sale criterion of morality)... ' (Grote 1870,64) 
and later, 
'Mr Mill in his proof of the utilitarian principle seems to me 
only to prove (if he does prove it) that as a matter of 
experience what people desire is the desirable or happiness: not 
the utilitarian principle 
, 
as he gives it, that the action which 
it is right people should do is that which tends to happiness. 
The principle involves an ideal, to which the proof does not even 
address itself' (Grote 1870,270). 
This account of Grote's position squares with that given by Sidgwick 
in his first review of the Examination. Here he says that Mill did 
not attempt a proof of the moral first principle, only a proof that 
people desire happiness, circumstantial evidence perhaps that at least 
happiness could be the ideal, and even the only ideal purpose (Warnock 
1960,22-23). Grote felt however that there was enough circumstantial 
evidence to support the claim of other things to be capable or worthy 
of being desired, (that is the right and the good, neither of which 
are in actual usage synonymous with happiness). So even this 
secondary form of proof would and does fail, a point we will come to 
again later. Without using the term, Grote still seems to be arguing 
that while tempted to commit the naturalist fallacy Mill held back, 
but in so doing he produced an invalid argument, and 'proving what is 
not the precise conclusion which we are called upon to prove', we have 
a case of 'ignoratio elenchi' (Joseph 1916,590). This interpretation 
is supported by Grote's own summary account of his argument given in 
Chapter X. 
'The reader will remember how in Mr Mill's papers, after right 
action had been defined as action conducive to happiness, it 
comes out by degrees, when it cannot be helped, that the 
happiness meant must have been that which the supposed proof will 
not apply to, - happiness morally determined, or into which there 
enter, for the determination of it, considerations extraneous to 
happiness, namely, virtue and duty' (Grote 1870,161-162). 
The reference to the argument that other ideals than happiness 
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are capable and worthy of desire as well as are regularly observed to 
be desired,. is turned into the basis of another central criticism. 
Mill tells us that the question of the ultimate foundation of morals 
is identical with the question of the summum bonum, the ultimate 
purpose of life and action. Grote firstly, considers this to beg the 
question of what is the true foundation of morality. Secondly, he 
argues that the true foundation may equally be the 'summum jus' or the 
summum faciendum', the 'something to be done'. 
'It may be expressed roughly by saying, that the thing which 
suggests itself to us as of importance, may either be to find our 
happiness, or to find our proper work' (Grote 1870,67). 
Later, after the intrusion of an argument about the possibility of God 
having put rules, order and intention into our existing moral world, 
Grote adds 
*This is the idea 
distinguished from the 
less desirable. This 
facien dum, the notion 
may in some circumstý 
the idea of the summum 
happiness i (Grote 1870, 
of action being right and wrong, as 
idea of it as better or worse, more or 
is the idea of the summum jus, the 
of duty, under which the moral question 
ances present itself to us, rather than in 
bonum, the acquirenduml the notion of 
67). 
Here Grote's argument of the Treatise, that morality has a 
deontological as well as a teleological basis is foreshadowed, along 
with the claim that right and duty have independent moral value, equal 
if not superior to that of the good and happiness. 
Other arguments flow, as Sidgwick notes, in a rather disorganized 
and repetitious manner. Firstly, if Mill is out to prove 'what are the 
things man desires' he has no need 'to show us that he desires the 
desirable'. Secondly, Mill equivocates on the meaning of 'desirable', 
between meaning the *actually desired' and 'the ideally desirable, the 
summum ýonum' (Grote 1870,65). This may be called the 'fallacy of 
conflation' arising from Mill's practice of building on equivocations 
in the meaning of words. To this an apparently original insight is 
added by the editor in a note; 
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*The analogy by which Mill supports his argument here deserves 
attention though it has not been noticed by Prof. Grote. He 
says (Mill 1862,51) 'The only proof capable of being given that 
an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only 
proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it. In like 
manner the sole evidence it is possible to produce that any thing 
is desirable is that people do actually desire it'. But by 
visible and audible we mean capable of being seen and heard, and 
in this case the argument holds good, if an object is seen, it 
must have had the capacity of being seen; the latter proposition 
is merely a restatement of a part of the former. But the word 
desirable does not mean capable of being desired, but deserving 
to be desired, and in the argument, 'an object is desired 
therefore it is desirable', the latter proposition gives a new 
statement quite independent of that which was contained in the 
former' (Mayor, in Grote 1870,65-G6). 
This argument was implied by Grote's comment on equivocation but was 
made explicit by Mayor and has now become a standard move in the 
debate on Mill*s proof (6). 
Next Grote in the middle of repeating the argument about the 
summum faciendum above introduces the insight that Mill's proof 
appears to work and be simple because 
'the various terms here used, independently of the following them 
out into details and particulars, may be considered as all 
meaning the same thing' (Grote 1870,68). 
The point that there is equivocation on the term happiness is turned 
into a charge of inconsistency later, noted especially in the 
different uses between Chapters II and IV of Utilitarianism. In the 
former, Mill 
'follows the Epicureans in developing the idea of happiness into 
definite, measurable, describable pleasure, to be tested by 
experience'. 
while in the latter happiness is widened to incorporate love of virtue 
and justice as its parts (Grote 1870,72-72). A similar point is 
repeated later. If by happiness we mean the desirable then it is the 
summum bonum, if alternatively we change the judgement and mean by 
happiness only pleasure, something particular not general, the 
argument fails (Grote 1870,74-75). This repeats the point that 
Mill's argument often appear to be simple and persuasive, to be 
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arguments not tautologies, but the appearance is achieved by 
equivocation and conflation. 
Three other crucial arguments can be produced to further this 
review of Grote's critique of the proof. (1)First is that concerning 
the fallacy of composition, (2) the failure of the proof in regard to 
whose happiness, and (3) what sort of happines is to be promoted. As 
a preliminary Grote asks what follows if we admit Mill's proof that 
happiness was the solely desired end of our actions? Very little, 
according to Grote until Mill adds the 'moralizing' or legitimatory 
term 'general'. We may consider Mill to show that the sole end is 
happiness but he nowhere proves that this ought to be the end and 
Grote wonders in addition where the natural sociability of men comes 
from in a philosophy that traditionally asserts that 
'the natural desire is not of the general happiness in the first 
instance, till social feelings and moral feelings have had time 
to work... (Grote 1870,70). 
He also wonders whether it is true that people do really want to 
promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number rather than the 
maximization of their own happiness. But the first problem is that of 
the general happiness, can the general happiness be considered 
equivalent to the aggregate of individual happinesses? Grote 
considers Mill's argument that 
'Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the 
general happiness therefore, a good to the aggregate of all 
persons 
fails dismally, coming to grief as it does on the age old problem of 
the irreconcilability of particulars and universals (Grote 1870, 
70-72). Grote's presentation of the dilemma is that Mill's 
formulation fails to show 
*in the same natural manner in which a man's happiness is an end 
to him, the aggregate happiness is an end to each individual of 
the aggregate' (Grote 1870,70-71), 
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and that an 'aggregate can act'. Mayor puts the problem more clearly 
and with better logic as follows, 
'Mr Mill's argument is really an instance of the 'fallacy of 
composition', in which the word all is used at one time 
distributively, at another time collectively. Thus: each human 
being A, B, C, etc. naturally desires his own happiness; but A, 
B, C, etc. make up all human beings, and the happiness of A, B, 
C, etc. makes up the happiness of all human beings' (Mayor, in 
Grote 1870,70) 
At this point Mayor expands on Grote's own brilliant insight contained 
in his implicit analogy of utilitarianism and classical economics. 
This is the argument that ýThe Happiness'of Societies' in ethics is 
equivalent to 'The Wealth of Nations' in political economy (Grote 
1870,242-245). Historically a case can be made for considering 
utilitarianism to be the equivalent of Adam Smith's formulation of 
classical economics, with general happiness replacing wealth as the 
end. In utilitarianism marginal utility is measured by excesses of 
pleasure rather than profit, and self interest and the common good are 
created by sympathy and manipulation not by the 'hidden hand. As 
Mayor notes 
'The fact is, this is an attempt on the part of the utilitarians 
to extend to morality the principle, true under certain 
limitations in political economy, that the public wealth is best 
promoted by each man's aiming at his own private wealth and 
occupying himself exclusively with that' (Mayor, in Grote 1870, 
70). 
By analogy both arguments are open to similar objections, including 
the marxist jibe that they are ideological, justifications not 
explanations of moral and economic behaviour respectively. 
But Mill fails to give any convincing reason why a utilitarian 
should not argue that it is 'my happiness that is the good to me, it 
is not the general happiness that is so ... * (Grote 
1870,72; Llewelyn 
Davies 1871,86). According to Grote the problem is precisely that 
many people do prefer their own happiness and need to have good 
reasons for preferring the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
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and Mill fails to provide such a convincing case. However Grote 
produces one rather weak argument. It is that if all an actor has to 
do prove his actions are right is to prove that his actions, 'do 
actually produce happiness of some kind to somebody', it will be an 
'ill wind which blows nobody any good'. The argument misses the 
significance of Mill stressing the 'general happiness' and the 
. greatest amount' rather than 'some happiness' for 'somebody' (Grote 
1870,74). Grote is on firmer ground when he insists that when 
speaking of morality 
. we must speak of general or social happiness to make certain we 
do not mean merely our own' (Grote 1870,76). 
In Grote's view Mill merely 'moralizes' a selfish doctrine by adding 
these epithets that have no convincing reasons to be there that can be 
found in the essay as presented. And so he finishes his examination 
of the 'proof'. 
The review of Grote's arg uments in the Westminster is extremely 
thorough, recognizing in brief most of the key points above. But 
whereas Schneewind later recognizes that 
'Grote is aware, unlike some later critics, that Mill does not 
mean to give a logically conclusive proof' 
the review here interprets Grote as accusing Mill of the naturalistic 
fallacy and produces a stereotyped defence, showing that Mill did not 
lapse into the fallacy, and that the nature of the proof was really to 
show only that because mankind generally did desire happiness that 
happiness was a highly probable candidate for being accepted as the 
summum bonum, (Schneewind 1977,185; Westminster Review 1871,51-52). 
Sidgwick like Schneewind rightly considered Grote to have desisted 
from the accusation of naturalism, and Quinton's silence, I presume, 
implies that he too recognized this crucial point in the argument 
(Sidgwick 1871a, 183; Quinton 1973,86). Personally I agree with 
Schneewind's judgement on this issue with the qualification that Grote 
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noticed the implicit tendency of any utilitarian doctrine to place its 
obvious intuitional first principle upon strong sociological and 
psychological observational foundations, a tendency made more 
pressing, when the advocates were claiming both to refute the 'a 
priori', 'intuitional' and 'deductive' ethics of their opponents, and 
to embrace for themselves in a legitimatory posture 'a posteriori', 
I experiential' and 'inductive' supports. 
d) Whose happiness, virtue, duty. and Justice 
Here Grote's charge is that Mill fails to give us convincing 
accounts of how to distribute our actions in regard to others, what 
are and why we should do our duties and be virtuous. Before examining 
his arguments we can just remind ourselves of the following points. 
Grote does not consider that Mill has given adequate grounds for 
adding the epithet 'general' to happiness in the formulation of the 
greatest happiness principle (Grote 1870,76,85-86). Secondly he 
does not consider that Mill has *proved that the aggregation of 
individuals' happiness is the same thing as the general happiness. 
Finally he has expressed the same sort of reservation as Sidgwick, 
that sociability and the socially altruistic motives of the Stoics are 
imported by Mill into a system that normally requires, as with 
Bentham, that interests of the self and others, individual and society 
are balanced artificially by education or legislation. This 
importation is incompatible with the old system (Sidgwick 1971b, 198). 
On the first point the Westminster Review considers not only Mill but 
Bentham to have prescribed the general happiness as both the motive of 
individuals and the purpose of moral conduct (Westminster Review, 
1871,45). On the second the reviewer remains silent, but on the 
third he is supportive. Mill is heterodox in that he insists on a 
basic and natural sentiment or instinct towards social behaviour where 
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Bentham relied only upon education, reward and punishment. The 
reviewer however rightly notes that David Hume also posited the 
existence of. a basic benevolent sentiment alongside his otherwise 
utilitarian account of human psychology Westminster Review, 1871,46). 
Llewelyn Davies-supports Grote when he asks the rhetorical questions, 
'Is not the social bond the more important part of the foundation 
of Mr Mill's ethics? Has not the Stoical or Christian cuckoo 
extruded the Epicurean sparrow? The ideal though you drive it 
out with a fork, will insist on returning' (Llewelyn Davies, 
1871,87). 
The central issue now is not whether man is a social being, or 
desires the general happiness, but how in practical life he is to 
determine his actions. Is he simply to do that which he personally 
believe will conform to his own happiness or to the greatest happiness 
of all? Must he obey traditional directives or contemporary 
calculations? Must he apply the principle directly to acts or to 
intermediary secondary moral rules? Must we treat all persons equally 
according to a principle of impartiality or must special social 
relationships be allowed to direct preferences? But. we can tackle 
only two issues in depth here, touching on the others in passing. 
These are 'whose' and 'what sort' of happiness is to be promoted for 
an action to be right. On the first issue Grote's position is that 
Mill does not advise us how we are to know how to distribute our 
actions (and happiness) between contending parties in the world (Grote 
1870,4-5). Mill tells us to maximize happiness but gives little 
coherent guidance on how this can be achieved. Nor does he tell us 
specifically what sort of pleasures or happiness to distribute (Grote 
1870,84). This, according to Grote, is a massive failuret another 
case of Mill's arguments missing the questions and being superfluous, 
for these issues are two of the most important in all of philosophical 
discourse on morality. To make good the failure Grote asserts that 
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Mill would need to inject more intuitive elements alien to 
utilitarianism. And indeed this to some extent Mill does in his 
arguments in the essay under review. 
On the former issue we can detect three key issues 
'The most important point in regard to this distribution is the 
question as between our own happiness and that of others, the 
question between selfishness and benevolence: the next in 
importance is the question of special claim upon us, or the 
question between justice and both benevolence and selfishness' 
(Grote 1870,88). 
In between we shall then take the other question of importance, the 
question of when our actions are already bound and when moral choice 
operates, or if we like the questions of duty and virtue, which Grote 
sees as sub questions of the first (Grote 1870,98). 
The central theme of Grote's criticism of Mill's argument on 
these issues is that he avoids the questions and parades superfluous 
arguments about other issues. In particular the utilitarian's 
argument, including Mill's 
. may be considered an attempt to shift the question from'this 
ground back to the ground of the production of more or less of 
happiness. It tries to blind its eyes to the fact that it must 
assume some principle of distribution for the happiness, and when 
if does assume such, it seems to avoid as much as possible giving 
a reason for it' (Grote 1870,88). 
We have seen how central these issues are to Grote, he says in the 
introduction to the Examination 
'that the most important points of moral difficulty arise not in 
reference to the question about actions, whether they are useful 
or not, but in reference to the question, who it is, in the 
conflict of various interests in life, that they are useful to' 
(Grote 1870,4). 
Put in another vocabulary the key questions in morality are not what 
is useful but what ought we to do, what is right and proper for us to 
do, in short, what makes an action right, proper or appropriate, 
either at the level of being bound or obliged, or at the level of 
being freely imperative, or virtuous. As I have already argued Grote 
considers that Mill does not set these issues out clearly and he does 
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not tackle them directly (Grote 1870,88,93). His usual tactic is 
merely to refer his audience back to the argument for promoting 'the 
general happiness' or 'maximizing' happiness, generally hence avoiding 
the issues (Grote 1870,86). This addition of general we have seen is 
an unwarranted and unjustified addition, a new intuition, and one that 
is anyway unjustified as it is fallaciously reduced to the aggregate 
of the happiness of all separately (Grote 1870,274). 
The point that Mill needs a criteria of distribution more 
specific than 'Maximize happiness' is pushed home by Grote in the 
following rhetorical argument, 
'I do not see why a person should not be acting on this principle 
(the G-H. P) who acted entirely for his own happiness, with the 
bona fide idea that he could do more for his own happiness than 
for that of others, he was really in this way most increasing the 
entire stock' (Grote 1870,88-89). 
This would not do for Grote as we know that he considered action 
arising solely from consideration concerning only the self to be not 
immoral but amoral, nothing to do with morality. In this case the 
actor did not consider others. He only considers maximizing the total 
amount of happiness in the world (though he could have escaped Grote's 
condemnation if he had agreed that he could but help others by looking 
after himself). So Grote's objection must be that morality only comes 
into effect when we do act so as to actually promote the happiness of 
others. What we need according to Grote is either some extra 
principle, ideal, standard or rule to judge practical questions of 
distribution by, or some other explanation as to why people act 
according to certain regular social rules. Grote's own answer is 
predictable, there are other moral ideals independent of happiness 
which explain how we are to act, or in Grote's language, how we are to 
distribute our actions. As with Kant and-Hegel these are the ideals 
of 'right' and 'duty' plus the sub-ideals of 'virtue' and 'justice' 
(Grote 1870,274-275). The particularity of distribution Grote 
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considered to be based of the facts of our position within social 
relationships, or as Bradley is to put it later the relation of 'MY 
Station and Its Duties' (Grote 1870,96-100; Bradley 1876# 145-192; 
Llewelyn Davis 1871,92-93). Human beings are fundamentally social, 
social in existence, thought, word and deed. Our ideals of right, 
duty, virtue and justice are to a large measure an abstract account of 
the imperatives that our everyday social relationships entail for us 
plus the feelings that are associated with these relationships e. g 
love of children. Our ideals 'fit' the actual circumstances of our 
lives. The ideals though imaginative are also shadows of the higher 
facts, the absolute standards of right, duty, virtue and justice Grote 
presumed were the elements of moral reality (Grote 1870,178-179). 
Feelings, relations and ideals were therefore relative to our society 
and our social imaginations but they were also guesses at the moral 
truth. All this will be explained in detail in the next chapter on 
social and moral political theory when discussing Grote's relational 
social theory, his accounts of duty, justice and law. 
Now believing as they did in the existence of only one source of 
moral value, and one moral ideal, to guide our actions the 
utilitarians could not entertain Grote's view. Duty, virtue, justice 
and right had to be explained in terms of happiness and particular 
moral rules had to be explained as secondary rules derived from the 
ultimate principle. Operating with an individualistic theory and a 
social anthropology based on desire and fear, might tempered by 
education and manipulation, they had a problem defining both social 
feelings, and the existence and imperative status of traditional 
social rules. Mill overcame the problem of explaining the everyday 
social norms and values that direct our actions by reference partly to 
force of habit and education and partly to the social nature of man, 
plus the existence of some strong social sentiments or internal 
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sanctions for wrongdoing. To make up for the lack of a particular 
criteria of justice Mill intuitively imports some alien help, the 
concepts of 'impartiality', 'disinterestedness' and 'equality' all of 
which in addition Grote considers to be confused and inadequate to 
account for what we think, do and feel we ought to do. We may take 
two points. (1) Mill's discussions of impartiality, disinterestedness 
and equality. (2) the status and function of the secondary ideals of 
right, duty, justice and virtue, and the reliance of distribution on 
secondary rules. 
(1) The first argument Grote objects to in Mill's account of 
distribution is the importation of the idea of impartiality following 
from Mill's claim that, 
'As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitariamism 
requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and 
benevolent spectator' (Mill 1910,16). 
This idea suggests to Grote ýa revolution' in our moral thinking. 
Now instead of the old 'Ptolomaic' morality which sees ourselves at 
the centre of the moral universe, as in Benthamite utilitariansm, we 
get a kind of rational or 'Copernican' system where reason tells us 
that we are each a unit in a greater system with no special place, 
without special ties or purposes (Grote 1870,93-94). Grote's own 
starting point is neither of these but with society and social 
relationships. 
'But all this must begin with the notion of ourselves, and of 
something, whatever it isl which makes us what we are, and with 
the notion of others as differing among themselves, and with 
certain things which make them what they are: ... * (Grote 1870, 94). 
Mill and his colleagues in short saw society as an aggregate of 
separate but similar units, while Grote saw it as 'an organization of 
dissimilar members' (Grote'1870,95). When it came to distribution 
of our actions then Mill has to produce an argument about equal 
considerations, impartiality and disinterestedness while Grote sees 
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that while these may on occasions be moral, it is a more usual moral 
criteria to be partial, interested and to treat people differently 
according to their special rights, their entitlements and deserts. 
In addition Grote makes the marvellously simple point that 
impartiality and disinterestedness have meaning only in the cont. exts 
where partiality and preference are not appropriate. They are not 
distinct and separate ethical concepts but are relative to particular 
occasions-and appropriate uses within moral vocabulary. 
'Impartiality and disinterestedness are negative terms, which 
have no meaning except on the supposition of temptation to 
partiality and of possible interestedness in the first instance: 
they are gaurds and corrections and cannot be given as original 
principles' (Grote 1870,94). 
Next, these principles ignore the reality that we are often bound to 
show preference according to the unique positions of parties to one 
another in a relationship. 
ýBecause a judge is impartial, it does not follow that he will 
divide the thing in dispute equally between the parties. 
Impartiality between parties means, the not allowing any 
consideration to contribute to the judgement formed which ought 
not to do so', 
or as he says, impartiality does not mean really giving 
% no preference, but the giving no undue preference: and we still 
have the meaning of 'ought' and 'due' to settle (Grote 1870, 
94-95). 
'Impartiality' and 'equity' Grote considers to be fundamently legal 
concepts that have been imported into moral language to express the 
undesirabality of 'undue preference'. To take the concept as 
fundamental, not as qualifications to 'justifiable preference' is to 
misunderstand language and to let a subsidiary qualification or tail 
wag a primarily legal dog . 
Religious appeal is made by Mill in his quoting the golden rule 
to 'treat thy neighbour as thyself* but Grote takes issue with Mill's 
interpretation of this maxim. Jesus did not intend that we showed no 
discrimination between deserving and undeserving cases, duty bound and 
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free situations. Jesus did not mean 
'Love your father and your neighbour, your benefactor and your 
neighbour, alike; yet this is in fact what the principle of 
every body counting for one' leads to' (Grote 1870,95). 
So Grote comes to the firm conclusion, based on the legal and 
relational theory to be examined later, that 
'if we are to answer the question, whose h, 
promote? we must answer it by saying, not 
alike, ourselves taking share with the rest, 
(if we are so to describe it) of each one 
do, according to the moral relation is which 
(Grote 1870,96). 
appiness we are to 
the happiness of all 
but the happiness 
with whom we have to 
we stand to him' 
We are in brief to find out what claims are validly made upon us by 
the existence of a relationship, say becoming a father. We are then 
to act to satisfy these claims (or as we call it) we do our duty. On 
other occasions our relationships do not bind us but peaple still want 
or request things from us. When we consider such requests are valid 
we distribute our actions in their favour, which is called being 
virtuous. 
Without wishing to enter too closely Grote's theories of 
obligation and justice we may still pick up his other worry about Mill 
and Bentham's use of 'equality' and the idea of 'arithmetic equality' 
in particular, in which we are exhorted to treat all other men alike, 
as equal units, for the consideration of the distribution of 
happiness. Grote is not here objecting to the idea of equal respect 
for all human beings, he indeed applauds Kant's 'Categorical 
Imperative' and writes that indeed 
'in some respects all people are to be treated 'alike by us, as 
men' (Grote 1870,340), 
But if by equality we mean something other than 'equal respect ' or 
equal consideration', and move to 'equal amounts to receive then 
Grote feels we have a principle neither morally or practically 
acceptable nor philosophically valid, nor one that has 'anything to do 
with utilitarianism' (Grote 1870,335-336). Indeed the importation of 
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the ideas of 'impartiality' and 'equal claims' or 'rights' are 'a 
priori' intuitions (Grote 1870,274; Llewelyn Davies 1871,88-89). 
The impracticality lies in the fact that we are all so dissimilar in 
so many ways. Continual levelling of differences may also produce the 
opposite of progress (1870,334-336,341). The immorality liesin 
treating unlike cases alike or equally and indeed 
'it has been no less generally recognized that in some respects 
they are to be treated differently, as this or that man bearing a 
particular relation to us' (Grote 1870,340). 
The philosophical invalidity arises from several considerations, 
starting with the most general, which is that 
'when the word equal is used in regard to them (men), it is used 
generally with very little meaning' (Grote 1870,336). 
Strictly the term has an arithmetical usage, but arithmetical 
measurement and comparisons are not regularly appropriate to human 
beings with all their differences exhibited. But Bentham and Mill 
extend the usages without specifying, defining, or separating them. 
Other considerations are the mistaken assumption about society being a 
collection or aggregate of similar units, the idea that we relate to 
each other as units without what Grote calls 'special ties', and the 
failure to consider that these ties and the relationships they 
involve, entail that unequal consideration of claims and unequal 
distributions are to be made. Most of these objections would however 
be superfluous if Mill was, when speaking of equality, only referring 
to the simple point that we are to consider each person as equally 
capable of feeling and worthy of having their happiness considered 
when distributions are to be made. But then such a claim would, if 
validated, only support Grote's objection that Mill does not have a 
well worked out theory of distribution (Llewelyn Davies 1871,88-89). 
(2) The Status of Virtue, Duty and justice as secondary moral rules, 
given to them by Mill, detain Grote for several chapters. 
ill 
Llewelyn Davies argues in his review that Grote overlooked the role of 
secondary moral rules in Mill's system. Mill required only that our 
everyday rules and laws be checked for conformity with the greatest 
happiness. 
'But when it has been concluded on such grounds that a certain 
action is right, its rightness is a law, on Utilitarian 
principles, to the individual agent. He is not bound or expected 
to have the results of the action consciously in view* (Llewelyn 
Davies 187,87) 
The Westminster Review also makes a similar point about the 
utilitarians as a whole, including Mill, 
'According to their reiterated statements, it does not supercede 
moral rules, it tests their worth. So far from nullifying the 
common duties, it postulates them as its logical deductions. 
That everybody should invariably seek the universal happiness 
would be the very worst way to secure that end. This requires, 
on the contrary, that a system of special duties, varying with 
the circumstances of the objects and their relations to 
ourselves, should be prescribed by society... ' (Westminster 
Review 1871,47) 
Now both these reviewers in considering Mill to be a rule utilitarian 
beg the central question of whether Mill was an act or a rule 
utilitarian. That is did he consider that each individual act should 
be judged individually by direct appeal to the happiness principle, or 
did he feel that individual acts should be judged against moral rules 
and only the moral rules be adjudicated by appeal to the first 
principle. The debate still rages and fortunately my discussion and 
Grote ;s do not hinge upon its settlement (7). Grote is more 
interested in two questions; firstly ar e duties, virtues and the 
precepts of justice only secondary moral rules backed by internal and 
external sanctions, and secondly are duties, virtues and the precepts 
of justice to be considered as logical deductions from the utilitarian 
principle? His answer to both is in the negative. 
Duty, *virtue and justice to Grote are ideals, valuable in their 
own right. We judge an act good as we do a good cricketer, not by 
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reference to one quality but by several in conjunction. As he puts it 
neatly, 
'Of these ideas then, virtue, duty, usefulness or conduciveness 
to happiness, I do not see the least how one can be resolved into 
another. They are various qualities of those actions which, 
speaking loosely, we call good, right, morally valuable: we have 
no reason that I can see, to say that their goodness or rightness 
consists in one of these more than in another: if we wish to 
test their goodness or rightness, we cannot take one of these 
qualities to the exclusion of the others, but must take them, 
according to circumstances in conjunction' (Grote 1870,162). 
Each ideal has rules which govern the application of its principles to 
practice and each has feeling and sentiments associated with 
obedience, or disobedience to these rules and the performance of 
virtuous acts, such as sympathy, conscience, the love of duty and 
virtue, and the feeling of fairness or unfairness. But Grote is clear 
that a) duty, virtue and justice do not get their imperative status 
as a logical deduction from the happiness principle, b) that the 
rules of each are valid in relationship to their own primary ideal and 
not to happiness, c) that the feelings asso ciated with the 
performance and non performance of moral acts are only 'signs' or 
'indications' that the acts are right, not the 'determinants of', 
. motives towards' nor 'sanction of* the rules. This being the case 
Mill's arguments about duty, virtue and justice are to be treated as 
suspect. His repeated entreaties that utilitarian ethics does not 
challenge or undermine conventional ethical standards can be given 
only with partial acceptance, and his views on internal sanctions and 
sentiments are to be rejected. 
Virtue 
Five separate chapters are devoted to a) above, i. e. that the 
principles and rules of virtue, duty and justice are not dependent 
upon the happiness principle. These are Chapter VI 'on the real 
goodnes of virtue', Chapter VII, on the 'Utilitarians view of the 
goodness of virtueo, Chapter VIII on' 'Duty and the utilitarian 
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sanctions', Chapter IX on 'Duty and the utilitarian justice', and 
Chapter X on 'The moral sentiment in its relation to happiness, virtue 
and duty'. My summary can be brief as the central arguments can be 
anticipated from what has been written in this and the previous 
chapter. We may take virtue first, then duty and leave justice until 
the next chapter. 
Virtue, we know has its origins in our freedom to choose to help 
others and make self sacrifices. It is a part of tight, the 
faciendum, that is it is judged not by its purposes done, its 
usefulness or productiveness of happiness but by its being in 
conformity to some standard or rule, by the effort of will, and the 
motive. Chapter VI was a first draft of the theory of moral value to 
be found in Chapter VI of the Treatise. Chapter VI of the Examination 
indeed starts with the statement of intention that 
'it will be my business in this chapter to show especially in 
regard of virtue, that its goodness or valuableness is not given 
to it simply by its conduciveness to happiness but has other 
sources independent of this' (Grote 1870,105). 
He then adds in a precise statement that utilitarianism is 
'the supposing that, whatever praiseworthiness or excellence 
there may be in virtue, whatever bindingness in duty, whatever 
indispensableness in society, whatever nobleness in 
self-devotion, whatever delightfulness in sympathy; all this 
depends in the last resort upon the maxim, that one action is 
better or more valuable than another, more to be chosen than 
another, preferable to another, on this principle only, that it 
is more conducive to some happiness' (Grote 1870,105-106). 
Chapter VII of the Examination starts with the argument that 
while 'conduciveness to happiness' is one source of moral value, it 
does not cover the 'whole ground' and that there are 'other original 
and primary' sources. Secondly we have the argument that 
I value for actions as conducive to general happiness is as much a 
secondary and derived principle (if either are to be called so) 
as value for actions in their character as virtuous or generous 
(Grote 1870,121) 
In other words right, just or virtuous action may or may not be 
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productive of happiness in life, but the value we attach to happiness 
may itself be derived exclusively from its association with virtue and 
right. Mill has not proved his case on the matter. The next argument 
refers to the oddity of Mill's claim that virtue is 'a part' of 
happiness and not just to be valued as a 'means' to its realization. 
Mill does not make his position clear on this, nor as to whether 
virtue is to be valued independently of the happiness it produces 
(Grote 1870,125-127). 
Duty 
The theory of obligation in Grote will be tackled later, here I 
shall refer only to his objection to the utilitarian argument that the 
nature, content and value of duty and duties derives from their 
conduciveness to the production of happiness. This is covered in 
Chapter VII of the Examination (Grote 1870,134-147), in which Grote 
is in ýevastating form. Firstly he notes that the Millian maxim of 
duty is to do what is right but that this is reduced to doing what is 
desirable or what we ought to do. 
'The maxim however thus stated will probably appear insignificant 
and a mere identical proposition: right and 'what we ought to 
do', mean the same thing' (Grote 1870,134). 
But Mill means by the word 'right' sometimes a reference to specific 
duties, and at other times to the general duty that we produce 
happiness. Mill hence does not prove what we ought to do, on 
particular occasions only that we ought to produce the general 
happiness, though his equivocation on the words 'right' and 'duty' 
allow us to gain a false. impression of comprehensivity. 
Secondly Mill shifts his ground from proving that duty is derived 
from happiness to proving that duty is merely a feeling, sentiment or 
sanction, an 'inducement' to encourage social activity (Grote 1870, 
136-13). Grote objects that this is an invalid move, as well as 
giving a false account of the relationships between feelings, moral 
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facts and the moral ideals of duty and right. Thirdly Grote makes the 
key point that Mill not only accounts for why we should do our duty in 
the general (if he proves even that) and not in the particular but he 
wrongly reverses the priority of general to particular duty (Grote 
1870,253). 
'And duty binds us, not in the first in the general (namely, to 
promote the general happiness), and in the particular only as a 
consequence of this; but first in the particular, duty in 
general being an expression for the whole of such particular 
duty' (Grote 1870,96). 
The point is, Mill does not help us to discover 'what is my duty', 
except in the most general terms. Like Bradley's criticism of Kant, 
Grote is accusing Mill of providing a merely formal account without 
any content or application. Like McPherson later he criticises the 
practice of trying to account for obedience in general and not in 
specific terms and cases (McPherson 1967,50-58)*. 
The over reliance on sentiments and sanctions to explain duty is 
also a criticism -Grote makes of Mill.. Grote as we have seen treats 
feelings and sentiments as lower facts that indicate what is right or 
our duty. Hence the feeling of being bound is only an attachment to 
the practice and reality of being bound, (the experience of it), it is 
not itself the source of value, nor a spring of action. The fact we 
must always consider is 'whether we are bound' in terms of our 
relationships, whether they be economic, political, social or moral. 
The moral feelings only reflect the facts in the same way that our 
sensations of a tree reflect the judgement that the tree exists as a 
fact. 
, It is not the feeling which binds or obliges us, but it is the 
state of facts of which we are thus made aware through the 
feeling' (Grote 1870,145). 
But this leads to a larger point. Just as Mill tries but 'fails 
to adequately explain what are our duties and why we do obey he also 
fails to explain satisfactorily why we ought to obey. His theory is 
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utilitarian - we ought to obey because by so doing we will help 
produce the greatest happiness. We do obey as a result of habit, 
education, the manipulation of external sanctions and the presence of 
some internal sanctions. Grote provides a unique and a highly 
persuasive critique and alternative to these two propositions. 
Grote's points are as follows, firstly the existence of duties is not 
the outcome of social pressures or the result of pursuit of happiness, 
it is rather to be seen as a precondition of social, legal and 
political existence (Grote 1870,275,151). The whole notion of an 
association of individuals implies the recognition of rights, claims 
and the performance of duties. Next a duty is not an. artificial 
construct whose imperativeness depends upon its purposes being 
realized, it is a historical construct, which usually pre-exists 
ourselves and which we find conditions our lives. 
'In reality man is born into a complicated scene, and before he 
is conscious or a free agent, he is hampered round with all sorts 
of circumstances, which, in a different poi * nt of 
view, make a 
large portion of his powers not his own, but variously due' 
(Grote, 1.873,145). 
Thirdly we obey not just becaus'e of sanctions or because we feel we 
should, nor just because we expect to gain happiness by obeying on 
this occasion or by conforming to the practice of obedience, but 
because we both recognize the"right 'of the duty or law and possibly 
recognize its 'reason' and its logic (Grote 1870,139-140,142-4, 
146). But more of all this later. 
The idea that socially conditioned feelings towards virtue, duty 
and justice, and against selfishness, disobedience and unfairness can 
in any way explain why we ought to obey is treated with particular 
derision as it was later by F. H. Bradley (Bradley 1876,111-113). 
Grote had raised the point earlier in the Examination that Mill's 
treatment of ordinary social feelings as the ultimate sanctions of 
morality was an instance of his departure from old or Benthamite 
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utilitarianism (Mill 1910, ChIII, 24-32). The point there was two 
folcl, firstly that Mill adds to Bentham's list of sentiments the basic 
social sentiment. The second was that he treated this alongside other 
internal sentiments e. g sympathy and conscience, as internal 
sanctions, and that he treated these as of more effect in determining 
obedience than the external sanctions (Grote 1870,21-22,138). Both 
needed the theory of sanctions because they disliked language in the 
morally imperative mood. Grote points 'out that Bentham advocated 
expunging the term 'ought' from the moral vocabulary, while Mill 
sought to explain its origins and effects on a psychological rather 
than a philosophical basis (Grote 1870,136). 'Why ought V is 
converted into 'What 'inducements are there' in Mill's moral 
vocabulary. 
Conceptual problems are the first that detain Grote on the theory 
of sanctions in Chapter VIII. After pointing out that sanction to 
Mill means 'inducement' and quibbling over the separation of internal 
from external sanctions, Grote notes the intrusion of an essentially 
legal concept of sanctions into Mill's moral discourse. The usage 
involves a legal analogy but the analogy does not hold good in Mill's 
argument. In law a sanction is an appeal to fear, a threatened or 
real punishment, but Mill applies it equally and wrongly to include 
. appeals to hope, namely promises or bribes'. This as Grote points 
out 'is an entire misuse of language' (Grote 1870,141). Worse still 
Bentham and Mill have the wrong idea of law, that it is obeyed 
primarily out of fear, that obedience has to be induced. So when the 
ideas of law are applied to morals the mistake is also transferred 
(Grote 1870,140). Obligation is reduced to inducement. Now fear, 
constraint and compulsion are 'very real' features of law and duty to 
Grote but they are 'subsidiary' to others, especially 'consent'# the 
recognition of right'orof legitimacy, and the recognition that there 
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is some 'reason' in or behind the law or the duty required. Once 
again utilitarianism gives a partial or abstract view of reality not a 
complete or coherent view (Grote 1870,142,206-207). 
To push home the point Grote discusses the case of the duty to 
keep promises. Paley explains that the reason for keeping one's word 
is 'because you will be fearfully punished if not'. Mill and Bentham 
answer the question by appeal to 'the vast advantages to society of 
general trustfulness' Grote considers both answers to be partial, and 
to reflect only subsidiary features of obligation. The answer he 
gives should wet our appetite for the next chapter, both for its 
simplicity, its novelty and for the echo it has of the contemporary 
arguments of those philosophical anthropologists who have discussed 
obligation in terms of the practice and its preconditions rather than 
its experience and its effects. We must keep promises according to 
Grote, for the reasons we must tell the truth, because the practices 
are pre-condi-tions for social existence, because without the duty to 
keep promises and tell the truth the practices would not be workable 
for nobody would accept a promise or believe what was being said. The 
acceptance of rights and duties rests in the end on trust. 
'But I apprehend that the real answer, which is felt in the minds 
of those who feel simply and well, is: 'I feel that T must speak 
the truth because I know that I am trusted: I feel that trust 
reposed in me calls for trustfulness from me, and calls with a 
voice which I cannot stifle or disobey: it is the person who 
trusts me to whom in the first instance I am under the obligation 
of truthfulness, an obligation under which he by his trust lays 
me, which so far makes me not free, and binds my action' (Grote 
1870,143). 
Later Grote adds that in addition to the duty being a condition of MY 
relationship to the other person, it is also a condition of my 
relationship to society, and hence 
'truth is a duty to society' 
Duty then arises from the facts of our relationships with others. 
Indeed duty is a precondition of relationships existing in the first 
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place, for one could not relate to another in any other way than one 
of conflict unless one accepted and recognized 'duties and rights, 
things owed and claimed. These are particular in the first instance 
but always exist in a social context. Duties are known to us by 
knowledge of these facts not just through our feelings. In addition 
obligation stems from recognition-of right and reason in our duties 
not just from sanctions or other inducements. Put briefly 
'The notion of duty carries with it that it is ciaimable by the 
party, and then enforcable by the superior-authority backing him 
. 
or coming into his place' (Grote 1870,145). 
Close acquaintance with Robert Leslie Ellis, well' trained in 
jurisprudence, was perhaps equipping Grote for his engagement with the 
legally minded Benthamites. To complete the discussion on sanctions 
we may refer briefly to Grote's rebuttal of Mill's account of 
conscience. To Mill it is 'a pain attendant on violation of duty' 
which arises from association via either education or fear engendered 
by experience. Conscience is no special faculty to Grote and he goes 
out of his way to reject Butler's explanations. Indeed he recognizes 
that conscience and other moral feelings, emotions and sentiments, 
such as shame, honour, sympathy and kindness, 
I are very far from being infallible guides: their suggestions, 
though pretty sure to be in the main right, are very likely to be 
in many details wrong; reason must halt after them in the best 
way it can to correct and examine them' (Grote 1870,167,168). 
But while distancing himself from the moral sense, sentiments and 
common sense schools because they made too much of consciencet Grote 
felt the utilitarian theory was deficient in the other direction by 
reducing conscience to a mere sanction and in providing for it a 
purely relativist account. Education and experience of sanction upon 
non performance of duty do mould our conscience and behaviour, but in 
a more serious way both are exercised in realizing our human potential 
and our *social 'nature (Grote 1870,20V-213). On human potential he 
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hW, 
writes 
'The saying that conscience or the moral sentiment in man is a 
result of education, seems to me like saying that flying in birds 
is a result of education, because it does not appear to be done 
all at once, but there is a process of learning on the part of 
the young, and as it would appear, of instruction and aid on the 
part of the older ones' (Grote 1870,169). 
On our social natures he reiterates his point that conscience is both 
individual and social, that we imagine and judge for ourselves on 
right and wrong, but that as our 'mind' and our 'condition' is social, 
this individual act is itself social. The judgement we reach is not 
social in the sense of resulting from social pressure, sanction or 
socialization, but is social in the sense of mediated by a social 
language, experience, practice, a social mind and imagination. 
Conscience is both an 'imagination of the judgement of others 
condemning us', and a 'self-condemnation' (Grote 1870,169-170). 
Conscience indeed is analogous to the feeling of guilt in regard 
to the breach of law. The feeling may accompany the breach of the law 
and 'may in part reflect one's fear of the consequences. With duty the 
law is only an imagined moral law and the feeling is as much to do 
with the recognition that the moral law has been broken and ought to 
have been obeyed as it is a recognition of impending consequences 
(Grote 1870,164-166). 
Justice 
As we shall see in the next chapter, John Grote develops in the 
Treatise and Examination a positive ethical and political theory 
labelled 'Jural Ethics'. The main lines of this are that the meaning 
of, nature, character and decision making concerning right and wrong 
in the moral and political spheres, are analogous to those operating 
in the legal sphere. In many ways Benthamite and Millian 
utilitarianism worked with the some analogy but understanding law in 
the way they did, the analogy produced vastly different accounts of 
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duty and justice. Because law to the utilitarians was a body of 
publicly sanctioned rules, the latter providing the unique character 
of legal as distinct from conventional rules, so duty and justice 
became sets of conventional moral rules deriving their obedience 
primarily by being sanctioned. Because laws are supposed to gain 
their moral value or right from their beneficial consequences to 
society, the rules of duty and justice gain their moral value from 
their general social utility. Grote has little to say against the six 
rules of justice Mill ennumerates at the beginning of his chapter on 
'Utilitarianism: How Connected with Justice'. Indeed, he notes both 
how right Mill is in describing these rules and that the account given 
is close to that of the 'jural ethics' which, 'I have given as in my 
view the right account', of law and duty and their relationship (Grote 
1870,150). The gap lies however where, instead of using the language 
of 'right' 'rights and dues', Mill speaks of consequential and 
reasonable expectations' to explain the source of obligation and 
right, and that Mill considers that it is force and a special kind 'of 
sentiment of unfairness that explains actual obedience, while Grote 
stresses other things, including 'consent' and the 'recognition of 
right' to be operative. As usual Mill has made his neo-utilitarian 
account sound convincing by 'the old plan' of 'modifying and adding' 
to the old theory, 
'"to save appearances" by accumulating cycle on epicycle where 
the fault is in an original wrong supposition... ' (Grote 1870, 
151). 
The wrong supposition is most evident in Mill's etymological 
account of Justice or Justum. We are reminded that etymology is not a 
reliable guide in moral reasoning, a lesson preached in 'On 
Glossology', and then given a case in point. Mill supports his 
contention that 'the general idea of justice is the idea of legal 
constraint' or compelled conformity to law by insisting that 
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originally Justum was 'a form of jussum, that which has been ordered'. 
The author, supported by Mayor insists on other possible derivations, 
and supports the tie between justum and jus which refers to 'a set of 
regulations as to mutual rights, an order of private rights and 
property' (Grote 1870,153-154). But the wrong supposition about law 
is seen most obviously in Mill's historical account of the growth of 
law, and in the odd introduction by Mill of ideal rules under which 
the utilitarian must operate outside the law and as a vantage point 
for its criticism. How can a positive legal theorist like Mill, 
following in the tradition of Hobbes, Bentham and Austin, all 
supporting a 'command theory' of law, possibly equate an ideal law 
theory needed to explain duty and justice, with the positive law 
theory used elsewhere? Grote himself considers duty to be covered by 
an 'ideal moral law' but he can explain this in terms of his idealist 
epistemology and moral theory. But such ideal moral laws are 'alien 
to' and 'incompatible' with genuine utilitarianism (Grote 1870, 
156-158). Further hints of heterodoxy in Mill's theory of justice are 
also found by Grote in the phrase that Mill once uses that justice 
stands for 'certain utilities which are vastly more absolute and 
imperative than others' (Mill 1910,60). What are the criteria for 
these utilities being more absolute and imperative? Are they 
differences in kind or quality or merely differences in quantity? if 
the former, then Mill has introduced another a priori and intuitional 
element into the now ragbag system of utilitarian ethics (Grote 1870, 
149). 
Finally there is a point about the status of secondary moral 
rules. Mill and his defenders, such as the reviewer for the 
Westminster, and Llewelyn Davis on this point, considered that the 
regular criticism of uti'litarian ethics, that it I advocated' 
expediency and undervalued the place of conventional moral rules, 
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especially those of duty and justice, was unfair. Mill, they argue, 
recognized fully the value of conventional moral rules, he demanded 
regular obedience to them and considered as his difference to Grote 
and other opponents that all such moral rules derived their 
imperativeness and value from their ultimate capacity to produce 
social benefits (Mill 1910,18,21-24; Llewelyn Davies 1871,87; 
Westminster Review 1871,47,53). Grote recognized Mill's advance on 
Bentham on this point noting also how Mill considers custom to embody 
lessons from history, but he complains a) that the advance is a novel 
addition and not a reiteration of something all utilitarians had 
agreed with, and b) that in addition this respect for rules is in 
conflict with the traditional form of act utilitarianism (Grote 1870, 
22-24). But in addition Grote still considered Mill to be mistaken in 
treating the 'rules of right action' as witnessed in the rules of 
virtue, duty and justice as deriving their value from their felicific 
outcomes (Grote 1870,237). Nothing to the utilitarian can be 
absolUitely right, just or my duty. All right is relative, everything 
has to be tested not by time on the one side or by the other moral 
ideals in conjunction but by utility alone. This new form of 
I reforming utilitarianism', Grote finds quite unacceptable (Grote 
1870,227-232). 
We may summarize this section with a question from Grote which 
contains his general argument that Mill's defence of utilitarianism 
involves a 'moralizing' or 'idealizing* of the old positivist and 
hedonistic doctrine, to such an extent that the question that remains 
is whether neo utilitarianism is still utilitarianism or a novel and 
heterodox moral theory. Mill's procedure in the essay can be 
summarized as follows according to Grote; 
'The first step is the supposing an ideal at all, and this at 
once removes ethics from the category of the simply positive or 
0 
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inductive sciences, to which no such supposition belongs. The 
next'is the giving for content, or filling up, to this ideal the 
imagination of a happiness beyond our own, the happiness of 
others or the general happiness. Then, when we imagine the world 
of moral beings with their various claims and their various 
feelings, we come to idealize both the happiness and the 
generality of it: we imagine not only a desirable manner of 
life, which we may call happiness, but a desirable kind of 
happiness, however we may name it; and also a desirable 
distribution of the happiness, or relation of the happiness of 
one individual to another' (Grote 1870,178-179). 
IV 
On Method 
An outline criticism of moral positivism was provided in part 
three of Chapter VII above. There Grote's arguments about the proper 
and improper relationships between descriptive and prescriptive, 
empirical and normative statements, and between various forms of 
positivism and idealism were discussed. Grote we will remember 
reacted against the belief that moral and political-activity could be 
explained adequately from positivist assumptions and observational 
evidence. In addition he noted with disdain the common practice of 
many positivists of smuggling moral terms, assumptions and methods 
into their arguments while claiming for them the purity and authority 
of empirical and scientific method. The result of so doing he saw as 
anything from being trifling and nugatory, to being illogical and 
perhaps morally and practically dangerous. We have now seen that not 
only moral philosophy but all intellectual study presupposes beliefs 
and even ideals. All intellectual knowledge, including science 
involves the belief in an ordered world and the possibility of true 
knowledge about it; all moral philosophers presume a belief in a 
right order and the possibility of a knowledge of that. Chapters XI 
to XIV and XVII of the Examination explores these points with special 
regard to utilitarian moral and political philosophy and finds it 
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wanting. 
To Grote's claim that utilitarianism must, if it is to be a 
philosophy, assume at least one ideal element, an intuitive principle, 
and hence could not possibly fulfill the claim to be purely scientific 
or positive, the Westminster Review's reply was that the argument is a 
case of ignoratio elenchi 
I since they (utilitarians) have never overlooked the fact that 
Ethics concerns itself with an Ideal of action, but have 
advocated their principle 'as the worthiest of Ideals' 
(Westminster Review 1871,83). 
This admission itself was a milestone in the debate on utilitarian 
ethics and became a premise for the next development in Sidgwick's 
Methods. John Grote did much to wring this admission from 
utilitarians, who despite disclaimers by apologists, had repeatedly 
claimed for their system the character of being observational, 
inductive and a posteriori, in short, scientific. 
fn brief the arguments of the above chapters are as follows. it 
is an essential characteristic of all practical life that there is 
something given and something absent, that we feel ought or ought not 
to be. The former we call the positive, the latter the ideal. The 
study of the former is positivism, and the latter idealism. A life 
pursuing what we do want is called prudential, that pursuing the ideal 
is called moral. The moral life is characterized by the attempt to 
reconcile the is and the ought, the given and the imagined, the 
positive and the ideal. Moral philosophy is to study these ideals and 
this process, 
'Mari in virtue of his free-will, reason, and imagination, forms 
an ideal of his action: what moral philosophy seeks to find and 
to recommend, as the guide of individual action, is the best 
ideal for the action of the human race' (Grote 1870,172). 
Unfortunately the history of moral philosophy has witnessed attempts 
by various schools to subsume the ideal under one notion only; 
sometimes as in the ancient world it was virtue; to the Romans and 
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others it has been duty, now to the utilitarians it has been 
happiness. Science cannot adjudicate between these claims, nor prove 
one correct. Plato had once wrongly set science on a purely ideal 
basis but now positivism has equally wrongly operated on the opposite 
premise (Grote 1870,179). 
One fundamental reason why a science of ethics is impossible is 
that man has free will. If we are free to choose our ideals and our 
actions then no explanatory laws or predictive method can operate. 
Free will again is not an ideal or even an hypothesis, it is a 
postulate of practical life, 
'Our free will is at least an assumption which we must always 
make, as we do that of the reality of our being and of the 
external world about us' (Grote 1870,180). 
This point is crucial and refers us to Grote's philosophy of the world 
of practice. Practice is conditioned by the gulf between past, 
present and future, and between that which is and which ought to be. 
In the world of science and physiology necessity may reign but in the 
practical world we never know what will be or what ought to be, we are 
always forced to choose what to think, to follow and to do. 
'This kind of necessity, like every kind of it supposed a 
reference to our action, must always remain extraneous to 
practice, and the science of the direction of our action must 
exist unaffected by it: 
Such sciences as hedonics and other psychologies of moral behaviour as 
those of conscience, reason and moral sense are useful in filling out 
our moral ideals and in checking rampant imagination and'unwarranted 
idealistic enthusiasms. But they cannot serve as a substitute for 
idealist moral philosophy (Grote 1870,178). 
The assumption of most fitilitarians was that a study of 
psychology would support their philosophical claims but Grote disputes 
this through the examination of three other forms of moral psychology, 
the conscience theory of Bishop Butler, the moral psychology of reason 
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which I presume Grote attributed to Whewell, and that of judgement 
attributed to Aristotle and by implication to Kant (Grote 1870, 
185-191). While weak on psychology Chapter XII allows Grote to argue 
for the compatibility of Kantian 'morality rule' and Millian 'morality 
of consequence' (an argument that appears again in Sidgwick later) and 
to distance himself from a morality of 'moral sense' (Grote 1870, 
190-195). 
If psychology offers only a subsidiary role in the analysis of 
moral imperatives how can idealism or the study of the higher facts 
help? Chapter XIII tackles this question and provides the 
answers, namely that idealism allows the study of the ontologically 
'higher facts' and the 'postulates' of moral practice, and secondly 
that it facilitates the study of our aspirations and ideals directly. 
Grote writes of his terminology, 
'I have called 'idealism', by way of an exceedingly general name; 
and I hope what I mean by it will be judged by the explanations I 
have given of it, and by a reference to the ancient philosophical 
uses of the term 'idea', and not by reference to its various uses 
in modern times' (Grote 1870,201). 
Having hopefully avoided condemnation by association Grote now makes 
his key point that as with all ideas, the idea of 'should be' 
'has reference to something as being or existing, to a reality 
which we may conceive more real - real in a higher sense - than 
anything which our senses perceive'. 
Our moral imagination may be over or under active, yet it not only 
I sets before us ideal natures superior to our own, but it sets 
before us an ideal moral society' (Grote 1870,206). 
The principles and rules of this ideal moral society are 'ideally 
imperative upon us', in the same way that 'obedience to the laws of 
the human society, in which we live is actually so'. On this point 
Grote makes a unique point, for while it had been regularly argued 
that in morality 'ought implies can', the point is made here that 'can 
implies ought', for in idealistic moralityý 
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'Whatever of good we can be, we ought to be' (Grote 1870,204). 
Idealist philosophy could be undermined if it could be shown that 
both the form and content of our moral ideals is the product not just 
of psychological processes but of education generally. The case for 
this is explored and rejected on the grounds that many of our moral 
beliefs and practices are constituents or postulates of our moral 
existence and not just results or products of it. Grote outlines the 
argument that the moral practices of moral responsibility, obedience 
and doing one's duty, are to be seen 
'in its less developed form a main constituent of the formation 
of societies', 
and not 
I as in its more developed it is a result of them' (Grote 1870, 
210-211). 
In short the very existence and practice of society assumes obedience, 
doing one's duty and taking responsibility for one's own actions. 
These postulates are the framework of our moral reality which idealism 
is to flesh out in its philosophy. 
Idealist philosophy is however not alone in parading knowledge of 
the moral imperative, 'religion too has this as one of its aims. 
Chapter XIV briefly assesses this point and the relationship between 
the two engagements. Religion, Grate argues, starts with beliefs and 
revelations, philosophy with reason and the imagination. Life may be 
studied from either side, ' but while the two explanations may be 
consistent they should for logical reasons be kept separate, it 
'is good that moral philosophy should exist as a science or 
manner of thought separately from religion, though not properly 
independently of it, or at least not in a form inconsistent with 
true views of it' (Grote 1870,215). 
Independent study of these subjects may be vital for knowledge but in 
practice 
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religion cannot exist at all, in any influential form without Ni 
incorporating a vast mass of thought which belongs properly to 
moral philosophy', 
while 'moral philosophy however, if it is good and earnest, yearns 
after religion' for its realization or completion' (Grote 1870,215). 
We come then to the vital Chapter XVII 'On the Scientific 
Character or Method of Utilitarianism' (Grote 1870,260-278). The 
argument is straightforward, Mill mistakenly counterposes 'inductive' I', 
and 'intuitive' methods while the opposite of 'inductive is 
'deductive'. Next under the heading of intuitive morality Mill 
confuses the essentially 'a posteriori* and inductive schools of the 
moral sentiments and senses and the essentially deductive 'a priori* 
schools of common sense reason. The claim that the intuitive schools 
all use a priori' and 'deductive' methods is therefore rejected# as 
is the claim' that 'utilitarianism' is the unique school of the 'a 
posterori' and of 'inductive' methods. This last claim becomes the 
issue for a rigorous analysis during which Grote states in the 
clearest-terms that utilitarianism can be shown to be and to use the 
methods of intuitionism and deduction as well as experience 
observation and induction. Mill and the utilitarians in fact rest 
their whole system on an intuition, an 'a priori' or supposedly self 
evident proposition that 'action is right, as it is promotive of 
happiness, wrong as it is the reverse'. They then deduce the nature, 
form, content and above all the value of the subsidiary ideals, rules 
and principles from the primary ideal or principle. Far from being 
solely inductive utilitarianism turns out. to be one of the most 
systematically deductive of all moral philosophies. Far from resting 
on grounds of observation it rests on a single intuition, a single a 
priori proposition. 
In addition the attempted proof is in fact superfluous, proving 
not that we ought to pursue happiness but that happiness is capable of 
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being desired, and regularly is, in practical life (Grote 1870, 
270). 
Mills own first principle is as 'a priori' as Kant's categorical 
imperative but is less persuasive. While a non idealist version of 
utilitarianism could be developed Grote considers Mill to have set a 
trend away from this towards 'ideal-utilitarianism', the realization 
of which we find can in the works of Henry Sidgwick, G. E. Moore and 
Hastings Rashdall. But not content with one 'a pridri' axiom, Mill in 
fact injects more as his essay develops concerning the quality of 
pleasures and the distribution of happiness. So in conclusion 
'The fault of utilitarianism therefore in respect of method 
consists, according to my view, in its professing and pretending 
to have a method which it has not and which, if it had, it could 
not use... * (Grote 1870,277). 
V 
-Conclusions on the Examination 
Five points can be made in summary. (1) The case against both old 
and neo-utilitarian philosophies by Grote is well aimed at their 
central assumptions and claims. His own critique is not therefore 
superfluous. (2) John Grote, unlike many of the other critics, did 
Mill the service of reading his text thoroughly and sympathetically. 
We find few purely polemical and moralistic arguments such as the 
claim that the doctrine is 'godless' or that it 'legitimates 
immorality'. (3) The Examination does pick up most of the novelties 
found in Mill's essay, except the modified account of the place and 
value of secondary moral rules, and (4) Grote explains the extent to 
which these novelties alter the character of the old utilitarian 
doctrine. But does he prove the case for heterodoxy? 
My assessment is that he did, to the extent that a) few 
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utilitarians before Mill had admitted the intuitive status of their 
first principle, b) nor had they considered differences in qualities 
of pleasures. Thirdly c) Mill had injected the alien premise about 
the fundamental sociability of man, and d) those new features of the 
distributive theory, impartiality, disinterestedness and equality of 
right of consideration. The case'for the heterodoxy of Mill's support 
for the 'general happiness' I find less well made, since it is true 
that Bentham had hinted at equality of consideration in his own 
writings. 
But Grote's value as a critic does not lie just in his case for 
heterodoxy in Mill's short essay (5). Both philosophically and 
historically we may judge many of Grote's arguments to be novel and 
even original, to be generally well made, to be as Bain indicated 
regularly 'valid' and as Acton puts it 'penetrating and subtle' (Acton 
1973, xiii). Compared with his other books we have some evidence to 
suggest that the Examination was more widely read outside Cambridge 
and we have circumstantial evidence that many of his arguments, 
especially those about the intuitive basis to utilitarianism and the 
implicit dangers of the conflation of fact and value arguments were 
well received. They certainly seem to reappear in popular books 
-later, the critique of utilitarian theories of duty in Bradley's 
Ethical Studies of 1876, the insistence on the intuitional basis of 
utilitarianism in Henry Sidgwick's 'methods of Ethics' Of 1874, and 
the development of ideal utilitarianism in G. E. Moorel and Hastings 
Rashdall (Bradley 1876; Sidgwick 1874: Moore 1903,1912; Hastings 
Rashdall 1907). 
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Chapter Nine 
Jural Ethics: 
Social and Political Theory 
We have now discovered how epistemology relates to ethics, and 
how knowledge relates to morality. The right, good, just, virtuous 
and, obligatory are known of and about in a manner analogous to the 
way we know the physical and intellectual worlds. That is, we acquire 
knowledge of each through an ascending system of revisions of our 
first immediate feelings or intuitions of the self and not self under 
the impact of further experience, thought, discussion, reflection and 
judgement, collectively but loosely, called reason. Through this 
process we arrive at sets of propositions or judgements we consider to 
be true or right. These principles, rules and ideals we take as the 
standards and framework for further intellectual and moral reasoning 
W, 
I 
until their further modification by the same process. Yet these 
standards and frameworks, 
_ 
while being subjectively and socially 
arrived at through experience thought and discussion, are not to be 
considered as totally subjective and relative forcing us into 
intellectual and moral scepticism, but are to be seen as uniquely 
human attempts to grasp an objective, absolute and unchanging 
intellectual and moral reality: the absolute. Moral thought, like 
intellectual thought, is a development towards sunlight through an 
intellectual, moral and political struggle for self knowledge, self 
realization and there embodiment in practical reality. This proposal 
is not to be. seen as based on revelation nor solely upon faith, but is 
a rationally supportable belief, or presupposition, deeply embedded in 
our ordinary language, thought, action and practices. The 
suppositions of the absolutely right and the true underpin all 
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intellectual and moral discourse. 
Moral knowledge we now know is an ascent from primary sensations 
(pleasure and pain) and feelings (for example a troubled conscience), 
to psychological dispositions and character traits (for example love 
of self), on to embodied cultural feelings and judgements recorded in 
habits, customs and everyday social relationships. Our knowledge of 
these is codified into knowable rules and principles, which are inturn 
rationalized into moral and political ideals such as those of duty, 
virtue, and happiness. These ideals however are midway between the 
lower facts and the ontologically higher facts contained in what Grote 
calls the moral law, the absolute principles of the right and the good 
which are much harder to know (Grote 1876: 393-394). 
This intellectual and moral ascent can be shown diagramatically. 
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Fig I: The Scale of Intellectual and Moral knowledge and 
the Disciplines for there analysis. 
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From this basis, which is essentially idealist in character, 
Grote launched his critique of not only utilitarianism and 
intuitionism as abstractions grasping only a part of the truth, but 
also common sense and moral sense ethical theory. From the same base 
he built the outlines of a consistent social and political theory, 
unfinished in the manuscripts now available but indicative of a well 
thought out position, to rival that of the Philosophical Radicals and 
other political theorists. In the last chapter we also learnt that 
our feelings, habits, customary beliefs and imaginations tell us that 
there are a number of moral ideals worthy of realization and that 
their individual value cannot be deduced from the ultimate priority of 
any one. The moral value of each action rests upon two 
considerations: of its result, consequences - purposes or utility and 
its worthiness or merit (Grote 1876,103-105). 
The highest ideal is the right but that depends upon its role of 
specifying clearly what is imperative upon us, not upon considerations 
of religion or of intuition. Good and happiness differ from right in 
that the former tell us wha t is choiceworthy, what we may desire to do 
or may find desirable in a non prescriptive and non imperative sense, 
while the right tells us what we ought to do, should or must do. The 
right takes priority because while what we ought to do implies and 
embraces what we may desire or what is choiceworthy, what is 
choiceworthy does not contain or imply what we ought or must do (Grote 
1876, a2-84). Most of our moral ideals are aspects of the right 
including virtue, duty and justice. Virtue is supererogatory, it 
operates where the specificity of duty terminates. Duty we must 
perform, virtue is desirable but optional; duty is more binding, 
explicit and governed by social and legal rules; duty is also binding 
in the sense of being owed to both second and third parties and by 
being sanctionp_<L by the latter acting for society. Breach of duty is 
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analogous to the breach of laws, there are rules or orders of duty 
analogous to rules and codes in the positive law. 
We have now come to the subject of this chapter, a reconstruction 
of Grote's own social and political philosophy, a philosophy that he 
at one place calls 'Jural Ethics' (Grote 1870,150; 1876; 85,88, 
96,221). In this system the philosophy of right, or aretaics, is 
seen in essentially legal terms and imagery. The right, in brief, is 
analogous to the legal; moral right, duty, justice and virtue are 
considered to be explicable by analogy with the law; moral behaviour 
is governed by an imaginary moral law just as legal relations are 
governed by positive law, moral relations are to be understood by 
analogy with legal relations. 
Such an analogy was not unique in the history of philosophy. The 
Judaic ethic is based on the idea of God's law, his command and 
sanction. Natural law theory operates on the analogy of ethics and 
p9sitive law. Other modern explanations of morality by Hobbes, 
Grotius, Bentham and to some extent William Whewell also related 
morality to positive law. What is original and interesting in this 
case is not the use of the analogy by itself, but the notion of law 
used in the argument. In an analogy something that is hard to 
understand and explain is elaborated and elucidated by reference to 
something which is already known about and understood, the unfamiliar 
is understood by being related to the familiar. So a new kind of 
state or political entity in seventeenth century England was made 
familiar to citizens by being explained as like a 'family' (Filmer), 
like a business contract (Locke) or like a 'mutual protection society' 
(Hobbes). What is vital however in an attempted analogy, is not only 
that the referent is similar to the referred to in crucial ways but 
that the referent is itself correctly understood in the first place. 
John Grote's contention is that no account of law and legal 
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relations so far devised correctly accounts for the true nature, 
character and authority of law, hence the former attempts at analogy 
go disastrously wrong. Only by elaborating the true nature, character 
and authority. of law can jural ethics explain moral conduct. But a 
second point is of great interest here. oddly enough political 
philosophy and jurisprudence, the attempts to explain political and 
legal rules, sanctions, authority, and obligation for Grote, become 
preconditions, like the study of epistemology, for understanding both 
the study of ethics and the operations of moral life. Political 
philosophy is welded into the whole system, as are ethics, 
epistemology and ontology. 
But the notion of jural ethics is not the only component of 
Grote's theory needed to explain his moral, social and political 
theory. There is both a sociology or social theory and a historical 
theory hinted at above. Grote, faithful to his aim of showing how 
empirical evidence or study of the lower facts may be made compatible 
with the study of ethics and the higher facts, latched onto and 
developed one of the most exciting and potentially fruitful of 
Victorian social theories, the theory of relations or Relational 
Theory. Society in this view, is to be understood as a network of 
relationships between individuals who in some respects are similar and 
in many other respects different. Our relationships are sometimes 
chosen, as in marriage, and sometimes imposed upon us, as in the case 
of our birth into a particular family or state. Some are open to 
negotiation for example friendship, others are determined by law or 
social convention for example marriage. Either way the particulars of 
our relationships define and circumscribe our duties, our obligations, 
or rights and our deserts as F. H. Bradley was to argue in his famous 
essay in Ethical Studies of 1876. The facts of our relationships 
whether socially or individually defined or conditioned are what our 
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ideals aim to explain, rationalise and idealize. Our state's laws, 
our particular duties and rights, our social conventions, practices 
and institutions are embodiments of both these facts and the ideals of 
right. 
A third and vital component we must explore is Grote's account of 
historical development, his theory of progress and contingency. 
Relational theory itself had a theory of dynamics. If relationships 
were changing through time then so would our moral psychology, 
institutions, ideals and moral knowledge. Maine in Ancient-Law of 
1861 had argued for one revolutionary change in the process of 
modernization, the replacement of societies whose essential 
relationships were based upon status to those based upon contract. 
But how and why were relationships changing, was there any pattern of 
historical change? Sceptical as he was about positivistic and 
deterministic accounts of history and progress in particular, and 
while condemning the method of 'running to history' to solve political 
and moral problems, Grote was also an idealist influenced by romantic 
notions of the development of the spirit of a society, the uniqueness 
of national culture and institutions, the conscious rational 
development of society and civilization, an idea of the crisis of 
society and the role of the individual as well as society in meeting 
its challenge (Barnes 1963,179-190 ). 
Near at hand he found two alternatives to the German historical 
school, the French positivists, and the English rationalist, 
positivist, and radical historians. The latter included Macaulay and 
the whig historians and the Liberal Anglicans. While waning in 
popularity in the 1850's, the Liberal Anglicans can in retrospect be 
seen to have been 'marching on the highroad of history proper, not 
wandering among the byways of pseudo - history' in the period between 
1820 and 1860 (Forbes 1952,152). impressed especially by the liberal 
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Anglicans in Cambridge, including Julius Hare and Connop Thirlwall, 
whom Klaus Dockhorn considered to be two of the few historians in 
Britain at the time working under the influence of the German 
'historical movement', Grote developed from 1850 an interesting 
version of the theory. Adapting and evolving the assumptions and 
assertions of the 'Comparative -Method' he, alongside his former 
Cambridge colleagues Henry Sumner Maine and Frederick Denison Maurice, 
produced a non-deterministic account of historical change comparable 
and analogous with his arguments for the individual and social 
construction of knowledge and morality. 
The goal is now social and self development but its achievement 
is not guaranteed by any laws of progressive development. In a 
Burkian and Hegelian fashion Grote argues that the maintenance and 
practice of everyday manners of thinking and behaviour, that is custom 
and tradition, represent a very high level of moral achievement 
already. But threatened on all sides by rationalism and empiricism, 
by dogmatism and scepticism, by new scientific discoveries and wilting 
faith, by the realities of laissez faire capitalism, with its 
attendant dissolution of traditional social ties and its production of 
massive inequalities of wealth and power, Grote saw the need for 
reform and change. Only free and rational human beings could be 
agents of change. God has a design only dimly and disputedly known to 
man. But Grote argues in a deistic manner verging on humanism that it 
is the sole responsibility of men to understand the world, to struggle 
for knowledge of right and wrong, and to design and implement changes 
in the world that would lead to its improvement. Progress is not and 
cannot be guaranteed. Utopian enthusiasm and rationalistic reform may 
set progress in reverse. Political and moral reform should be the 
pragmatic activity of slowly modifying the world to bring it closer to 
our individual and social ideals of what ought to be. 
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Of Grote's actual political preferences and allegiances we know 
little, we get glimpses of these and his proposals for reform only in 
throw-away examples and comments. His relatively closed social life 
at Cambridge, his preoccupations with the life of mind, his natural 
and intellectual reluctance to embrace dogmatic creeds or causes, all 
worked against his development -of a prescriptive political theory. 
But we know enough to recognize the position he took as one of a 
moderate reformer, a Trinity style liberal eschewing both Whig 
pomposity and radical enthusiasm. He was an advocate of self help who 
would not stand aside when circumstance revealed the impossibility of 
its application, whose views and actions resemble those of the 
Christian Socialists of the day, several of whom were associated with 
his Cambridge, including, F. D. Maurice, John Llewelly(% Davies and 
CL Charles Kingsley. Grote wasjespecter of cust 
. 
om and tradition who was 
unwilling to embrace either conservatism or the rationalistic theories 
or reform proposals of Benthamites, Comptians, St Simonians, and other 
radicals. He was a moral and political idealist in both the practical 
and philosophical uses of that term. 
In this chapter I develop an analysis of politics, law and ethics 
by building up from (1) Grote's theory of human nature, to his 
(2) theory of society, (3) social relations and institutions. I 
will continue with (4) Grote's specific account of law and jural 
Ethics, the application of the analysis of law to a) obligation, b) 
truth telling and c) justiceland then study (5) Grote's account of 
political activity, the role of government and war. We can then turn 
to (6) Grote's diagnostic and prescriptive political theory, with 
special reference to a) mass society and democracy, b) freedom and c) 
property, capitalism and social welfare. We can turn to 
analyse (7) Grote's theories of history and historical method 
before concluding (8) with his theory of historical change and 
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development and his critique of progress theory. At all times I will 
cross refer to the four key components or elements of Grote's 
political philosophy, his jural ethics, relational social theory, the 
Liberal Anglican idea of history, and his proposals for moderate 
political reform. 
The whole analysis will be prefaced with a brief account of the 
published critical assessments, or rather non-assessments, of Grote's 
social and political theory, and, an account of the teaching of 
politics in the university between 1830 and 1860, a period not well 
covered in the existing literature of college and curriculum 
development. My approach will mix together for the first time a 
textual reconstruction of Grote's ideas alongside a contextual account 
of their origins. I intend this both as a heuristic device and as a 
preparation for the final task of my thesis, that of linking all the 
elements in Grote's philosophy into a whole system and locating him 
both in his own age and in the history of modern philosophy, a task 
which I shall attempt in the final chapter and in the conclusions. 
This plan will also help realize the more general aims of the 
whole thesis. It is part of my argument that Cambridge University in 
this period housed a nascent idealist movement, which, while being 
intellectual in character carried implications for practice. In 
particular I will argue that Grote's social and political theory was 
not just a negative reaction to the utilitarian theories dorainating at 
the time but was a positive and original formulation, that built on 
several academic theories and movements of the previous forty years in 
Cambridge, which have themselves only been rediscovered in recent 
years. In brief, Grote's social and political theory both is a part 
of his wider philosophical system and of a set of loosely related 
developments in philosophy, history, anthropology, jurisprudence, 
philology and theology developing in Cambridge during the period 
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from 1820 to 1870. Both developments I argue, are idealistic in 
character, and bear comparison with the early ethical writings of 
F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green. 
Finally I wish to show that this philosophy of society and 
politics provided us with a very significant insight not only into 
Cambridge thought and culture but into wider developments in the 
Victorian world. Just as utilitarian, evangelical, radical and 
socialist political theories tell us about the contexts in which they 
were spawned and vice versa, so the Grotian and wider Cambridge view 
encapsulates another life and mind of a small but significant section 
of Victorian society experiencing the challenges of rapid change. 
What is most interesting however is that the response is not just 
ideological, in the sense of abridging and legitimating a sectional 
interest, but is genuinely philosophical and historical. Lacking 
sectarian charms, polemical advocacy, and intuitive popular appeal, 
Grote's theory failed to be recognized let alone be popularly 
received. Though the wider movements had their. effect and were 
realized in varying degree elsewhere in nineteenth thought, century 
the unique and attractive theory has been lost to modern scholarship. 
But first some preliminary analysis of the context. 
I Reception 
Enough should now have been said above to support the case that Grote 
had both a constructive moral theory as well as an original and 
powerful epistemology and ontology upon which it was based. Hisorical 
accident rather than personal design largely accounts for the relative 
popularity of the epistemological work when compared with the moral 
philosophy. But another oddity in the story is the almost complete 
lack of recognition of the existence of a social and political theory 
in Grote's writing by his contemporary and subsequent commentators. 
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Of the reviewers of the Examination only John Llewelyn Davies made a 
note of the relational social theory that underpins the theory of law, 
politics and obligation in Grote's writings. After stating accurately 
that Grote is hardly an 'intuitive' moralist he noted; 
'He is so moderate and hesitating in his own pretensions, whilst 
making it his chief business to moderate the pretensions of the 
Utilitarians, that he fails to give emphasis enough on his own 
convictions. But I gather on the whole from the chapter on 'Duty 
and the Utilitarian Sanctions', that Mr Grote makes the 
bindingness of Duty to consist in the claims which others have 
upon us in virtue of their relations to us. He is nearer to Mr 
Mill than he is to the 'intuitive' moralists; but his doctrine 
of rel3tions as imposing duties upon us, differs from Mr. Mills 
doctrine ' that the unity of the human race makes us all 
responsible for seeking each the happiness of all. Duty, as 
answering to relations, rests rather, as Mr Grote observes, on 
differences amongst men than upon their absolute equality. And 
it varies in stringency according to the closeness and character 
of the relations' (Llewelyn Davies 1870,92-93). 
In the reviews of the Treatise, which contains several chapters on 
right, duty, law, justice and war as well as elements expanding on 
man's social nature and on the presupposition of practice and action, 
there are again no specific references. Among later summaries and 
surveys only Pucelle and Thompson say anything of significance the 
former referring to Grote's theory of custom and tradition as 
embodying the spirit of a society, and the latter briefly noting 
correctly that Grote's own moral philosophy could be called 'Jural', 
which involves 
'looking at ethics as a system of rules or laws. In this sense 
duty may be regarded as an idealization of law' (Thompson 1887, 
433). 
MacDonald in his book says nothing about any of these three important 
aspects of Grote's philosophy and the extended review by Whitmore, 
Cunningham, and Schneewind do nothing to make up for the omission. 
II Teachinq and Talking Politics 
In one sense, we should not be surprised by the lack of interest 
in or even recognition of a social and political theory in Grote's 
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writings. Political and social issues were important not only to 
Grote but to many other representatives of the two schools of 
Cambridge philosophy up to 1860. However the formal structure and 
compulsory reading for the moral sciences were very narrow up to then 
and would encourage both insiders and outsiders to place little stress 
upon political and social issues. Discussions of contemporary, 
political and social issues, had to be conducted within the 
straight-jacket of the Regulations for the Moral Sciences, Classics 
and Law Tripos and their attendant list of Books agreed for study. 
Creative tutors could and did run rings around the regulations, but 
politics entered more genuinely by extrapolating from set texts and 
classical authorities to their modern equivalents. Discussions of 
democratic Athens and republican Rome, Pericles, Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle and Cicero could be turned into vehicles for the discussion 
of democracy in contemporary Europe, as could the otherwise tame 
looking histories of Guizat and Hallam. Bentham on laws, Kant and 
Fichte on ethics and Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and J. S. Mill on 
political economy also provided Trojan heroes, if they were ever 
needed, after 1860. 
Commentators both inside and outside the university from Mille to 
Ingleby and Sidgwick had noted the mathematical and scientific bent of 
Cambridge philosophy up to 1860 complimented by studies of the 
classical authorities, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, and one or two 
modern authorities, including Locke, Butler, Paley and Whewell. But 
even here there were opportunities to touch on philosophy and 
politics. Indeed in 1833 when Grote graduated his colleagues only 
touched -on philosophy in classics papers on the 'Evidence of 
Christianity' 'Aristotle's Ethics Book 6' the 'Analogy of Natural and 
Revealed Religion', 'Philosophy of Mind' and two papers on 'Moral and 
Political Philosophy' (2). But later papers covered a reasonably wide 
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area though Locke and Paley loomed large. Students sitting their 
examinations in 1837 would have touched on politics and philosophy in 
papers on 'Paley Natural theology', 'Butler on. Human Nature' and 
'Stewart on Active and Moral Powers', 'Aristotle's' Politics', 'Paley' 
and 'Locke on Human Nature'. 
The key philosophers touched on, in the 1837 fellowship 
examinations Grote sat, were Locke, Brown, Berkely, Stewart, Butler, 
Paley, Cicero and Aristotle. Political issues covered only about one 
third of the questions set, and economic and social issues were hardly 
represented at all. Between 1848, when the Senate agreed on an 
honours course in Moral -Sciences for students who had already 
graduated in other tripos, and 1855 when Grote took the Chair in 
Philosophy, Whewell's personal impact and his books were predominant. 
There were two'separate papers on Whewell's 'Elements of Morality' and 
about one third of the questions covered within them were of a 
political character. Separate papers in Political Economy, Modern 
History, General Jurisprudence and and the Laws of England were added 
to Mental and Moral Philosophy in the 1848 reform. 
The reformed Tripos of 1860 did allow a deeper and wider study of 
political and social issues as Sidgwick, Rothblatt and more recently 
Collini have -argued (Rothblatt 1968; Sidgwick 1870,1876; Collini 
1985t 344-347). Being allowed to sit for the tripos for the first 
time, undergraduates found themselves faced with examinations in Moral 
Philosophy, Mental Philosophy and Logic, Modern History, Political 
Economy and General Jurisprudence. The key modern texts for the 
former were by Dugald Stewart, Paley, Whewell, Kant and Fichte, and by 
Descartes, Locke, Reid, Kant, Cousins and Hamilton for mental 
philosophy. On 'History and Political Philosophy' students had to 
read Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, Guizot, Hallam and 'Brougham's 
Political Philosophy', and Adam Smith, Malthusl Ricardot J-S-Millt Mc 
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Culloch, Jones, Carey and Chavallier for 'Political Economy'. Bentham 
was covered under 'Jurisprudence'. Little change occured as a result 
of the modifications of 1867 except the removal of the papers on 
'History' and 'Jurisprudence'. But from this time onwards the 
professionalization of teaching in both philosophy and politics 
developed rapidly under Sidgwick's guidance and politics especially 
came out into the open as an independent and respected course of study 
(Winstanley 1940,1946; Collini 1985,341-363; Cambridge University 
Calendar 1870). 
The examination papers in fact provide a better guide to what was 
actually taught and discussed at the time than 'either the formal 
syllabus and the booklists. Both in the areas of politics and 
philosophy there are surprises. Questions were regularly set on the 
political issues of rights, justice, law, obligation, theories of the 
state, the origins of private property, on the political philosophy 
papers between 1860 and 1867. On the mental philosophy papers for 
undergraduates and fellows the questions were even more revealing as 
they regularly contained questions on German idealist philosophers 
before the period when convention agrees these subjects were 
popular. In the Trinity fellowship examinations of 1860 a question 
appeared on the epistemologies of 'Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel', the latter three reappearing on the paper for 
1864. Questions on Fichte's moral philosophy appear twice in the same 
year for the fellowship examinations at St John's, set presumably by 
Grote's colleague and tutor in moral sciences at that College Joseph 
Bickersteth Mayor. The St John's fellowship examinations of 1864 also 
had questions on consent theory, divine right, prescriptive and 
expediency theories of authority, the origins of the feudal system, on 
checks and balances, two questions on'Montesquieu and one on liberty. 
When put alongside Roby's advocacy of Vico and Hegel for the tripos in 
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1860, this evidence suggests an interest in and knowledge of both 
political philosophy and German idealistic thought by at least Grote 
and his two moral science equally tutors at the time, a knowledge 
demanded equally of all fellowship candidates of Trinity and St John's 
and to a lesser extent of undergraduates. We should also keep in mind 
that H. J. Roby was along with Grote, Henry Maine, and Robert Ellis, 
deeply interested in Roman law and was later to produce definitive 
works in this area (Roby 1886,1913). 
Teaching itself we are told by Stephen and others was not 
regarded as an important activity for professors, formal tuition being 
left to the poorly paid and overworked college tutors of the day and 
the highly paid private tutors like Shilleto, who were masters in the 
arts of cramming (Stephen 1865). To some extent the moral science 
students during Grote's tenure of office were lucky. Firstly, he took 
teaching seriously, and as against the practices of several 
professors, including Charles Kingsley the Regius Professor of Modern 
History who taught spasmodically, he lectured every week of every term 
on all days except Wednesdays (Cambridge Papers E. A. 17). Secondly, 
Grote was aided by several excellent college moral science tutors, all 
to have illustrious careers, including H. J. Roby and Henry Sidgwick at 
Trinity Collegel J. B. Mayor followed by Isaac Todhurter at St John's, 
Leslie Stephens at Trinity Hall, and John Venn at Caius. Thirdly, 
teaching was aided at the time by excellent libraries but especially 
in the colleges supplemented by useful personal collections. 
Fourthly, the teaching groups were small but contained some students 
to challenge the tutors including F. J. A. Hort, later Professor of 
Divinity, R. L. Ellis, and J. B. Pearson. Fifthly, Grote's professional 
colleagues included challenging and influential teachers such As the 
Professor of Political Economy Henry Fawcett, Sir James Stephen 
followed by Charles Kingsley in the Chair of Modern History, and Henry 
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Maine Regius Professor of Civil Law between 1847 and 1854, a year 
prior to Grote's election. 
Political and social debate could also be expected within the 
context of Trinity social life where many influential liberals of the 
day as well as christian socialists could be relied upon to direct 
conversation. Cambridge also had its intellectual and debating 
societies, some of which like the Apostles and the Grote society 
regularly turned their attention to social and political issues. 
Participation in politics was rarer but not unheard of. Trinity had 
amongst its fellows who stood for parliamentary seats as liberals in 
this period or later, J. Westlake, H. J. Roby, J. Rigby, with Robert 
Leslie Ellis, Grote's close friend as a prospective candidate for 
Bath. St John's College had L. H. Courtney, Trinity Hall has Henry 
Fawcett and Professor James F. Stephens was a successful candidate at 
Harwich in 1865 (Harvie 1976,269-271). When we add to this the 
number of fellows who became heavily involved in the legal profession, 
the upper echelons of the civil service, in journalism, particularly 
the Saturday Review and in doing good deeds amongst the working masses 
of London, Cambridge and some northern cities we come up with a 
picture of a college and a university far more politically and 
socially aware, informed and active than may have been suspected. 
This was the cultural ambience in which Grote's political and social 
theory was conceived. 
III 
Social and Political Theory 
(1) The theory of human nature 
Political theories usually make assumptions about the nature of man 
and society as well as knowledge and reality. In Chapter seven of 
this thesis considerable attention was given to Grote's theory of 
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human nature which may usefully be noted before proceeding with this 
chapter. Grote paradoxically describes man's nature as having no 
nature, meaning by this that what we individually and collectively 
exhibit as dispositions, habits, and behaviour patterns, we have 
learnt and have socially learnt at a particular time. Human nature is 
hence contingent. Basic instincts common to all men are few and are 
morally trivial. On top of these are built layers of character, 
habit, customary behaviour or our 'second'nature' until we reach an 
outer layer of the perfectly freely chosen self. What we call 
dispositional 'human nature' is generally the 'mean level' of human 
achievement in the society to which we belong or of those others with 
whom we are acquainted. One point is certain, that human nature is 
complex, many sided and in a state of development and transition. The 
production of simplistic keys such as those provided in the 
utilitarian and Darwinian theories are to be rejected as partial, and 
a composite eclectic account is to be put in its place. The key 
aspects are that man is both a sentient and an active being, who needs 
both to feel and satisfy his felt want, and act, do and achieve to 
satisfy his existential wants. The existence of time, space and want 
explain the next central feature of human nature and the human 
condition. Human life is riven by the gap between what is and what 
ought to be, and by what has been; what is and what will be; what is 
here and what is there but wanted here. Life is a relentless and 
fruitless effort to close these gaps by activity, fruitless because 
new wants always arise. Human nature therefore exhibits restlessness, 
dissatisfaction or ennui, as well as idealism, desire for improvement 
and perfection. 
Other elements are more or less existentially common to all human 
beings. First we are imaginative creatures who posit a world 
different to what is and set our plans to realise these ideals. Next 
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we are fundamentally free in the sense of being able and unavoidably 
compelled to choose our actions in life. Finally we are not 
individual, but social beings. While choice and will are always 
personal, the whole context of choice, our language, our thinking, our 
willing and our acting is social in character. Man is 'social to the 
bottom of his mind'. This theory-of man we saw was expressivist, it 
involved an idea of the unfolding of human nature from what was 
achieved to its ideals through self development. The theory of action 
is qualitative, activity developing in man and through history from 
what is immediate and unreflective to what is mediate and reflective. 
Mind and action have a capacity for self development towards rational 
self understanding and rational action and, as we shall see political 
history reveals a development from society being organized by force, 
to society based on authority to rule given by consent and reason. 
Dispositionally Grote is clear that we are neither essentially selfish 
nor altruistic, fearful or optimistic, truthful or liars, fair or 
inequitable, sociable or reclusive in our behaviour. Hobbes' advocacy 
of the universality of human fear of one another Grote sees is only as 
true as the claim for a universal love of all men for another embedded 
in the theory of stoicism, christianity and socialism (Grote 18761 
126). All such dispositions we learn in the practice of life while 
experiencing and interacting with others, as he once put it 'we are 
not by nature virtuous, but learn virtue'. One, and only one 
disposition, he argues to be provided to all human beings, an 
assertion for which he was taken to task by Bain and defended by 
Bradley, that mankind is never knowingly evil, that there is a natural 
benevolence in mankind, that wrong action and non virtues though and 
action are products of mistake not will or design (Grote 1876,471-4). 
Envy hence is mistaken respect for the success of others; over 
competitiveness is an overblown desire to do well. 
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Society 
The argument that man is a social being is at the heart of John 
Grote's whole philosophy. While popularly espoused by severalg but 
not all, of the positivist sociologists, some of the romantics, 
eclectics and idealists, this proposition challenged the basic premise 
of all empiricists and phenomenalists, as well as the classical 
political economists and utilitarians, that man is a individualistic 
being, a separate human atom, a construct of a unique sensory 
experience, the inhabiter of an inescapably private world, and a self 
concerned rational actor. Yet Grote's proposition is more fully and 
adequately grounded than the arguments of most other social theorists. 
In Chapter Seven I reproduced his metaphysical case for social man. 
Briefly, his argumeht was that the individual presupposes society, that 
society is a historical and logical precondition for the development 
of the individual. Social constructs pre-exist in time the production 
of each individual, for example the existence of the social 
institution of language. Communication is the precondition of the 
development of the individual. Language is social and with it we all 
speak, write and think. Individual thought is riddled with social 
constructions and social meanings - it is in fact social (Grote 1865, 
154). Willing and acting, it follows, are socially conditioned, as 
are the production of our ideals or plans in life. Indeed even our 
feelings and sensations are socially defined by the language used to 
portray them. Our whole body and our conscious life then is not 
private but public, thought and consciousness are not a personal 
retreat from public discourse not an inescapable cell as suggested by 
Hume, but are, as with Wittgenstein, public domains. Bodily feelings 
and sensations, as well as appearances are socially constructed. 
Societal man we saw in Chapter Five undergoes a unique cognitive 
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development in life. Our first unique experience of self is 
challenged by recognition of the not self, including others. The 
others provides some of the tools for intellectual activity# for 
knowledge of self, and they provide words and language, experience and 
practice, guidance and education, rules and ideals. Our cognitive 
development from immediacy to mediacy, from knowledge of acquaintance 
to judgement is a shared social development. our experience of 
naming, recognizing, describing, understanding, and explaining is 
imbued with social categories and is social in its very nature. 
Intellectual ideals such as truth, knowledge and certainty and 
intellectual constructs such as mathematical tables and scientific 
laws are products of social thought, reflection, argument and debate. 
And so too are our moral ideals, the right, the good, happiness, 
virtue and our knowledge of what are the virtues and our rights and 
what is our duty. Hence Grote's original and definitive conclusion 
that. when we think we do so generally, both for and with a general 
intelligence. In thinking we are in a 
communion of thought with all who think on the same subject.... 
And we verify our thought accordingly * (Grote 1876,62). 
In another place he goes further in a Hegelian and Whewellian 
direction arguing that 
* we each one of us learn, and the human race learns, and between 
the*two processes there must be some, and may be a very great, 
analogy' (Grote 1865,203). 
The argument is not a modified form of empiricism or a proto form 
of behavioural modification or socialization theory. It is logical 
and anthropological. The external social environment does not press 
in on the helpless individual prey making of it what it willst the 
self being a quasi accident of the environment which determines our 
entire nature and consciousness. Nor, on the other hand, does a fixed 
and innate social nature workitsway out as in Stoicism and some other 
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forms of rationalism. Firstly, education in the narrow sense of 
deliberate inculcation of social beliefs is but a small part of 
education in the widest sense of acquiring social skills, habits and 
beliefs in the practice of everyday life (Grote 1876,442). Secondly, 
0 no creature, man or other, can be educated in anything except 
what it is in their nature to be educated in' (Grote 1876,423). 
Education brings out, develops the fundamental capacities and then 
trains, directs and occasionally reforms our natures. Man differs 
from animals in being able in the long run to 'make his own customs 
and social habits' (Grote 1876,433). Indeed whatever may be innate 
to mankind 'his actual life is sure very greatly to form and modify' 
(Grote 1876,439). In true eclectic and typically Grotian fashion he 
sums up the nature/nurture debate with the following: 
'I do not think it is possible to draw any definite line of 
demarcation between what is congenital and what is the result of 
education. There may be a part of that which is individual to 
the born human creature which comes from some spiritual source, 
distinct from the parents: of-that I say nothing; in any case 
we cannot distinguish it. Again, what comes from the maternal 
communication, influence and tenderness, when all is as yet 
merely plastic and unformed. And so the process-goes on: where 
the congenital individually ceases, and where education begins, 
we cannot say' (Grote 1876,439). 
Mankind*s'social nature then is not innate nor simply a product 
of circumstance and nature. Rather our nature is educable and 
education is a process of transforming what is 
'immediate, instinctive, impulsive thinking, feeling and acting, 
which life begins with, by the circumstances of the individual 
social life' (Grote 1876,442). 
In line with idealist expressivist theory, education develops what is 
immediate (not innate) into self consciousness. But full development 
and coherence is only gained with the re-establishment of spontaneity. 
So the real result of education on man is the 'formation of character 
where the-learned becomes 'habit in the widest sense', an 
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'immediate and almost voluntary performance of the action without 
preparatory consciousness' (Grote 1876,442). 
In one lovely analogy Grote likens our habitual character and our 
moral knowledge to the way the 'accomplished pianist touches the keys' 
compared with a beginner. In another double analogy Grote likens the 
development of character, to that of the growth of knowledge and of 
them both to the growth of a tree. What starts in the seed grows only 
if the circumstances are right. What we are 'depends upon a thousand 
circumstances in the past I but in the end, we end up with something 
familiar, and reasonably perpetual. Moral and political knowledge 
becomes habitual, encased in custom but the custom is alive and itself 
grows (Grote 1876,443-444). Individual habit and social customs are 
our 'second nature' and both are involved more by 'companionship and 
society' than formal education in primary socialization (Grote 1876, 
464-465). Once again a theme common to Burke, the romantics and Hegel 
before, and Oakeshott later, emerges: - the significance of cu9tom, 
habit and tradition for social life, and the indication of its 
rational as well as practical properties. Custom here appears as 
tradition does later to Oakeshott, to be as 'blind as a bat. ' To this 
we will shortly return. 
We must not be misled into thinking that being a social being 
somehow detracts from being an individual, that the mountain of social 
ties threatens self development and personal freedom, or that growing 
individuality threatens society, social structure and social 
development. Grote as we shall see later prized variety in human 
nature, the development of individual character and attributes and 
individual effort as much as most mid-Victorians, distrusting in turn 
passive conformity, regimentation, the growth of mass culture and the 
general levelling down of social classes. But his real concern with 
regard to society and the individual was to stress their total 
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inseparability, and alternatively their almost complete 
interdependence. The argument is again both logical and 
anthropological. Our being a self, developing a personality and a 
will of our-own presumes not only language but others including 
parents, and family. Anthropologically, we find ourselves born into a 
pre existing society and here 
'Life is lived by men in conjunction: society is a part of human 
nature' (Grote 1876,335). 
The notion of 'self' is subjected to scrutiny and found to be 
'difficult to define and limit*. The individual self lives mentally 
and physically 'in community, and has in reality no independence... '. 
But equally 'rational personality makes each individual independentt 
so far as self-determination and responsibility go'. What binds us 
together apart from language, thought and a common social space and 
world is 'want and the power of mutual help' and social 'sympathy' 
. 
(Grote 1876,335). Individual and society are two sides of the same 
coin and are interrelated at all levels *from language to mutual 
economic support, defence of rights and territory. Education, family, 
custom, habit, moral rules, laws and political institutions are not 
threats to the growth of individuals but preconditions for their 
development. Against Rousseau, Grote even defends civilization, for 
while it generates 
*a great degree of imitation and fashion, which at first sight 
renders the aspect of civilized society, as to individual 
characters, more unvaried and monotonous than we imagine that of 
uncivilized to be. This impression however is superficial in 
more than one way. It is not so much that variety of character 
is really lessened in civilization, but that it is rendered less 
conspicuous than it would otherwise be by the restraint and 
mannerism which civilization generates in many classes'(Grote 
1876,467). 
(3) Relational--Social Theory 
We can now begin to unravel Grote's own theory of society. 
However in the absence of any essay, text or even chapter devoted to 
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this, the theory will be like a patchwork quilt and difficult for the 
reader to locate without one further preliminary. The social theory, 
of which John Grote's is an example, is itself relatively unexplored 
and understood today. A short reconstruction exercise is then needed 
in advance of further textual analysis. Social theory was at a 
relatively unadvanced stage in Britain between 1830 and 1866. Various 
options existed including utilitarian and empiricist atomistic theory 
building on the individualism of Hobbes; remnants of various consent 
and contract theories, various forms of social prescription theories 
derived from Burke and Hume, some historical development theories such 
as the positivisms'of Comte and St Simone and Montesquieu. Less 
popularly known were the new idealistic organic and developmental 
social theories and the 'ricorsi' of Vico. Social theory however 
underpinned many studies in the classics where ideas of Greek and 
Roman social development were applied to the present, and in 
jurisprudence where writers as widely opposed as Savigny and John 
Austin built models of law and legal development on social 
assumptions. The latter two influences, plus references to Burke and 
romantic notions of organic society, were the backcloth for Cambridge 
social theory at this time, though as I have hinted already Vico was 
beginning to be read and taken seriously. 
Relational social theory was unique. Its fundamental assumption 
is analogous to the epistemological argument that knowledge is 
relational, that it is a relationship between thought and things, mind 
and matter. This idea, was espoused by Grote in the- Exploratio of 
1865. 
'And more than this, knowledge not only is a relation, but is of 
relations or related things: that, of which or about which the 
knowledge is, must be constituted somehow, must have 
particularity and character, involving relations to other things, 
or qualities have relations to each other, in order for knowledge 
to be possible of it or about it' (Grote 1865,62). 
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The theory of knowledge as internal relations was developed both on 
the later idealists such as Bradley and Joachim and by Marx himself if 
Bertrand Ollman's interpretation is to be believed (Bradley 1876, 
Ollman 1976). The fundamental anthropological axiom is that society 
is neither an aggregation or collection of separate individuals, nor 
an organic collectivity or thing, but a conglomeration of 
relationships between social individuals. Both for knowledge and 
society 
'We have no business to isolate any one thing in the universe 
from other things which have relation to it, and to suppose it 
other than it is' (Grote 1876,61). 
We are what we are as individuals by virtue of the relations we have 
to the social and physical world around us, society is only a term 
used to describe the totality of these relationships. It is an 
'brganization' of individuals in terms of varying terms or conditions 
called relationships. The most general categories covering these 
relationships are the social and natural, the political and legal, and 
the general. 
'By moral relations and moral society, as distinguished from 
political, I understand men as stronger and weaker, benefactors 
and benefited, trusters and trusted, or linked together in the 
moral relations similar to these, besides the natural relations, 
as of family, which partially coincide with these; lastly, 
supposing there is no other relation, as linked together in any 
case by the general relation of human brotherhood' (Grote 1872, 
96). 
By political relationships Grote considers men related as ruler and 
ruled, governor and governed, legislator and citizen. Economic 
relationships are between employer and employed, rich and poor, owners 
and not owners. 
The next vital aspect of relational theory concerns the nature of 
the elements related in all human relationships. The stress is not on 
sameness or even similarity but difference. 
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'In some respects, society, whether moral or political, may be 
considered an aggregation of similar units; but in far more 
important respects it is an organization of dissimilar members' 
(Grote 1870,95). 
Later human society is described as 'a society of unlikeness' and it 
is this which differentiates social systems as human organizations 
from natural entities like the groupings of animals (Grote 1870,336). 
The differences of significance are not noted as being of sex or 
colour, but age, familial relationship, office, and country. But 
above all men differ from animals in two crucial ways which force them 
into political -relationships, differences in 'interests' and 
I opinions' (Grote 1876,490). Of the former the most important 
interests are family and property (Grote 1876,226). Conflicts within 
these spheres are matched by those of opinion, such as those over 
right and wrong, just and unjust, and over questions of morality, 
virtue and religion. The human production of wants and ideals, of 
ideal societies, roles, relationships, and needs and visions of 
affections creates entirely new areas for conflict and difference. 
As against contract and organic theories this model emphasiaes 
the complexity rather than the simplicity of society, social relations 
and social behaviour (Grote 1870,145). Positivism, and the new 
sociologies impose artificial simplifications by suggesting variously 
that only relationships of ownership, class, family, power or 
knowledge predominate. The truth is that society is a mass of 
different kinds of relationships between an almost infinite variety of 
individuals and the only major simplifying factor is that through time 
these relationships have been institutionalised into offices and 
officers, practices and institutions. Hence the institutionalized 
roles*and offices of mother and father, neighbour and friend, subject 
and citizen, doctor and teacherl lawyer and politician have evolved. 
Alongside these where permanent relationships have been codified or 
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forcibly brought into existence by rules or laws we have institutions 
(Grote 1876,227). The normal role of social and legal rules and 
order with regard to individuals is 'to bring out and to regulate 
their differences' including those of property or power (Grote 1872, 
339). But on occasions society, via the law, may decide to put us 
into certain relationships it considers right and then to extract and 
expect appropriate responses. The balance is a matter of history and 
circumstance but as a general rule 
'It is the purpose of society, not more to bring us into 
relations with others, than to preserve our individuality against 
the overbearing and oppression of others' (Grote 1870,340). 
Now the significance of this argument is that it was a part of a 
new sociology originating at Cambridge in the three decades*1840-1870. 
I shall call it relational theory, and associate it primarily with 
Henry Maine, Frederick Maurice and John Grote. To Grote human 
relationships are facts, but facts which entailed moral conclusions, 
obligations and rights. Relationships are at the point of transfer 
between the lower end hi: jher facts, the positive and the ideal, and 
between those things conducive respectively to positivist, empiricist 
and inductive method on the one side, and idealist and deductive 
method on the other side. Relational theory then is at the heart of 
John Grote's moral and political philosophy, in a way reminiscent of 
Bradley's chapter on 'My Station and its Duties', and the arguments 
for moral entailment by John Searle and Richard Norman (Bradley 
1872,145-186; Searle 1964,43-58; Norman 1971,105-107). Later 
Grote pushes home his argument. Society, its relationships, offices, 
institutions and practices pre-exist each individual. We are born 
into this complicated scene or 'web' of relationships as he calls it 
(Grote 1876,376). We act and interact within them, and act to 
maintain and occasionally to change them according to our individual 
or collective wills. But these relationships do not determine our 
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actions, nor are they merely results of such powerful incentives and 
sanctions that disobedience is unlikely, as utilitarians think. 
Rather the facts of our relationships have moral implications for our 
conduct. For instance the fact that I am a father signifies a 
specific relationship to my wife or child and entails the idea that I 
ought-to protect and care for them both. I can as a father determine 
whether I ought to maintain my family by looking at my position in a 
web of relationships and checking the moral rules and ideals of 
conduct considered appropriate for my place on the matrix (Grote 1870, 
146). 
Facts concerning our place in a concrete network of relationships 
will not provide us with either the notion of ought or duty nor a 
principle, rule or ideal of conduct. For this ideal we need what 
Grate calls a 'moral law' or ideal law. Kant provided us, not with an 
ideal law with a multiplicity of rules and principles of application, 
but with a single categorical imperative, a gol'den rule an ultimate 
rational principle. This principle was formal and as Bradley and 
others argued it lacked content and even meaning (Grote 1876, 
200-204). Grote recognised this defect in idealist Kantian (and I 
suspect Whewellian) ethics and compensated with the argument that our 
actual. relationships supply the necessary content. 
'The fact, i. e the relation, or relative position, as a matter of 
fact, does not give the notion of duty, but, supposing this to 
exist in general, it supplies the application and the 
particularity of it' (Grote 1876,212). 
The fact of our relationships 'fixes the particulars of duty' and 
indeed 
'the description of the duty owed, is, in many cases, little more 
than the same thing as describing the fact of the relation' 
(Grote 1876,212). 
We have now arrived at the position 'later made famous by Bradley 
that my actual duties are laid down by my various stations or roles in 
161 
life. Grote's theory is really presentable as 'My Offices and its 
Duties'. Derived mostly from the practice of Roman law and morality 
where 'officia' are legal duties plus 'tasks incidental to a man's 
status in the community', and prompted by Cicero and his 'De 
Officiis', the theory was novel for the time but of great pedigree 
(Grote 1876,92; de Burgh 1928,63; Cicero 1913). 
'The simple particularity of our duty, as regulating the 
distribution of our action ambng possible objects of it, is what 
is expressed by the term officium: a table of our officia, such 
as we have in the Church Catechism is the answer to the question 
'What is thy duty towards thy neighbour? ' is in reality an 
exhaustive, though summary, scheme of the entire regulation of 
our moral action, as complete as would be furnished by a 
knowledge of the particulars of the happiness of others, and by a 
table of the different kinds of conduct promotive of it' (Grote 
1870,146). 
Claims as well as dues are distributed by a table of our officia 
and so, as we shall see shortly, are our actions in regard to justice, 
equality and the law. But let us look briefly At the web of 
relationships binding us. At the most universal level 
we stand in some relation to everybody: in the relation of 
fellow-men... ' (Grote 1870,146). 
We are related as members of the human race and Grote is convinced, as 
are all christians and humanists, that the mere fact imposes general 
duties upon us.. Truthfulness; paying our debts and keeping promises 
are examples of general rights and obligations we expect in 
relationships between anybody (Grote 1870,142-144). More 
specifically we are members of societies and states and the 
relationships here bind us more directly under social norms and 
positive laws. Even more specifically we are members of social groups 
such as families, and here the relationship not the feeling obliges us 
'Let us leave out of Account family affection, i. e as a reason 
why we should care more for kindred than for others: I think the 
simple existence of the family relation, as a matter of fact, is 
a sufficient reason why preference should be given to kindred 
over others' (Grote 1876,211). 
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Familial relationships and their relative duties seem to be taken by 
Grote as central and as a model for all other relationships. Grote 
adds that once in a family 
0 our action, as useful, is engaged as it were to them, before we 
have right to general disposal of it; and also that the nature 
of our action towards or for them is determined by the nature of 
the relation: it is different according as they are parents, 
according as they are children, according to what they are' 
(Grote 1876,217). 
Apart from general' and familial relationships there are also 
. relations of occasion', those not fixed or permanent like membership 
of a state or family, but open to choice and change such as 
friendship. Friendship imposes definite obligations just as being a 
benefactor gives us certain rights but these are operative only so 
long as the relationship lasts and no longer. Generally Grote treats 
these transitory relationships as less morally binding and indeed a 
source of complication, 'mischief and a vast deal of vice' (Grote 
1876,134). 
In general the golden rule is that for every social relationship 
there is an appropriate set of rules of conduct, or rights and duties, 
claims and dues, expectations and bonds. The key guide is 'the fact 
of the relative position of the parties', and few other philosophical 
principles exist or are needed to explain this further. 
'And we may say in general that of all this duty there are 
different degrees of stringency, imperativenesse or 
enforcablenesst forming roughly a scale. Roughly only, because 
there are different manners in which one and another duty is 
owed, rendering it difficult to bring them into measurement 
together. Gratitude for instance is a duty of fairness or 
justice, and in this way far more imperative than any call upon 
us for the simple duty of kindness however urgent: and yet in 
definiteness and therefore in this respect in stringencyt it is a 
duty far beneath the simple duties of exact justice, as honesty' 
(Grote 1870,146-147). 
one guideline is that we must not show undue preference for either our 
particular or our general duties. Nepotism exaggerates special family 
claims and general benevolence ignores those with special claims upon 
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us (Grote 1876,217-219). Another is that duties are mutual and 
duties are correlative, duty being 'a scheme of recognized relation 
mutual dueness between parties' (Grote 1870,151). Yet another is 
that we must never let definite mutual duty be dissolved away into 
a general duty to mankind as does Mill in his essay of 1861 (Grote 
1870,96,253). 
Here we may add a detail that likens Grote's formulation of this 
theory of morality to* Bradley's. Bradley does not really deal with 
the case where duties attached to stations come into conflict, to him 
it is a practical not a theoretical matter (Bradley 1872,225-227 ). 
Grote notices that our 'duties may be contradictory and conflicting' 
(Grote 1876,246). He notes how painful and confusing such conflicts 
as that between duty and truthfulness may be but he too sticks to his 
theory and refuses to go outside for a criteria of adjudication. Each 
society ranks duties in its tables of officia or in moral conventions 
and each individual has to consult this when deciding, There are no 
easy answers because the hierarchy of duties is rarely written down or 
even agreed. 
'When such cases arise, they are real conflicts... Each case must 
stand on its merits' (Grot*e 1876,256-257). 
We may now remember Grote's objection to Mill's theory of the 
sanctions to morality in which the feeling of love of children or of 
duty, or fear of social approbation are taken to account for the 
performance of much virtuous and obligatory conduct. Feelings to 
Grote may indicate that something is virtuous or a duty but it does 
not account for it or give a sufficient reason for acting. Just as in 
experience our sensations indicate but do not guarantee objectivity or 
the truth so in morality. Our feelings are only guesse's or guides to 
the facts at two levels, the facts of our relationships and the higher 
facts the objective truth. Either way 
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'the feelings of obligation, like 
4ware of the external world, is a 
representing facts independent of 
which binds or obliges us, but it 
we are thus made aware through the 
see also 1876,368-369). 
the feelings which make us 
feeling which we understand as 
as. It is not the feelings 
is the state of facts of which 
feeling' (Grote 1870,144-145; 
Of course moral feelings are powerful and often do direct our actions, 
but Grote is objecting here not only to Mill but to all kinds of moral 
sense theory including theories of the moral sentiments used by Adam 
Smith and Hume, and theories of the conscience as used by Butler 
(Grote 1876,126,394). He advocates an 'objective' as against a 
'subjective' account of obligation (Grote 1876,457). In addition he 
is exempting himself from having to give much weight to theories of 
moral behaviourism, for if feelings as such are not the major 
determinant of duty and indeed virtue, then just how and in what 
direction our socialization has developed is of little relevance 
(Grote 1870,210). 
What our moral feelings indicate may or may not be the facts, we 
may mis-perceive or mis-feel. I may feel my duty to my student or my 
colleague is more important than my duty to my wife and children, but 
I would be wrong to do so. A perusal of the facts will show that 
family obligations are prior logically and historically, that in 
addition being more particular (or relative) they are more binding, 
and that indeed society having considered this to be the case has 
enshrined the obligation to family in positive law. I may feel 
inclined to refuse payment of that part of my taxes used to support 
causes to which I may morally object but the facts are that I am a 
member of this society, a citizen of this state and am therefore not 
only morally but Politically and legally obliged. 
I To demand further justifications or reasons why I should obey, 
such as that sought by utilitarians that doing one's duty will promote 
11 
1 the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number is as irrelevant as 
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relying purely upon feelings. Being a member of a society involves as 
a precondition that many of our actions are governed by rules and are 
variously due. Society would be impossible without this practice 
'that, if men are to associate together, they must recognise 
mutual duty' (Grote 1870,274). 
We all have the capacity to choose and act as we wish, 
'But in reality man is born into a complicated scene, and before 
he is conscious or a free agent, he is hampered round with all 
sorts of circumstances, which, in a different point of view, make 
a large portion of his powers not his own, but variously due' 
(Grote 1870,145). 
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This point is made in regard to virtue and right action in the first 
sentence of the Examination and is repeated with regard to duty 
specifically on several other occasions. The practice of performing 
one's duties may well and probably will promote the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number but its doing so does not constitute its value 
or 'explain what we mean when we use that term'. Duty is not 
specified by resort purely to feelings, or to consequences though both 
are'relevant secondary factors in recognizing what are duties and in 
evaluating them (Grate 1870-, 189-194). What does specify our duties 
and provide the imperative value we shall soon come to, but for now we 
might just recognize what this second argument entails. We should not 
look for reasons for doing our duty where no further reasons are 
needed. That we are bound by the relationships within which we find 
ourselves, most of which are unavoidable and which are themselves 
preconditions for social existence, is highly suggestive of that 
deontological argument of H. A. Pritchard on moral obligations and 
Thomas McPherson on political obligation later (Pritchard 1949; 
McPherson 1967). 
Two other Cantabridgians, Henry Sumner Maine and Frederick 
Denison Maurice espoused this theory during the decades of the 1840's 
to the 1870's. Maine, the famous author of Ancient Law had entered 
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Pembroke College Cambridge in 1840 and had been a member of the 
Apostles"before graduating in classics in 1842. Unwilling to take a 
B. D to qualify for a fellowship he waited for a tutorship until 1845. 
However even then he had to emigrate to Trinity Hall, the radical 
college of Henry Fawcett. and Leslie Stephen. By 1847 Maine was the 
Regius Professor of Law which he held until 1854, though he still felt 
himself qualified to publish on essay on Roman law, alongside Grote, 
in Cambridge Essays of 1856. Little detail is known of Maine's early 
education but John Burrow convincingly argues that 
'The germination of Ancient Latý thus lies somewhere in the decade 
1843-53. These, then, the years 1843-53, are crucial years in 
the development of Maine as a social theorist' (Burrow-, 1970, 
140). 
Relational theory was hardly commented upon directly by Maine's 
in his work though it. is implied in both his use of the Comparative 
Method and his famous anthropological thesis of the movement from 
power based relations in pre civilized societies, to status based 
relations in pre modern, to contract based relations in modern 
societies. Above all it underpins his espousal of the Patriarchal 
Theory of Law as against the natural law theory of Blackstone, the 
General Will theory of Rousseau, the Contrast theory of Hobbes, the 
Command theory of Bentham and the historical theory of Montesquieu 
(Maine 1917,67-72; 1886,181-209; 1890,192-228). Patriarchal 
theory, which considers family and kinship relationships to be the 
central social relationship determining all else and specially laws in 
ancient world was not new. Maine claims it first occurred in Plato's 
Laws and Aristotle's Politics and it had been espoused more recently 
by Bastion Georg Niebuhr (Maine 1890,196-197). But its development 
at Cambridge and its later publication in 1861 was novel especially as 
it was tied to the historical theory, later made famous by Durkheim, 
Fustal de Coulanges and Tonnies, that 
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'the qnit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modern 
society the individual' (Maine 1917,74). 
Put more directly we get the historical thesis that 
'The movement of progressive societies has been uniform in one 
respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the 
gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of 
individual obligation in its place' (ibid, 99). 
Hence 
, the movemeni of the progressive societies has hitherto been a 
movement from status to Contract (ibid 100). 
The movement we know had not been accomplished without trauma, but 
some societies had never progressed remaining status based and 
patriarchal including the contemporary society of India he later 
studies for further evidence. Maine himself considered the movement 
to be fraught with dangers many of which surface in his polemical 
diatribe against equal political rights in voting in Popular 
Government (Maine 1885) (3). 
It is most unlikely that Grote and Maine would have avoided each 
other so absolutely between 1840 and 1856 that some common concerns 
would not emerge. Anyway they both shared the Cambridge interest in 
Niebuhr and the common Cambridge background in the classics and 
philology. The study of Roman Law was rapidly gaining ground in 
Cambridge under the influence of Kemble, and Robert ýeslie Ellis was 
Trinity's local expert, who advised Whewell in 1846 on the references 
to Roman Law and practices in his Elements. Family relationships we 
have seen are close to the core of Grote's social theory and in his 
early essay or ancient naming systems he had spoken of the effect of 
the erosion of kinship ties. As we shall see both in terms of the 
comparative method and diagnosis of the present condition Maine and 
Grote shared views, especially deploring the erosion of customary and 
traditional relations by rationalisation and the degeneration of 
social relationships generally into arenas for individual competition 
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and selfishness. A general rise in'the philosophies of utilitarianism 
and moral scepticism, plus the emergence of scientific rationalism are 
the intellectual accompaniments and indicators of this development. 
To Maine and to Grote rationalisation of custom, tradition, law and 
constitution on the basis of these new 'a priori' theories and 
principles, was understood as the. siren calling Victorian society to 
its doom. As we shall see while both were liberally minded and in 
fact politically liberal at the time both were conservative in 
philosophical orientation. 
But we can see the same concerns in the work of F. D. Maurice. 
In his preface to Social Morality, Maurice admits the link 
between his own and Henry Maine"swork an the point of relational basis 
of law and morality. 
'I can scarcely express how great is my delight that an eminent 
lawyer should find himself obliged simply by his legal studies to 
abandon the atomic theory of Society and to accept the fact of 
Family existence as its starting point ' (Maurice 1869). 
The theory had been developed earlier by Maurice in his book The 
Kingdom of Christ, indeed it has a pedigree going back at least to 
Savigny and Niebuhr and before them to Giambattista Vico (Maurice 
1958,1,195,227-231; Rothblatt 1968,157-158). Social Morality 
provided the crucial development that took the theory beyond 
conceptions of morality and law. Family ties are here understood as 
the basic relationship from which develops not only clan and tribe, 
the 'Nation' and 'State' but also the 'Universal Empire' and 
'Humanity'. On the basis of the relational and especially the 
patriarchal version of the theory, Maurice felt confident not only in 
dismissing utilitarian, but also proto-marxist theories of society and 
the state, a position that he persistently pursued as a member of the 
Christian Socialist movement. 
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'What I have tried to say in the lectures is that the 
rebrganisers of society and the conservators of society are at 
war because they start from the same vicious premises; because 
they tacitly assume land, goods, money, labour, some objects of 
possession, to be the basis of society, and therefore wish to 
begin by changing or maintaining the conditions of that 
possession; whereas, the true radical reform and radical 
conservation must go much deeper and say: 'Human relations not 
only should lie, but do lie beneath all these, and when you 
substitute - upon one pretext or another - property relations for 
these, you destroy our English Life and English Constitution, you 
introduce hopeless anarchy -TMaur ice 1885,11,, 114). 
After his election to the Knightbridge Chair after Grote's death, 
Maurice produced an inaugural lecture which praised Grote's 
contribution to philosophy, and then he gave and published a set of 
lectures on The Conscience which both reflect Grote's own views on the 
subject and use a relational theory as well. Both reveal a crude form 
of idealism, recognisable despite the fact that the choice of subject 
matter might have forced the writer back into rationalism or 
intuitionism. In the first lecture, Maurice recommends the 
philosophic method of 'Egoism' outlined by John Grote in 'Exploratio 
Philosophica Part V, as the proper starting point for students in 
philosophy. The method involves the perusal of problems from the 
assertion of 'I*, 'self' or *ego', and taking as true only that which 
is satisfactory for thought in relation to the thought of others. 
Maurice recommends the adoption of Grote's method in ethics and then 
uses the life and writings of the German idealist Johan Gottlieb 
Fichte as the model philosopher for his students (Maurice 1872). 
The succeeding lectures are a kind of mental autopsy of ideas on 
conscience that challenge the contemporary diagnosis given by Bentham, 
Bain and Whewell. The final judgement given, strikes an interesting 
balance between the role of individual ego and social station in the 
formation of moral ideas which, like Grote's view on ethics, is 
remarkably similar to that of the later oxford idealists. Conscience 
is the simple assertion of my self and my existence, it is MY 
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judgement as to whom or what I am related and hence obliged. It is 
not a faculty, a product of reason, a divine insight nor a simple 
product of socialisation, but an expression of my own self as it 
responds to actual relations between other people and institutions in 
society. The advice given is to 
'dwell upon this fact - that. we are in an order; that relations 
abide whether we are faithful to them or neglect them; and that 
the Conscience in each of us affirms 'I am in this order, I ought 
to act consistently with it, let my fancies say what they 
please" (Maurice 1872,49). 
Conscience is the supreme free will prescribing for oneself the duties 
appropriate to one's particular social relationships and roles. 
Without doubt Grote used relational theory in the 1850s and the 
1860s but it is too early to say just how the theory originated and 
just who influenced whom at Cambridge. Signs of relational theory 
appear in the work of another Trinity Hall scholar James Fitzjames 
Stephen the author Of Uber_t_y'_, _Eý(fu a liny- and Fr ate rnitY and -in a n-dmber of 
later Cambridge. anthropologists including D and J. F. McLennan in their 
The Patriarchal Theory (Stephen 1873; McLennan 1885; Barker 1947, 
140-160; Burrow 1970,230-234). We must however also note the point 
made by Whewell on relational theory. At one place Whewell actually 
states that 
'There belongs to each man the Duties of his Station. our 
Duties, so far as they regard our special Relations to particular 
persons, may be termed Relative Duties' (Whewell 1845, it 
171-172; 11,180). 
As easy as it would be to make Whewell the key to the development of 
the theory it would be wrong to do so. For Whewell there are three 
sources of duty, God's law, reason and most important of all 'the 
internal Spring of Action; that is an Affection which binds together 
Father and Son', in the case of a family. social relations and 
circumstances 'Manifest' and 'signify' our duties but they are based 
upon the internal springs of affection as the subsequent chapters 
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indicate (Whewell 1845,1,173-309). Grote, Maine and Maurice all 
deny an innate moral sense or intuition giving us our duties, but to 
Whewell 
'All acts relative to other men in order to be moral must proceed 
from an internal Spring of Affection... ' (Whewell 1847,1,172). 
The phrase however may be one source of the idea that gave rise to the 
theory. 
(4) Jural Ethics-and Law 
Later we must return to Grote's social theory and especially his 
use of the comparative method and of assumptions in the Liberal 
Anglican idea of history, but now we must build on Grote's relational 
theory to rediscover his legal and political theory of ethics, or 
Jural Ethics, as he once called it. Our rights and obligations and 
even our criteria of justice, equity and preference we have s-een are 
based on the relationships we have with others. Our feelings, lower 
on the scale of morality, indicate the facts of our relative position, 
so that love of a parent for a child or of a citizen for a state does 
not make our duty but indicates the fact that we are children or 
citizens born into an pre-existing institutional framework. However 
as noted above to have such a theory that rises above positivism and 
which avoids reductionism we need an account of the rules or laws 
which supply the direction and imperative value to each role, office 
or relationship. Grote we know held rules and roles to both predate 
our birth, and to be a precondition for social existence but we need 
an account of the rule basis to ethics. And in addition we need to 
know ultimately why we must obey the rules and do our duty. the 
answers are supplied in both the Treatise and the Examination in the 
the analogy of law and duty. 
The difference between jural and non jural ethics depends on two 
things, firstlywhether the theory explains duty in terms of a network 
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of particular relationships, each entailing claims and ties, rights 
and duties between individuals and groupsj or 'whether the theory 
attempts to provide a universal theory of general duties as with 
Mill's account of obligation or natural law theory (Grote 1876,96). 
Secondly it rests on the idea that in ethics as in law and politics, 
actions are governed by rules and laws3 or by expediency or some 
abstract principle such as Kant's 'Golden Rule'. Tn the jural 
analogy, as Alexander puts it, we look 'at ethics as a system of rules 
or laws' (Alexander, 1887,433). What holds, for a legal system with 
its subjects, its rules, its authority, its reason, power and means of 
enforcement, also holds according to Grote to a social and moral 
system. Customary social rules governing everyday social 
relationships and moral rules governing more specific social 
relationships are analogous to legal rules. One-of the reasons for 
obedience to moral rules Grote will have to argue is that in ethics 
there is an unwritten ideal 'moral law', embodied specifically in our 
customs and everyday opinions, which operates like the legal norms of 
a society, and that we obey the moral law and customary codes for 
roughly the same reasons that we obey the law. In addition he needs 
to show how both customary moral and legal rules embody the subjective 
feelings, and realizes the needs of their subjects, that they codify 
existing relationships, that they embody our human ideals and to some 
extent at least embrace the objective and absolute moral standards 
that it is our aim to discover. 
As I have argued already any successful analogy has as its 
precondition an adequate account of the thing claimed to be known 
about which is to throw light upon the relatively unknown. In this 
case the precondition for understanding the moral law is to understand 
the positive law and relations as they are called by Grote, and to 
work towards duty. 
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'Before it can be applied to any extent, there is quite a 
different set of considerations upon which we have to enter. We 
have to consider man as existing, as in fact. they always do 
exist, in certain relations to each other more complicated and 
more definite than those which we have as yet considered: they 
are what are called positive as distinct from moral relations, 
and the system of them is what is called positive law. I shall 
call them jural relations. The law of duty has to be applied to 
the conduct of men to each other, in reference to these 
relations; to take cognipance both of the manner of the 
formation of the relations, and of men's conduct in them. These 
will form the subject of our next chapter' (Grote 1876,221). 
Unfortunately this next chapter was never written (according to Mayor) 
and the deficiency is made up for by utilizing a manuscript from 
elsewhere and adding Grote's notes for the chapter proposed. Together 
with this 'Appendix on the Distribution of Action in References to 
Existing Law' we can read Chapter VII of the Treatise on 'Duty' and 
various parts of the Examination which refer to the same theory. I 
shall take the chapter an Duty as the model for this discussion. 
This crucial chapter begins with Grote's reminding us that doing 
something because it is better for us to do it, because we like to do 
it, because we desire it or even because we believe it to be good, is 
not the same thing as doing it because we ought to do it. Duty is an 
aspect of right which deals with what we ought or must do. While we 
are free to choose, a duty is still imperative upon us, 
'I feel I must do it, I feel I have no choice' (Grote 1876,84) 
To the extent that we feel unfree, the ideal of right 
'takes to us the form of an ideal law Or rule, or, as it is 
commonly called, duty (ibide 85). 
Now duty as an ideal law is analogous to the positive law in the first 
instance in four ways, firstly, it is distinct and explicitt for 
instance, pay y our taxes; secondly, duty like law considers only 
falling short of its rules not transcending them; thirdly, it 
involves giving up our actions to others; and finally, it considers a 
third party as an 'enforcing power' (ibid 85-86). Moral law then 
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operates like the ordinary law, first, its dictates are known and laid 
down in custom and everyday social norms and rulesi such as keep your 
promises; second, virtue is supererogatory but duty like law only 
expects obedience; third, all duties are owed to someone or somebody 
who has a claim against us, that iG has rights (ibid, 223); and 
fourth, in morality as with law. another body analogous to the state, 
in this case society, adjudicates and enforces claims and dues. 
This presumes a particular account of law. The definition given 
is that, 
'Law is (a) the determination of the mutual conduct of a number 
of agents with conflicting interests (by (b) some sufficient 
power, possessing also authority so to determine it), (c) inview 
of the advantage of each and of all' (Grote 1876,88, also 223). 
Each of the three elements (a-c) of this sentence is a part of a 
coherent definition of law, but various elements have been taken by 
different philosophers and ages as adequate by themselves. Each ager 
where the analogy of law and duty has been applied, has therefore 
produced misunderstanding of duty arising from a misunderstanding of 
law. The first example taken is of Greek conceptions of law and 
morality. For them law is a+c, mutual agreements for the common 
advantage with considerations of M sufficient power and authority 
being passed over (88-89). This very idealistic and 'noble' view 
produced an account of duty which saw it as the 
. great law which the members of the moral universe, if we may so 
speak, impose upon themselves: ... Duty in this view 
is public 
spirit, public spirit not for a nation but for the moral or 
sentient universe' (ibid, 98-99). 
Historically this ignores conflicting theories of law prevailing in- 
ancient Greece and seems to build on a coincidence of Plato's ideal 
laws as witnessed in the St3tesman and some Stoic notion of universal 
law. The idea of customary law is down-graded as are later 
codifications by such reformers as Pericles. However the general 
point is illuminating. 
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Roman law provides the second example. The Romans subordinated 
section (c), pushing to the background considerations of personal and 
public advantage, stressing determination of mutual conduct, and 
stressing authority rather than power as the operating condition. 
Roman lawyers tend to consider a political community as a group 'in 
virtue of a superior authority. regulating its arrangements' (89). 
Their law while practical in content was ideal in form, for their law 
set standards of conduct for individuals in various positions and 
relations. Law to the Romans was a codification of a mass of rules 
appropriate to its citizens. The legal relations were called jura, 
theyhole law, jus (95). This rather idealized theory ignored not 
only the power that made the law but seems to ignore questions of 
interests. When applied to duty by analogy we get the idea of duty as 
submission to authority or right and the rules thereby made. Power 
and interest are disregarded (99). 
Hobbes provides Grote with his third paradigm of law and hence 
duty. His view dictates that 
* we dismiss, as visionary and ideal, the notion of authority, and 
attend only to the very practical or concrete notion of power' 
(ibid 89). 
Grote is right to recognize the downgrading of authority in Hobbes and 
in recognizing that Hobbes sees no 'reason suggesting the law', but he 
is wrong in adding that Hobbes overlooks authority completely and 
ignores 'any advantage aimed at by' the law. Without such an 
individual advantage it seems that Hobbes natural man would never be 
induced to leave the state of nature. Yet if there is a general 
stress on 'arbitrary power* behind the law in a theory Grote notes 
that by analogy, moral law and duty become seen themselves as 
.a yoke imposed by the Deity (Paley), or by society and public 
opinion (some Socratic interlocutors and several philosophers in 
later times), or by arbitrary power in general' (Hobbes) (ibid 
99). 
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Obedience is explained by fear not by respect for right, reason or 
self interest. 
We come finally to Bentham, Mill and *Austin and the 'absolute 
legislative view'. According to Grote this is largely the Hobbesian 
view with the general addition that power is ; exercised honestly for 
the supposed advantage of each and for all subject to the force' (90). 
The Philosophical Radicals are lumped with Hobbes as considering law 
to be 'command' of those with the power of enforcement rather than as 
an 'order' supported by some 'agreement with it' by the citizens. 
Duty in this view is analogously seen as submission to a command, not 
a moral law, backed by sanctions, not respect for right or approval, 
combined with a general recognition that if mutually performed duty 
will promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number (99). 
Deficient as it is in failing to recognize authority, the source of 
right behind the law, and in undprestimating the level of willing 
compliance to law based on recognition of this right and of the reason 
in the law, the theory does have an element of tenability to Grote. 
But so do they all, for the various suppositions about law and duty 
discussed above all belong to law and duty as such, 
. all the special views which I gave of it seemed to me partial, 
the proper general definition including them all... If we are to 
give a complete account of it, I think we must unite all the 
above' (ibid 100). 
In practice however while Grote happily concedes that, 'there 
must be (by definition) sufficient power to enforce the law', and 
ideally some common advantage to all citizens, his stress lies upon 
the Roman, Stoical and jural view. In particular his eclectic view of 
law stressed the law as (1) the formal prescription of mutual action 
according to the relations in which human beings find themselves in a 
state, (2) made by a proper authority, (3) for the reconciliation of 
conflict. Downgraded are (4) commands by a superior force, 
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(5) backed by sanctions or punishments (6) and of the idea of law 
being legitimated as for the common good. Scholars of Roman Law, 
political thought and of Cicero in particular will recognize the 
historical foundations of Grote's theory here. His respect for Cicero 
had been referred to by Sidgwick, who called this stoic Grote's 
favourite philosopher. Passing praise for Hooker, Grote's notion of 
duties in terms of officia, his humanism, the notion of social man, his 
moral earnestness, the notion of right reason, and respect for reason 
and the moral law generally, reinforce the connection (Grote 1870,157; 
Allen 1961,184-198; Hunt 1954). We may usefully expand on these 
first two points before returning to duty. * 
(1) That law codifies or formalizes relationships already 
existing in society is a recurrent theme in Grote as it is in Henry 
Maine later. Law 'recognizes that people relate in certain sorts of 
circumstances in unison or conflict, classifies them, and prescribes' 
how they should act. Law in brief 
'finds, or puts (it matters not to our present purpose which term 
we use) individuals in certain relations one towards another: 
and it prescribes mutual action according to these relations' 
(Grote 1876,94). 
Put in terms of the purpose of law he writes later 
'The purpose of law is to regulate individual action, but the 
manner in which this is done, in all actual law which is in other 
than its rudest stage, is not by mere isolated injunction, but is 
by the recognition of individuals as in various relations to each 
other, or by the placing them in such relations, with certain 
things which each must do and which each may claim; and then 
saying to individuals, If you do anything inconsistent with, or 
offending against, these arrangements, you incur such and such a 
penalty* (ibid 223). 
Building on relational theory we now have the idea that society is 
premissed upon and codifies relationships between members, regulated 
by certain rules, and that law is the formal authoritative and 
positive mode of fixing and enforcing those that the society considers 
most crucial (Grote 1876,223). Law is primarily about ordering what 
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is already unofficially ordered in custom (225,232,401). Law is a 
'definite and exact form' of customs (404). Grote notices that the 
Greek for right originally meant 'the accustomed' and remained closely 
connected with it (419). Law formally recognizes the customary and 
existing, it is 'the name of a recognized system of right and duties, 
the reason and force of which-is in themselves' (Grote 1870,155). 
Law is essentially, 
'regulation, order, distribution, arrangement, and that the 
enforcement of this order by denunciations of penalty or 
sanctions upon the individuals subject to the law is, though 
real, only a secondary or subsidiary portion of law* (Grote 1870, 
154). 
The point is made in another fashion when Grote repeats the 
assertion that as law only rarely 'puts' people in certain relations 
rather than 'finds them there', so law is rarely 'enacted' or 
established as a result of deliberate policy. Rather like Maine, 
Dicey and Maitland later 
'Law grows of itself, like language, and passes from one state to 
another. Much of it begins in the form of custom: and, of the 
great and important parts of it, there are few which, as a matter 
of fact, have even been established as the result of previous 
deliberate discussion' (Grote 1876,224-225). 
Briefly the usual historical process is 
practice over time, recognition of its uti 
to it as customarily right. Legislation 
process of considering ends and drafting 
response to what is. 'previously existing' in 
attack', so that 
the establishment of a 
lity, imitation and assent 
is not a rationalistic 
rules for them but is a 
the form of 'defence and 
'What has been deliberate has been sometimes repeal or alteration 
of the great principles, but more generally various development 
and modification, with addition of smaller accompaniments' (ibid 
225). 
All this justifies Grote's claim that 'political society# in many 
things, legislates for itself (231). Law, the familYt . property and 
other 'cardinal social institutions' are like language, %ecustoms made 
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definite in rules and refined by criticism and invention) but 
pre-existing the practices of reform, rational scrutiny and even 
discussion of purpose (Barker 1947,154). Using reflexive theory once 
again he completes the analogy of law and language, 
'Deliberation or previous discussion as to the establishment of 
cardinal institutions of this kind would have been impossible, in 
the same way as a previous discussion, on the part of any number 
of men, whether they should adopt the practice of language: the 
possibility of orderly organization for the previous discussion 
involves the existence of the institution' (Grote 1876,225). 
Considerations of autý. orfty loom large in Grote's 
account of law. In the Examination he had attacked. Mill for his 
statement that 'penal sanction is the essence of law; Mill only 
qualifying this with the phrase that the compulsion must be 
rightful'. For Grote, ' a command is 'arb. "t-razy' and a sanction 
simple violence' unless both are 'rightful', that is made by and 
enforced by a group themselves 'bound by the law to its subjects as 
they to it' (Grote 1870,152). Law is distinguished from command, and 
threats, and punishment from sanctions by being ' under the 
guardianship' of'rightful authority (140). In the Treatise the 
argument is repeated and used against Epicurians, Hobbesians and 
Utilitarians writing on law. But Grote adds four crucial points. 
Firstlylauthority entails, respect for and 'recognition' by those 
expected to obey, and the provision of 'sufficient power' to support 
the authority in cases of conflict (Grote 1876,223-224,91). Like 
Hume, Grote argues that-authority usually starts with 'accidental' and 
'bare power', the 'struggle between two parties, in which the weaker 
has yielded'. But 
'Sociality or political life has been the gradual conversion of 
this state of things into one of mutual understanding and 
consideration: bare power has become authority by the prevalence 
of the feeling on the one side that obedience to it is a duty, 
and on the other that the exercise of it is not meant for private 
benefit, but for the benefit of all' (ibid 224). 
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Thirdly, the authority provides a 'reason' why the power should be 
obeyed, that. a law is rightly fully authorized is a sufficient reason 
for obedience (89; 1870 151,152). Finally, law usually embodies some 
reason for its existence even if it is immediate and customary and not 
self consciously recognized. Put very strongly, law is the 'public 
reason of a society', containing as it does the wisdom of time 
embodied in custom, plus the trial and error, imitation and 
reconsideration involved in enactment (Grote 1870,155). In true 
romantic fashion Grote adds later that, 'The laws of a nation are a 
more or less definite and complete expression of public spirit'r and 
then adds in summary that the law 
'thus generated derives its authority from public opinion, its 
sanctions are public approval and disapproval, and they are very 
powerful' (Grote 1876,236). 
Grote is no natural law theorist. Reason may be embodied in the law 
but; 
'It is not the reason of the law, but the fact ýhat it is the 
law, that is looked to' (Grote 1870,155). 
(6) That law reconciles conflict I will turn to later, and we have 
already seen in Chapter VIII and above that neither command by the 
powerful, nor sanction by punishment are by themselves operative 
conditions for law (Grote 1876,93-94,176,471-473,501t 504,509). 
What then about production of the common good? As with virtue and 
duty, so with law, Grote argues that while their practice may promote 
the common good, it is not this which constitutes their justicet duty 
or legality. We are reminded that only when we keep in mind that 
'historically, much of law has never had an express purpose, we 
may say that the purpose of law is the public utility, and that 
law is good in proportion to its utility, that no law which we 
are certain is useful can be unjust' (Grote 1876,225). 
Utility is only onecriteria for evaluating a law. Grote's advice on 
sound legislation is that a law must be in conformity with 'custom'r 
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that is be 'natural' and that 
1876,225-233). Support fo: 
first; and legal support for 
observance of Sundays as a 
mood reminiscent of Green 
I nightwatchman theory' of the 
it must be 'useful' and 'just' (Grote 
r the family and property illustrate the 
publicly provided education and the 
day of rest illustrate the second. In a 
and in opposition to Spencer's 
state Grote writes, 
'A society is a partnership not only for the purposes of police 
i, e, for the mutual protection of property, but also for the 
purposes of helping the common 13rogress, and for the aid which 
the members may give each other in all which makes human nature 
better. The law is the action of the society in doing this' 
(Grote 1876,232-233). 
Law is most certainly compatible with the promotion of happiness. 
Finally, the positive law is seen to be ideal both in practice and in 
aspiration. In practice law like custom is the 'mean level' of 'human 
society' which represents 'a very high standard of moral attainment to 
the individual' (Grote 1876,396). In addition the positive law sets 
standards that citizens are not to fall below even if law, unlike 
virtue, does not demand that they are surpassed, and these standards 
are ideals to most citizens. 
Finally, the actual law is an attempt by human beings to fix' the 
ideal moral law, of which as Grote says 
'the actual law of our country is a partial representative' 
(Grote 1876,338). 
This point is crucial for understanding Grote's whole political 
theory. Far from being a pessimist, depressed about the condition of 
man and society under the weight of a rigorous Calvinist upbringing he 
conceived idealism in practice as well as theory. Like Burke and 
Hegel before him Grote considered-custom and its legal codification as 
a kind of mean temperature of earthly virtuer slowly we hope 
rising, and as such as may be raised thus gradually by human 
effort' (Grote 1870,357). 
This is not just a moralist passing observation but the conclusion of 
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a serious theory ofaction and history. Firstlylat a practical level 
the customary is itsqlf the return to immediacy of what was once self 
consciously struggled and achieved for ideals. Law and custom, like 
our character, grow by 
"the change of consciousness and sensibilityl as promptings of 
action, into an immediate and almost involuntary performance of 
the action without preparatory consciousness' (Grote 1876,442). 
But this immediacy and apparent involuntariness must not be mistaken 
for lack of intelligence or wisdom. 
'Human civilized custom (in which I include opinion and 
legislation) is a vast mass of result of human intelligence and 
effort at improvement, which continually puts to shamel and has 
to maintain itself against, a large number of individuals who 
have not risen to its level' (Grote 1870,358). , 
Custom and hence law, in fact demand self conscious perusal and even 
individual challenge if their embodiment of intelligence evolves and 
is to be- kept up to date. Grote did not demand blind obedience but 
active respect and recognition for the value of custom and law, and he 
considered that 
'the person who. does not preserve his individuality of thought 
against it (opinion and custom) is a traitor to it' (Grote 1876, 
423). 
Custom, general opinion and law are both our own judgements and 
'the putting together of a number of individually conscientious 
judgements, each affecting perhaps and affected by others, but 
each having its own root' (ibid 422-423). 
In a phrase reminiscent of Hegel's aphorism that 'the real is the 
rational and the rational the real' Grote writes of the actual course 
of development of human moral and political thought, 
'These minds may have been mistaken, and so may we be; but when 
we are thinking out in particular what it is best man should 
become, we , may reasonably, 
to a certain extent, associate our 
judgement with theirs, and conclude that, to this extent, what 
man has become represents what its best he should become and what 
it was in his ideal nature to become' (ibid, 394-395). 
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And hence 
'In looking back thus to the past development of man we see that 
the ideally good does, to a certain extent, produce itself in the 
actual or existing' (ibid, 395). 
We can now spell out the analogy involved in jural ethics more 
clearly. Duty, rights and justice all operate as if there was a moral 
law equivalent to the positive, law, which sets the rules of right 
conduct. The moral law may be expressed as a formal principle such as 
Kant's 'golden rule', but'Grote goes deeper and shows that' the moral 
law is not only ideal but actual, embodied that is in customr opinion 
and law and reflected in our feelings and sentiments. Duty is an 
ideal 'which we do not luxuriate in', we immediately relate it both to 
the higher and lower facts (Grote 1876,368-369). Custom, opinion, 
law and codes of duty in turn embody the implication of our being 
related to one another in key ways (Grote 1876,221,393-394). Above 
the actual law is the ideal law, our codes of duty, our officia, and 
an ideal law, the equivalent of the Roman jus (Grote 1876,221). 
'Obedience to the actual law is looked upon as the lower limit of 
moral duty.... (238). Above this is the higher fact, the belief 
posited in our imagination and apparently posited in the practice of 
moral conduct and language that there is an objective law or set of 
standards that our opinion, law and philosophising is a groping 
towards and an attempt to fix (101,338-339,517-519). This is the 
moral law or if we are christians, God's law or commandmentsland if we 
are believers in the brotherhood of mankind, such as the Stoics, it is 
the 'jus gentium or jus naturale' of the Roman law (Grote 1876, 
221,236-237). Our imagination sets before us this ideal moral law and 
a vision of 'an ideal moral society' 
'It is thus that right conduct is ideally imperative upon us, 
just as obedience to the laws of the human society in which we 
live is actually so' (Grote 1870,206). 
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The feeling of moral wrong Grote claims to be an offshoot of 
positive law applied to breaches of our moral law, at all thd levels 
from custom, duty and the ideal code (338). Guilty knowledge or 
conscience are the feelings associated with breach of this *ideal 
moral law' (139-140). In moral life our feelings and 'sympathy 
follows duty'. The pleasurable- feelings of being dutiful and the 
painful feelings accompanying my non performance reflect the facts of 
the existence of a law of duty (Grote 1870,97). Duty, rights and 
justice we have seen are analogous to law being embodied in definite 
norms, in being negative not positive, in being owed to some specific 
other person with a right (neither duty or law being general), and in 
being adjudicated and enforced by a third party, by society in the 
case of duty (Grote 1870,96-97). Now we can add that the six points 
enumerated about law are also appropriate to duty. 
Firstly, our rights and duties and even just conduct is prescribed 
by our relationships, our officia. Duty is conduct appropriate to our 
stations in society (Grote 1870,145-146). The moral law of duty 
codifies or fixes what is entailed in our relationships, duty being 
Ia scheme of recognized relation or mutual dueness between 
parties' (ibid 151). 
Duty like law is only prescribed action considered appropriate to our 
particular relations, so 
'The description of the duty owed, is, in many cases, little more 
than the same thing as describing the -fact of the relation* (Grote 1876,212). 
The attendant feeling is that our relationships demand something is 
'due from us', which indicate that the action 'belongs to us' to do 
(Grote HiO, 142). 
Secondly, something is only our duty and a right when authoritative, 
that is validated by an appropriate authority (Grote 1870,1451 
151-152). The appropriate authoritative body on duty is society, 
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rather than the state. Thirdly, duty, rights and justice prescribe 
conduct whpre conflict exists between parties. Like law they are 
authoritative allocations or distributions of actions between human 
beings (Grote 1870,151-152). 
Of the last and less significant features of law and duty Grote 
says more in order to show his disagreement with the utilitarians and 
Hobbesists. Duty does seem like a command and we often may feel bound 
or constrained by it (Grote 1876,84-85). However duty, while being a 
set of rules, leaves us totally free to act. As with law, while 
telling us that if we transgress penalties will followl morality 
leaves us free to transgress or not. Duty involves this apparantly 
contradictory fact and feeling of being thoroughly free and yet being 
bound or obliged. Grote's reconciliation is in the Kantian idea that 
duty and freedom are not only compatible, but that dutiful action 
realizes our absolute freedom, it being a law we freely impose upon 
ourselves (Grate 1870,111,166t 152f 155,212,353; 1876,84). 
Performance of duty involves greater constraint than being virtuous 
but even with duty 'we give the law to ourselves' (Grote 1870,147). 
Using a further neat logical argument he writes of the incompatibility 
of command and moral theories of law and duty. If law and duty are 
just what are commanded how can Mill and Austin speak of 'laws which 
ought to exist'? Law is either what is actually commanded, or that 
which ought to be commanded, which has an ideal element. How can one 
speak as a command theorist of a law that 'ought to be *as well as 
'has been' or 'is' or 'could be'? Indeed 
'If the notion of 'command' goes before 'that which ought to be', 
where is the command in virtues of which the laws which ought to 
be, ought to be? Mr Mill tries to rise above this Hobbesianism, 
and no wonder he should: but I do not think that logically he 
can' (Grote 1870,158). 
Fifthly, while non performance of duties, like non conformitY to 
the law, may lead to sanctions or punishment Grote is clear that it is 
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not this sanction by itself or even primarily that distinguishes or 
characterizes duty. The argument that the force of duty' resides in 
sanctions is as false as the view that sanctions explain conformity to 
law. Firstly, it ignores the difference between 'enforced obedience' 
and chosen conformity to a duty. Secondly, it ignores the difference 
between explaining the actual feelings that may 'induce obedience' and 
giving the reason why we ought to obey (Grote 1870,139-141). Thirdly) 
the argument fails to separate teleological considerations of the 
consequences following disobedience, the recognition of reason behind 
and in the duty (ibid 142), and considerations of past and present 
relationships (ibid 144). Fourthly, it ignores the prior historical 
consideration of the rightness or authority of the duty (ibid 152). 
Finally, it is not production of the common good or happiness that 
alone justifies law, as we have seen already, and the same is true of 
duty, the arguments for which appeared in the previous chapter. To 
Grote the existence of sanctions, being commanded and constrained, and 
producing the general welfare are not the essence of law but only 'a 
part of the notion of it', and that a subsidary part (ibid, 152). 
The last feature of law mentioned, that it reflects and presents 
an ideal, embodied in social values customs and social norms, we can 
now apply to duty, right and justice. These three to Grote set a high 
standard of conduct to govern human relationships even outside the 
law. In their crude form our ordinary optional moral norms, the 
I moral mean', represent a standard we should not denigrate as too low 
nor despair as too high. Duty, or officium a collective name for our 
officia, are the products of generations of human beings, their 
intelligence, thought, argument choice and will. Doing ones duty is 
not moral perfection, perfection requires being virtuous as welly but 
duty and obedience to law are all that can be expected. To realize 
the three basic general duties governing all social relationships 
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would be a great moral achievement for a society-and its members, to 
be responsible for ourselves thereby relieving others of the worryi to 
do no wrong and obey the law; to do all the good we can (Grote 1876, 
337). 
a) The Question of Obligation 
For many philosophers the question of ethics is the question of 
obligation; why should we obey? Grote disagreed and saw rather that 
this question, though important, was only one perennial issue in 
ethics. Others are 'why be virtuous', 'why be good' and 'what makes 
our actions morally valuable? * For this reason he refused to 
prioritize a philosophy of Deontics, and even refused to isolate it as 
a science alongside aretaics and eudaemonics (Grote 1876,102). 
However he did tackle this important question and his answers and 
straiegy are interesting. Moral and political obligation will be 
taken together because Grote considers these issues and solutions to 
be analogous. Why we should obey the moral law is answered by 
reference to why we should obey the-positive law. Moral obligation is 
analogous to political and legal obligation if not exactly the same 
sort of thing. 
Interest in Grote's account of obligation is aroused by three 
arguments, apart from the law and morality analogy. Firstly, Grote, 
like Pritchard and McPherson later, argues that no general 
justifications of duty can be given or in fact need to be given 
(Pritchard 1968, McPherson 1967). With Pritchard he seems to say that 
we need not seek further justification of what is already implicit and 
entailed in our language and practices (Pritchard 1912). With 
McPherson he argues that duty being a collective term for particular 
and relative duties, can only by justified by reference to particular 
cases and relations in society or the state. Secondly, Grote, like 
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Bradley and McPherson argues that the word duty entails the idea that 
we ought to obey, and the fact that a relationship entails a duty 
implies and means that we ought to perform it., (Bradley 1876, 
132-133; McPherson 1967,63-68). Grote indeed argued a relational 
theory of duty in 1861 and had it published two years before Bradley's 
famous formulation of 1876. Thirdly)it is argued by Grote, as by 
McPherson later, that if further reasons for obedience in addition to 
a description of what the words duty and obligation mean, and what is 
entailed by our position in a particular relationship, we have to 
formulate an eclectic answer (McPherson 1867,52-54). These points of 
Grote's can be taken in order. 
The term duty implies that an action 'ought' to be performed. 
This is a basic premis of Grote's whole moral philosophy. Duty 
carries in itself both the idea of being claimable by a party and 
enforceable upon us (Grote 1870,96,134,145,187). In addition he 
argues that the fact of something being a duty entails the idea that 
it ought to be done without further need for reasons. This argument 
appears on several occasions but is most explicit in this comment on 
Nelson's famous speech on the eve of the Battle of Trafalgar 
"England expects every man to do his duty' is what we may call a 
noble truism. The idea of duty in those to whom this was 
addressed was - what England expected of them, and that was 
complete self-devotion of each in his particular assigned place 
and office' (Grote 1870,166). 
That duties are specific not general, and that therefore only specific 
reasons can be. given for performing a duty appears on several 
occasions (Grote 1879,253). After recognizing that in various 
relations individuals have claims upon us he writes: 
'And duty binds us, not first in the general (namely, to promote 
the general happiness), (sic) and in the particular only as a 
consequence of this; but first in the particular, duty in 
general being an expression for the whole of such particular 
duty. The particularity of duty and its felt stringency or 
urgency go together. Failure in duty is an injury to the person 
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towards whom we fail, and it is in this , not the diminution of the happiness of society or of happiness in general, which makes 
the point of the wrongness of it' (Grote 1870,96-97). 
As stated earlier Grote considers all duties arise from particular 
relations with others,. 'all duty may be called relative', and hence no 
general arguments such as those of Hobbes, Paley and Mill are of 
consequence (Grote 1876,97-97). -To ask for general reasons why we 
ought to do our duty is a redundant exercise, as all duty is relative 
so all questions and answers should concern the details of particular 
social relations. 
On the question of what would constitute an adequate account of 
obligation Grote differs from Hobbes, Bentham and Mill in two areas, 
the answer to the question of why we do in fact obey, the reasons 
given; and ýthe question of, why we ShoUld obey, the moral-question. 
On the former he writes that the real reasons why most people do obey 
legal and moral norms is not hope of reward, nor fear of sanctions, 
nor because they are forced to. The. real reasons are first 'because I 
choose it*. (Grote 1870,137). The second reason a person may actually 
give is that I feel 'I must do it, because it is my business, it is 
what falls or belongs to me to do... * (ibid 138,142). Thirdly, those 
who obey may say that they sympathise with the reason or purpose of 
the law, and so 
'Setting aside certain exceptional cases, the manner of action of 
the law upon the minds of the intelligent mass of those subjected 
to it is by more or less of consent to it, that is, to the reason 
of it' (ibid 139; and 142,155; and 1876,100-101). 
Fourthly, both in regard to law and moral norms, many people obey 
because they recognize the authority or right of the law and the 
authority of its source (Grote 1870,134-136g 140,151-152). 
However the real question concerns the issue of why we ought to 
obey not why we do. Here Grote's reference is to the moral facts and 
sociological facts of our position in regard to other parties, i. e. 
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as parents,. children, husbands, wives, tutors and students. The first 
moral fact is our language. The term obligation or promise entails 
the idea of obediencel performance, and of being bound. So to the 
notion of being a husband, tutor or father carries the idea of being 
bound to care for one's wife, students or children. Secondly there is 
a sociological fact, membership of a social group i. e. being a parent 
entails the acceptance of mutual claims and dues. Duty arises from 
these relations not as a consequence of anticipated benefits but as a 
precondition of association (145-146). The third moral fact is our 
belief in an objective moral law analogous to the positive law. 
Societies and groups are premissed on beliefs that certain things are 
right and others wrong, some good and some bad. while disagreement 
remains in and between societies a reflexive fact is that all assume 
some things are right and ought to be done. The belief in a moral law 
is not a religious hypothesis, as Schneewind suggests, but a rational 
deduction from rational practices. If there is a moral law, then this 
carries with it, as does positive law, the notion that it ought to be 
obeyed, if we additionally accept the analogy in jural ethics. 
But Grote, like Macpherson later, does go on to consider 
additional general reasons why we obey, apart from those embedded in 
our language, our practices and our relations. He looks at certain 
post-facto and subsidiary rather than implicit and essential reasons. 
His answer is eclectic stressing a large number of reasons all of 
which fit harmoniously in a coherent explanation. Generally, and 
abridging what I have said above, we'ought to obey because doing so 
will probably produce the greatest happiness of the. greatest number, 
a) because it produces the specific happiness of those with specific 
and legitimate claims upon us, b) because doing our duty conforms with 
the moral law and our standards of right, c) because obedience is 
expected of us and society relies on mutual respect and performance of 
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expectations, d) because there is usually some sensible reason behind 
and in a law or duty, law and duty being 'public reason', e) because 
duties and laws have some authority, f) because in one sense at least 
we consent to the law and duty, that its re-enactment constitutes 
consent (ibid, 154-155) and g) because finally, we are induced to do so 
by our education, by imitation and by the existence of social and 
legal sanctions. Whereas most theories of obligation 'are designed 
not to supplement each other but to exclude each other' as McPherson 
puts it, Grote's general theory is wide enough to catch everything 
going, but at its relational heart is specific and flexible enough to 
account for most particular cases (McPherson 1969,51-54). 
b) Telling the Truth 
One example of the theory at work may help to explain its 
operation, the case of the obligation to tell the truth. We might 
start with the question of what is the truth which we are obliged or 
not to tell. This question is tackled in 'On Giossology'where Grote, 
rejecting Horne Tooke's etymological methods-asserts that the meaning 
of the word corresponds to its usage in everyday language. 
Historically he rejects Tooke's claim that it derived from 'trowed' to 
trust or believe, preferring instead derivations from trusted. In 
everyday parlance the truth is what we trust to be the case. 
Repeating what he does on other occasions Grote derives intellectual 
usage from moral useage, and so 
'the reader should observe that the real force of the 
dianoematism, so far as we seek the meaning there, is mora2; 
truth - that which may be trusted, that which one man trusts 
another about' (Grote 1874,111 166-168). 
Elsewhere the numerous meanings of the word truth as a reference to 
knowledge are distinguished, criticized and reconciled. Grote argues 
that while truth may be used to mean 'correspondence of a thought to a 
thing', 'clarity and distinctness of view* and 'inconceivability of 
I 
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the opposite' or *applicability to action', in the end in 
epistemological terms truth is most usually taken to mean 'a coherent 
or complete view of something' or 'reasonable conceivability', or 'the 
communion of intelligences' on a matter. The objective use of truth 
as 'right thing' which suggests thought follows facts, is contrasted 
to 'thinking rightly' which suggests truth is conceptual and 
propositioned. 
On the issue of the truth of the meaning of a statement Grote is 
unequivocal. The truth lies in the use of the words and what the user 
intended them to mean not what the words actually say as if there was 
some essential meaning to the words (Grote 1874,166-168). As he puts 
it in the Treatise 
'Truth is not in the words, but in what the words mean. The 
value for the truth, and the value for the words which contain 
the truth, are two entirely different feelings' (Grote 1876, 
268). 
I rl 
Turning to the moral issue of why we ought to tell. the truth, we 
get several interesting answers. First' and foremost there is the 
reference to the nature of social relations generally, and of the 
specific relations in which we find ourselves. After complaining that 
both Paley and the Utilitarians answer the question by reference to 
the fearful divine and social punishments we will receive for lying, 
and the rewards for truth telling, Grote writes, 
"But I apprehend that the real answer, which is felt in the minds 
of those who feel simply and well is: 'I feel that I must speak 
the truth because I know that I am trusted: I feel that trust 
reposed in me calls for truthfullness from me, and calls with a 
voice which I cannot stifle or disobey: it is the person who 
trusts me to whom in the first instance I am under an obligation 
of truthfullness, an obligation under which he by his trust lays 
me, which so far makes me not free, and binds my action'"(Grote 
1870,143). 
Note the three reasons given by Grote here for telling the truth: 
(1) 1 am trusted, (2) 1 feel or-recognize that by being trusted I am 
obliged, (3) that a second party who trusts me has a claim or right 
I ýj W 
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to my veracity, therefore I ought to obey. Truthtelling in brief is 
explained in terms of the pathology of a relationship between two 
parties the key phenomenon of which is trust between persons. 
We may go on to see that truthtelling may be an obligation to 
specific parties in the first instance but that in the second instance 
because we live in societies of fellow members our obligation to 
truthtelling 'is a duty to society' (143-144). This does not make 
truth telling a general duty in need of general justifications, it is 
only a general term or phrase referring to a- collection of specific 
duties to other specific persons or fellow citizens. Truth telling is 
not justified because it promotes, if followed as a rule, the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number, but because in each case I am 
trusted and that means that I ought not to betray that trust. Truth 
telling does in fact promote the general welfare but that is a 
coincidental matter, perhaps a necessary but not a sufficient reason 
for justifying truth telling as a duty. 
But why should we not betray trusts? Is it because to do so 
would itself promote social unhappiness? This answer would take us 
into the utilitarian fold and Grote refuses to be drawn there. The 
reason why we should not betray trusts is that the trusting person has 
a claim or a right belonging to him or herself which they have over us 
by virtue of the relationship to us (Grote 1876,247-248). Ordinary 
language and ordinary social intercourse make us indebted to one 
another in many instances, and one such indebtedness is to be as 
trustworthy as the trust that is invested in us demands (250). As 
Searle puts it later, ordinary language (or semantics) involves both 
regulative and constitutive rules. The first are descriptive, the 
second are regulatory. The speech act itself and its 'constitutive 
rules involve obligations, commitments and responsibilities' Searle 
in Foot 1967,113). 
k 
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How for Grote does this arise? Firstly, by simply being a fellow 
user of a common language. In language we convey some part of our 
thoughts and intentions to others and in one sense language c*Ould not 
exist unless there was a presupposition of-trust in the use of words 
(Grote 1876,. 251). Hence 
'Truthfulness as a duty rests thus in the first instance upon two 
pillars conjunctly, the one the consideration that speech 
evidently exýsts as a means for community of thought among men; 
the otherl when it appears, as we have seen, that this community 
cannot be, and (as men are) had better not be, complete, the 
consideration that we have a trust reposed in us by the person 
desiring information, which we may easily violate, and which, the 
more easily we may violate it, calls upon our conscience the more 
imperatively not to do so' (ibid 253-254). 
This argument appears later in the work of Peter Winch and Alistair 
MacIntyre for whom trust and truthfulness are similarly prerequisites 
for any viable social interaction or form of life (Winch 1958,1970; 
MacIntyre 1967) 1981). Grote states once that 'speaking the truth' is 
a 'universal' custom or one of a number of 'manners of thought, 
feeling and action, which are to some extent general' (403-404). In 
language strikingly similar to Oakeshott's these 'general -ways of 
thinking, judging and acting, the general arrangements, the 
institutions... ' are elaborýýIed and held up as the most important 
preparations for a good society (ibid, 404-432). 
A second argument goes further in exploring the pathology of 
social relationships in regard to truth. Any kind of language or 
social exchange, that is not intended to deceive or which is 
accidentally meaningless, involves two parties having specific 
attitudes to one another (219-220). Firstly on the one side 
truthfulness is ( faithfulness ... to the communication by speech 
from 
mind to mind'. But there must also be 'the correlative faithfulness 
from the other side' or a 'truthfulness or disposition to give credit 
and believe' (253). Because these are postulates of the operation of 
ordinary language, as well as moral, political and legal. action, 
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-'Offence on either of these sides is treason, in various 'degrees, 
against the great bond of human society' (ibid, 251). 
Lying, deception, equivocation, misleading people and many other 
departures from openness and truthfulness in language is then as 
serious as betraying our country to the enemy because like military 
treason it cuts away at a fundamental presupposition of social 
existenceýe. trust between members of a social group. That this 
produces unhappiness is a peripheral truth and consequence when set 
alongside this logical and anthropological argument about the 
presuppositions of social existence. The empirical fact that all 
societies do exhibit a massive amount of mutual confidence and trust 
supports the general logical and moral proposition that it must and 
ought to, if we extrapolate to society from the following: 
'The degree of mutual confidence which must exist, and does 
exist, in order to the carrying on of complicated commercial 
transactions, might well astonish the unprepared spectator. This 
mutual confidence, and mutual justifying of such confidence, is 
in fact the basis-of all civilization: society is founded on 
mutual truth' (ibid, 266). 
Finally, a third argument considers self respect, personal 
autonomy and social credibility. Our words and our actions are a 
*sign' of our character and our identity. Our statements and actions 
are in the final analysis our own, and express our motives. A member 
of a society who is trusted can interact with fellow beings. That 
person not trusted, because of lack of veracity, 'is without the 
greatest guarantee of virtue' and credibility (ibid 254-255). 
Truthfulness is then a precondition for having self respect and social 
status, and while we can and sometimes must depart from absolute 
veracity, when for instance our duties may conflict in times of war, 
we should hormally observe the duty of truthfulness. 
What if after all this argument we ask Grote, why should I 
perform those things claimed against me, why should I satisfy the 
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rights of those with claims against me to tell the truth? Is he 
obliged to say, that this practice will promote the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number? The answer is 'no' again. The real reason 
why I should satisfy others'claims against me, why I should do my 
duty, for example tell truth, is that the institution of, practice oft 
respect for rights and performance of duties are preconditions for all 
social, moral, political and legal intercourse. Any person not seeing 
the strength of this argument can only have it all explained to them 
again through an account of the logic and practice of social lifel or 
what Winch and Wittgensten call, 'forms of life'. No other reasons 
can be given or need to be given in answer to the question, and the 
basal premises are not about the teleological consequences of actions 
but the nomocratic preconditions for social practice. Mill explains 
the meaning and practice of rights and duties in terms of utility plus 
some natural sentiments but Grote refuses to do so (Mill 1964t 50). 
once again utilitarian. moral, political and legal thinking is met with 
an argument of astonishing profundity and effect. Arguments of a 
similar character are used to defend the practices of promisekeeping 
and fair and just distribution of action. 
c) Justice 
The reader may 
I 
well have recognized once again the all pervasive 
presence of jural ethics in the above analysis. The reasons for truth 
telling in language, social, moral and political life are analogous to 
the reasons actually given for truthtelling in the legal system as the 
'Appendix on Justice and Truthfulness' ably illustrates (Grote 1876, 
262-274). Now we have already seen why Grote diverged from the 
utilitarian accoun t of justice, in rejecting its general claims 
(1) that justice is morally good solely because it promotes the. 
general welfare (Grote 1870,146), (2) in its assertion that justice 
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is merely. a sanction of utility, a force, a rule or principle to 
ensure social welfare, (3) in his rejection of the idea that the key 
principles of justice are impartiality, disinterestedness-and equality 
(in the general sense of the term), and (4) in his refusal to see the 
feeling of love of justice and detestation of unfairness- as the 
essence of justice and the reason for its moral popularity Mid 
Chapter Eight). As we rebuild his own account of justice we shall see 
once'again how the analogy of morality and law underpins the argument. 
There is no systematic theory of justice presented in any one 
part of Grote's corpus, like his ideas on duty, virtue, good and right 
the main essentials and details appear in various places. My 
reconstruction therefore is something of a patchwork quilt with all 
the defects involved in this product. The main concern of Grote was 
to explicate the place of justice as a moral ideal in relationship to 
the other ideals; and to show as with duty, that justice is to be 
understood in relationship to both. the actual, the lower facts of 
social and legal relations and the feeling below them# and the ideal, 
the higher facts, the ideal moral law of which justice is a part. 
In Chapter VIII we saw that justice was an aspect of the primary 
ideal of the right. So far we have discussed other sub-ideals of the 
right, virtue and duty and much of the Treatise is devoted to relating 
these three ideals. In Chapter III we find in a single sentence a 
hint to the content of his whole theory 
'The fair, or just, is an ideal formed by mixing the first, or 
what ought to be done, with an observational view of the 
conflicting interests, and various interrelations of men' (Grote 
1876,37). 
The key elements are the notion of justice as an ideal, and as an 
aspect of right, arising from actua*l conflicts and relations between 
human beings. Ideal and the actual, moral and sociological and 
psychological concerns are brought together in one eclectic theory. 
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That justice has ideal elements was encountered in the 
Examination. There Mill was seen to have produced an inaccurate 
etymology, history and philosophy, of justice. one element of this 
was the idea that at some stage in history it was recognized that 
often 'men make bad laws;, that they were not conducive to maximum 
utility. Accordingly they devised, according to Mill, ideal laws, and 
gradually injustice came to be only 
I violations of such laws as ought to exist, including such as 
ought to exist, but do not; and to laws themselves, if supposed 
to be contrary to what ought to be law' (Mill 1964,44). 
Grote approves of the idea that justice is an ideal that posits an 
ideal law but objects to Miles account on three grounds. Firstly, he 
objects to the idea that utility alone brought about the development 
from law to morality. In Grote's view respect for rights, and duties 
also had an effect. Secondly, Grote saw that Mills' move only 
* moralized' abitrary commands, suggesting the idea of justice as only 
the legitimation of force. Thirdly, Grote noted the logical 
incompatability of a theory of law and justice based on command with 
one based on moral ideals (Grote 1870,156-158). Justice in fact is 
an ideal which relates to the actual, at three levels, 
(1) That to which applies particular and express human law, with 
its definite authority and penalties. 
(2) That td which applies general and unformalized human law, 
i. e. universal, public, or (more or less) general opinion. 
(3) That to which applies conscience, imagination representing 
to us a more general and higher opinion or judgement still, 
viz. that of all possible intelligence and moral beings, to 
which our intelligence and moral judgement, so far as they 
are true and right, must be conformable' (Grote 1876,222). 
Injustice therefore can be a breach of the law, a breach of customary 
moral rules regarding distribution of our actions, or a breach of an 
ideal moral law. In each case injustice is actually a breach of a 
positive law or is analogous to this. Like diltyr justice is to be 
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considered under the law and through methods of and under the 
explcwatory system of jural ethics. 
As with all examples under jural ethics, actions are to be judged 
in the particular not the general. General rules such as 'treat thy 
neighbour as thyself* or the Kantian versus 'do not act towards 
anybody without the thought, what*you, would like if you were in his 
place and he in yours' can be formulated as rules of thumb, but 
justice like duty is a term that covers a multiplicity of claims and 
dues arising from particular relationships with others (200-203, 
209-221). Not to do so, as is the case with utilitarianism is to 
court confusion and practical disaster. Not only are general rules 
such as those of proportional justice, pure impartiality and equality 
confused but as we shall see, if applied in moral, political or legal 
practice would produce the rationalisation and ruination of civilized 
social life. 
Justice, like its neighbour duty, is concerned with the 
distribution of action, with doing, not with the end, of action or 
feeling. It deals, accordingly to Grote, with that part of the 
distribution of action between parties that concerns whether they have 
'benefited or injured us, or we have benefited or injured him' and 
with the reward of benefit and redress of injury (213). Two 
considerations affect us in this area, one utility, and the other 
conflict. Justice is divided between justice as utility and justice 
as fairness between conflicting parties. 'Both the public good and 
fairness to individuals must be considered in every case (213-214). 
Like Kant, Grote considers injustice as a kind of nomocratic 
settlement of conflict, between individuals or parties aver interests 
or merit, in which some party has 'gained an advantage' that was not 
deserved (214-215). The feeling associated with the fact of 
unwarranted advantage is that of unfairness, resentment and a desire 
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for revenge, the feelings associated with warranted advantage are love 
of fairness or justice, the desire to correct inequalities is the 'love 
of right'. But in all cases the feelings only indicate the fact of 
injustice or justice, they are not the fact nor the reason why people 
are just, as both Mill and members of the moral sense and sentiments 
schools supposed. 
How are justice, fairness and equality to be defined? The first 
answer is historical and philosophical, that is, like the idea of 
wrong the idea of rights, justice? fairness and equality derive from 
original. legal usage. 'Wrong' refers to the original legal position 
of a person in breach of the law and the term 'rights' was introduced 
in later jural language to express the circumstances of the party to 
whom duty was owed, signifying the same as claim, call, due (223). 
Like Maine and Ritchie later, rights are seen as arising from the 
codification of Roman law after its demise in the Middle Ages, it is 
not existent prior to this (95-97). Rights and duties. in this 
historical account were and still*are correlative terms and positions. 
Similarly, equality derives from legal equity and the social and 
economic usage is an elaboration of the earlier and more practical 
demand of early reformers for. 'equality before the law' (Grote 1870, 
340). Justice originally arose, as Mill argues in Chapter IV of 
Utilit3rianismj in the language and practice of law and has come to be 
applied to human custom and the imaginary and ideal moral law (ibid, 
222-223). In terms of the old Greek battle as to whether law arose 
from justice (morals) or morals from law, Grote sides with the latter, 
but though he argues that justice in the most abstract of legal 
conceptions he would have seen this as more or less compatible with 
the idea of it as the most legal of all virtues. 
As we saw in Chapter One Grote placed little value on the use of 
etymological methods for clarifying the meaning of words but stung by 
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Mills's derivation of'justum (the right and just) from jussum (the 
ordered) and by implication ofjus (law) from jubeo (command) he 
marshalled a now quite famous rebuke (Mill 1964,43-44). Mill had 
needed such a derivation to add support to his utilitarian account of 
law as the command of those with force enough to guarantee obedience 
and had gone to an early defendant of radical utilitarians, Horne 
Tooke for his authority. Firstly, Grote notes that the ordered in 
jussum might refer to commanded but could and proýably did refer to 
the idea of ordering as classifying and arranging. In this case 
justice relates to an ordered system of rules for distributing 
actions, rewards and burdens, not to the practice of obeying commands; 
Secondly, Grote objects to 'saying that justum is a form of jussum', 
on the grounds that there is no more reason why we should'deduce jus 
(law) 'from jubeo or jussum, than jussum from this' (Grote 1870 
153-154). The two Trinýty and St. John's moral science tutors, Mayor 
and Roby, adjudicated on the issue and found for Grote, 
'Jubeo is in fact derived by one of the most eminent of living 
etymologists from jus habeo, and jus is supposed to be connected 
with the root ju, to bind... ' and again, 
'Justus is of course derived immediately from just like onustus, 
scelustus, from onus, scelus' (ibid, 153-154). 
The effect here is to derive justice from law, and to see jus (law) as 
not the ordered or commanded but as a system of laws, a set of 
regulations as to mutual rights and duties, an order of private rights 
and property. 
This leads us to the heart of the issue for Grote. Mill and 
Bentham had argued, in part correctly, that ethical discourse and 
practice is related to legal discourse and practice. Howevert because 
they had the wrong view of law in the f irst place they ended up with 
the wrong views of duty and now justice. Moral and political justice 
is correctly seen as distribution according to an ideal law with law 
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meaning a set of rules governing the actions of individuals, for 
mutual advantage, made by a sufficient authority and backed by 
legitimate power. To be just an act must be authoritatively backed 
and for the mutual governance of agents in social relationships for 
their mutual good. Justice, like law obtains obedience to its 
dictates not because of sanctions-but because of respect for right, 
recognition of the reason in the rule or principleand because tacit 
or explicit assent is given, not simply for considerati6ns of advantage 
or fear of sanctions. Arbitrary commands were not historically or 
politically 'moralized' before becoming just, nor did natural human 
sentiments of self regard and resentment have to be further 
I socialized' into sanctions for justice as a practice to operate 
(Grote 1870,144,152-157). Justice, like law, contains an implicit 
reference to oughtlit hasan imperative quality in its origins, usage 
and practice. 
An explanation of the relationships that the rules of justice, 
like duty, codify will help us decide which acts are just. As we have 
seen our social existence dictates that we find ourselves in the 
society of others, related to them in various ways. Our deserts like 
our dues arise from the facts of these relationships, and are morally 
justified on the same grounds, that is, they are preconditions for 
membership of the society (Grote 1870,144; 1876,210-217). Grote 
writes that the facts of our relations define justice. The case 
'is the same thing as what I have already spoken of under the 
name of duty' (ibid, 212). 
In the case of the family he writes that for the distribution of 
benefits and burdens, even if we ignore parental feelings 
'I think the simple existence of the family relation, as a fact, 
is a sufficient reason why preference should be given to kindred 
over others' Ubid, 211). 
Now at heart' social relationships embody not identity but also 
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difference. Relationships such as those between parent and child, 
employer and employed, truster and. trusted involve us being in 
different positions in the relationship. In addition we are all 
individuals, unique selves, with our own dispositions, needs, reason 
and ideals. Justice then is generally about distributing amongst 
unequals in many morally. relevant-respects, and hence what is demanded 
is not so much impartiality, disinterestedness, or arithmetic equality 
of share but partiality, interestedness and due preference (Grote 
1870,93-97,150; 336; 1876,262-274). 
Two golden rules are given for justice, fairness and equality. 
First is a formal or presumptuous rule 
. all individuals who may be the objects of our action, are, as a 
matter of course, to be treated equally or similarly, except so 
far as reason may appear for preferring of some to others' (Grote 
1876l 211, also 218-219). 
This is the relevant role of equity or impartiality. If various 
parties are in a similar position in a relationship to ourselves we 
are to treat them alike as Aristotle originally indicated. However if 
people hold different positions in a relationship they are to be 
treated differently. Hence the second general rule is that 
'Our conduct to different people should be regulated, in other 
words, our care for them apportioned, on three principles 
combined: proper preference# proper fairness, or absence of 
preference; and proper particularity' (ibid 217). 
An example may help here. The golden rule of equity or fairness is to 
treat all alike and to abstain from any undue preference as say 
amongst my children. However, if one is more needy than the other or 
one more meritorious these may be taken as reasons for preferential 
treatment for a particular child in this particular instance. The 
crux of justice is in fact the giving of due preference and the 
witholding of undue preference in the distribution of rewards and 
burdens, according to the nature and facts of the relationships in 
which we are involved. As Grote put it 
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'Justice consists in making preferences where they should be 
made, and carefully abstaining from making them where they should 
not be made' (ibid, 262). 
In this sense, because impartiality does not take note of differences 
and deserts, it can be said to be 'no respecter of persons' and that 
'justice is drawn blind' (Grate 1876,276). 
The pervasive force behind all this seems to be Aristotle and 
Grote uses his categories to bolster up his own explanation. There 
are three types of ethical theory of justice. The account of where 
preferences are due is 'distributive justice', that of the restoring 
of equity or equality is . corrective justice', while intermediate 
between the two is the account of impartiality or 'fairness' (262). 
Impartiality to Grote is the most general or abstract principle and is 
not a rule of practical significance except formally and as a check on 
undue preference. The other two studies are more concrete and 
concerned with the particulars of life, the former with distribution 
of rewards, the latter primarily with law and punishmentg the 
distribution of burdens. 
Grote's account of punishment is fully consistent with the above. 
Punishment is to be understood in legal terms as the public infliction 
of a pain where a law, or rule, established by an authority, has been 
transgressed (Grote 1870,139-142; 1876,262-3,501-505,509). The 
actor must have intended to commit the crime and to be responsible for 
his actions (1876,471-3). Punishment with regard to justice has two 
roles, firstly, it is corrective in the sense of restoring equity in 
society and annihilating the criminal's advantage (262-263). 
Secondly, in making amends or repayment of debts to the person hurt 
and to society, 
I punishment is in one way or another reparation' (ibid, 176, 
262-263). 
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That punishment is against the act, the crime, and the actorg the 
criminal, should go without saying. Punishment is not and should not 
be for the feelings of the criminal, the victim or to placate the 
vengeful feelings of the public body (176). Finally, punishment may 
have some secondary qualities and advantages, for it may make some 
citizens feel better, it may promote public happiness, and it may 
cause the criminal's reformation or even promote future moral action 
(Grate 1870,205-208; 1876,450-451). But in general punishment is 
about the restoring of right, it is an absolute obligation on the 
state to offended parties, and it is a dictat; of justice (Grote 1876, 
262-263). 
With both justice and punishment there are three spheres in which 
the concept operates, the legal, the moral and the general (245-247). 
The first deals with positive law, the second with the*moral norms of 
a specific society and the third deals with the hypothetical laws that 
should govern all human relationships, as for instance with the 
principles in the Bible or in Kant's ethics. While each operates in a 
fashion analogous to the other we should not confuse them. Justice 
under law is not quite the same as justice in society, as no 
authorized public body exists to correct transgressions with the 
second. Again to equate something like the international lawg the Jus 
Gentium orJus Naturalewith the positive law of a state would be both a 
confusion and a potential cause of disaster (490-500). In addition, 
while as we have seen, it is normally our duty to obey the law and that 
in so doing we may promote legal justice, this may not necessarily be 
the case. Grote was too much of a Victorian respectable gentleman to 
develop a serious theory of political disobedience or injustice. But 
he recognized the problem of conscience and made the point on some 
occasions that performance of legal obligations may lead to a moral 
injustice. Law, in many ways is only the attempt to quantify, measure 
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and balance what we find abstractly contained in the moral ideal or 
-moral law, and the achieved norms and standards found in custom and 
opinion (400-401). A case of the former would be where a legal 
contract was made under duress, where one party was being manipulated 
or even where the performance of the contract would do both or even 
one party to the contract no good (ibid 265-274). With the latter 
(opinion) Grote. notices that while law and custom can usually be 
relied upon to be just, no person must ever 
. abdicate his prerogative of judging them by his ideal of what 
they should be' (ibid 401). 
What makes them just or unjust is not just the existence of the rules, 
nor the fact of approval by others. For a good citizen 
, it is his own approval of it, and his recognizing the reasons of 
it, which makes it so. He neither despises others' opinion, nor 
blindly follows it' (ibid 401). 
The same goes for states in conflict with one another. For while 
there is no positive law to keep states in order, and war is absurd, 
cruel, and immoral, Grote argues for the right and obligation of each 
state to judge for itself both the right, the just and the true. In 
the end both the individual and the state have both the right and duty 
to define justice for themselves and if necessary to defend it by 
action (500-503). 
There is little of the radical in Grote but much of the moderate 
reformer in regard to the law, social injustice, moral rules and 
civilization as a whole. Like most of his contemporaries he felt it 
the duty of the state to defend in law the citizens' rights to private 
property. To do otherwise would be unjust (Grote 1870,336-339; 
1876,225-229). But he fully recognized the gross inequalities of 
property and wealth in society and suggested moderate reform, and even 
compensation in the form of improved 'Poor Laws'. While his 
recommendation to the Propertyless to emigrate seems defeatist and 
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complacent8his attack on the institution of slavery, the property*of 
persons, was assertive and aware (Grote 1876,228). Anti-slavery had 
long been a popular cause amongst Trinity Fellows, and Whewell even 
had a letter from his old adversary John Stuart Mill, in the last 
years of his life congratulating him on his long and consistent 
advocacy of abolition and the northern cause in the civil war (Mill 
1865: Whewell, Add. Ms. a. 209.48). Grote's objections were that 
negroes were human beings, and that, 
'beings in whom consciousness, will, and reason exist, as they do 
in anything bearing the shape of man, have a right to be 
considered really men, and to live for their own benefit, not, 
compulsorily, for the benefit of others' (Grote 1870,320). 
Both in the Treatise and the Examination Grote makes a meal of the 
argument that a Georgia 'white-man-utilitarian' may justify slavery on 
utilitarian grounds (Grote 1870,318-325; 1876,409-411). This as 
the Westminster Review notes is the only case of Grote arguing from 
example against utilitarianism. But he also uses this-against the 
slavery of women and the conquest and subjugatioh of foreign and 
backward races. In rhetorical style he asks 
'Are the races of highest civilization doomed only to 
exterminate, with wretched accompaniment of vice and degradation, 
the weak uncivilized races like the North American and the 
Australian; to rule over and oppress the weak civilized races 
like the Hindus and Chinese, without entering into real 
association with them; and to live in an association which is 
worse than none, in the relation of master and slave, with the 
strong uncivilized races like the Negro'? (Grote 1870,325). 
One last point on property and the family can be made here. Neither 
institution is defended as either God given or as the product of 
utilitarian calculation either made at a time or historically. Both) 
to Grote, are cardinal institutions of society, and though the family 
like property 
'is a thing which has never been historically instituted: the 
human race has never been without it. It is, historically, an 
universal custom, made definite, in various ways, by particular 
law' (Grote 1876,225). 
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Like language and law, property and the family pre-exist our social 
life and are postulates of it. In the first of two Hegelian sounding 
phrases, Grote accounts for property as fundamental to human 
personality and language, 
'The genetive case and possessive pronoun are as early in thought 
as the nominative case and the personal pronoun' (Grote 1870, 
339). 
The family for its part mediates between the self and others, the 
not-self and, 
'As the body is, for sensiveness, at once a part of ourselves and 
the physical external world, being the medium between the two, so 
family stands between a man's self and the societyl at once a 
part of both' (Grote 1876,226). 
(5) Politics and Government 
Unlike his brother George and his friend Robert Leslie Ellis, the 
former involved with the Radicals andthe latter with the Whigs, John 
Grote appears to have abstained from active politics outside of his 
college, Nor most certainly was he a political polemicistnor an 
ideologist, and even his prescriptive comments on politics are few. and 
far between. Above all Grote was an academic and a philosopher, 
preoccupied with understanding and explaining moral and political 
practice not with practicing them. But we must not mistake such a 
position as one of a recluse or a cloistered university don of 
Stephen's characterization. Nor was Grote aloof from the economic and 
social problems of his society. Rather Grote felt that the relative 
calm of the 1860's had given the opportunity for serious ref. lection 
and analysis of these issues, and that a correct understanding of 
their character and structure was a precondition for further efforts 
in the way of improvement and reform. Practically as well as 
philosophically Grote was an idealist. He considered man, society and 
history capable of improvement and progress towards the realization of 
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their ideals and he was not averse to propounding liberal reforms. 
But reform and improvement could only be adequately appraised within 
the context of the correct theoretical understanding. Sheer 
enthusiasm, desire to do good, rationalist, religious and political 
faith would not make up for the lack of a correct philosophical and 
historical appraisal of the situation. 
Positivism and utilitarianism in Philosophy, the progressive 
historicism of Comte, Mill and Buckle in history were in fact 
impediments to practical reform. The 'claim of utilitarianism to be 
the morality of progress' and a 'practical philosophy were' not only 
spurious, but were in many ways the reverse of the truth (Grote 1870, 
Ch's VI; XVIII; XIX; XX). The rationalistic methods, analysis and 
prescriptions of those groups offered to Victorians a dangerous threat 
to society and the state as well as to general human progress. it 
would be unrealistic to claim that Grote provided a thorough analysis 
of political societies past and present, of the major political 
thinkers and theories and even more absurd to claim he added a worked 
out alternative. However as we have seen in his account of law, Grote 
was aware of the historical growth of both political institutions and 
ideas, and we can now see what contributions he made to building a 
philosophical and practical alternative to rationalism. 
As we saw in Chapter VIII, for Grote human beings are 
wanting creatures and the effort to satisfy want and to achieve what 
we want is, alongside the social nature of our thinking and feeling, 
the starting point for a correct assessment of human action and 
practice. Practical life and existence is premissed on the ultimately 
unbridgable gap between what 'has been', 'is' and 'will be', and more 
importantly 'what is' and 'what ought to be' in the future. 
Our wants indicate not only the satisfaction of the senses but of 
the mind also. This satisfaction can be achieved in the realization 
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of intellectual ideals, especially the true, and moral and political 
ideals. Of the 'latter, the right is of more significance than 
happiness and even the good. And the sub ideals of right that satisfy 
our moral and social want are virtue, duty and justice, realized via 
the meeting of social standards, rule*s and goals, set in custom# 
opinion and the law. Activity' is the necessary response to this 
contradiction within existence, between the actual and the ideal but 
it is fraught with difficulties. What 'is' has been the outcome of 
what has been' but is now gone and is beyond our present control. 
What 'will be' is beyond present knowledge and what 'ought to be' is 
both hypothetical and a hypothetical imperative open to massive 
conflicts of opinion in our individual and collective imaginations. 
Life may be a constant struggle to overcome want and to realize 
ideals while being in conflict with others, but we have some aids. The 
first is our human powers. These include our physical abilities our 
mental abilities, and our ability to cooperate together. Each power 
has its own resistance, gravity to the former, the unknown to ýhe next 
and common rivalry to cooperation. But human beings are aspiring 
creatures, they create ideals in their imaginations and use their 
powers to realize them in practice. Human beings strive for social 
self realization and even perfection. 
Experience and history distilled and embodied into opinion, 
custom, moral rules, law and ideals offer the second aid. Religion 
provides a third but as Grote argues, unless a man speaks with the 
voice of God he should not underrate experience. Practical life is 
seen to take place in the context of historically created 
institutions,. practices, rules laws, knowledge and thought. Its 
progress is involved in maintaining what is best in this, which is 
most, and changing what is inadequate and unideal, to satisfy our 
wants and to create a world more in line with our ideas of how it 
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should be. Life and-action are an engagement of adapting the actual 
to make up for its defects and to realize wants hnd to achieve 
something that better approximates to our ideals. 
One recurring theme in Grote's theory of practice is that much of 
life is and must be devoted to maintaining what is and has been. As 
he argues against Mill, 
'The mass of human life consists of action or behaviour not aimed 
at an end or fixed by a rule, but resulting from our general 
manner of thinking and acting' (Grote 1870,131). 
Like Hegel and Burke he is fully alive to the fact that 'what is' is 
the fragile creation of many efforts at maintenance and change. The 
present and the actual is a product' of 'the achieved dialectic of 
human conversation' in the past (Grote 1876,505). Existing human 
naturej custom, opinions and law, as well as existing institutions of 
practices are a triumph neither to be undervalued, mocked, or lightly 
exchanged or surrendered (238-239,395). Hence, 
'The present mean level of human civilized morality, or ordinary 
respectability, represents a very high standard of moral 
attainment to the individual who instead of having been subjected 
to its discipline and education has been subjected to influences 
all the other way' (ibid 396). 
What we have has been tried and tested by former generations, it has 
been argued about, disputed over, tried practically and its survival 
indicates some reason or rationality in itself (399). While the level 
to which custom embodies right may be argued over there is a definite 
relationship (422-423). We must test custom both in thought and 
practice by abstract standards, such as its naturalness, its effect on 
human happiness, by re ference to whether it promotes human elevation 
and realizes our moral ideals of right and good (414-418). As we have 
seen we must also criticise and even act against e veryday custom and 
practice and remain free and independent critics where necessary. But 
the normal state of affairs is one of conscious, free and willing 
recognition of the rightness, reason and practicality of custom, 
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opinion, practice, law, institutions. 
But to go about this in the wrong way or to go too far is 
dangerous. Moral positivism is the going about this in the wrong way, 
applying scientific tests to the past, present and future, to ideals 
as well as reality where it is of no relevance. The consequences are 
moral relativi*sm, scepticism and naturalism. Another equally wrong 
method is that of Whewell and his followers who seek to create a 
systematic morality in which moral rules, everyday opinion and 
practice can be codified into a set of regulative rules. Kant had 
pioneered this by providing his Categorical Imperative, Mill tried 
with the utilitarian principle, Whewell abridged conventional morality 
under the headings of several moral axioms considered to be ultimately 
self evident. For Grote 
'Objective morality, or the rule and law of proper conduct and of 
a good life, is not anything which can be expressed in any sort 
of way in a code or system' (ibid 238). 
With indirect reference to Whewells Elements and his Lectures 
on Systematic Morality of 1846 he recognizes the force of Mill's 
original criticism, that the conventional headings of the law provide 
an inadequate framework and anyway, 
I are incomplete as an index of morality' (ibid, 238). 
In reality practice involves an infinite number of relationships, 
governed by a mass of rules, and principles of great variety which 
cannot be resolved into a system. Both for everyday life and even for 
the astute philosopher, 
'Practically, the book to which we each one of us have to refer, 
to discover, as to a particular line of conduct, whether it is 
right or wrong, is the general opinion of our age and time 
variously commented upon, interpreted, or criticised by the whole 
immediate circle in which we move, by the books which we have 
read, and by the view of life which our past or present 
circumstances have given to us' (ibid 238-239). 
This last point the 'view of life' or 'form of life' has modern echoes 
is the moral theorizing of Wittgenstein, Winch, MacIntyre and 
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Bernstein. The earlier points suggest a critical philosophy in which 
moral judgement and reform arises from engaging in and thinking about 
civilizing and reforming an existing view of life. Moral philosophy 
gives 'us rational grounds' on which to criticize and compare moral 
practice, but we can not seek to rationalize moral practice under 
rules or principles or systematic-codes without destroying it. 
'Life cannot be lived by rule, or it is not life' (ibid 239). 
Practical morality and politics is the activity of engaging in and 
critically developing, maintaining and changing a viewpoint, a manner, 
and way of life common to a social group. 
Undeniably there are dangers in holding on too closely to the 
actual and in breeding an attitude of quietism, apathy and 
conservatism. There are dangers too in the attitudes and practice of 
being dissatisfied with reality but being too cynical or sceptical to 
attempt its modification, which was the attitudes of Pascal, Montaigne 
and R9chfauld (Grote 1877). Equally dangerous is-that idealism that 
leads to 'mere dreaming or castle building; to utopianism (Grote 1876, 
393). An idealism that loses a grip on the actual or the practical is 
not helpful in theory or practice. For Grote, rationalism and 
positivism, apathy, cynicism and scepticism, blind obedience and 
utopian idealism are all inadequate responses to the practical world, 
both at the philosophical and the practical levels. In practice we 
need to grasp ideals that can practically be achieved and which will 
develop and fulfill individual and social want. Moral and political 
philosophy is to help by rationally scrutinizing and grasping with 
'the inward eye' these ideals; to relate this to the actuall to the 
*humýn condition and of human feeling, to see from the former how 
the ideal may be applied, to see-from the latter, how others, 
like - constituted with ourselves, look upon it' (ibid 393). 
It must then, look at social development and history, 
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'because misdevelopment is possible, the particular plant we are 
studying might be a monster'. 
Finally we should check this against the actual character and practice 
of human relationships and with the'actual feeling and psychology of 
people (392-394). 
We can now specify Grote's idea of politics more clearly. 
Politics and political society, as distinct from morality and moral 
society, sociality and society, is the formal and authoritative 
practice, or manner of behaviour, for maintaining and changing society 
and for reconcilifig conflicts within and about it Politics both 
arbitrates conflicts between members and by legislation) andinpractice 
codifies custom, opinion, relations and ideals. In so doing politics 
and the law are an expression of the 'public spirit and feeling' in a 
society (236). A useful starting point is Grote's account of 
conflict. Human beings differ in terms of wants as well as ideals, 
and may come into conflict over each of them in theory and practice. 
In a small chapter On Discussion, Controversy, and War , we find this 
explained in regard to politics. History, we are told, is 'a record 
of perpetual conflict', of which there are two sources, 'interest' and 
I opinion'. Neither notion is defined though we are to conclude that 
the former concerns physical or material wants, while the other is 
concerned with moral and intellectual wants and ideals. The conflicts 
or contests to defend or promote our interests or opinions also 
reflect a basic 'principle of human nature', that of mutual rivalry, 
which arises from our active as against our sentient nature. We are 
not just combative to satisfy our senses, as Hobbes presumed, but to 
assert our wills and our selves (despite resistance), to be active and 
free, as Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were arguing at 
theýsame time. 
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'Action is not action without some resistance to it, just as 
there could not be physical movement without some resistance. 
Action is a triumph of our will, and it is in the triumph, and in 
the amount of success against what is triumphed over, that we are 
conscious of ourselves, of our liberty and of our power' (ibid 
488). 
From childhood in pure playfulness to adult rivalries of all sorts 
there is then a dual drive, one to realize our interests and opinions, 
the other to exercise our will and freedom in action. This 
beautifully fits Grote's theory of action, ontology and human nature. 
Grote differs from Hobbes and Mill in another crucial way, 
conflicts are not just individual but social, and more generally 
'Instead, of individually conflicting men, we have corporately 
conflicting parties' (ibid 488). 
These may be of many types from families, to villages, to political 
parties, countries and nations. This is vital because not only does 
it change the unit of internal psychology to *group ', but because 
'the existence of man in families, orders separate governments, 
and other such divisions, with the various feelings arising 
therefrom, such as those of family partialities, of esprit de 
corp, of patriotism, are main agents for breaking down 
selfishness ..... , (Grote 1870 337-338). 
How does politics differentiate itself from moral discussion, resort 
to opinion, and war in the means of settlement of conflict? The 
answer in regard to conflicts within a society is the presence of 
authority, power and public reason. 
'The conciliation of different interests, 
thing, the authoritative and forcible decis 
interest among the members of a community, 
civil government, and forms the subject of 
law. Authority, power and reason, are the 
to to such decision' (Grote 1876,490). 
or, which is the same 
Lon of conflicts of 
is one main reason of 
a iarge portion of 
three things which go 
For this discussion the key words are 'authoritative' 'forcible' and 
reasonable'. We have seen this in the discussion of law that 
authority' and 'power' are very different and distinct. Authority 
involves right and is obeyed because of recognition or respect for 
right. Power on the other hand is a public ability to ensure 
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obedience without the need for respect or recognition. Reason in the 
law was what helped make it, what explains its utility and what also 
explain the normal state of mind of the subject, whose willing consent 
was given because the law and the practicew-re reasonable. Now in the 
context of politics Grote writes) 
'Authority causes respect to the decision on the part of the 
well-disposed; power causes obedience on the part of all, 
however disposed; and reason makes it a decision not only 
apparently, but really, satisfactory and just. If authority and 
power are both wanting, their place may be supplied by the 
previous and subsequent consent of the parties, and the decision 
is then arbitration; but reason is of the essence of its 
satisfactoriness' (ibid 490). 
Here we have an eclectic account of politics and the state which 
differentiates the former from social practice and the latter from 
society by three features. Society settles its conflict without 
formal authority, without sovereign power and more likely on the basis 
of habit rather than custom and law based on reason. 
We can add to the distinction from other sources. A society is 
ordered according to social norms, embodied in custom, opinion, moral 
rules and ultimately in the moral law. A state or nation is governed 
by laws that abridge, codify and formalize this custom and opinion and 
the relationships they formalize. Politics is then about the 
maintenance, enforcement and modification by legislation of the 
positive law as distinct from the moral law. In addition the law and 
politics finds, records and places men in different relationships to 
those in which they find themselves in ordinary society. We relate 
not as fathers and children, employers and employees but as rulers and 
ruled and governors and citizens. The law usually only rationalises 
these but occasionally, as when an employer or citizen is forced to 
look after his workers or fellow citizens' welfarer we are put into a 
specific relationship and are told to act accordingly. Society cannot 
perform the last task, political society can. 
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Now if society and political society differ in terms of 
authority,. power, reason, the law, relationships and the ability to 
force changes in them, how does one political society relate to other 
political societies? Here Grote is specific and his analysis explains 
why war arises and is so common. Between states there is no 
authority, no sovereign power, no-common reason, no law, no binding 
social relationships to diminish self interest, and no capacity to 
negotiate and alter the relationship between the states, or to 
conciliate and arbitrate between them (Grote 1876,490-491). But 
there are also differences, as the last point indicates, in the ways 
of reconciling conflicts between members of a society, citizens in a 
state and between states. Members of a social group reconcile 
conflict in several ways: by discussion and argument, by appeal to 
third parties such as friends and neighbours, by competition, economic 
or otherwise. In a state conflicts are settled more formally but 
differently 4ccording to whether the conflicts are of interest or 
opinion. The former are settled ultimately by appbal to an existing 
law, a struggle to get a law passed favouring your interest, or by 
appealing to an authority to arbitrate or conciliate, or use their 
power to enforce a decision. This stops what Grote calls 'private 
war'. In international politics this is impossiblet there is no 
international law that is authoritative and enforceable. 
'In conflicts of interest, between states, there is never any 
possibility of judicial decision except by consent and 
arbitration: in these cases then, if there is not agreement 
there must be either foregoing or war' (ibid 491). 
Conflicts of opinion in a society are settled by debate and argument# 
and in a state by appeal to a third party, be it an arbitrator, a 
committee, or by voting. Conflicts of opinion can not be settled by 
judicial decisions of a court. Yet in a society conflicts of opinion 
are not allowed to be taken as far as violence even if the difference 
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cannot be reconciled. In international politics there are no such 
constraints. No third parties exist and each party not only has the 
right but may also have the obligation to defend or promote its 
opinion, as well as its interests by war (495-496). Conflicts of 
opinion between states of this kind are usually over right, and, more 
specifically over justice and truth (492). But oddly enough for a 
priest and a humanist Grote did not lack political realism. 'War is a 
barbarism' but war may also be just. 
'At the same time war and dispute are less evils than the 
acquiescence in injustice: the maintenance of truth and right is 
the all important thing among men, and however evil war may be, 
it is better that war should exist than-that they should go 
unmaintained' (ibid 502). ' 
Nowhere, as far as I know, does Grote define the state or 
elaborate in detail its functions other than those of maintenance, of 
order enforcement of law, legislation, arbitration and adjudication, 
the handling of internatinnal issues, defence and war mentioned above. 
Some ideas about nations are however given, and the term is used as a 
simple corollary for the state and not in its traditional sense as a 
derivation from 'natio'. Firstly, he notes that insofar as 
international law and conflict is concerned the basic units are 
I nations'. The boundaries of nations are usually ýsettled by war 
rather than negotiation, they are the outcome of the foregoing of some 
nations and the triumph of force of others in the past and present 
(496). Secondly, a nation has a citizenry of its own which are united 
by a distinctive setof bonds apart from law and force, the bonds of 
society' or in modern terms 'political identity', the *common 
feelings' and 'manners of thought' and 'habits that unite them both to 
the state (497). At one place Grote likens the nation to an 
individual, in the sense that it acts as one body, that its members 
come to think alike and be intolerant of others (493,498,504). The 
fact that citizens in a nation do often 'think alike' is not however 
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altogether evil even though it may lead to patriotism and war, for the 
very same force ýinds individuals together, reduces selfishness and 
'brings out' human potential in many areas. As in philosophical 
schools sectarianism brings both light and 'its dark shadow* (499). 
Grote is certain that simple financial and economic interests are 
not enough to unite nations (497).. But Grote notices another key 
factor, nations differ from individuals in this respect, 
that it has very definitely and decidedly duties to itself, i. e. 
that the ruling power has duties towards the subjects or 
individual members of the state' (ibid, 496). 
Moral relations involve duties between people, and there are no duties 
to the self which are not ultimately for others. A states duty is 
however a duty to its citizens, and he adds with approval that there 
has been a 
I growth of the feeling that government exists for the good of the 
governed' (ibid, 497). 
War is the ostensible subject of this Chapter' and Grote's main 
intention is . not to debate politics or the state but to discuss the 
possibilities for reducing incidences of war. For definitional 
reasons he argues that 
'Where there is conflict of interest without possibility of 
judicial decision, or with indisposition in the parties to resort 
to it, there is combat or war. By war we mean mutual violence 
which is more or less formal: in our present use indeed the term 
is limited to a combat between two individuals, with states for 
individuals' (ibid 491). 
on the problem of how to diminish war Grote rejects four 
hypotheses. (1) that it can be achieved by 'the diminution of the 
independence of nations', or 'international arbitration', (2) by 
considerations of material and economic interests, (3) as a result of 
increased 'tolerance' and (4) Showing how 'absurd' and fruitless it is 
(ibid, 495-503). In the end war is seen as just another form of human 
conversation and controversy, akin to but not the same as political, 
religious, moral and intellectual controversy. The dialectic of, or 
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conversation of history and time has produced the present and will 
produce the future, and as in all conversation there is purpose and 
reason. In Hegelian terms he writes) 
'In the controversy of the past, 
religious, we have the debate 
world, that actual dialectic 
discussion, which has resulted i: 
whatever is accepted anywhere 
rest' (Grote 1876,505). 
moral, philosophical, political, 
of reason, the thought of the 
of human conversation and 
n present opinion, and upon which 
upon these must be conceived to 
Discussion and conversation should lead to truth in philosophy, and to 
right in politics and war, but in both areas the adversaries waste too 
much time on attack and rarely clarify their views or seek 
reconciliation. Usually, 
'the truth, is merely a piece of intellectual force wasted in 
worthless quarrel, just as life and wealth are wasted in war' 
(ibid 506). 
This and the mixed results of controversy, some good and some evil, 
are 'the history of human dialectic thought' from which Grote sees no 
escape in intellectual, moral, political or military terms in the 
future (507). 
In practice then politics is defined as the attempt to 
I conciliate' and 'arbitrate' on conflicts of interest and opinion 
where there is an authoritative body, with the power to enforce its 
laws and arbitrated decisions. Such a definition is deficient in that 
with arbitration and conciliation the parties are free to enter 
negotiations or not, to accept conciliation or not, to accept the 
judgement or not, and to accept the arbiter or conciliator or not, 
while in politics the state, the legislator, the government, its 
decisions, its power and its jurisdiction is not optional in regard to 
citizens. However we have seen that a political society differs in 
regard to power, authority and the ability to formally define and 
organize social relations. 
In my view law is the heart of Grote's political thinking and 
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political philosophy. Politics is essentially the process of making 
and enforcing the laV, it is public rather than private controversy, 
which results in the formal ordering of society under the state. Its 
precondition is not just conflict and separate interest and opinions 
nor grievances but sociality which to Grote is synonymous with 
. political life' (Grote 1876,224). This is another key concept to 
Grote and it refers to 'the reconciliation or putting together of 
different interests' and 'opinions' (428,430). This separates 
sociality from gregariousness which is a natural attraction to members 
of the same species. Sociality involves difference, and humanly 
organized relationships. Like Aristotle, Grote argues that man is a 
rational and social animal, and* while not calling him a political 
animal he makes it plain that his sociality and his imagination, his 
language and his ability to reconcile conflicts make the creation of a 
state or political society possible. Differences between human beings 
are for political reasons as important as their similarities and it is 
difference that makes the political and social unit distinct. Beither 
gregariousness nor equality (sameness), nor conformity or force are 
needed to have a social and political order amongst humans. 
Sociality, diversity, acceptance of basic rules and duties and rights, 
and acceptance of authority allow individuals to bind together in a 
political society. 
(6) Diagnostic and Prescriptive Political Theory 
For a thinker of theýbackground and concerns of John Grote, the task 
of diagnosing' his society and suggesting reforms was somewhat alien. 
Aware of the pitfalls in diagnosing and prescribing for theoretical 
argument put him on guard and made him a reluctant moralist, political 
and social critic. But Grote did have a view of his own, a political 
diagnosis of his age and a set of political preferences that appear in 
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his moral writings but most especially in the last chapters of the 
Examination . These concern (1) tM growth of mass - society; 
levelling and equality, (2) the defence of freedom; (3) a defence of 
private property, wealth and capitalism, tempered by a recognition of 
responsibility to the worker, the poor and the uneducated; (4) a 
desire to ensure that authority and obligation set the character of 
political relations rather than force, power and violence on the one 
side, and prudential considerations of self interest on the other. 
(a) Mass society-and democracy 
Nineteenth century capitalist industrialization was bringing in 
its wake massive social Political and intellectual changes on which 
Grote felt obliged to comment. Of central concern was the break down 
of difference, of uniqueness of individuality, that was a result of 
the growth of a mass society (Kornhauser 1960). Social relations we 
have seen lay at the heart of Grote's social and moral theory, they 
dictate what are our duties and rights. Justice and the law' are to 
codify customary social relationships and roles and to reform them 
where necessary. Virtue is supererogatory, it starts where law and 
duty end but still reflects not only ideals to be pursued but real 
moral relationships to others. But what if traditional social 
relationships are breaking down in practice and being eroded in 
theory? What happens if demands for new kinds of relationships 
incompatible with the old and new kinds of duties, rights, justice and 
law incompatible with those of the past and, present are advocated by 
reformers such as the Philosophical Radicals, including John's brother 
George? 
Relationships to Grote are premissed upon differences between 
people. Father, mother. and child are not equal in statust power and 
responsibility, but are united -in the family. Friendship may be 
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between equals in status but the parties are distinct and unique. 
Work relationships, social academic, political and military 
relationships invo 
embody and contain 
respect to them. 
unlikeness as well 
ways (Grote 1870, 
sentence 
Lve unique individuals organized into groups that 
differences, and rights, duties and power arise in 
Society, in brief, involves, differences and 
as similarities and being alike in some crucial 
336). Grote's fear is expressed in one neat 
'Now is the day of the masses; now we have done with special 
interests, special manners of thinking, special privileges; one 
common way of thinking makes us understand each other and act as 
one man' (Grote 1876,428). 
Now with the growing reality, ideology and theory of 'egalitarianism'. 
all difference and uniqueness is being destroyed and it is now it is 
advocated 'all are alike, and that it is a grand thing to be a unit in 
a force or mass so vast and mighty as a civilized people' (Grote 
1876,42-9). 'Whole nations' we are told 'have been subjected to this 
process of pulverizing' until it seems possible to see society not as 
an 'organization of dissimilar members' but 'an aggregation of similar 
units' (Grote 1870,95,337). 
Most recently the pulverising process had been seen in modern 
France with the Revolution and its aftermath and Grote did not like 
the spectacle (340). But the process, which he calls 
* egalitarianism', or the breaking down of differences, has been a long 
historical episode that some associate with Capitalism and some the 
development of civilization, including presumably Rousseau and even 
Henry Maine. Yet Grote concludes that, 
'Little as the experience of the world and of the past may be 
able to teach us, it may at any rate teach us that such 
advantages of civilization as consists in breaking down 
privileges and class interests, and making men in thiS manner 
equal, has no tendency to produce in them that feeling of unity 
with others, which, as we should all agree with Mr Mill, would be 
so great an improvement in morality' (ibid 337). 
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The study of the process can be historical and it is generally a part 
of 'political science'. 
The cement of civilized society is not to Grote, class nor 
gregariousness, not sameness, not force nor rationally organized 
prudentialism of the kind advocated by Bentham, but recognition and 
respect of mutual duties and rights between fellow members of a group. 
Special ties based on specific relationships are being replaced by 
prudentialism in practice and theory. Mill for instance is accused of 
advocating in utilitarianism 'the equality of men as a principle of 
morals' which neglected 
'All idea of special ties and sympathies for that of an 
arithmetic aggregation, and certainty in this way allowed it to 
be supposed that our duty to each other, including ourselvesl was 
to be measured out by a real education' (ibid 341). 
This development Grote saw as taking us back towards 'barbarism' not 
forward to 'civilization'. While the philosophical underpinning to 
this critique is Grote's novel idea of. society and his theory of 
duties and rights, the historical context was the collapse of the 
aristocratic class system and the rise of bourgeois society. At one 
place he notes that 
'The restraints and mannerisms which aristocratical opinion 
carries with it are very likely to be weakened before the 
restraints and mannerisms of bourgeois opinion are prepared to 
take their place. The moral result of this may be good or may be 
bad. In the last century when something of the kind occurred in 
France, the result was bad: with us in England at the moment it 
may be otherwise' (Grote 1876,426-427). 
Aware of such a historical and contemporary development, and 
seeing much radical and utilitarian thinking as a bourgeois 
philosophy, attacking both aristocratic 'privilege' and 'culture', 
Grote felt obliged to adjudicate and moderate the debate. He 
formulates one key question 
'Does egalitarianism (the modern democracy of M. de Tocqueville 
and others), by which I mean the feeling antagonistic to 
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aristocracy and privilege, the looking upon men, and their 
looking upon themselves, as being all in the same position, with 
its accompaniments of using the same sort of language, wearing 
the same dress, etc. bring out individuality, or the opposite? ' 
(ibid 428). 
The answer is that *egalitarianism acts both ways' but that its 
tendency to stifle individuality, difference and the desire for 'self 
cultivation and self-development'-is dangerous and must be opposed. 
In a neat passage which also indicates Grote's idea of the 'ideal 
man', he writes of all classes 
'Let a man be encouraged to be a something as a man besides what 
he is as a wheel in the great industrial machine. If the man 
holding the plough for two shillings a day can become the 
merchant writing at his desk and earning a hundred pounds a day, 
let him; in the meantime the energies of both are engrossed, and 
it requires an effort for either to be anything more than this 
work: good sense, force of character, imaginative feelingst 
vigour of mind seem to me quite as possible for the poor man as 
for the richer, if you can only get him to value them' (ibid 
429). 
The compromise proposed was that while the end of ancient privileges, 
monarchical despotism and unwarranted inequalities could happily be 
allowed to pass, the defence and promotion of individuality, 
difference, special ties and the system of rights and duties they 
supported was essential as a bulwark against mass society and what 
latter thinkers have called 'alienation' and 'anomie'. Mill we know, 
along with Arnold and others, feared the same pulverizing process and 
argued against it. But Grote's analysis is unique, based as it is on 
a relational theory of society, morals and politics not upon 
empiricist, individualistic or laissez faire ideas and presuppositions 
or upon aristocratic cultural aestheticism. 
(b) Freedom 
This brings us to political freedom and the boundaries that should be 
drawn between society, the state and the individual. Here the 
conclusions of the argument are quite similar to Mill's thesis in on 
Liberty and to bourgeois thought at the time. generallY, but once again 
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the arguments are different. Grote is opposed to what he calls the 
disposition to over meddling' and the growth of a 'tyranny of the 
majority' that replaces the 'tyranny of the opinion of our own rank or 
set' (ibid, 425-426). He wishes to promote individual liberty in 
thought and behaviour, but in one throw away comment he regrets the 
principle behind Mills On Liberty. 
'Between what injures others and what does not, it is hard enough 
to draw the line even in regard to what is palpable and flagranto 
and in the (comparatively) rough way which will do for the 
legislator and judge: if we are supposed to be really 
conscientious, it seems to me impossible' (ibid 431). 
When in practice we demarcate between what is a public and private 
matter 'we can hardly do so on the principle that here we arrive at 
something which cannot affect others... ' The line to be drawn rather 
depends on considerations of history, practice, circumstance and the 
balancing of interests, opinions and ideals. No simple principle such 
as the harm principle allows us to make hard and fast judgements on 
each case. 
Preference for freedom arises from three considerations in Grate: 
that freedom of the will is *a precondition of thought and moral 
action; that as human beings we feel free and wish to assert our 
freedom; and that only by so doing can society encourage its citizens 
towards 'self development' or what Green later calls 0 self 
realization'. Mayor tells us that John Grote had, like his brother, 
0 an almost fanatical love of freedom of thought, even when it 
took a form with which he could not himself sympathize. His 
bias, if he had one, was always in favour of the unpopular side: 
i. e of the side, whichever it might be, which seemed in danger of 
being wrongly treated' (ibid xvii-xviii). 
This love of freedom of thought he extended to the moral and political 
sphere as preconditions for the development of man and citizen, 
society and the state. Forced or manipulated adherence to the moral 
rules and common good of society, are by themselves of little or no 
value. 
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'The moral ideal is the union of full and free individual choice 
with public or social motive... ' (Grote 1870,354). 
(c) Property, 
-capitalism and social welfare 
A defence of individual difference and intellectual, moral and 
political liberty are a likely corollary in nineteenth century Britain 
to a defence of private property and a laissez faire political 
economy, and so they were in John Grote's writings. The defences 
howevei are not based on utilitarian considerations, natural rights, 
nor entitlement theories of justice but upon historical, legal and 
logical claims about the nature of personal property , about liberty, 
rights and duties in society. 
Private property we have seen, was considered by Grote to be a 
cardinal institution in society. Historically he was fully aware, 
like David Hume before him, that it originated in simple force, power 
and violence, or 'primeval abuse' (Grate 1870,339; 1876,226-228). 
As societies advance, this. abuse is regulated and legitimated by 
custom and law. The effect has been positive and negative. 
Negatively property has produced selfishness and massive inequalities 
in wealth which in turn have produced a propertyless class who usually 
live in poverty. On the positive side it has had several benefits. 
Firstly, property allows its owners 'power of action' and secondly, it 
has given human beings a sphere to develop difference and 
individuality (Grote 1870,339-340). Thirdly, it has allowed for the 
massive commercial success of the capitalist political economy, with 
its resulting benefits. Indeed, 
I so far as human experience goes, it seems as if a high 
economical civilization or a large population (which can only 
exist on the supposition either of this, or else of a very low 
level of material welfare on the part of the mass) cannot arise 
or be kept up without the full allowance of such inequality' 
(Grote 1876,227). 
Historically efforts at reform of the property system in the way of 
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greater equality, including common ownership, 
'has always been as yet to paralyse commerce and industry (upon 
which the nation depends) and in this way to prevent the increase 
in property in general, while the existing property has only 
changed hands, without any greater equality than before being at 
all secured' Ubid 227). 
The smashing of privilege in property and wealth are gained at great 
cost and with dubious benefits. - But at the heart of the argument is 
an issue about human personality and freedom. Human beings need and 
like to 6wn things, feel greater commitment towards their own property 
and make more strenuous exertions on private rather than public 
matters. In addition 
'It is not only human selfishness but individual independence, 
which revolts against equalization' (ibid'227). 
Grote sees the 'idea of community', the ideal 'that the stock of 
property might without injuring be held in common' as worthy of 
consideration, but in practice his estimate of human nature and of the 
practical necessities for the mass production of the -means to a 
civilized life, made him consider the ideal to be one as yet unready 
for realization. While the pleasant life of abundance in a 
* communistic settlement' or 'phalanstere' may sound attractive it 
would not compensate for the lost liberty and diversity of life in a 
liberal political economy (Grote 1870,247-248). 
However, unlike Hume and Locke, Grote did not consider the state 
as being primarily an entity to defend private property. As he 
writes, 
'A society is a partnership not only for the purpose of police, 
i. e. for the mutual protection of property, but also for the 
purpose of helping the common progress, and for the aid which the 
members may give each other is all which makes human nature 
better. The law is the action of the society in doing this' 
(ibid 232-233). 
The state should intervene 
0 so far as it can act to improve public morality and the general 
character of the populations' 
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and Grote recommends that legislators keep this in mind. The law 
indeed should have both negative and positive roles, 
'The law should be not merely a restraint, but a means of common 
action for good * (ibid, 233). 
The state can be the agency by which society can promote the welfare 
of its citizens, and Grote edges towards a notion of the enterprise 
State (Oakeshott 1980). This theme, popular later amongst the Oxford 
idealists, underpins not only Grote's critique of contemporary 
political economy and industrial society but his own reform proposals. 
A competitive political economy has two major advantages. First, 
the opening up of an area for self development and secoýd, the 
production of the common good by reducing individual dependence on 
others. To Grote, taking care of one's own interest was a social duty 
that relieved pressure on others to take care of us. The law should 
encourage such endeavour hence promoting the common good (336). 
However while a competitive laissez faire capitalist economy may be in 
reality an embodiment of personal freedom and an efficient economic 
system for the production of wealth and the common good, it also has 
its defects. Firstly, as we have seen, the inequalities in ownership 
and wealth produce both selfishness and poverty (Grote 1870; 326). 
Grote observed that 
'In civilized society there is a vast amount of wealth and powerl 
and a vast amount of want and need over against them: and these 
two sides do not as they should correspond and fit each other: 
the happiness of the society is measured by the degree in which 
they do so' (ibid 337). 
The general prescription for this evil is 'more of public feeling'. 
But elsewhere he proposes that there is not an easy or simple 
diagnosis let alone solution to the problem (Grote 1870,325-326). At 
a private and ad hoc level Grote and his Trinity colleagues gave 
generously towards alleviation of deprivation' associated With 
unemployment as far afield as Lancashire (Grote MS 1862 a). Secondly, 
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he agrees that the community has an obligation to support the poor 
where there is 'unsupported destitution'. There is also 
*a right in each individual to support at the hands of the- 
community to this extent; it is a part of the common law of 
mankind' (ibid 228). 
Thirdly he proposes emigration and occupation. Where all the soil and 
property is already appropriated - 
'It is competent for those who are born into a preoccupied land 
to repeat such movements into other lands' (ibid 229). 
Apparently unaware of the contradiction between this proposal and his 
earlier statement of fears about the subjection of uncivilized races, 
and apparently unconcerned about imperialism and colonialization, he 
felt that nineteenth century emigration was just a part of a long 
historical process of population movements, emigrations, and 
occupations'. 
Thirdly while Grote does not preach a gospel of work and self 
help of the kind found in Carlyle and Samuel Smiles, his whole 
philosophy of aretaics placps stress on the necessity and inherent 
value of work' and personal effort. The difference between the 
classical political economists and Grote lies in motives and the end 
anticipated by labour. To Adam Smith, Bentham and Mill the normal 
state for man was leisure, tranquillity and ease, work is only 
performed to gain some end, happiness, or to help avoid pain (Grote 
1876,293-2940). Grote, like Carlyle, saw work as a natural state not 
motivated solely by desire for happiness and material reward. Work 
can be fulfilling and can give full reign to our capacities, indeed 
work can be its own reward. More important than physical wants are 
our moral and intellectual wants and they call forth far more 
significant human actions, they stimulate creative work and activity 
(Grote 1870,326-327). These active wants have been understimated by 
the classical political economists and give rise to a fourth point in 
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Grote's critique of capitalist industrial society. Capitalism fails 
to recog nize and allow for the satisfaction of other th an economic 
wants and abilities. Like its theoretical companions the 'Wealth of 
Nations' and the 'Happiness of Societies', the 'industrial society * of 
Herbert Spencer fails its citizens by providing inadequate ideals and 
opportunities for self realization (Grote 1870,40-41,242; 1876 
294-295). For this evil the remedy is presented in the whole of the 
Treatise, an entreaty to recognize, believe in and act upon higher 
ideals than the satisfaction of sentient want and the sentient self 
through labour and consumption. 
Finally there is one other proposal in Grote's various essays and 
books on a social provisions that ought to be made for the poor. 
Education was near the top of the list of his priorities as reference 
to A Few ýords on the New Educational Code will reveal.. But this 
education had to be other than that being propounded by the new 
industrialists and the utilita; ians of the day. Usefulness. and 
practicality are not to be the sole, or even the major criteriajof 
success, or the purpose of the exercise. Education is to allow persons 
to realise their individual potential and to serve the community 
(Grote 1856,74-76). The criteria of judgement should be ability to 
think, argue and comprehend others, not learn, have learnt, or to be 
able. to perform specialist tasks (ibid 113; 1871). Above all a 
non-professional and general education in thinking was good for all 
people, whether rich or poor, upper or lower class, young or old. All 
people were in need of, deserve and could benefit, according to Grote, 
from the gift of education. Hence 'the law should provide for the 
people' (Grote 1876,233). 
(d) Power, Authority and Reason 
History has few lessons to teach, according to Grote, but it does 
reveal some interesting developments,. One piece of knowledge Grote 
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felt he had gained was that not only had property moved from a 
primeval abuse to a legitimate -and rational institution but that 
generally, 
'Sociality or political life has been the gradual conversion of 
this state of things into one of mutual understanding and 
consideration: bare power has become authority by the prevalance 
of the feeling on the one side that obedience to it is a duty, 
and on the other that the exercise of it is not for private 
benefit, but for the benefit of all' (Grote 1876,224). 
Much of power is the result of and the accident of history, it is as 
arbitrary as violence. Authority and reason both involve subjective 
recognition and assent, they are intentionally given and exercised, 
they allow an element of freedom not known in the exercise of power 
and violence. In addition Grote was anxious to show that authority 
was neither blind obedience, nor the result of training or education 
(460). Authority was a vast improvement upon power and violence 
because it involves free choice and because it replaced might by 
right. Unfortunately, as Weber was aware, rationalism was having a 
corrosive effect upon authority structures and Grote feared that power 
and manipulation would rush in where respect for authority was lost. 
Such a process was mirrored and accelerated in thought, especially in 
the philosophy of utilitarianism, the psychology of association, the 
epistemology of empiricism and the religion of positivism. Grote's 
hopes lay in defence of authority against power, the bolstering of 
morality against a world of interests, and the championing of human 
thought and reason against the irrationality of various determinisms 
and unknowables. Above all Grote hoped to reveal the high level of 
practical, rational and moral achievement that was represented in the 
law and custom of the day, and to advise against unwise efforts at 
radical reform. 
Modern political society exhibited, to Grote, some dangerous 
tendencies, including the de-individualizing process, the growth of 
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mass society, the raijonalization of customary and traditional bonds? 
the theoretical rationalization of law and political institutions 
advocated by Bentham and his followers, the growth of the meddling 
state on the one side and laissez faire apathy on the other# the 
undervaluing of fundamental beliefs, customary practices and 
institutions as well as such -things as liberal education, the 
promotion of knowledge and moral ideals. His political. position is 
itself eclectic. The first major element is liberal, in the sense of 
respect for the individual, a belief in rationality, a faith in the 
moral and practical effects of freedom, a love of education and the 
idea of perfectability of human nature. This liberalism is however 
different from that of the radical Whigs, associated with Macaulay and 
the politics associated with Mill and Bentham, for both rapid and 
rationalistic reform are rejected by Grote in favour of gradualism. 
Grote was a reformer but one with a weather eye on history and 
practicality, rather in the fashion of Burke before him'and Maine 
during his own lifetime (Pilling 1968,1970), On ideas his advocacy of 
freedom for the individual was also tempered with respect for existing 
ties and obligations to others, rights were not allowed to shroud his 
recognition of both responsibility and duty. Defence of private 
property and capitalist production did not blunt him to their defects 
and dangers and the need for the state to make amends. With a deep 
respect for history, practical achievement, human capacity and 
goodwill, Grote trod a slow and careful route towards a liberal state 
in which everyone had a chance to be a rational and autonomous actor, 
able to realize both themselves and society. Like Green and Bosanquet 
after him he argued that politics and the state were ultimately moral 
in aim but practical in character, the point of the practice was 
however to realize morality, the right, amongst a citizenry of free and 
rational individuals. 
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In several senses Grote was a conservative political thinker in 
the tradition of Burke and the later Maine. (Burrow 1970,156-15; see 
also 175-176). Man and society for Grote are creatures of time and 
history not artifact or nature. What exists is to some extent 
rational and is worth defending. As he says in true Burkein and 
Humeian fashion, 
I what is in possession has already one great point and 
presumption in its favour' (Grote 1870,228). 
While ideals are vital they must not be allowed to divert us from 
maintenance of what is and what has authority. The job of politics is 
to make, adjudicate and enforce the rights and duties of citizens and 
to promote. the common good. But this cannot be done by resort to 
simple plans, formulas and theories. Politics, like life, is a 
complex business, success in which presumes a traditional education 
and an understanding of history and practice. 
Finally, Grote shares at least some political aspirations and 
orientations with the Christian Socialists. This movement was firmly 
embedded in Cambridge from the 1830's under the impact of Frederick 
Denison Maurice and later, his friends Charles Kingsley and John 
Llewelyn Davies. In his Sermons Grote speaks of the real brotherhood 
of man and the need for christians to live out the message of their 
faith. Like Maurice and Kingsley this fell short of calls to abolish 
private property and to end inequalities of wealth, but he shared with 
them the belief in the goodness of all men, the right of all to self 
fulfilment, the ultimate sociability of man and the role of the state 
in promoting social harmony and well being. Liberal in attitude, 
conservative in practice and socialist in belief Grote produced a 
reforming liberal theory which avoided the pitfalls of academic 
aloofness, liberal quietism, philanthropic paternalism and benevolent 
despotism. Full of moral feelings, idealism and benevolent concern, 
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Grote's emotion)faith and reason are still held in check by his desire' 
and for the truth 
I 
the practical nature of the concern. Faith was put in 
ordinary people rather than in elites, in his thinking, ordinary 
thinking and clear thinking rather than scientific or technical 
thought offered better guidance. Ordinary virtues were a good guide 
to the right and ordinary language was a good guide to the truth. 
On the needs and the prescriptions for the age we have little 
direct advice but some indicators can be found to Grote's own 
preferences. Grote s tresses 'Sociality, the knowledge and capacities 
associated with political life in a civilized society. In the 
Treatise he describes its premises as follows, 
'The particulars of this sociality will be obedience to the laws, 
interest in the Support and vindication of themr moderate, not 
revolutionary, effort at the improvement of them; together with 
a constant feeling how much the best system of 'law and custom 
must leave to be done by individual principle; and in this view 
watchfulness to supplement laws by respect for claims of all 
kinds; active benevolence to redress in some measure the 
, inequalities of condition which law could not prevent, even if 
it 
aimed at doing so, and which it sometimes even increases; and to 
meet the vicissitudes, troubles, and difficulties of the less 
fortunate. That doing these things,... constitutes a sort of 
social law or moral standard' (Grote 1876,398). 
Earlier in a summary of one kind of practical idealism, a mixture of 
stoicism and christianity which typifies his own views, he writes of 
an ethic of 
0 reverence for law, respect for active and public life, value for 
sociality and in* the other case, most detailed and careful 
recommendation of common duties... ' (ibid 377). 
For the individual we have seen respect for custom and duty, obedience 
to the law and effort to reform them all where necessary, are the key, 
prescriptions. This is the Aristotelian medium applied to Britain in 
the 1860's (399). For man the social and political animal, 
'Man's happiness may be much more truly described as lying in 
that society with his fellow men of which law and justice and 
mutual trust are the condition, and in the development of his own 
nature which is only possible in such society... ' (Grote 1870, 
317). 
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In summary, human society is a product of time, the experience, 
trial and error of which are embodied in wisdom, ordinary opinion, 
custom and law. The preconditions for a reasonable social existence 
are law, respect for rights, the fulfilment of duties, justice and 
mutual trust. From this base a properly moral and intellectual life 
can develop in which virtue and self realization are both possible and 
desirable. Right is not only the primary end or ideal of life, it is 
also its precondition. Happiness and the good are then made possible 
by the conditions set up by the provision for and pursuit of the 
right. Fo'r the individual the good life is the Aristotelian mean 
supplemented by virtuous effort after perfection. Ordinary opinion, 
ordinary customl everyday institutions and practices represent a high 
level of achievement, the shore line from which assaults upon the high 
plateau of the moral and intellectual ideals can be launched. 
ordinary morality, custom and practice like ordinary language are a 
good and reliable guide to the ideals. They must not be mocked, 
undermined, misused or departed from unless in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Only Lasson amongst commentators grasped this central theme in 
Grate's work. He writes in the last paragraph, that Grote 
0 clearly perceives the inability of law to express the totality 
of moral action, but as a positive regulator for the guidance of 
particular individuals he returns to the father - confessor, in 
the guise of the general climate of opinion; and in an. 
authentically English manner, 'respectability' is maintained to 
be the basis of morality' (Lasson 1878). 
Accurate as the last comment is on the central place 'Of 
respectability in much Victorian British thought, Lasson did conflate 
the place of opinion as a 'guide to' and as a 'basis' of morality. 
opinion supplemented by custom and law are key indicators to morality. 
according to Grote, but not its foundation. This lies in the 
ontological existence of want, the epistemological awareness of the 
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gap between self and not self, and the gap between what is and what 
ought to be which indicates our need to create and realize moral and 
political ideals. Undoubtedly Grote does conform quite well to what 
George Watson calls 'The English Ideology' and what Best calls the 
'Dominant Ideology' of Victorian England, but to rest on this point 
would be to miss entirely the. originality of his contribution to 
Victorian thought (Watson 1973; Best 1979,279-286). 
Rationalisations and legitimations of- various interests and groups 
abound in the literature of Victorian thought but Grote's work is not 
essentially of this character. He was a philosopher and a scholar, 
his account of morality, law and politics are founded on logical and 
metaphysical arguments of great vigour' and consequence. Little is 
assumed, and little based on belief or prejudice in his writings. Few 
unstated assumptions lurk behind his defence'of established tradition 
and custom. Grote in short was a philosopher and not an ideologist 
though his conclusions conform very closely to the details of the 
bourgeois ideology of Englishmen at the time. 
(7) History and its Methods 
Two related movements in the Cambridge of the day provided Grote 
with the historical method and social theory to develop such an 
account of human life and practice, the Liberal Anglican view of 
history, and the use of the Comparative Method. 
This latter view was the main sociological plank of Cambridge 
Social Theory in the first seven decades of the nineteenth century 
supporting in its turn a complex moral and political philosophy bard 
to define as simply liberal, conservative or socialist. The key to 
unde rstanding the theory, apart from the recognition of the 
development of an indigenous version of epistemological idealism, is 
the use by the Cambridge intellectuals of what was later to develop 
into the Comparative Historica, 1 method. This comparative method has 
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been recently defined as premissed on the idea that 'socio-cultural 
systems observable in the present have different degrees of 
resemblance to extinct culture', (Harris 1968,150). The hope was that 
from a study of simple societies past and present 'through testimony 
of three sorts accounts by contemporary observers of civilizations 
less advanced than their own, the'records which particular races have 
preserved concerning their primitive history and ancient law', an 
explanation of the socio-economic and political origins of 'modern 
social organizations' could be constructed (150-151). Hardly 
surprisingly most of the Cambridge classicists who applied the method 
came to agree with Maine that 'the effect of evidence derived from 
comparative jurisprudence is to establish the view of the primaeval 
condition of the human race which is known as the Patriarchal Theory 
(Maine 1861,122). 
The method originated in the methodological studies of the 
eighteenth century Scottish historians and English geologists, but 
received its major impetus from the assimilation of the ideas of the 
German historical school, and in particular, those of Barthold Georg 
Niebuhr (1776-1831). As a historian, Niebuhr became interested in the 
similarity of development in the ideas, language and laws of various 
societies, and in particular, he became entranced by the analogy of 
developments in Roman Law to those of Germany and Europe in recent 
history. The contemporary French and German attempts to codify their 
law he analysed in the context of the movement from family based to 
codified law in ancient Rome, and via the Analogy he drew the 
attention of statesmen and lawyers to the dangerotis results of 
abstract and rationalistic codification. The study of various legal 
and social systems convinced Niebuhr that the Hegelian procedure of 
trying to establish the direction of historical laws by metaphysics 
and dialectics was misguided. Though reality lay behind the flux of 
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actual events, it was only to be discovered by comparative historical 
analysis of various examples of laws, governmentst cultures, religions 
and languages and not through complex application of dialectical 
method. 
While another anti-Hegelian and friend of Niebuhr's at Berlin, 
Friedrick von Savigny, developed the comparative historical analysis 
of law and legal institutions, Niebuhr researched not only Roman law, 
discovering the lost Gaius Code in 1816, but, also Roman political and 
moral ideas, publishing rediscovered tracts from Cicero and Livy in 
1820, and developed comparable work on comparative philology. (4). 
While in Germany, Savigny and Von Ihering were widely held to be the 
originators of the historical school of jurisprudence, in Cambridge 
Niebuhr took the credit. Niebuhr was held to be 'God' and the 
teaching of history in the 1820's and 1830's became jokingly known as 
'Niebuhrization', (Brookfield 1906,8). Connop Thirlwall and Julius 
Hare were the first to translate Niebuhr's massive 'History of Rome'. 
Hare wrote a 'Vindication of Niebuhr' in 1829 in response to the 
attacks of Sir Henry Cornwall Lewis, a friend of George Grote, and an 
ally of the positivist school (Niebuhr 1827; Hare 1829). Thirlwall 
wrote a companion 'History of Greece' between 1835 and 1847 and at 
oxford Matthew Arnold wrote another 'History of Rome' on similar 
comparative lines (Thirlwall 1835-1847; Arnold 1838-1843). In 
Germany Niebuhr was less widely read though both Karl Marx and Max 
Weber later found use for his writings on Roman History (Marx 
1972; Weber 1891). 
Comparative analysis was evident in several areas of mid-century 
Cambridge scholarship as well as in history and anthropology. Whewell 
has used the method to great effect in his work on the methods and 
history of the inductive sciences and Sedgwick used it in the history 
of geology. In an earlier section on Grote's theory of language and 
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philosophy reference was made to his use of the comparative method. 
It also appears in his accounts of law and progress. Grote is careflil 
here and in the ixamination to avoid making firm statements about the 
original condition of man and his development, but it is part of his 
whole theory to see, as does Maine, that as central human social 
relationships change so do our, feelings, our institutions, our 
practices and even our ideas. He also shares the key argument of 
Niebuhr and Maine before and Weber and Oakeshott later that the growth 
of modernity has witnessed a rationalization of customary and 
traditional norms, values institutions and practices. In addition he 
shares the pessimistic conclusion that this amounts to a loss, and 
with Hegel and Oakeshott that this is a loss because custom and even 
ordinary opinion embody the morality of a society and much of its 
wisdom and reason. More positively Grote was confident that a 
comparative study of politics, jurisprudence and literature were a 
good guide to the actual development of man and potentialities for 
future self development. The comparative methods was never to be a 
social science, but the plurality of its methods offered, along with 
philosophy and religion, valuable guides to life. 
Where else could Grote and even Henry Maine go to find a credible 
but non positivist account of history in Britain between 1840 and the 
mid-1860's? Under the guidance of Coleridge, Hare and Thirlwall, 
there developed at Cambridge what J. D. Forbes so accurately describes 
as the Liberal Anglican Idea of History best represented at Cambridge 
in the 1848 edition of the Second Series of Hare's Guesses at Truth 
(Forbes 1952; Hare 1827,1848, Dockhorn 1949). Mill recognized this 
and asserted in 1840 that Coleridge, Maurice, Sterling and theGermano 
- Coleridgians' 'were the first (except a solitary thinker here and 
there) who inquired, with any comprehensiveness or depth, into the 
inductive laws of the existence and growth of human society. ' Th. ey 
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were the first to discover the three cultural prerequisites of social 
existence, educationi loyalty and identity and were the first British 
thinkers to produce a genuine 'philosoph y of history' (Mill 1965, 
315). What the group learnt from Niebuhr and comparative analysis of 
societies was that 'all nations go through similar stages of 
development' (Forbes 1952,15).. And from Vico they learnt that the 
history of a society, state or civilisation revealed a series or 
sequence of cycles. The crude 'progress' and 'perfectability of men' 
theories of eighteenth century rationalists and modern positivists 
were to be rejected as unhistorical and unphilosophic, for while it is 
the nature of a cycle that one side is ascending or progressing, it is 
equally true that the other is descending or declining (Hare 1897, 
313-339). They replaced the progress paradigm by the idea that 
historical development both reflected and was analogous to 'a gradual 
unfolding of all, the faculties of men's intellectual and moral being' 
(Hare 1897,334). From the further use of the analogies of society 
with individual, organic and natural life cycles, Hare was able' to 
deduce that 
0 we may perceive that the progress of mankind is not in a 
straight line, uniform and unbroken. On the contrary it is 
subject to manifold vicissitudes, interpretations and delays: 
ever advancing on the whole, but often receding in one quarter, 
while it pushes forward in another .... *(Hare 1894,339). 
The crucial point of importance to the Liberal Anglicans however 
was that each society is unique in time and space and that while 
evidence of similar and recurring patterns of change could be observed 
within each, it was also true that societies, states and civilisation, 
like individuals, develop at different speeds and at different times, 
each responding to its own unique material, moral and intellectual 
capacities (Forbes 1952,20-21). A science of history, and 
understanding of the laws of social change, though both desirable and 
plausible, would not give us a complete account of historical 
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development, for cycles follow each other. endlessly, and each will be 
a unique response to a unique condition. Philosophy -of 
history and 
comparative social analysis could provide generalizations about social 
change that might prove useful in analysis of particular unique 
societies. Its job was to aid history not to provide a science 
providing absolute laws of change of relevance to all societies past 
and present (Forbes, 1952,39-62). 
If we accept this summary of the central tenets of the Liberal 
Anglican view 6f history dominant in Cambridge in the 1840's, when 
Maine was a student at Trinity Hall and writing his lectures on 
*Ancient Law' as Professor of Civil Law in the 1850's, then there is 
no need for us to labour the arguments, as Burrow does, with reference 
to the origins of Maine's use of the Comparative Historical Method 
(Burrow 1970,132-178). Nor need we, like Burrow, posit a conflict 
between two sides of Maine's thought, one Germanic with an 'emphasis 
on the uniqueness of civilisation' and the other positivistict. 
elucidating 'general laws of social development', for within the 
Liberal Anglican view there was room for both (Rurrow 1970, 
163-164). Maine's use of the Comparative Historical method can be 
seen as a refinement of the prescriptions of Vico, Niebuhr, Savigny 
and Hare and the other Liberal Anglicans. If societies develop in 
cycles and according to regular patterns, then laws of change in and 
between societies are definable on the basis of both contemporary as 
well as past cross cultural studies. That is, at any time various 
societies would be at various stages of development, and the laws 
gained from the history of some societies may be used as a paradigm 
for the analysis of others. What was original about Maine was the 
empirical application of the comparative method to such a wide range 
of societies. This judgement is similarly true for the writings on 
the comparative politics of John Seeley and Henry Sidgwick, and on 
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comparative anthropology by Lubbock, McLennan and Frazer at 
Cambridge15). 
The recognised need for comparison in analysis was evident in 
many other areas of Cambridge study, not least in the fields of 
science where Whewell's work on methodology. and Sedgwick's on geology 
used comparative techniques. Prior to Maine the historical method was 
used by Hare's colleagues, Thirlwall in his study of Greece and Kemble 
in his studies of philology and Mediaeval Europe. In the 1850's and 
1860's it was in the field of philology that the method proved most 
fruitful in the writings of R. C. Trench, F. W. Farrar, J. W. Donaldson. 
other leading luminaries J. B. Mayor, J. Lightfoot and F. J. A. Hort edited 
the Cambridge 'Journal of Philology'. (See Chapter Three above). John 
Grote encouraged the development of Comparative Philology and 
constructed a highly suggestive framework of analysis in a series of 
essays 'On Glossology'. In addition there are repeated attacks in his 
writings on positivist theories of history and progress once 'on the 
grounds of the 'existence of man in so many different states of 
development' (Grote 1870,319; Burrow 1970, ). 
On the Liberal Anglican side Grote explains the analogy of moral 
and social with intellectual development and equates progress in one 
area with the other. On details Grote seems to differ with Hare and 
his colleagues, being less impressed with the idea of cycles in 
history and analogies of the life of civilisations with those of 
animals and other natural organisms including men themselves. But in 
other, more important regards his concerns coincide with theirs. 
History is not determined, except by human beings, and they are free. 
Progress is not natural nor necessary, though aspirations towards 
perfection and efforts toward progress characterise much of human 
life. Human nature is not fixed but can grow and change, with the 
autonomous self assisted by the wider culture, the language, 
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literature, law and opinion, inherited from the past and practised in 
the present. 
Academic study can aid self development only on the peripheries 
but still in a useful way. A progressive political society was 
composed of free rational and autonomous social beings, who freely 
performed duties and willingly 'acted to realise claims and social 
ideals. Intellectual freedom and self development were a precondition 
for social and moral development. Positivism on the other side 
was corrosive and reactionary, utiliterianism was. a. new kind of 
barbarianism. Not surprising then, -. - not only Grote but many of his 
Cambridge colleagues should raise their pens in protest. In the same 
decade that Grote attacked positivism and empiricism essays on them 
flowed from Whewell and lectures from Charles Kingsley (Whewell 1866 
Kingsley 1880)ks we have seen Grote's attack on utilitarianism was part 
of a larger Cambridge attack fired home by Sedgwick, Macauley,. 
Whewell, Maurice, Birks and Sidgwick. We must shortly proceed to draw 
together this attack and summarize and analyse the contribution to 
Victorian thought of John Grote and his Cambridge Colleagues. 
(8) Progress 
one last -and major question was popularly posed during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century which engaged Grote's mind and will 
help us locate his intellectual and practical position, the relation 
of the present to the past, that is whether the present was an advance 
or a retreat, whether history as a whole and recent history in 
particular revealed progress. A belief in progress was very much a 
part of the intellectual baggage of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
European culture (Bury 1955; Becker 1932; Pollard 1968). (6), While 
it received philosophical expositions it was often only an assumed or 
believed element in a wider ideological formulation. Joh. n Grote felt 
few affiliations with that tradition known as the Enlightenment and 
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even less with its intellectual inheritors of the nineteenth century 
and so it. is not surprising to find him opposed to the historical and 
sociological idea of progress, as distinct from the idea of moral 
improvement or idealism. 
At heart this distinction involves the issues of freedom, of 
moral responsibility, of theories of practice and action, and of the 
ideal in practice. As Grote notes there are two general theories of 
progress that are antagonistic, *one is the idea of progress as free.; 
willed, attainment of ideal states, he calls improvement, and this he 
finds, though mistaken to be of some value and coherent. The second 
idea of progress, the idea of a. stream or course -of human nature', 
independent of our choice and action, he decidedly rejects (Grote 
1865, xvii; 1870,280). The former view is called 'idealist' using 
the term in the older sense of aspiring to ideals, the latter view is 
called 'positivist', referring to its pseudo scientific character and 
is specifically associated with Augustus Comte and his science of 
sociology. In the Exploratio a third type of progress theory is 
added, the notion of advance. Advance, it seems, differs in being 
quantifiable and being able to be judged on a scale, while the first 
two ideas of progress are more general and more subjective (Grote 
1900,231-232). 
Before proceeding, we may remind ourselves of the discussion of 
Positivism in section two of Chapter five above. Here Grote objected 
to this new school of thought on four grounds, firstly, it took 
scientific knowledge alone to be of ultimate value. and meaning; 
secondly, it mistakenly applied scientific method to objects and 
experiences where the limited scope of science had no application; 
thirdly., it undermined other modes of study and finally it undermined 
the basic presuppositions of practice, free will, individual power and 
responsibility. In the Exploratio Grote had complained that the 
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positivists ran to history for evidence to prove not only that 
something had happened but what would and should happen in the future, 
thus committing a gross logical error. The Examination had been 
written as a critique of utilitarianism two years before but the seeds 
of this argument were still present. Grote saw, progress as a central 
belief not only of positivists but also of utilitarians, for whom it 
meant an increase in total human happiness and for whom positivist 
methods and calculations were adVantageous means (Grote 1870, 
316-317). Taking the epistemological and methodological issues as 
given, we can now see'how the theory of progress unravels. 
'Unideal' or positivist progress theories have several defects. 
Firstly, they usually confuse the three distinct notions of progress 
given above. Secondly, they presume a determined course of history 
which, even if we are not awarer progresses without our reason, choice 
or will. Thirdly, these theorists extrapolate inductively from what 
has been to what will be, they not only build a course of development 
in history but predict it will continue (281-283). Fourthly-and 
fifthly, these theories deduce two invalid conclusions; that progress 
will take place and that we ought to assist its development (Grote 
1870,282j 300). Grote notes in fact that the unideal theorists have 
often confused their positivism with idealism to the extent of 
creating a 'religion capable of exciting enthusiasm', presumably a 
reference to the antics of B-P Enfantin and his disciples in France 
and Britain (283). That the inductive methods of sociology will fail 
to produce a science of progress is agreed. Grote recognizes that 
generally the future is to us 'entirely undivinable' and that even in 
science prediction and progress cannot be assumed (302-304). Inde. ed 
there is 'no real connection between positivism as such, and those 
anticipations of progress in which some positivists indulge' either in 
theory or practice (307). Three final criticisms remain. Firstly, 
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how can we judge from the existence of a change that 'what comes last 
is best' and that this is the best that could have happened (282, 
301). Secondly, science cannot tell us about the ultimate origins, a 
0 vera causa' of our development as a species, nor the force that keeps 
it in motion (360-361). Thirdly, while science as a subject does seem 
to have a recent history of progressive development itself, Grote 
rightly judges that this progress cannot be guaranteed for the future 
and that we cannot extrapolate from this intellectual to moral or 
political progress (303-307). 
Idealist theories of progress have a different set of defects, 
but one they share, in the need for an agreed standard or a fixed 
point from which judgement of an advance or an improvement, or some 
progress could be made. Positivists set the base line in an 
uncivilised past and the pinnacle in some ideal of civilisationg run 
in terms of scientific rationality. Idealists generally set the base 
in some barbarian, or uncivilised state of affairs in the past and the 
pinnacle in some. ideals of perfection, the content of which is widely 
disputed between themselves. Faced with dispute on the ideals, 
advocates usually resort to mere belief or dogmatism. Faced next with 
the impracticality of their ideals they usually compromise and bring 
the 'ideal very poorly down' so that the ideal turns out to be only a 
0 vain glorification of that which happens now to be' (283). Vain 
idealism and naive acceptance that the world is the best of all 
possible worlds are the counter sides of the idealist view of progress 
Which Grote sought to avoid. 
The two general conclusions that we can draw so far are, first, 
that progress is not 'natural', and second, that there is no agreed 
standard for judging progress. Other errors abound in the language of 
progress. For instance there are some fallacious or confusing 
analogies applied to progress and history whose conceptional appeals 
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blind many to their defects. The most dangerous is the analogy 
'between the historical life of the human race and the life of 
the human individual ... * (ibidl 288,290-291,299). 
This analogy was used not only by enlightened historians such as 
Gibbon, but also by Comte, Mill, and Buckle for whom positivist 
knowledge was a sign of intellectual maturity, and a growing out of 
the adolescence of metaphysics and the childhood of theology. It was 
also used by several idealist historians and especially Hegel, though 
Grote does not make reference to this. Another defective analogy is 
the likening of intellectual and moral progress to the physical growth 
process (1865, xvii; 1870,284). The fallacy lies in the reference 
to nature, for unlike the nature of a plant or animals, according to 
Grote, it is man's 
. nature to make his own nature, his own 'self, his own course of 
action" 
Grote also warns us about mistaking simple and even perpetual 
change for progress. We should not judge progress by the criteria 
applied to 'the manager of a theatre' for whom novelty and change are 
in themselves good. Progress in fact can only be judged against an 
ideal standard, such as the true, and mere change far from being 
progressive may be counter-productive (Grote 1870,292). indeed 
against some ideal criteria such as 'respect for human life' 
respecting moral ideals' and 'levelling differences' between human 
beings we may say that history has often witnessed regress, rather 
than improvement (290-291,298-300,323-325,327-328,340-341). 
Finally we must not mistakenly conclude from a general trend towards 
intellectual progress especially in the field of science, that 
progress has occurred in other areas such as morality, or -even in 
other intellectual fields such as philosophy (296-298t 301-305). 
Briefly, Grote considers the theory of progress to be 
unhistorical and even anti -philosophical. Its origins lie 
in the 
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early optimism offered by religion of salvation from earthly woest and 
in the need to provide faith and hope in an age when scientific ideals 
and materialistic practice were undermining religious faith (ibid 
279-280). Indeed Grote made the point that faith in progress was both 
a religion and a replacement for christianity well before John Morley 
made the same judgement famous (Grote 1876,359; Morley 1917,1,27). 
But for all its defects the idealist version of human progress can be 
rehabilitated as it was in Grote's own positive thinking on the 
subject. Progress may not 'come of itself', it may not be 'natural't 
'determined', 'inevitable' or % guaranteed: but it can be made, though 
only made by human effort, will and action, whether individual or 
social (Grote 1870,284-286). Progress, for Grote., is a practical 
possibility if we mean by that advance towards ideals we set as human 
beings, and we understand by practice the free action of self 
determined human beings. we are progressive beings if we mean by that 
beings who can improve. themselves and be improved by self education 
and free thought (Grote 1876; 354,360). The end of moral and 
intellectual life we have already seen, was considered to be 
self-improvement (Grote 1870,351). To achieve this we need to 
encourage clear thought, imagination, and a sense of freedom and 
desire for action (298-299). 
At the end of our journey then we can see why after finishing the 
Examination, Grote felt obliged to rdurn to his philosophical. 
explorations. Real moral, social and political advance were premissed 
upon the development of intellectual abilities which were being widely 
denigrated in the latter years of his life. The Explaratio was not 
just a philosophical exercise to underpin the moral argumentst it was 
also a necessary preliminary, even a precondition, for the intellectual 
and moral self development of modern man. This comes out clearly when 
Grote hints at the correct analysis of progress. Human nature 
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according to Grote is far more diverse in time and space than had 
generally been recognized, as Burrow notes (Burrow 1970-, 98). In 
addition human societies were at many 'different stages of 
development' (Grote 1870, 319 Denied revelation only a rigorous 
history of specific societies and comparative analysis of key elements 
in them could help detect any lines of progress. Amongst the latter 
we have quoted several potentially valuable areas of study, 
comparative philology called in the Exploratio 'the past history of 
all human race, both intellectual and moral or civil' (Grote 1865, 
xvii). Other subjects recommended include physiology, economics, and 
political science which deals with man's well being, 
'the theory of legislation (which) treats of the detailed customs 
and laws which will best conduce to this; jurisprudence and 
historical politics, of the manner in which man has, in practice, 
judged of what -he wanted, legislated for it, and governed 
himself; the history of literature, philosophy and science, of 
the manner in which man has thought, reasoned, and come to know; 
the history of civilization, of the manner in which he has 
struggled after, and partially succeeded in, progress or 
self-improvement' (ibid 313-314). 
Such studies Grote sees as incapable of being reduced into one science 
but they can be correlated to help man reason with consistency, and 
find some common ground on which mind can meet with mind. 
The result would come out this exercise would be true 
intellectual progress. What this amounts to in man is found in 
Grote's Exploratio, what we need is a rethinking with greater clarity 
and coherence, what had been thought before, a deepening rather than a 
widening of knowledge. ' It is neither aggregation of knowledge nor a 
spreading of learning that is needed but, 
'It is intensification or, as I have called it, greater fulness 
and enrichment of the already existing, rather than such change 
as we can readily follow' (ibid 296). 
There have been revolutions in our thought, as for instance in the 
Copernican rethink about the cosmos, but even this has now become 
orthodoxy. 
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The history of significance, is the history of our ideas about our 
world and ourselves, and man has 
'in the course of his collective experience, been exploring the 
world of his own moral being; just as, physically, he has been 
coming to the knowledge of the globe he inhabits. Or, more 
accurately, he has been filling out and enriching the idea, which 
he has always more or less had, of something from what he isi 
which nevertheless he has always felt he might and ought to 
become' (ibid 296-297). 
In brief we can see that Grote has the Hegelian idea of historY 
as the unfolding of human intellect which is at the same time an 
attempt to comprehend divine mind or spirit. The history of 
consequence is the history of ideas, of human thought about itself and 
the world, and how they become embodied and communicated. If there is 
a correct analogy for history or progress it is with mans actual 
intellectual activity and development, and the Explor3tiO was to be 
the base, the known or familiar from which, and by which, history and 
progress are to be explained and understood. 
Progress, if there is such a thing,. is neither cyclical nor 
linear, it is rather the 
0 progress of intensification keeping and exalting the old, not 
leaving it behind as done witLn' (ibid 297). 
New moral as well as PhYsical ideas are emerging which are not 
just different but are an improvement towards our ideals (294). Mere 
conservatism, the maintenance of old ideas and ideals blinds us to the 
need for new and fresh thought about and efforts towards truth and 
right (307). Our hope is to stimulate new thought, a rejuvenation in 
thinking and a stimulation to the imagination. As I quoted in Chapter 
four, Grote feared above all else that the modern world and modern 
thought would stifle imagination and he had an earnest desire to, self 
development towards the ideal. His whole philosophy was his riposte 
and his effort for the progress of mankind. Human progress was 
premissed on the unfolding of the human mind and Grote was committed 
to help. 
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PA-RT-Ill 
Chapt r Ten 
John-Grote, Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian 
Ideas. 
In the introduction to this. thesis I proposed two sources of 
interest that John Grote should have for modern readers, first the 
power and rigour with which he deals with the essential questions 
puzzling mid-Victorian philosophers, and second his historical 
position in the context of the development of Victorian thought. it 
was not a major aim or intention of this particular work either to 
critically assess Grote's philosophy or its effects on later British 
thought. However to provide a context for analysing Grote I was 
obliged to reconstruct a picture of mid-Victorian thought and its 
emergence from the nineteenth century. Even more specifically I was 
obliged to reconstruct a picture of Cambridge philosophy and thought 
in the same period. But in this final synthesis I wish to draw 
together my picture of John Grote's philosophy and its Cambridge 
context to produce a reVised picture of mid-Victorian thought. In a 
third appendix below, I will draw out the implications of this thesis 
both philosophically and historically, for later Cambridge and British 
thought. Future research and writing dedicated to this later task 
should reveal a most exciting and surprising lineage to the present 
from both the thought of Grote and the mid-century Cambridge Movement. 
Here I shall only sketch the barest outline of descent, a kind of 
check list for future research without any pretence at historical 
rigour. In line with the general aims of this thesis I shall usually 
refrain from providing detailed philosophical criticism of Grote, 
though I will make some general points in appraisal'of the merits of 
his work. In short this chapter will survey the work of John Grote, 
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Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian thought to the 
1870's with some additional indicators as to its later effects. 
I 
The Philosophy and Thought of John Grote. 
Historically John Grote - considered - the decade of his 
philosophical maturity from 1855 to 1865, to be a watershed in British 
philosophy, thought, culture and society. Tensions that had arisen 
during the industrialisation process in areas of economics, Politics 
and class had produced conflicts within the culture and philosophy of 
mid-Victorian Britain. Unfortunately, as we shall remind ourselves in 
the next section, this conflict had become institutionalised; the 
adversaries were battling from fixed positions without any apparent 
hope of, or desire for, compromise. In this controversy truth was 
being sacrificed, just as in the economic, social, political and moral 
battles the casualties were right and its hand maidens: duty, justice 
and virtue. Grote saw his . task to be that of the moderator and 
mediator of the old controversies, the harmoniser of the old positions 
and the originator of a new eclectic, yet coherent philosophy that 
could transcend the old stalemates. 
As a mediator he patiently sifts the essential points of 
agreement and disagreement between opposing camps. In methods, he 
synthesises the schools of observation, induction, and positivism of 
reason, deduction and philosophy. In epistemology he adjudicates 
between the old Cambridge rationalist tradition, intuitionism, 
common-sense philosophy, phenomenalism and pure materialism. In moral 
philosophy he bridges the divide between what Mill calls intuitionism 
and utilitarianism, between the a priori ethics oft for example 
Whewell and the a posteriori ethics of Bentham. In politics Grote 
tempers excessive enthusiasm for Whig and radical style liberalism, 
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orthodox conservatism and utopian socialism. His calls for reform and 
improvement are tempered by warnings of the dangers of political 
rationalism. Calls for more political freedom, public involvement and 
debate are set alongside fears about the dangers of excessive 
egalitarianism and democracy. Excesses and polarizations in the 
fields of religion, education, history and science are also moderated 
and mediated. The slide into scepticism and atheism, witnessed by his 
colleagues Aldis Wright, Henry Sidgwick, Leslie and James Fitzjames 
Stephen. j were counselled against as were the evangelical enthusiasms, 
the dour Calvinist broodings and the fatalist submissions to the 
0 unknowable. ' of other religious, contemporaries. In education we find 
Grote opposed equally to the apathy and aloofness of those opposing 
universal education; to those like the Philosophical Radicals who 
preferred rote learning for all at the lowest cost to the taxpayer; 
the new trend to technical and professional education that was to 
dominate twentieth century education; and to academic elitism, which 
maintained high -standards at low cost by restricting provision to the 
middle and upper cla'sses. On history, Grote is opposed both to 
positivist historicism on the one side and idealist ramblings about 
evolution or growth on the other, neither history as progress nor as 
perfection are allowed. 
To reconcile and conciliate Grote uses the strategy and methods 
of the eclectic. Root out the truth and discard the error of each 
thinker and school of thought. Harmonize what is left. The results 
are striking. Positivism offers a unique clarification of the correct 
methods for studying phenomena but not man. Once mind and man are 
encountered then Vico's entreaty that we study mind with mind is 
embraced. Hence, while the logic of Bacon, Mill, Comte and Bain is 
praised in the areas of the physical sciences, Whewell's methods are 
recommended for the study of the hi. story of scientific thought; 
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idealist and hermeneutic methods for the study of human constructs 
such as language, arguments, books,, social and political institutions 
and practices. Science in short is made sovereign in its own small 
kingdom while its pretensions for expansion are rendered illegitimate. 
Philosophy, religion and history for their part are given kingdoms to 
reign over sul generis areas where their own languages and logics 
rule, where their own aims. can be explored. Fear of invasion and 
subversion are rejected as paranoia. Grote had no fear that' science, 
positivism and materialism would ever undermine philosophy, history 
and religiong and the more they tried the further into error and 
confusion they fell. Over fundamental epistemological issues Grote 
takes the original stance he has taken with issues of method. 
Mediation comes by requiring the opposed forces to retire to areas in 
which their assumptions and arguments are appropriate and to cease 
incursion into areas where their presence causes confusion. On his 
scale of Victorian philosophers Grote praises those at the extremest 
precisely because they know how to behave in their own terrains. 
Hence Bain on physio-psychology and Ferrier in philosophy are praised, 
while those in between them, including Spencer and Mill close to Bain, 
and Hamilton and Whewell nearer to Ferrier, are condemned for lack of 
precision and demarcation in languageý and thought, for 
mis-phenomenalism on one side and notionalism on the other. 
Over ethics the mediation is-achieved again by giving distinctive 
. and soveriegn territory to the major opposing 
forces. To the 
utilitarians, the moral sense and sentiment theorists, and the 
political economists, Grote concedes the science of the sentient self, 
eudaemonics. But to the intuitionists, the deontologists, to Kant and 
the romantics and idealists he gives aretaics, the new science of 
moral action, which builds on the active side of the self - on the 
fact of intellectual, aesthetic and moral want rather than felt want. 
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To the former the ideal of happiness is conceded as primary, to the 
latter the primary ideal is right. While consequentialist ethics 
dominates the former, non-consequentialism characterises the latter. 
As with epistemology and methods so in ethics the two poles are 
complementary, different but not incompatible, each unique and sui 
generis, but each incapable of providing what the other can give. The 
synthesis then is not to be in 'running together' these distinct 
disciplines, modes, of analysis or view points, but in keeping them 
apart and yet in a harmonious relationship. Syncrety not synthesis 
then is the key. As later with Collingwood in 'Speculatum Mentis' 
Oakeshott in 'Experience and its Modes' and Croce in various texts, 
the transendance of confusion comes by demarcation, not conquest. The 
patient analysis of presuppositions (postulates), language, and 
argument and logical deduction are the negotiator's skills. His role 
is that of intellectual boundary commissioner. 
A similar set of approaches work in history, and in the more 
practical areas of politics, education and religion. In the former 
Grote prefers the 'concrete study of history*: staying close to the 
facts. But the facts are the conclusions of historians, not some 
primordial data, the historical equivalent of external objects or 
atomistic sense data. History is the study of a variety of sources, 
from things to ideas, modified in their presentation to us by the 
thought of others, which we shape into a coherent picture we believe 
to be the actual account of the past event. Positivist and idealist 
histories of progress are put firmly in their place, real history is 
of actual human beings, who freely act to realize their ideals at 
different times in different societies. In politics ideas of 
conservatism, liberalism, whiggism, reformism and utopianism are 
sieved for the truth each contains. From the former the chief 
residues are respect for custom, tradition, habit, opinion, existing 
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institutions and practices. From liberalism there survives a lasting 
respect for freedom in every sense, from freedom of thought and speech 
to political freedom. In addition there is a respect for 
individuality, moderate and rational reform, as well as a belief in 
the progressive effect of education, support for the institutions of 
the laissez-faire state and a defence of civil rights. From the Whigs 
and radicals little survives, only a deep concern with social welfare 
and the need for an enlightened political leadership. opposition. to 
the rise of bourgeois culture, institutions and interests unites Grote 
with the romantic conservatives like Coleridge and Carlyle and the 
christian socialists like Kingsley and Maurice. From them Grote 
retains a theory of man's basic sociability, a recognition of his real 
needs, and a belief in the responsibility of the state for citizens in 
need, and for the central provision of education and social welfare. 
But Grote did not stop at moderation, mediation and arbitration. He 
not only returned to rejuvenate himself in past philosophies bringing 
back truths for his eclectic collection, buý he provided proposals for 
an advance towards the, truth. There is in Grote's corpus a 
constructive and positive philosophy, a proposal for a synthesis in 
philosophy that at least transcends the old dichotomies, and even a 
system, if we mean by that term not a plan, a method, a scheme of 
classification or a simple explanatory hypothesis and theory, but a 
full, coherent and connected view of some department of knowledge. In 
chapter four I explained Grote's intentions in philosophy as being to 
clarify his own thoughts, to provide the basis for truth, to expose 
error - particularly the errors of positivism, phenomenalism and 
utilitarianism, - to find a distinct place for science, history, 
philosophy and religion, and to prove a coherent picture of the 
intellectual world. His methods and approaches I explained were 
four-fold: first eclecticism; second, the patient analysis of 
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language with stress on ordinary language meanings; thirdl an 
existential analysis based on the exploration of the postulates or 
preconditions of being, acting, practice and thinking in the world, 
and finally, the development of idealism. Philosophy to Grote is a 
thinking and rethinking of those issues considered vital until the 
answers become clearer. Philosophy, if it advances, does so by 
increasing the 'intensity' of the analysis of what philosophers have 
previously explored; by rethinking until clarity appears, a pattern 
comes out and coherence is restored to the world of our -ideas. 
Philosophy is only a developed form of ordinary thinking, it is the 
* awakening of intelligence' to itself not just an external world or an 
undifferentiated world of everyday meaning. Imagination, reflection 
and knowledge by judgement are the calling cards of philosophy as they 
are of all thought, but concentrated on thought, being and doing 
themselves, and used with an intensity of a different order.. 
But the first major originality lay in the stress on the place of 
language in thought and the role of the study of language in 
philosophy's, scrutiny of thought. First, Grote places massive stress 
on language at the expense of sense experience and even cognitive 
activity. Thought is impossible and sense experience incomprehensible 
unless mediated by language. Language is the mother of thought - we 
think in it. Sense experience is a jumbled nonsense until judged and 
that means named and described and evaluated in words. Nominalism, 
and linguistic realism which relates words to things with opposing 
priority, are rejected as inadequate. Etymology that reduces meaning 
to past uses is similarly devastated. In its place Grote has a 
positive theory of language. Words mean what they are intended to 
mean by ordinary people in the ordinary contexts of usage in everyday 
life. Each word and its meaning implies the whole of a language and 
its complex of meanings'. Each word and each language are themselves 
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social in origin and character, so that even thinking is a 
conversation. In philosophy as in 'ordinary language meaning and truth 
are to be gained from the careful elaboration of usage. Careful 
thought about the meaning of words and care in usage will allow a 
transcendence of the fruitless quarrels of the day. In addition there 
is in Grote the belief that in conversation, in argument and 
controversy, we have a dialectic of mankind about the true and the 
right, a dialectic of a time and through time or history. Language 
constructs meaning, but in its record, -in the history of its products, 
in literature, poetry, religion, laws, customs, opinions, myths 
especially we have matter for understanding the present and our place 
in the dialectic of mankind (Grote 1865,204-205t 241-245; 1876, 
506-507). Both in theory and even more in practice, Grote's use of 
language analysis is ingenious and effective and is of immense 
historical significance. 
The existential ontology and the resulting theory of practice in 
Grote's work is its next imposing feature, and at one stage this 
thesis was to be entitled John Grote's Theory of Politics and 
Practiceýeflecting its significance. To be in the world is to 
encounter certain existential conditions, the generality of which is 
called the 'human condition'. To be involves being a wanting being, 
with sensory wants being matched by intellectual and moral wants. Our 
wants are constantly being recreated and call forth action for their 
satisfaction. Action, the practice of every day life, is the attempt 
to placate our want, while thought placates the intelligence. But the 
gap between want and satisfaction is unbridgeable and worse still so 
are the gaps produced by time between what is and what will be, what 
is and what ought to be. Ideals of the future and of moral priorities 
within it, what ought to be, are as natural to life as consciousness of 
'felt want. Life, action, thought and practice are predicated upon 
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want, time and the production of ideals, and cannot be understood 
properly without regard to them. We need above all a proper 
philosophy of practice as well as practices in society which will 
satisfy our actual and ideal wants, our felt and existential wants. 
These alone can realize and satisfy human need and purpose, but both 
involve the discovery, pursuit and attainment of the right ideals 
correctly understood. The Treatise performs the first task as an aid 
to Victorian society discovering and implementing the second. Facts 
and values may be separable in theory but not in Grote's idea of 
political practice. Philosophy theorizes practice with the hope that 
this may clarify muddles and direct attention to the true and the 
right. 
But theoretically we have seen that Grote's positive philosophy 
appears in 'his self-conscious and often stated allegiance to 
philosophical idealism both in epistemology and ethics. The 
intellectual foundations written for the publication of the 
Examination projected in 1864 was called 'Idealism and Positivism'# 
and the term idealism appears throughout all of his four major texts 
and obtains extensive elaboration. Idealism Grote saw as, the only 
philosophy that could provide a coherent account of the world from the 
philosophical perspective (Grote 1865,57-59). It alone had a 
starting point that did not need further logical underpinning - the 
existence of consciousness of beingg which is feeling, seeming and 
being all as one, the existence of immediate experience. Second, such 
a philosophy alone allowed him to build a complete knowledge of the 
world which avoids relativism, scepticism, notionalisms the belief in 
things in themselves and unkn6wable absolutes. Knowledge grows by 
. reflection upon what is 'given' in immediate consciousness, but while 
it differentiates what is united in the immediate, reflection and 
judgement do not, as they do in Kant and Bradley, render complete 
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knowledge impossible. Knowledge to Grote is a mixture of immediate 
knowledge of acquaintance and mediated knowledge of judgement and much 
else between. Third, as in most early forms of European idealism, 
knowledge is pictured as the unfolding of the implicitt the 
development of a seed or germ encapsulated in the given into full self 
consciousness. As he puts it in this oft quoted phrase: 
'Advance of knowledge is essentially distinction, not 
aggregation. Each new particular of knowledgeis not an addition 
to, but a newly observed part of, a previously conceived whole' 
(Grote 1900,299). 
Likewise human nature is considered as a complete whole, capable 
of social and self development, a potential ready to be unfolded, 
realized or developed. Romantic and expressivist, it rejects 
materialistic assumptions or rather relegates them to near 
insignificance, in favours of the idea of a free, creative, active, 
social self, capable of making its own nature by imagination and 
willed struggle. Imagination is the fourth distinguishing trait in 
Grote's idealism. Epistemologically imagination is the vat of 
knowledge, it is what makes possible the development of what is 
implicit to mature judgement certainty and truth. We hypothesisel 
test, reorder, challenge and, in the end, fix our knowledge in the 
imagination. Knowledge is, in fact, described as the 'fixing' of 
vague imagination, it is imagination made 'self consistent'. For 
morality it is also vital, without it we could not have any rational 
or practical action because we could not imagine the future (Grote 
1900,307-308,313). Without imagination we certainly could not 
conceive a world that ought to be, nor its contents and ideas. Moral 
practice and moral philosophy presuppose imagination, the imagining 
and fixing of ideals and actions to realize them. 
In chapter four I took as my basic characterization of idealism 
Noel O'Sullivan's three criteria and added a fourth. Grote satisfies 
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all four. Firstly, both subject and object are bound together in all 
thought and experience to Grote; secondly, the self moves towards 
self recognition in the process of experience and gaining knowledge; 
thirdly, Grote denies cognitive and psychological individualism as 
well as social individualism or social atomism, asserting instead the 
social nature of language, thought, knowledge, and activity. But I 
added the insistence by idealists of cognitive and volitional freedom. 
Freedom to-Grote is a postulate of all our thinking and acting, 
without which neither would make sense, for neither the search for 
truth nor for right would be possible. Pure moral activity as the 
free acceptance of social imperatives is only possible on the 
assumption of freedom according to Grote. This led, we saw, to a 
qualitative theory of action in which self-conscious free action like 
reflectional judgement evolves out of what is unreflecting or 
immediate. What we first do reflexively, customarily or immediately 
we explore in thought and imagination and alter by will. Moral 
thought and moral action, like their mental and political equivalentse 
are explorations of what is implicit in custom and practice until 
their real nature# character and purpose become explicit and clear. 
Self-conscious reflectional knowledge or truth, absolute knowledge of 
the moral ideals and of-right in particular, and action to further 
self-development and self-realization are linked both by analogy and 
by the same epistemological processes. Finally we should remember one 
other usual feature of English idealist social and political 
philosophy, the idea that the real is the rational, that existing 
opinion, custom, tradition, * institutions and practices embody the 
ideas and wisdom of a society. Grote, like Hegel before him and 
Bradley, Green, Bosanquet and Oakeshott afterwardst subscribed to this 
argument, perhaps the most distinctive feature of idealist ethics and 
politics. 
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But what sort of idealist is Grote? In chapters five and six 
transcendental, subjective, objective and absolute idealism were 
examined and Grote's idealism was argued to be absolute (Walsh 1985, 
381-382). Grote considered that mind expresses itself and finds 
itself in objects; he posits an absolute reality and considers it 
knowable by finite mind. That absolute reality is both the totality 
of human reality and truth, and at the same time from the other side 
God. Does this conflict with the central thesis of Lauchlin 
D. MacDonald in his book John Grote: A Critical Estimation of His 
Writings (MacDonald 1966),?, For MacDonald Grote is a 'personalist' and 
an 'idea: list', he is a* personalist idealist' (MacDonald 
1966,118-121,188-208). MacDonald's arguments are rambling, often 
repetitious and sometimes contradictory but the two key claims are 
contained in the following quotation. Personalist idealism has a 
moral and a metaphysical claim. 
'It should be noted also that Grote's idealism is personalistic. 
It is personalistic in two main senses. First, this 
personalistic idealism engages the whole person in aspiring after 
an objective or ideal, the summum bonum, which in Plato is the 
Good and in Aristotle eudaemonia or happiness akin to ecstasy. 
Second, this personalistic idealism is evident in the emphasis 
that Grote lays upon the 'philosophical' consciousness, or 'idea' 
side of his epistemology without which there is no being of any 
sort. All existence must be such for persons; there is no other 
existence' (MacDonald 1966,243). 
On the first Grote does argue that human life is premissed upon want 
and involves the presentation of and attempt to realise ideals. That 
this takes account of the whole of the person is however doubtful as 
I 
he recognises both that part of our nature is biological and that much 
of life is taken up with maintenance activities. Secondly, Grote's 
ideals are more numerous than the Good and Happiness, and he 
prioritizes the Right. Thirdlyr it seems by this definition that 
Plato and Aristotle are personalist idealists, a claim that remains to 
be substantiated. Personalism is obviously being used here in a most 
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general fashion and not in a more limited technical sense. Almost all 
idealists, intuitionalists, moral sense theorists and even ideal 
utilitarians could qualify as personalist idealists by this 
definition, as all see man as aspiring after at least one ideal. 
The second part of MacDonald's definition is similarly. vague, 
being so broad as to embrace almost all empiricists as well as 
idealists, because all consider consciousness, the idea side to 
predominate, and consider being to be dependent upon subjective 
consciousness. Personalism is used only once by Grote and then as an 
equivalent for idealism generally, 
'The idealism, personalism, or whatever it may be called, which 
lies at the root of all that I have said, is not simply a 
doctrine or opinion, but seems to me to have been my earliest 
philosophical feeling, and to have continued, if not so vivid, 
yet not less strong, ever since' (Grote 1865,146). 
His intention is to show in a-philosophical 'reminiscence' that not 
only does he believe that the logical starting point for epistemology 
is the unity of self and not self in immediate consciousness, but that 
both in childhood and early life we feel as if the world is our world, 
a feeling we lose as external life imposes its weight upon us. The 
point is that in adulthood we 'sink all our independent selfhood, in 
other things, institutions and people, the result being that the magic 
of childhood on which everything is seen from our own perspective is 
lost, and 
Ia kind of dullness which is superinduced over our disposition to 
higher thought by what the course of everybody's life is pretty 
certain to be' (ibid, 146). 
By personalism in the context of the passage quoted Grote means to 
re-express what he describes elsewhere as *egoism', 'thinking for 
oneself* and intellectual 'rejuvenation', the idea that the universe 
we explore is what it is for us, that we must start with our 
consciousness, explore it for ourselves, and to assist in this we must 
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return to that fundamental unity of knowing and being, self and not 
self implicit in our primitive consciousness. 
Now in this sense Grote is sharing a thesis inherent not only in 
Hegel but in the whole German idealist movement - wider still in the 
European romantic movement and the aufklaerung or counter 
enlightenment. Grote's personalism is also shared by almost all later 
idealists and many other non idealist philosophers and even 
psychologists. Unfortunately, however, the term personalist has 
served other usages and meanings, many of which are highly technical 
and restricted, and most of which are of more recent origin. Two 
dangers exist then in defining Grote as a personalist idealist, The 
first that his very general statement about the logical point being 
immediate consciousness# and his preference for egoism and personal 
thought is conflated with one or more of the more technical uses. The 
second is that Grote's concerns of 1865 are muddled up with the 
concerns of the later personalists, namely Andrew Seth and the Oxford 
personalists from 1887 and the American personalists starting with 
Edgar Brightman in the 1920's. MacDonald's arguments flirt with both 
4angers, become muddled as a result and leave us confused as to the 
nature of the claim, let alone its substantiation. The same thing 
happens, as W. H. Werkmeister notes in his review of MacDonalds book, in 
the authors account's of 'Kantian idealism', 'epistemological monism' 
and 'pluralism'. Indeed confusion and even contradiction appear so 
regularly throughout the text that any attempt at clarification 
becomes too daunting and the results so dubious that it is hardly 
worth undertaking. (1) Werkmeister concludes his review as follows 
'Unfortunately I am in no position to say who is more responsible 
for all the confusions - John Grote or Lauchlin MacDonald' 
(Werkmeister 1969,218). 
My answer' is that it is the latter, and that MacDonald's efforts 
generally have done a disservice to the recovery of Grote's 
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philosophy. 
The list of family resemblances that make up personalism include 
the following: the only things that are real are persons or selves 
(Brightman 1925); all true being is personal (Brightman 1925); 
persons are ontologically fundamental (Flew 1979); personality, not 
nature or the absolute, contains. reality (Sturt 1902); personality 
represents the highest value within the field of our experience 
(Copleston 1967); knowledge originates in consciousness within the 
seli(MacDonald 1966); selves have value independent of God and the 
absolute (Seth 1887); God is a community of personalities or selves 
(Rashdall 1902); God is the primary manifestation of personality 
(Flew 1979); reality is spiritual, an expression of God's personality 
(Flewelling 1947); reality is a community of selves without God 
(McTaggart 1906). As these premises are woven together so we can 
have, according to MacDonald, monistic personalism (dominated by 
either oneself, one God or the community); pluialistic personalism 
(many personalities); theistic personalism (the personality is God's) 
or non-theistic personalism (McTaggart). MacDonald also separates 
epistemological personalism'; and 'metaphysical personalism' the 
first being concerned with the origins of knowledge in the self, the 
second with the origins of reality in the personality (MacDonald 
1966,192-194). 
MacDonald ignores the vast variety of often conflicting strands 
in personalism and in identifying Grote restricts himself almost 
entirely to the American tradition and then almost exclusively to 
Edgar Brightman(Schneewind *1968,171). ' In so doing he ignores a more 
fruitful line of descent through Grote's successors at Cambridge, 
James Ward, McTaggart Ellis and W. R. Sorley(Passmore 1966,75-84; 
Copleston 1967,267-283), and two other philosophers who quote Grote, 
Andrew Seth(Pringle Pattison) and Hastings Rashdall(Passmore 
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1966,72-75). Secondly, as Werkmeister points out the various 
categories and definitions are confusing and get confused together.. 
Grote is described as a metaphysical personalist who sees individual 
personality alone as real, and as an epistemological personalist for 
whom only personality is fundamental, while he is also asserted to be 
a theistic personalist for whom God's personality is real and known! 
In addition Grote is considered to be both an *epistemological monist' 
and a 'metaphysical pluralist'. In fact there are fundamental 
tensions between such views that are not tackled by MacDonald. We are 
not told how epistemology relates to metaphysics and ontology, nor how 
all three relate to ethics and theology in Grote's thought. Is the 
self self real or only Gods self? Can knowledge arise from one self 
or does it require a plurality of selves, or does it derive from God? 
How can Grote's supposed 'metaphysical personalism', the belief in one 
God, be compatible with 'metaphysical pluralism' where there is a 
plurality of realities) 
In fact Grote is a personalist only in the sense of that term 
which he defines for himself. He was an epistemological personalist, 
along with Hegel, the romantics and many others, in treating our 
immediate consciousness as the basis for knowledge, but that tells us 
very little. Hewas a metaphysical personalist in the general sense 
of seeing reality as essentially spiritual, but so did absolute 
idealists. Grote was certainly a monist and not a pluralist in both 
epistem ology and metaphysics but these categories cover his whole 
idealism, not narrow personalism. Finally, Grote tackles my second 
question above and produces a novel answer. For each of us our own 
consciousness is basic, but its creation and exploration requires 
social language - our self and our knowledge are communal. In coming 
to know, our personal minds meet or find the minds of others who have 
already defined, known or created things; one of these other minds 
is 
268 
our society's and another is God's. Grote's idealism then blends 
assertions about the primacy of self in knowing and willing,. with a 
recognition of the role of a plurality of selves in a society, with a 
belief in the reality of the external world and its coherence, a 
belief in a knowable absolute as both the totality of truth and of 
Gods will. Luckily Grote did not have MacDonald's conceptual baggage 
to delay him, he could just explore his own theory and develop its own 
coherence. Grote is not confused or confusing here, but MacDonald 
certainly appears to be, as Werkmeister argues. 
A similar and profitless debate concerns Grote's affiliation to 
realism. He is appreciatively quoted by several realists without ever 
being embraced as a member of that school. In the most general sense 
Grote is a realist if by that we mean a belief that there is an 
external world that can be known directly, and that qualities of it 
are carved out of this immediately known or given reality. (2) This for 
instance is the apparent poini behind G. Dawes Hicks quotation from 
Grote (Hicks 1938,124). 
'The advance of thought in my view, is the simultaneous 
development of the distinct conception of ourselves, or our 
personality, and the distinct conception of objects of thought as 
independent of us: and each conception brings out the other. By 
an object of thought, as distinctly conceived, we mean something 
standing off from, though connected with, our thinkingl and we 
cannot mean this without a co-conceptionof ourselves, from which 
the other is relieved: * (Grote 1900,146-147) 
Other similar quotations stress Grote's belief in the reality of the 
external world and of its knowability in ordinary thought. Both 
realist beliefs are found in R. W. Sellers Critical Realism, and John 
Laird's A Study of Realism (Sellars 1920,257-259; Laird 1920,15). 
Each quotes Grote as follows, 
'In my view, a thing is what it looks,. and looks what it is: we 
can see it as it is, and it is as we see it' (Grote 1900,176). 
But this is a one sided interpretation that ignores Grote's arguments 
that immediate consciousness, while of reality# is not fully fledged 
269 
knowledge about it, but needs more experience, reflection and mediate 
judgement to bring it out. It seems to confuse Grote's 'immediate 
awareness' with the 'direct intuition' of the realists. It also fails 
to recognise that absolute reality to Grote develops from the 
immediate by a process of 'distinctification' and then re-unification 
within a coherent world of ideas. However this one side of Grote's 
philosophy is as compatible with his idealism and his personalism (if 
that term is allowed) as it was in the thought of a later Trinity 
idealist, 
'Ontologically I am an Idealist, since I believe that all that 
exists is spiritual. I am also, in one sense of the term, a 
Personal Idealist. For I believe that every part of the content 
of spirit falls within some self, and that no part of it falls 
within more than one self, that the only substances are selves, 
parts of selves and groups of selves. On the other hand, I 
should say that epistemologically I was a Realist. I should say 
that knowledge was a true belief, and I should say that a belief 
was true when, and, only when, it stands in relation to 
correspondence to a fact... ' (McTaggart 1934). 
We may now pass to Grote's moral philosophy. Two insubstantial 
aspersions can be quickly rejected: one implicit in W. R. Sorley's 
classification of Grote along with Maurice under the heading of 
Rational and Religious Philosophers, and the other by James Ward who, 
in a private and unlocated letter called Grote a 'moralist'. Sorley 
does not justify the classification. It is undoubtedly true that 
Grote was deeply religious and that his belief in God not only 
complements but completes his philosophy. Nevertheless religious 
presuppositions are not amongst his fundamental philosophical 
assumptions, and he usually provides non religious arguments alongside 
religious ones. -In the end the character of his work 
is more deeply 
philosophical than religious; he avoids, so far as is possible, 
discipline confusion and category mistakes. Schneewind, we saw twice 
got close to arguing that Grote's philosophy was premissed upon a 
religious assumption, that the world is an ordered whole, with purpose 
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and reason. But twice I have argued that a) this assumption was also 
founded upon a reflexive argument, that an ordered world is a 
postulate of all language and thought including the scientific and 
that b) the existence of reason and purpose in things and events is a 
compatible assumption embedded in all practical language and action. 
In addition, the reason and purpose and order found in the world Grote 
considers to be there from the sources of the individual mind social 
opinion and from God. He provides us with a non-religious option that 
few other idealists dared to provide, except McTaggart later. 
The charge of being a moralist is harder to handle as we do not 
know exactly how Ward was using the term. However if it was used to 
mean a practical thinker who, teaches and preaches practical morality 
the charge must be qualified if not rebutted. (King and Parekh 
1968,156). Grote's moral philosophy is not primarily prescriptive but 
explanatory and analytic, his work is not legitimatory or ideological 
but critical and rational in short, philosophical. The priest in 
Grote rarely appears in his philosophical works. Few if any moral 
prescriptions exist in either the Treatise or the Examination. The 
few that do, such as the claim that right entails obedience to the law 
and performance of duty, are always the result of long and detached 
philosophical analysis and not a search through subjective prejudices 
or feelings. Thirdly, and most importantly Grote explicitly, notes 
the dangers of moralism in philosophy and argues for its rejection. 
In the Examination he wrote of the attempt to make moral philosophy 
immediately practical as a 'philosophy of non-philosophy' which not 
only damages philosophy but usually leads to 'wild dreams and 
imaginations', something quite 'unpractical' (Grote 1870,242-245). 
Philosophy is about critically testing assumptions and presuppositions 
and systematizing and methodizing the resulting conclusions, not 
creating practical guidelines-, rules of thumbe practical principles or 
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even systematic codes of ethics. 'Moralistic' thought he separates 
from moral philosophy in that the former involves 'exemplar stories 
and advice to others*(Grote 1870,33-34). On this criterion he is no 
moralist. 
Finally, in an interesting aside on moral criticism Grote 
discusses the merits and de-merits of three groups of 'moralists' and 
one group in particular called 'practicalists'. By moralists Grote 
means 'makers of maxims, essays and remarks' on human character. 
There are three types: 'theoretical moralists' both psychological and 
ontological; 'dialectic moralists' and 'critical moralists' (Grote 
1876,476-486). The 'practicalists' are generally more cynical, 
treating all men as 'fools or knaves'. Without going into detail 
Grote has in mind here moralists such as Pascal, Montaigne, Pope and 
La Rochefoucauld. of old and probably Southey, Carlyle, Ruskin and 
other similar writers of hit day. Moralists usually ignore the 
complexity of human nature in favour of prescription, and having 
shut their eyes to one of these sources or to the other, have in 
general gone on with a weary battle', 
stressing mans fear, desire for power, happiness or somesuch other 
disposition (Grote 1876,125-126). Generally, moralists' and 
practicalists' work from abstractions about man's dispositional 
nature, one stressing its goodness, the other its cruelty (Grote 
1876,462-463). 
But at one level Grote is a moralist; he does study human 
character,, he does analyse the psychology as well as the. epistemology 
and ontology of morality, and he does pass an optimistic judgement on 
human moral character, fulfilling his own claim that 
0 we want a La Rochefoucauld of a converse kind, who would hunt 
out, not the root of bitterness in every good action, but Of 
reason and excusableness in every bad... ' (Grote 1876,486). 
But generally these elements are a minor part in an otherwise 
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generally analytic corpus; the study of character is not a central 
element of his work, and many of the moralistic elements appear in 
appendices that were once only undergraduate lectures, that Mayor as 
editor chose to add. Grote generally kept his moralism in check in 
his own intentions and writing, Mayor pushed them forward, perhaps 
wishing to have Grote seen as a moralist and good Victorian as well as 
a philosopher. 
If the nature of Grote's moral thought is philosophical not 
moralistic or religious, we can now turn to the only two remaining 
serious contenders to account for the character of his ethical and 
political writings, intuitionism and idealism. The debate over the 
first interpretation appears at the end of chapter seven and involves 
a qualified rebuttal of the former claim made in regard to both 
Grote's epistemology and his ethics. On top of the analytic arguments 
presented there we can add primary source evidence and witting 
testimony that Grote, wished to distance himself from intuitionism, and 
that he set out deliberately to create both an idealist epistemology 
and ethics. Analytically Grote had noted the confusions inherent in 
the notion of intuition and the false dichotomy, kept in motion by 
Mill and Whewell, between intuitionism and individualism in logic and 
epistemology. Just as opponents of Spencer had falsely set up an 
antithesis between organic theory and individualism when the 
dichotomies should 'be organic and mechanistic, individual and 
collectivist# so Grote sees the true dichotomy to be between induction 
and deduction not induction and intuition as presented by Mill (Gray 
1985; Grote 1870,260). Next he saw the dichotomy between the a 
priori and a posteriori, necessary and contingent moral truths as 
false and profitless (1870,269-270). (3) similarly the distinctions 
between 'dependent' and 'independent' moralities, and 'consequential' 
and 'intuitional' moralities were false dichotomies (Grote 
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1876,79-80). Grote aimed to synthesise Whewells so-called 
'fundamental antithesis' in his system, a system he called idealism 
(Grote 1900,152-159; 259-299; 321-324). In so doing he conceded 
some truth, but only a 'partial truth, to both phenomenalism and 
epistemological rationalism, to induction and deduction, to the a 
priori and the a posteriori, to intuitionism and utilitarianism. 
However Grote is responsible for misleading his readers on occasions 
for while in some places he calls himself an idealist on other 
occasions he seems to identify himself as an intuitionist# or 
intuitivist (Grote 1876,20 244-45). But on both occasions Grote is 
denying that utilitarian arguments from observation and induction 'can 
come in the place of first principles', that they can work without 
'ideal' moral premises (ibid, 18). Grote is denying the value of 
arguments from self evidence and observation and promotes instead an 
idealist moral epistemology which allows moral ideals to be known via 
the ordinary processes of experience, reason and judgement in which 
* greater clearness of view, firmer hold in the mind of the 
principles it deals with, and happier expression of them' 
take priority (Grote 1876,151; and 45-46,49). Being an eclectic in 
nature Grote's allegiance to intuitionism is qualified and his 
distance from the schools of intuitionism are occasionally stated. 
'There are, I suppose, different forms of this intuitivism: 
though what those who use the word mean by it, is rather their 
business than mine' (ibid, 47). 
Unfortunately Schneewind and Rothblatt seem to have taken these 
concessions to partial truth as admissions of adherence to the full 
blown theory of intuitionism. But even here there is a qualification 
to be made, for in one of his early analyses of Grote Schneewind does 
admit a basic idealist character to Grote's thought (Schneewind 
1967,393). It seems a pity that this early interpretation was dropped 
in favour of a retreat to Grote the intuitionist in later writings, a 
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retreat that is hard to explain. The only influence I can see is 
Schneewind's over riding concern to explain the Cambridge origins of 
Sidgwick's own philosophy. How could Grote's most illustrious 
disciple have failed to detect his mentor's idealism not only in his 
lectures, but also in his conversation and in his later books? How 
could it be that a man so lightly dismissed by Sidgwick as an 
eclectic, an immature thinker who could not make up his mind or devise 
a philosophic system, really have been one of the first originators of 
philosophical idealism in England? -Sidgwick was right only if Grote 
was a typical Cambridge moralist of minor significance, which on most 
occasions Schneewind seems to conclude. 
However one of Sidgwick's own definitions may allow us to exclude 
Grote from the intuitionalist label. To Sidgwick 
'The fundamental assumption of this theory is that we have the 
power of seeing clearly, within a certain range, what actions are 
right and 
, 
reasonable in themselves apart from their consequences 
(except such consequences as are included in the notion of the 
acts)' (Sidgwick 1877,176). 
Grote, we knowl considers that moral actions can be valued both for 
their consequences and their inherent moral worth (or their aretaic 
value), which lies in their self sacrifice, motive, and conformity to 
ideals and moral imperatives entailed in moral relationships. The 
consequences of value include happiness, the good and right, and above 
all self development. By Sidgwick's own definition then Grote 
transcends intuitionism and as we shall see, embraces moral idealism. 
In another place Sidgwick provides a further definition of 
intuitionism and of three schools within it that, it could be claimed, 
embrace Grote's ethical arguments. There, intuitionism is described 
as that ethical argument 
which regards as the practically ultimate end of actions t eir 
conformity to certain rules or dictates of Duty unconditionally 
prescribed'(Sidgwick 1907j96). 
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Of its three forms the first or 'ultra intuitionism' stresses that 
these rules are immediately perceived (98-99). The second school or 
that of 'common sense' intuitionism, 
'have presented the process of conscience as analogous to one of 
jural reasoning*(ibid, 100). 
The third school of 'philosophical intuitionism' seeks to provide 
reasons and principles for the explanation and deduction of these 
moral rules of duty(ibid 102). John Grote, it could be argued, fits 
either the second or third of these categories for he does use the 
analogy of moral and legal rules in his jural ethics, and he does try 
to provide reasons for and explanations of both this procedure and of 
the imperativeness and content of our moral rules if not providing 
principles for deduction. 
But Sidgwick's actual view which confirms that he considered 
Grote not to be an intuitionist appears in a passage just after the 
reference to jural reasoning. Sidgwick notes that in the jural 
analogy the moral rules may not be revealed by reason or intuition but 
may be 'communicated from some external authority', such as a sacred 
book, 
. or perhaps the common opinion of the society to which they 
belong. In so far as this is the case we cannot strictly call 
their method Intuitional. They follow rules generally received, 
not intuitively apprehended' (Sidgwick 1907,101). 
This indeed is Grote's view and that of Hegel before and Bradley after 
him. The rules of right can be -arrived at inductively from 
observations and deductively from the truth, from right reason and the 
imagination. This is not intuitionism but idealism. 
Idealist ethics embraces many strands of thought, some negative 
and other positive. For convenience I shall list them quoting the 
source after each. 
a) Idealist ethics involves a general opposition to utilitarian 
ethics. A. J. M. Milne argues that this position is based on a 
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rejection of 1) social individualism, 2) a rejection of hedonism in 
favour of self realization, 3) a positive theory of freedom and 4) a 
rejection of the 'technical theory of government' all associated with 
utilitarianism (Milne 1967,320). John Grote satisfies all but the 
third of these criteria; he rejects social atomism and asserts man to 
be a social being, he roundly criticises hedonism 'and 
neo-utilitarianism, and he rebels against rationalism in thought and 
in social, legal and political practice. On freedom Grote both 
insists on the freedom of the will, ind argues the liberal case for 
liberty from the over meddling of the state. His defence of state 
education and state-provided social welfare were however only pale 
shadows of the truly positive theory of freedom of the later idealists 
(Milne 1967,323-328; Berlin 1969,118-172; Vincent and Plant 1984, 
27-28). 
b) Ethical naturalism in all its forms is rejected by ethical 
idealists, 'the starting point for Bradley and Green (Vincent and Plant 
1984,18-21; Warnock 1966,1-2; Carrg 1949, ch. 14). John Grote attacks 
moral positivism and materialism, especially in the Fxamination and 
Book III of Exploratio Philosophica Part Il. Moral naturalism cannot 
explain the existence or the nature of the world that ought to be, and 
can never tackle its content and imperatives. Naturalism is for ever 
cut off from the ought to be, from the discussion of moral ideals. 
More positively ethical idealism involves one or more of the 
following. 
C) Idealism involves the assertion that the ultimate end of life, 
the purpose of moral conduct, is development of the self or person# 
where the person is regarded as a social self (Milne 1962,28-35; 
56-59; Sorley 1921,288-292; Warnock 1966,2-10). Grote, we have 
seen, subscribes to both mental and moral life as the develpment of 
the self to full self knowledge, which is at the same time a 
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recognition of mind or reason in the world. In his advocacy of moral 
self development he is fully in line with the central core of later 
English idealism as. reflected in the work of Green and Bradley. 
d) There is also in idealism the recognition that morality involves 
the free activity of self-willed agents to realise the moral ideals or 
to do one's duty (Barker 1947,16-22; Vincent and Plant 1984,20-22; 
Schneewind 1977,405-406). This is a postulate of Grote's entire moral 
philosophy. 
e) Post Kantian idealism argues that ethics must give content to the 
formal account of moral conduct, morality must be made concrete as is 
so illustrated in the relational theory of 'My Station and its Duties' 
(Warnock 1966,8-10; Milne 1962,61; Vincent and Plant 22-33; Richter 
1964,212-215; Wollheim 1969,242-246). We have seen in chapter nine 
that Grote develops a proto Bradlian version of 'My Station and Its 
Duties' in his Examination and the Treatise written in 1862-4 and 
published in 1870 and 1876 respectively. 
f). The notion that the moral person must be more than a good citizen 
who performs his duties. The moral person is someone who pursues the 
higher ideals of virtue., self-sacrifice, self-realization and even 
perfection (Wollheim 1969,246-8; Schneewind 1977,408-411; Milne 
1962,69-_77; Richter 1964,195-199). The central arguments of both the 
Treatise and the Examination satisfy this element in an account of 
ethical idealism and in fact Grote is extremely close to Bradley in 
Chapter 6 of Ethical Studies and to the whole enterprise of Green in 
the Prolegomena to Ethics. 
g) To Kant and Hegel at least the ultimate ethical ideal was the 
right, not the good or happiness, and in this John Grote concurred. 
The right was less spoken about by later English idealists for whom 
the common good became the more popular notion for the political 
ideal. 
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h) Most, but not all, English idealists believed that their 
philosophy was not only compatible with Christianity, but provided its 
best vindication in an age of growing positivism, materialism and 
resulting atheism. The basic premise was that the self-development of 
the mind of the person was at the same time the recognition of the 
mind of God in the universe (Vincent and Plant 1984,6-17; Richter 
1964,25-32,36-38tiOl-135; Copleston 1967,172; Passmore 
1966,72-84; ). We have seen how Grote's philosophy was not only 
compatible with religion but was in his view finally realized in the 
idea of God, his mind, purpose and order. Unlike Green, Grote avoids 
building this in as a major premise in his philosophy, rather it is an 
optional conclusion. In this sense Grote is one of the most refined 
of nineteenth century English idealists. 
i) The English Idealists tended to treat duty, obligation, justice 
and the right as outcomes of human reason, embodied in custom and 
institutionalized in the state. To them fictions of natural law and 
rights were generally spurned, as well as the command theories of law, 
duty and the right of the Hobbesians and philosophical radicals. The 
state's job was to defend the freedom of the individual, to codify and 
uphold customary rights, to enforce legal duties, and to change laws 
in line with the real will or spirit of the society (Milne 1962, 
124-164,237-245; Richter 1964,222-266; Barker 1947,22-69; ), Once 
again Grote conforms to the general tenets of this thread of English 
idealism, despite the fact that his political writings are only a 
small part of his general corpus. 
j) Next we can restate the point made earlier concerning the 
idealist's arguments that what is real is rational and now add to it 
the idea that what is real is ideal. Throughout his epistemological 
and ethical writings Grote insisted that all thought and action was 
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directed towards some ideal, and that all results of thought and 
action such as institutions, structures, practices, customs and 
traditions embodied some ideal. This theme, found earlier in Vico, 
Burke,. Herder and Hegel, was restated with vigour and clarity by Grote 
and later by Bradley, Green, Bosanquet, Collingwood and Oakeshott. 
k) English Idealism in the Victorian period was generally associated 
with either progressive liberalism or the romantic conservatism of 
Coleridge, Carlyle and Bradley. Grote's political theory, we have 
seen, was liberal with some christian socialist connotations 
associated with F. D. Maurice and Grote's Cambridge colleague Charles 
Kingsley. Grote almost certainly supported the Liberal Partyl as did 
his friend Robert Leslie Ellis, and shared that reforming spirit 
associated with the Broad Church movement and Trinity College 
generally. His respect for tradition lines him up with Michael 
Oakeshott later. 
Such a list could be extended and elaborated to provide more 
similarities and differences between schools of idealism in Victorian 
England and between John Grote and each of them but to little extra 
effect. By now the case for Grote's philosophical idealism should be 
taken as secure, spanning as it does the range from his own definition 
of himself, the identity of his thought with many centrat tefiets of 
nineteenth century idealism, and the support of several authoritative 
secondary commentators. Of all these the late and almost hidden 
admission of Bernard Bosanquet, an undisputed Oxford Idealist, is the 
most potent. 
*Mr Gr 
, 
ote's position is peculiar. He does not treat by name any 
idealist philosophy later than Kant. But his highly original 
criticism lays down, in a characteristic terminology of his own, 
the fundamental doctrines of objective idealism' (Bosanquet 
1902,128). 
Next come the considered judgements of two philosophers and historians 
of idealism, James Seth and G. Watts Cunningham (Seth 1912; Cunningham 
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1933 ). Seth lists Grote as an absolutist idealist, while Cunningham 
goes so far as to write that 
'John Grote, who was one of Green's contemporaries and who held 
the chair of moral philosophy at Cambridge from 1655 to his death 
in 1866, outlines an idealist argument which, though apparently 
independently conceived, is quite in the spirit of the Hegelian 
dialectic method. In fact in some of its details it is 
strikingly reminiscent of the earlier stages of consciousness as 
set forth in Hegel's remarkable "voyage of discovery", the 
Phoenomenologie des Geistes. So far as I am aware, Grote's is 
the earliest formulation of this type of argument to be found in 
British philosophy .. ' (Cunningham 1933,65) . 
(On Grote 's relationshil 
to Continental philsophy see Appendix 111,347-350). ', 
After these two figures several other major commeniators toncur in the 
recognition of Grote's early creation of an idealist system, including 
Torgny SegerstedtRudolph Metz in early twentieth century England and 
Dr. Krohn from Germany (Sergestedt 1934,153; Metz 1938,245; Krohn 
1872). Later the idealist nature of Grote's work is attested to by 
Edgar Brightman and Lauchlin D. MacDonald in America, Jean Pucelle, 
E. Gilson, and Jacques Chevalier in France, the historians John 
Passmore, Martin Walsh and Frederick Copleston, and in a slightly more 
authoritative philosophical form, by Anthony Quinton (Brightman 
1925,1940; MacDonald 1966,188-231; Pucelle 1955,75-85,129; Gilson 
1962,435; Chevalier 1966,96; Passmore 1966,53-54; Walsh 1985, 
381-382; Copleston 1967,186-188; Quinton 1972,21). Jerome 
B. Schneewind did admit Grote's affiliation to idealism in his 1967 
contribution on Grote to the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, and there is 
some grudging acknowledgement of Grote as a proto-idealist in Robbins' 
thesis on the Reception of Hegel in England (Schneewind 1967; Peter 
Robbins 1967iChIII). The reference to Grote in Ueberweg also supports 
the case for Grote being an idealist (Ueberweg 1928,5,138). 
A second tier of authorities imply Grote's close association with 
idealism without explicit statement of the fact. One group are 
idealists who express great sympathy or gratitude to Grote for his 
help. This group includes the Oxfor4 Idealist, J. A. Smith and the 
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ex-Balliol man and student of Green's, the Prime Minister H. H. Asquith, 
who claimed that he used Ferrier and Grote to 'clear my own mind, in 
the post Kantian domain' he found himself in at oxford (Smith 
1925,229; Asquith 1928,19). Other such contextual support comes from 
the interest taken in Grote by Georg Lasson the German pastor who in 
re-editing Hegel; s collected works did so much to re-excite study of 
Hegel and idealism in late nineteenth century Europe (Lasson 1878). 
Thomas Forsyth's analysis of English Philosophjý; ritten from the 
Scottish perspective, rarely uses the term idealism to describe the 
English current, but by associating Grote with Ferrier, Green and 
Bradley puts him in the English Idealist camp (Forsyth 1910,139-147). 
Later idealists who have expressed a strong interest in Grote include 
R. G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott (Collingwood 1961,209; 
Oakeshott 1962,162; MSS; ). Another later idealist who owned Grote's 
books, one of which is heavily and interestingly annotated, was Ellis 
McTaggart, a fellow Trinity scholar whose birth name and family tree 
is Ellis, relating him indirectly to Grote's close friend Robert 
Leslie Ellis. Other idealists who have obviously read Grote and who 
quote elements of his work include W. R. Sorleyt A. E. Taylor and 
J. S. Mackenzie, from Cambridge, Bernard Bosanquet, H. W. B. Josepht 
F. H. Bradley and W. G. De Burgh' from Oxford (Sorley 192lt264-265, 
1921,193,198t2O4; 1884,195,206; Taylor 1932,58; Mackenzie 1924,130; 
Bosanquet 1902t 1927; Joseph 1916,55,1935t66-68; Bradley 1935 t 
136-137; De Burgh 1938,44-45,49,70; 1937,44,227). 
But the establishment of John Grote as an early exponent of 
epistemological, metaphysical and ethical idealism does not exhaust 
John Grote's philosophical interest to us. By his own account Grote 
was not a prophet, he was opposed to sectarianism and he disclaimed 
the intention to found a new system of philosophy (Grote 1870,9-10). 
Grote was a reconciler in philosophy, a careful and patient analyst, 
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unwilling to rush to judgement, careful with criticism and expression 
and unwilling to associate himself with old philosophical dogmas and 
disputes. The very titles of his essays and works reveal much about 
the writer, Remarks on; On the ... A Few words on..: An Examination 
of; Exploratio Philosophica ... A Treatise on. These were not 
just 
conventional titles, except perhaps in the use of Examination. They 
reveal Grote's intentions not to pretend to finish a-debate but to add 
to the conversation, not to be dogmatic but to add humbly a few words 
or thoughts and to examine the ideas of others with a constructive 
interest. His style has been described as dreary and confusing, a 
positive barrier to the apprehension of his thought. However I find 
it the style of a patient and thoughtful philosopher unwilling to 
throw himself into half truths and commitments. The repetition in his 
thought is much to do with his belief that constant re-statement may 
ensure clarity and intensity of view. His coining of new words was to 
allow him to step out of old feuds and misunderstandings, as with the 
coining of intuitivism to explain modern rational as against' moral 
sense intuitionism. Lack of time to edit properly, odd and even bad 
editing by Mayor, also explain much about the difficulty of the form. 
But close reading reveals that Grote's works and meanings are far 
more clear and accessible than he has been given credit for. The 
preference for ordinary language and the use of ordinary language 
method, the rigour of linguistic clarification and conceptual 
argument, the striving after truth, the drive for clarity and 
coherence may prove difficult for the casual reader but reward anyone 
willing to go below the 'surface. His conversational, informal and 
even everyday style make his work both attractive and accessible for 
professional and non-professional philosophers alike. Dipping into 
Grote is an unlikely source of profit to the reader, who will better 
use his time engaging Grote's mind directly and in some depth. On the 
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rigour, quality and interest of Grote's philosophy, the judgement of 
Michael Oakeshott is of most relevance. 
'What I like about Grote is that he was clearly a man of great 
intelligence, learning and imagination, grappling with old 
problems in a fresh manner and always very much more certain 
about what will not do than concerned to construct a doctrine of 
his own. He is an education in how to reflect much more than in 
how to put thoughts together to make a doctrine' (Oakeshott 1970, 
MSS). 
These qualities, more than the methodological and textual similarities 
between Grote and Sidgwick, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, seem to 
have prompted Passmore's judgement that Grote was the first to exhibit 
that modern style of thought called the 'Cambridge Spirit' (Passmore 
1966,54). Those readers utterly uninterested in idealism will still 
find much of value in John Grote's corpus. 
do 
Nor, the style and constructive philosophical ideas of Grote 
exhaust his interest to intellectual historians. His ideas on 
history, philology, psychology, religion, education, curriculum and 
college reform stand by themselves as important. In history Grote is 
remembered by Oakeshott for his separation of practical from real 
history on the grounds of closeness to and interest in the practical 
events in hand. His use of the comparative method in his philological 
writings and the moderate Liberal Anglicanism in his work on the 
history of ideas in the Examination are useful examples of how 
fruitful long forgotten theories can be. In philology Grote 
profferred his own positive theory, the 'use theory' of language, 
which was later to have an illustrious career, and his ideas on dating 
systems are of considerable contemporary interest. Religion did not 
loom large in Grote's publications though it did in his everyday life. 
His defence of the liberal rationalist authors of Essays and Reviews, 
his rejection of dreadful visions on a Future State, his humanistic 
and idealist idea of God, his pantheism and the loving and concerned 
spirit for the poor and needy revealed in his parish Sermons reveal 
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Grote as a member of that Broad Church movement of the time that did 
so much to keep religion in touch with a society undergoing 
industrialisation. 
For psychology Grote performed the service of relieving it from 
metaphysical and philosophical baggage. His prescription was that 
psychology should become a sui generis subject, based on rigorous and 
materialistic studies of the brain and comparative anthropology, a 
study he called 'psycho-physiology'. Such a recommendation was 
applauded by J. Hunt of the Anthropological Society, was welcomed by 
Alexander Bain and was swiftly put into practice by one of Grote's 
Trinity philosophical successors, James Ward, in a number of famous 
articles and books. On education Grote stood firmly in favour of 
state and social influence and even control while holding out against 
the forces of bureaucratization, professionalization and technocracy 
that were massing at the time. Defending state aid to schools and 
opposing Lowe's system*of payment by results, welcoming the Royal 
Commissions to Cambridge but fighting for old rights and privileges as 
well as liberal reforms, embracing some new subjects such as 
comparative philology, philosophy and history into the curriculum at 
Cambridge but rejecting professional and technical education per se, 
he must be remembered as an opponent of rationalism in education who 
pioneered gradual reforms, holding on to the best of the old and the 
new alike. His work is indeed a mixture of Old Studies and the New. 
We may now pass on to Grote in his Cambridge context. 
ii 
John Grote and Cambridge University (1830-1870) 
In the introduction to this thesis I claimed that the interest of John 
Grote to contemporaries is not only as a thinker who tackled 
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philosophical problems in an original way, but also as one who 'filled 
a historical position which, when explained, makes more coherent the 
picture we have of Victorian intellectual history'. This section 
explains the revisions we must make to the conventional views of 
mid-century Cambridge thought, and of its relations to Oxford, 
Scotland and the Philosophical Radicals. The final appendix will 
examine the effects on our whole picture of the development of 
Victorian thought by suggesting some lines of influence and similarity 
between Grote and his predecessors and successors. 
In the early chapters of this thesis I argued that the 
conventional view of mid-Victorian thought. is that of 'a triumph of 
empiricismi positivism, and utilitarianism over a rump of 
rationalists, intuitionists and religiously minded metaphysicians', 
upset after 1870 by the arrival of an alien and damaging metaphysical 
import from Germany, Hegelian Idealism. Institutionally the dominant 
picture is of the English uni versities, and Cambridge in particular, 
as bastions of social privilege, religious dogma, and 'arid 
rationalism', moderated only by traditional reverence for the 
classics. In the 'hands of V. R. Mehta Oxford from 1850 to 1870 is 
absolved somewhat, and George Eden Davie has brilliantly redefined the 
power and originality of the Scottish Universities. But the picture 
of Cambridge before 1870 has gone little unchanged, despite the 
efforts of Rothblatt and Garland, and the universities as a whole are 
generally presented as becalmed while in Londont M4nchester and 
Birmingham intellectual ferment was producing not only the triumph of 
positivism but the institutionalisation of the new culture in the red 
brick universities. (On Sidgwick's -Cambridge see 
below, 351-355) 
- What I intend to do now is to build on the alternative analysis 
of Susan Pay Cannon which I developed in chapter- three on 
'Intellectual Elites, Universities and Philosophy' to show that this 
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conventional picture must now be further revised. Such a revision 
would take account of the existence of an exciting movement in 
mid-Victorian Cambridge which worked from romantic and idealist 
premises to challenge and moderate the forces 'of positivism and 
materialism, atheism and utilitarianism which it was felt threatened 
the gradual progressive evolution of modern thought and society. The 
key is the 'Cambridge Network' discussed by Susan Fay Cannon with 
support from Noel Annan's article on 'The Intellectual Aristocracy', 
Duncan Forbes brilliant essay on The Liberal Anglican Idea of History 
and Charles R. Sanders book, Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement. 
The Cambridge Network was, as the title suggests, a straggling 
conglomeration of personalities and movements centred on Cambridge and 
its college system in-the period from 1830-1870. While its elements 
interacted there were two distinct nodes: the rationalists, mainly 
scientists, mathematicians, geologists and historians of science, such 
as*Sir John Hershel, Clerk-Maxwell, Lord Thompson, Adam-Sidgwick and 
William Whewell, and the more romantically and idealistically minded, 
including Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Julius Hare, Alfred Tennyson, 
Frederick Denison Maurice, J-W. Donaldson and Charles Kingsley. The 
general character of this second movement was romantic, Liberal 
Anglican in social theory, Broad Church in religion, and liberal or 
romantic conservative in politics, and it centred on Trinity and St 
John's colleges. In social and cultural terms Annan notes the 
connections between the families of the Mayors, Grotes Stephens Venns 
and Ellis, though the connection with others is easily made (Annan 
1967,257-258; 274-277) 
The sources of the historical caricature of mid Victorian 
Cambridge is built rather unfairly on the first group, unfair because 
many of its members were brilliant and original researchers in their 
own areas, better scientists and logicians than Mill for instance, who 
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played a major role in the early college and curriculum reforms at 
Cambridge to 1850. William Whewell is especially unfairly treated by 
Mill, Leslie Stephen and Henry Sidgwick and the image of him as the 
arch rationalist and intuitionist, conservative and reactionary blinds 
us to the picture of a more complex and exciting intellectual and 
political figure whose early romantic and reforming activities are 
matched by a brilliantly novel approach to the history of science and 
to Kantian philosophy which closely associates him to idealism and 
Cambridge idealism in particular (Butts 1965; 1967,1968;. Marcucci 
1963; Schneewind 1968). Even Leslie Stephen noted Whewell's 
knowledge of and propensity to Anglicanize German thought. Speaking 
of Samuel Clarke, the 18th Cambridge metaphysician he writes, 
'He somewhat resembles a more recent Cambridge pbilosopherl 
Dr. Whewell, and stands to Cartesians in the same sort of relation 
which Whewell occupied to modern German philosophers. In 
softening the foreign doctrines to suit English tastes, he 
succeeds in enervating them without making them substantially 
more reasonable' (Stephen 1927,119). 
However it is to the successors of Whewell, to John Grote, Henry 
Maine, James Fitzjames Stepehn and whom to Frederick Denison Maurice, 
whom we can turn to find the development of the Cambridge idealist 
reaction to the positivism of the philosophical radicals and the 
Manchester networks, and the common-sense philosophy of Scotland. I 
have called this romantic, idealist, liberal tradition, the Cambridge 
Movement, though I do not wish to suggest by this anything more. than a 
rather loose set of dispositions, attitude, methods and aims. 
John Grote, we have seen, launched critiques of major positions, 
phenomenalism, positivism, materialism, common sense realism, 
intuitionism in epistemology and ethics and utilitarianism. He did so 
from an idealistic philosophical strong hold, inhabited not by German 
idealists later than Kant, but mainly by the spirits alive and dead of 
Cambridge philosophy, especially the Cambridge Platonists, Coleridge, 
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Hare, Whewell and Maurice, plus his colleagues, Ellis, Venn and Mayor. 
From outside the key influence was that equally long forgotten founder 
of British idealism, James Frederick Ferrier. The result of Grote's 
reconstruction of philosophy was a corpus of work, then largely 
unpublished, which amounted to an early example of idealist* 
philosophy. 
The death of John Grote in 1866 when he was only just beginning 
to crystallise his ideas into a systematic form had contemporary 
significance for only a small group of thinkers with whom he was 
personally acquainted. Many of these were members of the 
philosophical society later known as the Grote Club. Though 
membership was open, the regular members included, apart from Grote, 
the logician and mathematician John Venn; the philosopher Henry 
Sidgwick, who learnt more from the experiences than he cared to admit; 
the literary editor and agnostic Aldis Wright; Joseph Bickersteth 
Mayor, a tutor in moral sciences at St. John's; and then, laterl 
Grote's literary executor, John Mozley, a mathematician, and John 
Pearson, a mediaeval historian. The Grote Club continued under the 
guidance of Grote's successor, Frederick Denison Maurice, and gained 
the membership of two other important Cambridge intellectuals, Alfred 
Marshall the economist, and William Kingdom Clifford, the 
mathematician and philosopher (Sidgwick, A., 1906,134-137; Keynes 
1937l 158-'60,168; Stephen 1901,5-6). 
Historians of philosophy usually remember Maurice for his Moral 
and Metaphysical Philosophy which in its treatment of Kant, Fichte and 
Hegel was said by a leading Idealist, J. H. Muirhead, to have symbolised 
I an end to the soul-destroying method which preceding historians had 
adopted of epitomising (usually in a wholly unintelligent way) the 
philosophers of Kant's successors' (Muirhead 1965,159). As a 
philosopherg Maurice can best be understood as a direct descendent of 
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the Germano-Coleridgian movement once sustained by his friends, 
Sterling and Hare, but now dwindling in influence and kept alive at 
Cambridge only by himself and perhaps the theologians, John Llewellyn 
Davies and F. J. A. Hort. 
Hort, later professor of Divinity, is in fact a most interesting 
source on Maurice's influence on mid-Victorian Cambridge. In letters 
to his friends in the 1850's he admits to giving himself to the study 
of Maurice, and even I communism' as well as to theology. His regular 
advice to friends was to read Maurice and Kingsley (Hort 
1896,1,129-144). Politically, Hort was close to both Grote and 
Maurice, as well as Maine, in politics calling himself a 'liberal 
conservative" who was willing at least to entertain a study of the 
merits of socialism (Hort 1896,1,130-144). In the end all three came 
to the same conclusion, that socialism, like philosophical radicalisms 
thrdatened to destroy the social fabric, recognising that society was 
a unity based'on differences not upon the equality and. impartiality 
spoken of by the socialists. Hort went to school with Joseph Mayorl 
helped him to edit Grote's Examination, and to publish his On 
Glossology. He also considered that Grote's friend Robert Leslie 
Ellis, 'knows more than any man living, and (is) amongst the deepest 
thinkers' (Hort 1,309). 
Maurice, as David Lindsay argues, must be accepted 
philosophically 
0 as an idealist if one is going to make any sense of his writing 
on either theology or politics' (Lindsay 1968,13; Brose 19711 
15-27). 
But he was primarily a theologian not a philosopher and he deferred to 
both the Broad Church and the Liberal Anglicans on some important 
issues (Brose 1971,238-253). In his dispute with Mansel he argued for 
a knowable as against an unknowable God just as Grote had argued for a 
knowable as against an unknowable absolute (ibid*258-259). The first 
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lectures. Maurice published after receiving the Chair at Cambridge 
under the title of The Conscience, revealed the development of a crude 
form of idealism, recognisable despite the. fact that the choice of 
subject matter might have forced the writer back into rationalism or 
intuitionism (Maurice 1868). In the first lecture, Maurice recommends 
the philososophic method of *Egoism' outlined by John Grote in 
Exploratio Philosophica Part 1, as the proper starting point for 
students in philosophy. The method involves the perusal of problems 
from the assertion of 'I', 'self* or *ego', and taking as true only 
that which is satisfactory for thought in relation to the thought of 
others. Maurice recommends the adoption of Grote's method in ethics 
and then uses the life and writings of the German idealist Johan 
Gottlieb Fichte as the model for his students. 
The succeeding lectures are a kind of mental autopsy of ideas on 
conscience that challenge the contemporary diagnosis given by Bentham, 
Bain and Whewell. The final judgement strikes an interesting balance 
between the role of individual ego and social station in the formation 
of moral ideas which, like Grote's view on ethics, is remarkably 
similar to that of the later Oxford idealists. Conscience is the 
simple assertion of my self and my existence, it is my judgement as to 
whom or what I am related and bence obliged. It is not a faculty, a 
product of reason, a divine insight nor a simple product of 
socialisation, but an expression of my own self as it responds to 
actual relations between other people and institutions in society. 
The advice given is to 
'dwell upon this fact -' that we are in an order; that relations 
abide whether we are faithful to them or neglect them; and that 
Conscience in each of us affirms 'I am in this order, I ought to 
act consistently with it, let my fancies say what they please' 
(Maurice 1868,49). 
Conscience is the supreme free will prescribing for oneself the duties 
appropriate to one's particular social relationships and roles. 
291 
The above argument, which understands definite social and, in 
particular, family relations as the main determinants of legal, 
political and, later, moral obligations, was the basis of Cambridge 
social and political theory, became widely popular and is linked 
clearly with the idealist ethics of the Oxford philosopher, 
F. H. Bradley. (See Chapter Nine, Section III part 3). Henry Maine 
whose book on Ancient Law was being recommended at Cambridge in 1863, 
uses the relational and patriarchal theory in all of his writings on 
law and ancient societies, but in Ancient Law he introduced the 
original sociological hypothesis that while ancient societies were 
organised legally, politically and morally on the basis of definite 
social relations, rights and duties accruing according to one's social 
'Status', so in dynamic or progressive societies these ties break down 
to be replaced by those of individual agreement or 'Contract'. While 
respecting multilinear patterns of change, Maine insisted that 
'the movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in 
one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by 
the gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of 
individual obligation in its place' (Maine 1917,99). 
Intermediate stages have seen the ascendency of relationships wit in 
the gentest clans, tribes and the state but in general terms 'the unit 
of ancient society was the Familyl of a modern society, the 
individual' (Maine 1917,74). The ancient law of Greece and Rome is 
understood as the codification of concrete family and kinship 
relationships. The development of Roman Law into the modern world is 
understood as the gradual modification of codes in response to 
concrete changes in kinship relations, partly by acts of legislation, 
but primarily by creating. such legal fictions as the Natural Law and 
the Social Contract which would allow the accommodation of new 
individualistic and egalitarian relations within the law. 
Maine attacks the political thought of Rousseau on the grounds 
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that it 'illogically applies legal fictions to the area of government. 
The idea of the primacy of pre-social individuals with natural rights 
within a natural law, shared by Locke, Hobbes and the Enlightenment, 
he understands as abstractions from a confused account of Roman Law. 
The confusion leads to the creation of another fiction, the Social 
Contract, to explain how societies and states came into being and yet 
another, that of the 'Sovereignty of the People', to explain their 
continued existence (Maine 1885,154-157; 1917,181-182). The 
Historical theory of the Benthamites is rejected for ignoring 'what 
law has actually been at epochs remote from the particular period at 
which they had made their appearance' and for placing intentional 
commands and expediency before habit and custom in their development 
(Maine 1885,156; 1917,70). Maine supports the radical political 
thought of the Benthamites, George Grote, the two Mills, Molesworth 
and the two Austins and Roebuck, for its rejection nf the ideas of 
contract, natural law and rights as fictions and fallacies. However 
the two premises the utilitarians put in their place as the principles 
for constitutional reform, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number' and later the 'political authority of the greatest number', he 
rejects as equally absurd, a priori and dangerous (Maine 1885,165; 
1917,4-7; 69-71; Grote 1870,357-361 ). The rationalization of 
custom, tradition, law and constitution on the basis of 'a priori* 
theories and principles, was understood by Maine and Grote as the 
siren calling Victorian society to its doom. Though politically 
liberal they tended therefore to remain conservative in orientation. 
Reform had to be gradual and an elaboration of existing practice not a 
radical replacement of it by alien entities. 
John Grote, we saw, uses the wider theory of relations to attack 
empiricist, individualistic and utilitarian theories of society. Man 
is essentially a social being and concrete relations define his 
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existence (Grote 1870,145). Society has no 'a priori' order, nor is 
its form fixed throughout history as in the writings of the 
Utilitarians. Society is a complex organisation of different, but 
related members, not an aggregation of similar units. Laws, duties 
and other moral obligations reflect the concrete relations in which 
men find themselves (Grote 1876,212). Legal rights and duties differ 
only in that they might actually alter particular social relations 
(Grote 1876,94). For Grote, as for Maine and James Fitziames 
Stephen, law is normally an emanation from customary and traditional 
practice: politics, the activity of creating laws, is the 
elucidation, codification and occasionally, where necessary to 
overcome contradictions and incoherences, the alteration of existing 
social and civil relations. The idea of law as the result of purely 
rational calculation is rejected. We should not be surprised to find 
that James Fitzjames Stephen and Grote's friend Robert Leslie Ellis 
were themselves close friends (Stephen, L. 1893,93-101). 
One surprising source of evidence that there was a distinctly 
Cambridge way of thinking at the time, opposed to the positivist 
utilitarian axis, comes paradoxically from one of the few 
representatives of the later group in Cambridge in the 1850's and and 
1860's, Leslie Stephen. In the memoir of another Cambridge 
positivist, laissez faire liberal and utilitarian, Sir Henry Fawcett, 
Professor of Political Economy from 1863, recounts how the little 
coterie of positivists saw their-situation in the university in the 
1850's. 
'The more 'sentimental' youth learnt Tennyson by heart, wept over 
Jane Eyre, and was beginning to appreciate Browning. If more 
seriously disposed he read Sartor Resartus and the French 
Revolution: he followed the teachings of Maurice and had some 
leaning to Christian Socialism. But the sterner utilitarians 
looked to Mill as their prophet. They repudiated Carlyle as a 
reactionary, and set down Maurice as muddle headed... (Stephen 
1885,23-24) 
1 
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There is also unwitting testimony to the romantic pressure on the 
positivists in the university in the same book. We are told that 
Alexander Macmillan, the young publisher 
. was often in our rooms, trying fruitlessly to stimulate 
Fawcett's interest in the writings of Carlyle, Maurice and 
Kingsley' (ibid 116). 
Again Stephen admits that 'some of the younger men' in Fawcett's 
political economy classes considered Mill and Ricardo to be obsolete 
and demanded 
'that a professor should have his eyes open to recent 
speculations in Germany and elsewhere' (ibid 125) 
Finally Stephen recounts the conspiracy that led to Fawcett's 
narrow victory for election to the Chair of Political Economy in 1863 
over Grote's close friend Joseph B. Mayor. Mayor was a product of the 
romantic wing of the Cambridge movement, a liberal and a cleric. 
Fawcett represented all that Mayor, Grote, Whewell and the now 
dwindling bunch of Coleridgians detested, a positivist, a laissez 
faire political economist and utilitarian, whose key reading was 
Mill's Political Economy and Buckle's History of Civilization (ibid 
97-98). Mayor's 'character and abilities were all that could be 
desired... ' according to Stephen, but the battle was about a lot more 
and became even 'a Church and political question' (ibid 121). In the 
end Fawcett won by ninety votes to eighty through the device of 
encouraging a third party to stand from Mayor's own college St. John's. 
Leonard H. Courtney's candidacy split the Trinity and St. john's phalanx 
(116-123). If Mayor had joined the line of descent of professors 
teaching on the moral science tripos, from Whewell to Grote and 
F. D. Maurice in philosophy and Charles Kingsley in history, the 
romantic idealist axis would have been almost complete. As it was 
Fawcett would later be joined by T. R. Birks and Henry Sidgwick in 
-philosophy and J. Seeley in history forming a line of a very 
different 
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character in the 1870's and 1880's. 
. 
The strength in depth and breadth of the mid-Victorian Cambridge 
elite in its opposition to Westminster was evident inside and outside 
of the twin centres based on the scientific rationalism of Whewell and 
the idealism of Hare and Grote and Maurice. In the areas of history 
and literature the University produced some of the most prominent 
cultural propagandists, of the age. Cambridge provided the best 
selling of all Victorian historians, Thomas Babington Macauley, and 
three other popular historical moralizers, Charles Kingsley, Sir James 
Stephen and Sir John Seeley, as well as the Liberal Anglicans. In the 
field of literature the impact of the Cambridge Apostles, Charles 
Kingsley and the three great Cambridge poets, Coleridge, Wordsworth 
and Tennyson, is well researched but their common link with Cambridge 
and more particularly with the Cambridge Network, has only recently 
been acknowledged (Cannon 1964). In Augustus de Morgan and John Venn 
the university provided two of the most influential logicians of the 
age, the twin founders of modern Symbolic Logic prior to the 
reformulations in the writings of another Cambridge philosopher# 
Bertrand Russell. All were opponents of utilitarianism and 
positivism (Morgan 1847; Venn 1866,1881,1889; Passmore 1966, 
121-130). 
The impact of Cambridge thinkers on religion was registered at a 
practical and an' academic level and in both cases was far from being 
reactionary. Apart from the Broad Church movement Cambridge 
encouraged the most radical of all social movements within the 
Victorian Anglican Church. 'Christian Socialism, with its ties with 
the Labour and Trade Union movements, recruited three of its leading 
propagandists from the'University: John Llewellyn Davies, Frederick 
Maurice and Charles Kingsley. Their message was that God's Kingdom on 
earth was for all men despite class distinctionsg and that working men 
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should organize to fight for a fraternal and just society. For their 
pains the works of the last two were listed as 'Revolutionary 
Literature' in an 1851 edition of the Quarterly Review. ., and 
The 
Times printed accusations that the two advocated murder, abolition of 
private property and civil disobedience (Maurice. F. 1885,11,71-74; 
Chadwick 1966-70,11,69-71,272-285,439-459; Kitson Clark 1965, 
307-313). 
But at the academic level the impact of the Cambridge 
intellectuals was made first by the group of Liberal Anglicans around 
Hare and Thirlwall, who along with Arthur Stanley were labelled as 
'Broad Churchmen'. In the period up to the mid 1860's all Fellows and 
most professors at Cambridge had to be ordained and as they were 
obliged to be interested in theology it was natural that they should 
understand it in philosophical, historical and rational scientific 
terms. Cambridge already had the potent model of Coleridge's 
theological writings on which to proceed, but Camb . ridg e theologians 
were quick to absorb contemporary German writings and then to 
accommodate themselves to the new scientific discoveries of the age. 
Most centrally, Hare and Thirlwall were quick to accommodate Cambridge 
theology to the critical theology of Schleiermacher, Bunsen and 
Strausst twenty years before these ideas were revealed with such 
dramatic effect with the publication of Essays and Reviews at oxford 
in 1860. In fact, while Oxford was undergoing a slow change in the 
direction of High Churchism with Manning, Pusey and Keble, and in the 
case of Newman in the direction of Catholicism, Cambridge bathed in 
the light of critical theology and liberal rationalism. While oxford 
needed its Essays and Reviews controversy to re-establish liberal 
theology, Cambridge remained unimpressed. Charles Kingsley described 
the Cambridge reaction to Arthur Stanley in a letter of February 1861. 
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'Cambridge lies in magnificent repose and 
stares at her more nervous sister and asks 
about.... There is little or nothing, says 
book which we have not all of us been through 
denials, destruction - we have faced them t 
them' (Kingsley, F6E., 1892,242). 
shaking lazy ears 
what it is all 
Cambridge, in that 
already. Doubts, 
ill we are tired of 
Kingsley could only promise that Cambridge 'will see fair play for 
them, according to the forms of English law and puhlic opinion', a 
promise fulfilled by John Grote's widely praised pamphlet criticising 
the conviction of two authors of the Essays on the grounds of heresy 
(Grote 1862a). 
One Cambridge-trained theologian-who found himself both in the 
courts and largely ostracized by his colleagues for his radical 
attitudes-was Bishop John Colenso (Colenso 1862-1879; Chadwick 
1966-70,11,90-97). His application of mathematical and critical 
techniques to scriptures seemed to many to suggest that the Old 
Testament was simply a book of 'fictions and forgeries'. John Seeley, 
using the. critical approach, provided a humanistic and non-mystical 
interpretation of the life of Christ which produced a similar public 
furore (Seeley, 1866, Gladstone, 1868). However the mantle of the 
moderate liberal tradition was continued at Cambridge by the trio of 
Lightfooto Westcott and Hort who did most to hold things together at a 
time of great confusion and difficulty. (Carpenter 1959; Moorman 
1967,380-397). In their roles as teachers, authors, bishops and 
activists in such movements as the Cooperative Society# the working 
Mens Colleges and the Christian Socialist Union these figures sought 
to reconcile the church to the discoveries of modern science and the 
demands imposed by industrialisation. 
However, the old liberal consensus, hardly ruffled by the 
controversies of Essays and Reviews and Colenso, was eventually upset 
by the implications of the origins of the Species for theology, and by 
the extension of democratic ideas and the franchise in politics. 
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After reading Huxley, Lyell and Darwin, arguing for the compatibility 
of evolution and belief in God, Charles Kingsley commented to Maurice 
that 'verily, God is great, or else there is no God at all' 
(Kingsley, F. E., 1892,253). But while Kingsley, Maurice, Grote, Hort, 
Lightfoot and Westcott simply widened their view of God's design to 
accommodate evolution, and attempted to save religion by placing it in 
a different domain of discourse to science, Whewell and Sedgwick 
plunged into reaction and Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Marshall, James Ward 
and William Clifford followed Leslie Stephen and Aldis Wright into 
agnosticism (Chadwick, 1966-70, II 23-35). 
. In college and university politics, Whewell and Sedgwick, great 
liberal reformers in their youth, reacted against government 
intervention and became anti-democratic reactionaries. The reformers 
who took their place, including John Grote, Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, 
H. J. Roby and Leslie Stephen, were soon overshadowed by the group 
around Sidgwick, but in the late fifties John Gr'ote's proposals for 
the democratic reform of Trinity could still be labelled as 
revolutionary', 'hateful' 'and mischievious' (Winstanley 1940,347; 
1945,252). In a reply to Grote, the autocratic Master of Trinity, 
William Whewell, wrote 'when there is a question of power between. 
sixty persons on one side and one on the other, to refer it to the 
whole body of sixty one, each having an equal vote, is a palpably 
absurd proceeding'(Whewell 1857, MSS). But by the 1870's the spread 
of democratic practices and the new liberalism of Gladstone proved too 
much for even those good old liberals who had supported John Morley 
and James Bryce in the Saturday Review. The Cambridge liberalism 
associated with Mainel Grote, Mayor, James Fitzjames Stephen in the 
1860's gave way (Harvie 1976) and was replaced by an interesting form 
of analytic conservation associated most obviously with the later 
Maine, Fitziames Stephen and Seeley. Indeed taking into account 
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Popular Government, (Henry Maine's tirade against democracy), Liberty, 
Equality and Fraternity, (James Fitzjames Stephens assault on J-S-Mill 
and liberalism), and John Seeley's The Expansion of Europe which 
propogated imperialism, we find these Cambridge intellectuals had 
espoused the most coherent development of a new sceptical and analytic 
conservative political theory in the late nineteenth century (Roach 
1957,59-60,80-81). 
So with this critique of political liberalism and democracy the 
whole spectrum of Cambridge opposition to the supposedly dominant, 
non-academic, elite of empiricists, positivists, utilitarians and 
radicals is complete, and the traditional view is evidently in need of 
modification. Such a non-academic and non-professional elite did 
certainly exist, as a reading of J. S. Mill's Autobiography or John 
Gross's Rise and Fall of the Man of Letters will illustrate, and their 
intellectual orientation was essentially positivist. But the 
domination of this elite was seriously challenged by various 
university elites throughout the century and especially as I have 
illustratedl'by the network of persons and ideas centred on 
mid-Victorian Cambridge. 
In place of the cultural sovereignty thesis, then, I suggest a 
dualistic paradigm mentioned in passing by A. Carre and Duncan Forbes 
(Carre 1949). Both institutionally and culturally the Victorian 
intelligentsia was divided into 'Two Worlds'l each containing a. 
plurality of definitely related sub-groups (Gibbins 1976). One world 
was inhabited-by literary gentlemen, editors of journals, journalists, 
political activists and authors, roughly equivalent to Arnold's 
0 philistines', while the other was inhabited by university educated 
academics - Arnold's 'cultural elite ', located as Gross suggests in 
the 'older universities', 'the learned professions and the more highly 
educated sections of the upper middle class' (Gross, 1973,70). The 
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first group were predominantly positivists while the second were 
united in their opposition to this unholy doctrine. Each world had 
its own centre of gravity in regard to personalities, institutions and 
theories despite its pluralistic nature. Each gave a view of the 
world that was meant to be all-embracing and hence was engaged in 
polemical battles with its opponents, the most significant being 
J. S. Mill's controversy with Whewell on scientific methodology; the 
controversies over utilitarianism with Whewell, Sedgwick, Macauley, 
Grote and Bradley; and that between Hamilton, Grote, Ward, Green and 
Mill on empiricism. 
In addition, each world had its own scheme for recruitment and 
training, with London University and University College recognized as 
the final institutionalization of that 'kind of unofficial university 
in Londont with Mill as tutor and the venerable Professor Bentham in 
the background' which existed prior to the 1840's (Clarke M. 1962; 
Young, 1953,67). Formal communications were essential via the 
Fortnightly and Westminster Review' for London and the Atheneum, 
Saturday, Edinburgh and Contemporary Review for the university elites. 
occasionally the personalities and views of the two worlds coincided, 
or as in the cases of John Morley and Leslie Stephen, members migrated 
to the opposite camp, but generally the inhabitants of each world 
remained distinct. What happened in the 1870's was not a 'Revolution' 
that suddenly transferred sovereignty to the university elite, but an 
equinox which saw the balance of idealism over positivism, academic 
over non-academic, lecture theatre over drawing room and debating 
society, tilted in favour of the universities (Heyck 1982,155-189, 
221-224). 
The 'Two Worlds' metaphor can usefully be illustrated by 
comparing the careers of two mid Victorian intellectuals who, despite 
ýeing brothersl came to be luminaries in the. alternative elites: John 
301 
Grote at Cambridge and. George Grote at London. John was a 
professional philosopher, a Knightbridge Professor, Senior Fellow at 
Trinity College and a moderate liberal reformer of the established 
order. George was an amateur historian and philosopher, professional 
banker, 'radical M. P. and an opponent of the existing power elite. 
John was a member of the university intelligentsia, an anti-positivist 
metaphysician and idealist, a defender of J. S. Mill's arch enemies, 
Whewell and Sedgwick, and an acquaintance of Sidgwick, Maurice, Venn, 
Kingsley and Maine. George Grote was a leading luminary in the 
opposing world, an empiricist and utilitarian, a close friend and 
defender of Bentham and J. S. Mill, a patron of Augustus Comte and an 
acquaintance of Spencer, Carlyle, Austin, Ricardo, Place, Brougham and 
Molesworth. John was a churchman and a university liberal, whose 
views were coloured by a deep respect for the value of history time 
and. tradition, while George was an unbeliever, the author of An 
Analysis of the Influence of Religion on the Temporal Happiness of 
Han, a rationalist, a nationally known radical republican reformer and 
an opponent of the' established 'sinister interests'. John was 
sceptical about laissez faire economics and social policy while George 
remained an ardent exponent. John was a romantic idealist while 
George was a rationalist, dedicated to creating a society run on 
rational principles. 
Much more could be made here of the comparison between John and 
George Grote. One reason for doing so is methodological. How, if one 
accepts the contextual methodology of marxist intellectual historians, 
can one explain how two sons of the same family, class, and culture 
could end up being so far apart on fundamental philosophical and 
political beliefs? Marxists, I feel, would have difficulties that 
even subdivisions into factions of the bourgeois would not help 
overcome. Does the example give support to those like Richter, 
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Harvie, Cannon, Collini and Clarke who have turned attention to the 
study of local networks and elites? The best explanatory system for 
accounting for the differences between John and George seems to be the 
intellectual networks into which each become embroiled. George Grote 
was loyal to James Mill and Bentham until his death and even when John 
Mill showed signs of heterodoxy George stood firm (Thomas 1979, 
406-438). Despite the influence of Ferrier and the eclectics John 
Grote remained a Cantabridgean. 
Similarities do exist to moderate the sharp differences. Both 
were serious, earnest and disciplined scholars. Both thought that 
progress was an unlikely product of industrial society but backed 
education as its most likely producer (Clarke 1962,176-180). Both 
remained very high (though open) minded, believing it to be the duty 
as well as the right of all men to think out problems for themselves 
and provide individual answers. Both politically and philosophically 
both preferred Aristotle to Plato; both believed we coUld learn from 
the classics and treated Niebuhr as the father of modern historical 
scholarship. John expressed the close companionship but distinct 
intellectual background and interest between him and his brother on 
one occasion (Grote 1861,1). According to Bain they remained friendly 
until'John's death but what letters remain reveal dealings of a purely 
administrative kind. George twice attempted to get John Mill to take 
regard of his brother's criticisms in the Explorat-io and the 
Examination but to little effect. Mill wrote of the Exploratio to 
George in 1865 
'I read Professor Grote's book carefully, but found speculations 
and criticisms much more vague and less tangible than I expected. 
Bain seemed to think the objection to Noumena was important, and 
mentioned notice, but, as I understood it, it amounts to little. 
It is very well to say, why suppose an unknowable entity as the 
substratum of everything knowable, but the truth seems to be that 
the Professor merely, with Reid and Hamilton, * believes this 
unknowable entity to be the knowable. Altogether I could make no 
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use of the Exploratio for the improvement of my Logic and have 
merely touched upon it briefly in a note' (Mill 1972, Mineka and 
Lindloy 111 1095-6). 
John twice felt obliged to respond to his brother's ideas#-once 
defending him from the attack of Richard Shilleto, and again in the 
Exploratio Part 11 where he referees a dispute between Grote and 
E. M. Cope on the interpretation of a passage from Protagoras and 
administers a slight rebuke to both (Grote 1900,261-283). John. aided 
his brother on some academic matters and made sure that George's gift 
of the History of Greece was placed in the college library. (TCC., 
Whewell, Add. MS. C. 88133; British Library, Add. MS. 47229, f. 222). 
Cambridge even honoured George in John's lifetime, presenting him with 
an honorary LLD in 1861. 
But in the end the differences dwarf the similarities. 
Associational psychology and empiricism do not fit happily alongside 
mataphysical and epistemological idealism; nor does atheism with 
christianity. In the year John produced his subtle attack on Mill in 
theExploratio, John Stuart Mill paid tribute to George Grote's support 
and inspiration in the Examination of Sir William Hamilton's 
Philosophy. While John devastated Comte's philosophy of science and 
history, George had earlier provided financial assistance to the sage 
in times of need. In the end history's judgement of George will lie 
between 'whigg historian' and 'Vulgar Materialist', the latter passed 
on him by John Ruskin (Cook and Wedderburn 1903-1912, XXXIV, 586). 
Something far different will be the judgement passed on John Grote. 
On one last point there is some similarity: both sought to 
institutionalize their thinking and their influence. John found a 
ready home in the church and Trinity College but George had to build 
his own. George entertained the Utilitarian Society in his banking 
office in Threadneedle Street, London in 1823 but soon his mind turned 
to bigger projects, and along with Lord Brougham, John Mill and Thomas 
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Hodgskin and others he helped to found and run the first University - 
now University College, - London. The colleges here were to be 
non-conformist if not atheist and there was to be no religious 
instruction allowed. - George financed the Chair of Logic and 
Philosophy of Mind but with restrictions an payment if the holder was 
a cleric. He opposed a minister, the Reverend J. Hoppus, for the Chair 
of Logic and Philosophy of Mind in 1827, despite his being an 
independent. He resigned on this issue of the religious character of 
chairs in 1830, but returned in 1849 in time to ensure that he helped 
George Croom Robertson, John's D. N. B. biographer, to obtain the Chair 
of Logic over the Reverand James Martineau, an intuitionist and 
unitarian, in 1866. The brothers throughout three decades were 
pulling against each other and in the end their strenuous intellectual 
efforts may well have cancelled each other out. In these offspring 
irom the same family, religious and class background, are embodied the 
central intellectual conflicts of the day, positivism versus 
romanticism, utilitarianism versus idealism, the old amateur 
intellectual elite versus the emerging professionals, the urban 
centres versus the old but reviving university towns. 
Further study of the two men is likely to provide a fund of 
interesting information on Victorian intellectual and cultural life. 
of course Cambridge was not alone in opposing the alien forces of 
London, Manchester and Birmingham, the forces of empiricism, 
positivism and materialism. Popularly, there was the wider romantic 
movement with its wings in the pre Raphaelite artists as well as in 
the musical support Mendelssohn and Liszt, and the writings of Ruskin, 
Carlyle and William Morris. At Oxford there *was the religiously 
grounded Oxford Movement and in the 1860's the early efforts towards 
-idealism of Mark' Pattison, Edward Caird -, Benjamin Jowett and 
T. H. Green, and there was also the scottish cultural movement. The 
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comparison with Oxford can be tackled by responding to the 
conventional presentation of Oxford and Cambridge philosophy in 
V. R. Mehta's article 'The Origins of English Idealism in Relation to 
Oxford' (Mehta 1975,177-187). 
Here the picture is of a sterile, rationalistic Cambridge 
dominated by the classics and mathematics. It is suggested that no 
German thinkers appeared in the teaching an the moral science tripos 
and that Kant's Critique failed to appear before 1870 (179). Both 
statements are false: Kant's Critique and his ethical writings did 
appear on the reading lists before 1865 and Fichte's Popular Works wee 
recommended at least on the reading list and in examinations from 1860 
onwards (Mayor 1863,145-148). Mayor in his section of the Students 
Guide to the University of Cambridge on the moral science tripos 
recommends on ethics that 
'Kant and Fichte should be left to the last: the Metaphysics of 
Ethics of the former has been tran$lated into English by Semple, 
who has added some chapters from the Practical Reason. A history 
of modern German philosophy should be read along with these 
books' (Mayor 1863,147) 
on mental philosophy he adds 
'Kant should succeed to these. An analysis should be made of the 
Critick of Pure Reason, and Cousin's Commentary (contained in the 
fifth volume of his first series on Modern Philosophy) may be 
readily consulted'(ibid 148). 
Kant's Critique is recommended in the German original, Chalybaus, 
history of German philosophy which is 'a close study of Fichte is 
advised and Cousins and Ferrier are recommended after 1866. This may 
make Cambridge more advanced in metaphysics and continental philosophy 
than oxford in the same period. only Ellis McTaggart satisfies Mehta 
as a Cambridge idealist and he concludes, missing completely even 
Leslie Stephen's point about the 'rationalist' character of Cambridge 
thought, that 
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'the overall tenor of Cambridge philosophy continued to be both 
empirical and positivist' (ibid, 180). 
Of the Cambridge Network Sedgwick and Whewell are quickly 
dismissed by Mehta. Whewell leant, we are told, 'towards the 
intuitionism of Kant'. Coleridge, Hare, Stanley and Maurice are held 
to have had not much 'echo in Cambridge, and whatever influence they 
had remained esoteric' (181). Grote is not discussed and Maurice 
dismissed, with the authority of Maurice's pupils, as a 
I muddle-headed, futile and mystical thinker'. Henry Sidgwick and 
Leslie Stephens are allowed by Mehta to paint the picture of 
depression and sterility at Cambridge while Mark Pattison and Jowett 
portray a dynamic and potent Oxford (Mehta 179-180,184). The 
judgement of Henry Sidgwick in 1877 goes unchallenged 
'Since the time of the Platonists the history of Cambridge shows 
no philosophical school 
, 
or set, and scarcely any philosophical 
coterie: at least one observes no ideas or manners of thought 
going about the world which can be definitely traced to such a 
coterie'. 
and that in the Moral Science Tripos 
'the historical study of metaphysics is limited so as to exclude 
the post-Kantian developments in Germany' (Sidgwick 
1877,244-245). 
This picture we can now see is not altogether accurate, either at 
the level of philosophy or in the classics or university reform. In 
Whewell and Grote, and at a lower level in Coleridge, Hare and 
Maurice, Cambridge had a group of philosophers who commanded as much 
respect as the doyens of Oxford philosophy prior to 1870, including 
Dean Mansel, John Newman, Mark Pattison and the early jowett. While 
after 1870, even under Sidgwick, Ward, Sorley and McTaggart, Cambridge 
thrives, it is equally true that Oxford, and Oxford idealism in 
particular blossoms. The dating is crucial. ' In the classics and 
history Cambridge had numerou's scholars in the first rank prior to 
1870, including Hare, Thirlwall and Kemble, and to these must be added 
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the glittering array of scientists, mathematicians and logicians. In 
university and curriculum reform, Whewell, Sedgwick and Thirlwall had 
given Cambridge an early start, and while they tired in the 1850 and 
1860's the torch was taken up by John Grote, Joseph Edleston, John 
Westlake, Leslie Stephen, Roby and others before the period of rapid 
reforms after 1870. In many ways then Cambridge was in advance of 
Oxford prior to 1870, an advance that Sidgwick and his allies however 
were unable to sustain. 
Two attempts to revive interest in Cambridge philosophy after 
1820 have been made, one successful the other unsuccessful, but both 
deal with the period after 1870. Jerome Schneewind's account of 
Sidgwick"s efforts is a superb piece of scholarship. But oddly it 
largely ignores the non-Sidgwickian strands in the rest of Cambridge 
philosophy. James Ward, John Venn, Ellis McTaggart, and W. R. Sorley 
are hardly touched upon, which Morell surprising as they might show 
Sidgwi ck. to be somewhat of a loner in a university Where ideas were 
moving in a different direction. In the second, C. J. Dewey has tried 
to argue that in Sidgwick, Marshall and Toynbee, Cambridge had in the 
last three decades of the nineteenth century its own 'Cambridge 
Idealism', characterized by a revulsion from utilitarianism and a 
subscription to social self-realization as the end of life and 
politics (Dewey 1974,63-78). Quite rightly this thesis has been 
savaged-by Stephen Collini who has noted the odd definition of 
idealism, the false identification of Bradley and Sidg*wick, and the 
mistaken accounting of the ideas of Sidgwick in particular as idealist 
by Dewey(Collini 1975,171-177). Idealism of a sort does continue at 
Cambridge after the death of Maurice. James Ward has more sympathy 
with it than is often given credit and McTaggart, Sorley, Taylor and 
Mackenzie all have idealist credentials. But Sidgwick and Marshall 
had other concerns, and while both attended the Grote Society, and 
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knew Maurice well, it would be hard to identify them as followers of 
either and they are certainly not idealists. (See 351-8,370-9 ), 
Finally, we can turn briefly to Scottish philosophy and the 
Scottish Universities. If the Cantabridgeans had built a defence 
against the encroachments of the industrial cities, and launched 
sustained attacks on their citadels, especially empiricism, positivism 
and utilitarianism, how did they respond to Scotland? As we have seen 
in Whewell, Coleridge and Maurice, Cambridge found warriors willing to 
do battle. Davie records the effects of these attacks on morale in 
Scotland, and the retorts made (Davie 1961,253-338). Cambridge in 
fact had Trojan horses at Edinburgh in J. D. Forbes and Clark Maxwell, 
who brought the Cambridge ideas of Whewell and of a scientific 
education back to Scotland. In the end Scottish philosophy and 
culture after 1870 gave way to the alien currents of German and 
Oxbridge origin's, but not without a fight. Two forces emerged in 
Scotland to oppose them: Evangelicals, who stuck with a modified form 
of common-sense intuitionism typified by James McCosh, whose 
Intuitions of the Mind was in Grote*s private library, and the 
neo-Hamiltonians influenced by German idealism, French eclecticism and 
typified by James Frederick Ferrier. In the internal battle Ferrier 
lost chairs in philosophy at Edinburgh on two occasions and settled in 
exile at St Andrews. In the end the Evangelicals' victory was pyrrhic 
for the distinctive school of Scottish philosophy was soon to lose its 
integrity and influence. 
But the loss for idealism was very great. Nascent and indigenous 
idealism in Scotland died the death it did at Cambridge when the 
writings, teaching, personal and political influence of Grote, Maurice 
and Ferrier came to an end. But while Cambridge rationalists had 
little link with either of the Scottish movements, Grote and Ferrier 
were in the same intellectual, if not cultural, campt and, had been 
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from the 1850's. In a letter of 1856, Ferrier had written to Whewell 
'I am glad that Mr Grote has thought the Institutes worthy of 
contributing some materials. Whether a pro or a con view is to 
be taken of their opinion is of little consequence' (Ferrier 1856 
MS). 
These contributions did not emerge until 1865 but had been thought 
about for a long time before. Ferrier it seems had sparked off the 
idealist streak that ran through Grote's Cambridge education. The 
replies Grote wrote on Hamilton and Ferrier are remarkable evidence of 
the potency of Scottish philosophy in the period and its effect on 
Cambridge. If we add to this the realization by Segerstedt that 
Grote's work completes Scottish philosophy by reconciling the 
common-sense stress on direct apprehension of reality and Ferrier's 
idealistic stress on mind and its development to the absolute, we can 
see that Grote not only learnt from Scotland but paid his debt. 
London and the philosophical radicals, 'and Edinburgh and the Scottish 
schools of common sense and Hamiltonian idealism are the forces to and 
against which Cambridge and Grote responded. The works of Ferrier and 
Grote were forged in the resulting battles within British culture. 
That they were forged too soon to be recognized as potent weapons or 
machines of use is obvious, though the explanation of this is not, and 
we must return to this question later. 
IIT 
John Grote. Cambridge University and their Place in Victorian Thought 
If this argument Above, and the specific account of the 
originality of the mid-Victorian intelligensia at Cambridge is 
accepted, then several important conclusions follow. Firstly a new 
theory of the history of Victorian universities is needed that 
attributes a new role in terms of intellectual developments to 
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Cambridge in the period between the demise of the Scottish 
universities and the flowering of Oxford in the later part of the 
century. Secondly, a revision is needed to the established theory of 
the origins of idealist philosophy in England. In this more attention 
needs to be given to the writings of John Grote and the movement which 
fostered the development of his particular brand of idealism and so 
also to another long-overlooked creator of indigenous British 
idealism, James Frederick Ferrier. Such a study should revise' the 
assumption that the emergence of idealism was simply an accompaniment 
of the 'Reception of Hegel in England', which took place pritharily at 
Oxford in the 1870's, and should attribute a new role to Cambridge 
academics of an earlier period. * 
Thirdly, a new analysis of the non-positivist origins of modern 
sociology, philosophy and anthropology, similar to that of J. D. Burrow 
on evolutionary theory, is needed that considers the contribution of 
other Victorian university intellectuals. In particular, more 
attention needs to be given to the idealistic philosophy, social 
theory, historiography, jurisprudence, relational theory and 
anthropology of the Cambridge and later Oxford idealists whose social 
theory wasl in the view of Frederick Copleston, 'more in tune with the 
perceived needs of the time than the position defended by Herbert 
Spencer'(Copleston 1967,173). What is even more importanto their 
writings should be recognised as more related to contemporary 
developments in sociological theory, philosophy# and political theory 
than anything provided by empiricists and positivistso the so-called 
'Founding Fathers' of the modern social sciences. The similarity 
between Grote's idealism and contemporary phenomenology and 
hermeneutics is especially evident. In a narrower sense the political 
thought of Cambridge can be revised in one area. In the figures of 
Coleridge, Maurice, Maine, John Grote, i. F. Stephen and, laterl Seeley, 
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Cambridge had a group of liberals whose respect for history turned 
them against both rationalism, utilitarianism and the laissez-faire 
society. After 1870 the survivors turn towards a new form of analytic 
and sceptical conservatism, the outcome of which is most interesting 
and worthy of study (Harvie 1976). 
Fourthly, in the wider philosophical context we now have the 
evidence to speak of a non rationalist Cambridge Philosophical 
Tradition, or Movement, with an analytic and common sense approach anA 
preoccupied with problems of the rationality of the natural and human 
world, running on through the Victorian era to link with modern 
'Cambridge philosophy'. T here is a basic line in Cambridge philosophy 
from the Cambridge Platonists to the Cambridge Network, and on to the 
recent philosophy of John Grote, James Ward, J. R. Sorley, Ellis 
McTaggart, Bertrand Russell, G. F. Stout, G. E. Moore, Alfred Whitehead, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Oakeshott which could usefully be 
explored in greater depth. But in the mean time, to paraphrase a 
comment by John Passmore, we can safely assert that any university 
that can lay claim to the above 'need fear no accusations either of. 
sterility or narrowness' (Passmore 1968,343). 
But one central theme, if not the central theme, of this study 
has been that the interest and character of John Grote's thought would 
only be fully appreciated if the intellectual context of his thought 
was recovered. This has involved me in challenging several 
conventionally held tenets of modern intellectual history: that the 
universities, and Cambridge university in particular, had little to 
offer to modern philosophy prior to the 1870's; that during the 
period to 1870 Victorian philosophy saw the triumph of empiricism, 
positivism and utilitarianism over a rump of intuitionists and 
religious thinkers; and that knowledge about idealism was rare during 
this period, arriving when it did in the 1870's from Germany and ip 
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Oxford University. 
In place of this collection of theories I have argued that 
Edinburgh and Cambridge Universities housed and produced two valid 
philosophical and intellectual movements in the period up to 1870. 
The Cambridge movement in its two forms, those of Whewell and Sedgwick 
and of Coleridge, Hare, Grote and Maurice, launched a serious and 
sustained challenge to empiricism, positivism and utilitarianism, in 
the period. Philosophical idealism was known about and espoused quite 
widely in mid-Victorian Cambridge, in part from those with direct 
contact with German thought such as Hare and Coleridge, in part 
through acquaintance with secondary literature such as Chalybaus, 
Maurice, Lewes and Morell, and in part from indigenous British roots. 
The romantic idealist line of Sterling, Coleridge and Wordsworth, 
whose brother was Master of Trinity, Julius Hare, Kemble, many of the 
Apostles, Maurice and Whewell , 
before 1850 was developed and 
refined by John Grote, Joseph B. Mayor, Fenton J. *A. Hort, John' Llewelyn 
Davies and others in the 1860's. 
These threads of indigenous romanticism and a serious, though not 
deep, acquaintance with German romantic and idealist thought, were 
bound up with French eclecticism and the indigenous transcendental 
philosophy of Scotland, especially that of Sir William Hamilton and 
James Frederick Ferrier. In Cambridge between 1860 and 1866 John 
Grote bound these elements together to produce a comprehensive and 
coherent philosophical system that was idealist in character and which 
owed more to its immediate Cambridge context and to the thought of 
William Whewell, Sir William Hamilton and James Ferrier than to the 
close acquaintance with and interpretation of imported German 
metaphysics. In James Frederick Ferrier, Frederick Denison 
and John Grotet Britain had a trio of idealist philosophers of 
distinction before 1870. At Edinburgh, then St. Andrews, and in 
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Cambridge, Britain had a nascent idealist movement before 1870 and 
before the influence of Jowett and Pattison had inspired the 
publications of Caird, Green and Bradley in the 1870's. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of'the preceding arguments would be repetitious and 
unrewarding at this point and my conclusions will only set out the 
outcome of the argument of this thesis. Firstly, we are to conclude 
that John Grote is not only 'an interesting figure in the history of 
philosophy but also a major voice in his own right in that 
conversation which is philosophy (Oakeshott 1962,197-247; Rorty 1980, 
264,389; Dallmayr 1984, Bernstein 1986). Historically, his interest 
is in being, along with Coleridge, Maurice and Ferrier, one of the 
first thinkers to produce an idealist philosophical system in 
nineteenth century Britain. Secondly, he is significant for his 
synthesis of eclectic method and idealist metaphysics, which allowed 
him to unite together the best elements from a variety of sources in 
his contemporary intellectual world. Grote, we may tentatively 
conclude, is a truly indigenous English idealist. 
In his own right as a philosopher we have seen that he produced 
many arguments of great significance. Grote sets out to build his 
moral and political philosophy on a plurality of foundations, on 
epistemology, metaphysics, ontology and the theory of language. In 
the first he develops a distinctly English philosophy in which subject 
and object, immediate and mediate, a priori and a posteriori, 
knowledge of acquaintance and description, correspondence and 
coherence, are woven together in the idea of the development of 
knowledge out of primitive consciousness by a process of distinction 
and judgement. In so doing he not only holds together subject and 
object, thought and its objects but, as Heidegger did later, knowingr 
feeling and being. Moral and political ideals he takes to be 
knowable. The right, the just and the obligatory become clearer as we 
reflect on the customary, the traditional, and the immediate in 
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practice. They can be related to being - the higher - facts and to 
our everyday experience and reality - the lower facts. The actual or 
customary, to Grote, contains much of the ideal, and the real is in 
most cases rational. However empirical and normative statements are 
logically distinct as are the actual and the ideal the gaps between 
them are never and can never be in practice. Practical life is a 
struggle to close the gap between what has been, what is, and what 
ought to be, and hence reform and innovation are as important as 
maintenance of what we have already achieved for the good. In Grote 
we have a liberal reformer with the deepest respect, almost Burkian 
and Hegelian, for tradition, custom, everyday practice and 
institutions. An attractive figure like Arnold, in a world of 
rationalism and rapid change. 
Our study of Grote has led us to reconstruct the intellectual 
contexts of both Victorian Britain and Cambridge and in so doing new 
pictures of them have emerged. Along with them a new and highly 
pluralistic paridigm of mid Victorian British philosophy has been 
constructed. Philosophy was not, as Mill considered, in the sad state 
of disrepair he describes in the early decades of the century and was 
not premissed upon the straightforward division between a priori and a 
posteridri, intuitionist and-utilitarian systems. Rather, there were 
numerous schools of thought at work in British philosophy at the time 
and rebirth had begun much earlier than Mill's own identification. 
Cambridge, in particular, we found to be the home of an interesting 
and original intellectual movement which rivalled not only the 
Philosophical Radicals in London and the provincial Positivists but 
the Common Sense school in Edinburgh and proto idealists in mid 
century Oxford. In the warfare that went on on between them all, 
Cambridge accounted for itself well. 
Victorian Cambridge inherited a rationalist, and idealist 
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tradition going back to the Cambridge Platonists and especially Samuel 
Clarke, of whose work Adam Sedgwick and William Whewell were the 
natural inheritors. In this sense Col eridge, Julius Hare and the 
Cambridge Apostles were not a suprising oddity in the intellectual 
history of Britain and Cambridge, but parts of its continuity. In 
William Whewell, Frederick Denison Maurice and John Grote the idealist 
movement at Cambridge received new impetus and direction, and with the 
first two, popularity and influence. The contemporary debate over the 
philosophical character of Wbewell is far from over and in several 
recent works the claim that he was an idealist, based on his 
Kantianism, his idea of history and his general opposition to 
empiricism and positivism, has been powerfully and persuasively made 
and awaits proper adjudication (Marcucci 1963). However, while we 
await for such texts as Simon Schaffer's forthcoming collection of 
essays on Whewell for further help, we can more confidently conclude 
that Maurice and Grote were non-sectarian idialists, who shared a home 
with classicists, theologians, philologers, anthropologists, historians 
and lawyers with similar interests and sympathies. 
In exploration of the loss of recognition of idealist Cambridge I 
have offered three explanations. Firstly, Mill and his colleagues had 
successfully popularized a view of Victorian philosophy within which 
an idealist movement had no place before 1870. Secondly, many in 
Victorian Cambridge, like Whewell and Sedgwick, more or less accepted 
this definition of themselves, and neither John Grote nor Maurice had 
the character or desire to popularize their own philosophical 
allegiances. Thirdly, the. two most powerful figures of the next 
Cambridge generation, Henry Sidgwick and Leslie Stephen, who had 
sympathies with positivism and utilitarianism, had an interest in 
confirming Mill's 'outsider' view of Cambridge. They confirmed the 
picture of a sterile, reactionary and rationalistic Cambridge. 
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tradition of philosophy, and because of their popularity transmitted 
this intact to later Cambridge generations and the outside world. 
But now, if we read Appendix III to this thesis we will see that 
not only was there a 'Cambridge Idealism' in mid Victorian Britain but 
that it blossomed later, after the winter of Birks. And then, not in 
the figures of Sidgwick and Marshall, as Dewey suggests, but in those 
of William Sorley, George Stout, John McTaggart Ellisl the early 
Bertrand Russell, John S. McKenzie and perhaps even James Ward, whose 
idealist credentials still have not been adequately tested. When we 
add to this line the other major Cambridge minds of the period 
sketched in Broad's essay 'The Local Historical Background of 
Contemporary Cambridge Philosophy': the logicians John Venn, Leslie 
Cliffe Ellis, John Keynes, William Johnson and John Maynard Keynes; 
the moral philosophers, including Henry Sidgwick and George Moore; 
the epistemologists a nd mathematicians Robert Leslie Ellis, William 
Kingdom Clifford, Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead; and such 
originals as C. D. Broad, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Oakeshott, we 
get a completely new insight into the Cambridge tradition of 
philosophy in the last two centuries (Broad 1966,13-61). 
In chapters two and three and in chapter ten above we encountered 
not only the Cambridge but also the national and even European context 
for this story. In Chapter two especially, the massive range, 
plurality and complexity of early Victorian philosophy was sketched 
out to present what amounts to a new picture of intellectual life at 
the time. Especially relevant are the conclusions, both that Mill's 
schools of Experience and Intuition were not unified but contained 
many groups with highly distinctive methods and theories, and that the 
label intuitionist was incorrectly used to embrace such diverse 
schools as the rationalists, the intuitionists, the moral sense and 
common sense movements, romantics and idealists. of particular 
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relevance in my thesis is the role of the romantics- in sustaining 
opposition to positivism and the role of the now forgotten French 
eclectics in providing at least Grote and Sidgwick with a new 
approach. We have also learned of a whole bevy of contemporary 
historians who brought German idealism second-hand to mid Victorian 
Britain. 
My suspicion is that against these forces positivism, 
materialism, empiricism, evolutionism and utilitarianism had a hard 
and generally unsuccessful struggle. The anti-positivist schools at 
Edinburgh, Cambridge and Oxford before and after 1870 put up a largely 
successful defence against the erosion of traditionalism, romanticism, 
religion and national cultures which threw their opponents into even 
more exaggerated claims for success. However, it is clear that the 
picture of Victorian thought painted by JS Mill and reflected inside 
Cambridge by Sidgwick and Stephen has had a powerful grip on the minds 
of historians. This suggests that we could adopt an academic 
application of 'labelling theory' to intellectual history. The most 
powerful historians are the ones who get their labels and paradigms 
accepted not those whose methods, aims or arguments, are most 
coherent. Just as, controlling an agenda is a key determinant of power 
in politics# so getting one's labels, definition of problems and 
priorities accepted is a key determinant of success in intellectual 
history (Lukes 1974). The, dominant picture is now in *need of 
de-construction. 
However, my research has revealed at least two dichotomies that 
did emerge in Victorian intellectual life, which John Grote had 
already anticipated. The first was that the old dispute between the 
so called schools of induction and intuition would be transcended and 
the new battle lines would be drawn between 'Idealism and Positivism'. 
Secondly, Grote had spotted, and the Cambridge# Oxford and Edinburgh 
. 
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of his day made concrete, the decline of the role of the amateur 
intellectual and of scholarship in British intellectual lifet and the 
accordant rise. of the professional. In % Old Studies and New* 
Grote reacted to the professionalization of knowledge and opposed the 
modern demand that scholarship sucumb to society's demand 'for 
practical achievement. In their own texts Sir William Hamilton, 
Whewell, Ferrier, Sidgwick, Pattison andZowett, aided by the Royal 
Commissioners, secured a professional monopolization of British 
intellectual and even cultural life for the late Victorian and 
twentieth century universities. But the price was that the ideals of 
pure scholarship, and of knowledge as an end in itself, were 
sacrificed, the compromise deal with the State being 'liberal 
education*. In this process, one general feature of what Michael 
Foucault sees as the trend to the professionalization of knowledge in 
the interests of power in the modern world, amateurs had to adapt or 
die, and so the last amateur remnants in London, Birmingham, 
Manchester and elsewhere in the big Victorian cities built their own 
institutions, the new redbrick universities and later the polytechnics 
(Foucault 1980). Thus we saw why Mill, George Grote and their 
colleagues founded the new University of London and fruitlessly 
directed it to wage war on the old universities, the church and- the 
remnants of the sinister interests. John Grote was not the man to 
professionalize politics, economics, history and philosophy at 
Cambridge. He resisted the new ideology of pragmatism and left the 
task to his student friend Henry Sidgwick. 
If this thesis has been successful we can draw four major 
conclusions. Firstly, in John Grote, Cambridge and Britain had a 
philosopher of the first order, who in his own distinctive fashion 
built a powerful idealist system from the indigenous materials of his 
own age and its 'intellectual inheritance. Secondly, that in the 
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University of Cambridge from the 1820's right through to the 1860'sl 
England had an intellectual movement and a philosophical impetus of 
great range, power and penetration which is worthy of, much greater 
respect and research. In addition, we may conclude that there was a 
Cambridge idealism between 1830 and 1920 which was as impressive as 
that of Oxford but not associated, as Dewey believes, with Sidgwick 
and Marshall. Finally, we must conclude with John Passmore that any 
university that can lay claim to the line of figures I have discussed 
need fear no accusation either of sterility or of *narrowness* 
(Passmore 1966,343). However, we must quote as evidence for this 
conclusion not only 'Moore, Russell, McTaggart and Whitehead, Ward and 
Stout' but also Coleridge, Julius Hare, William Whewell, John Grote, 
Frederick Denison Maurice, John Venn, Henry Maine, James Fitzjames and 
Leslie Stephen, Henry Sidgwick, W. R. Sorley, G. F. Stout, C. D. Broadt 
. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michael Oakeshott. Put in this context, 
Cambridge philosophy has an intellectual line of massive interest and 
satisfaction. 
Much of the argument presented here has, however, only been 
indicative and much more research needs to be done to support and draw 
out the conclusions reached. On John Grote, more work needs to be 
done on his epistemology, his ethics and his theory of language. A 
new generation of research will begin if Grote's original manuscripts 
which have eluded me so far are recovered. Next, I feel there is room 
for a detailed critical appraisal of Grote's philosophy and its 
influences, and of John's relationship to his brother George. On the 
origins of Cambridge philosophy much more work needs to be done on the 
Cambridge Platonists, Clarke especially, and on Whewellt Ferriert 
Robert Leslie Ellis, John Venn and many other Cambridge Network 
figures. But, of prime imoortance, we must give more attention to 
John Grote's theory of language. Mayor reported that Grote left one 
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volume of 422 pages and several other chapters and essays on the 
philosophy of language which he asked Mayor to publish tinder the title 
0 Miscellanea Philologica et Philosophicao From the brief extracts in 
Thought versus Learning and on Glossology I conclude that Grote was 
struggling to develop an original and exciting theory of language with 
extremely modern connotations. The discovery and analysis of these 
manuscripts and a critical re-analysis of what we already have should 
take priority over all other ventures. 
But after giving such advice, one last general conclusion must be 
made to moderate the general direction of this thesis. Being 
interesting in both a philosophical and a historical, context, Grote 
can still be read profitably for another fundamental reason, the 
reason given by Michael Oakeshott. John Grote is a lesson in how 
to reflect. Attacked as he has been for a dry and difficult style, we 
might come to Grote expecting the prophecy to be fulfilled. Yet in 
both. his literary and conversational style, his persistent restatement 
of arguments, the use of analogy and metaphor, Grote's work offers an 
exciting and rewarding source of inspiration for all philosophers of 
whatever persuasion. John Grote is an. education in how to think 
clearly. 
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Appendix I 
The Grote Manuscripts 
A complete list of the remaining John Grote MSS are published on 
pages X-XI of the Exploratio Philosophica Part II (Grote 1900). They 
are extensive covering epistemology, language, moral philosophy, 
social theory, history, literary and art criticism, religion, and 
pages on architecture. Other elements contain aphorisms, and note 
books, but not, I gather, letters. No trace of the original MSS has 
been found, despite extensive searches in the following libraries and 
archives, and consultation with named sources: no trace of the 
original MSS has been found. 
Royal Commission Historical Manuscripts. 
British Library (British Museum Library). 
University Library, Cambridge. 
Bodelian Library, Oxford. 
National Library of Scotland. 
Wren Library and Trinity College Library. 
University of London Library. 
King's College, London. 
St. John's College Libr'ary'Cambridge. 
King's College, Cambridge. 
Bristol University Library. 
Clifton College Library, Bristol. 
New College, Oxford. 
Balliol College, Oxford. 
Corpus Christi College, Oxford. 
Cambridge University Press Archives. 
Deighton; Bell and Co. Archives. 
Andreas Mayor (Joseph Mayors grandson). 
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Robert Robson (Trinity College). 
John Roach (University of Sheffield). 
J. S. Boys - Smith. 
Michael Oakeshott. 
Bertrand Russell. 
B. Acton. 
Church Archives, Ely Cathedral. 
The Library of Congress, Washington. 
University of Michigan Library. 
New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature. 
In desperation a request for help was placed in Notes and Queries 
in March 1970 but to little effect. Many other searches of less 
obvious sources have been made with similar results. Tt is now hoped 
that, with the aimed for publication of this thesis, the manuscripts 
will come to light. 
The last source of research was through the Literary Department. 
of the Principal Probate Registry, Somerset House, London. The last 
will and testament of John Grote appointed Joseph Bickersteth Mayor as 
both Executor and Literary Executor. His library was given to Trinity 
College, and enough money was given to Mayor to publish at least some 
of his work. The last Will and Testament of Joseph Bickersteth Mayor 
is not very helpful. We know that he still had the Grote MSS in 1900 
and still aimed to publish more. His executors were his wife, Grote's 
niece Alexandrina Jessie Mayor, and his sons, Robert John Grote Mayor 
and Henry Bickersteth Mayorla master at Clifton College, Bristol. No 
mention is made of literary remains but the whole estate was given to 
his wife and their two sons and this would have included manuscripts. 
Mayor died at Queengate House, Kingston Hill, London. Robert John 
Grote Mayor the philosopher died at 26 Addison Avenuet Notting Hillt 
London, on 19th June 1947 but his own will was not helpful and his 
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executor was his wife Katherine Beatrice Mayor. As indicated, Robert 
Mayor's son Andreas was contacted but knew nothing of the whereabouts 
of the Grote MSS. 
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Appendix II 
Methodoloqy 
This thesis has been written during a lull in the recent period 
of methodological debate, which has involved not only the history of 
ideas, but most especially political thought, sociology and literary 
theory. The excitement, novelty and value of these debates has been a 
source of inspiration for the task in hand and while what follows is 
far briefer than originally envisaged, because the story told has 
taken longer than envisaged, it indicates what was of value for and in 
the mind of the author. Many of the methodological issues and 
assumptions underpinning this thesis have already been elaborated in 
the introduction and will not be repeated in detail here. But 
generally five methodological sources have been threaded together in 
this work to create a methodological synthesis that builds on, and 
does not challenge, the traditional approach to the history of ideas 
in Britain. 
The first is the 'historical' and 'hermeneutic' approach of 
R. G. Collingwood, Michael Oakeshott and Quentin Skinner, which in turn 
goes back to Max Weber, Dilthey, Croce and the European neo-idealist 
historians of earlier decades (Collingwood 1946; Oakeshott 1933, 
1962,1983; Skinner 1969,1970l 1972,1974; Weber 1922,1949; 
Dilthey 1976; Croce 1960; Outwaite 1975,. Antoni 1959; Hughes 1979; 
Rickman 1967). From this tradition I have applied what I learnt to be 
their key message, that the understanding of a text requires an 
examination of the mind of its author; its meaning lies, if anywhere, 
in his purposes, aims and intentions. Secondly, I gathered from them 
that, as authors are members of social groups who share a common 
language and perhaps a common culture, an author's intention needs to 
be placed in the social and cultural context of his time, and in a 
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tradition of thought through time. Thirdly, from his work of building 
on Collingwood and Oakeshott and applying later Wittgensteinian 
understanding, I learnt with Skinner that the linguistic context and 
conventions of groups were a key to reconstructing individual meaning, 
cultural and intellectual ideas and traditions of thought (Pareýh and 
Berki 1973; Schochet 1974). 
Hence while Chapters six to nine in this thesis have involved a 
great deal of traditional philosophical textual analysis, this has 
been made possible by a contextual reconstruction of the aims and 
intentions of John Grote in chapter five, of his contemporaries in 
chapter three and four and of the cultural and linguistic traditions 
they inherited in chapter two. My early conclusions were that a 
historical reconstruction was a precondition for a meaningful 
philosophical or rational reconstruction, and that the two exercises, 
though differant, were compatible. In this I have found support 
readily from Richard Rorty and John Yo. 1tan (Rorty 1984,49-75; Yb-l-. ta-n 
1985,571-578). Chapter ten then involved the reconstruction of the 
mid Victorian intellectual and cultural world; its identification of 
problems and issues; its sources of conflict, and its structures and 
institutions which give sense and meaning to John Grote's 
philosophical engagement. 
Recent commentators on Skinner have confirmed me in the belief 
that his ideas are part of a longer continuity in modern European 
thought, not a break or revolution (Boucher 1981,1983, ). Despite 
tensions I consider his views an linguistic conventions to be coherent 
and generally compatible with Oakeshott's idea of the tracing of 
traditions (Lockyer 1979, Parekh and Berki 1973, Greenleaf 1964, 
Gunnell 1979). My approach has been: (1) to locate Grote's texts in 
the correct cultural and intellectual contexts, (2) to treat Cambridge 
and severaý other traditions of thought (and their institutional 
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organization) as the correct context for understanding Grote, (3) to 
. 
locate and trace Grote's aims and intentions, and to recover (4) 
his picture and others' pictures of Victorian intellectual history. 
Under point number four we encounter the results of the debate 
with T. S. Kuhn over 'paradigms' within intellectual history (Kuhn 
1970,1974; Lakatos and Musgrave 1970). As the debate has now 
subsided to the point where Kuhn can write with no reference to a 
paradigm we can benefit from the results. One aim of the thesis was 
to draw out several paradigms or intellectual pictures of the world of 
Victorian philosophy shared at the time, especially those by Mill, 
Stephen and Sidgwick, and, later, by historians such as Mehtaj Roach 
and Robbins. After recovering lost paradigms, and critically 
assessing others and attacking in particular the traditional picture 
of a reactionary University of Cambridge in the mid nineteenth century 
I have endeavoured to sketch the outlines of a new picture or paradigm 
that makes good some of the revealed errors or omissions in the old. 
Such a procedure has revealed the wisdom of those hermeneutic scholars 
such as Gadaver, Ricour and Bleicher who stress the impossibility of 
an objective reading of a text. Readers of texts are embroiled in a 
circle of understanding that relates writer, reader and society, in a 
permanent conversation. We read texts -and the past through lenses 
provided by others or as Rorty puts it, through mirrors (Rorty 1980, 
357-394). But the conclusion of this discovery is not a descent into 
relativism but, as Rorty and Oakeshott argue, a redoubling of will to 
enter into the conversation that is philosophy, to seek to understand 
each voice and each conversationalist as best one can, and to converse 
with them. To add one's voice is the purpose of philosophy. 
Thirdly, under point number two above, mention was made of the 
structural and institutional setting of ideas. In this area I have 
been impressed by the work of Sheldon Rothblatt and Martha Garland 
in 
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recovering the institutional structure and reform of Victorian 
Cambridge, of Christopher Harvie in his work on the links between 
local elites, and by Cannon and Annan on intellectual networks. I 
have tied this research in with the idea of professionalization as a 
modern process, and with the thesis of the bureaucratization of 
knowledge made famous by Weber and Foucault. That knowledge was 
increasingly being seen as a source of power, and that the 
organization of knowledge and, above all, its definition and control 
led to conflict in mid Victorian Britain, has been a theme in this 
thesis that has surfaced on several occasions. mill and the 
Philosophical Radicals in London; Hamilton and, later, the 
Evangelicals at Edinburgh; Whewell and, later, Sidgwick at Cambridge; 
Pattison and, later, Green at Oxford were all vying to characterize, 
label, centralize, institutionalize and control knowledge in 
mid-Victorian Britain. 
In understanding this I have kept in mind Foucault's notions of 
the archaeology and geneology of ideas, the process of first 
'defamiliarizing' and then 'refamiliarizing' history, through critique 
and then recovery (Foucault 1970,1972,1980; Smart 1985; Poetzl 
1983 ; Cousins and Hussain 1984). In many ways the typifications of 
Grote as original, interesting and yet uninfluential was a necessary 
part of the maintenance of the picture and interests of Mill, Hamilton 
and, even, Sidgwick and Stephen. Recovery of another picture of Grote 
was difficult and full of anomalies within the context of the accepted 
story. Hence, a precondition for understanding Grote was a 
'defamiliarization' of the old view and the creation of an alternative 
view. However, despite the Foucaultiafi expectation that this exercise 
would reveal discontinuity in history or a rupture, the opposite has 
happened. The new picture actually fits better With what we know 
already than the old picture; the new one is more coherent and seems 
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less odd. Perhaps this experience may lead to a revision of the 
conclusion we expect from the Foucaultian method, even if the method 
can be productive of useful results. Genealogy and archaeology may be 
useful methods built on correct assumptions, but it does not follow 
that history is a process of discontinuity and ruptures. 
A final, and more general, methodological debt can be paid to 
Le Roy Ladurie and to the French Annales Historians (Hughes 1966; 
Burke 1973,1978; Iggers 1975; Stoianovich 1976; Stone 1979; Clark 
1985). From Ladurie I received the example of how a lost world of 
ideas could be reconstructed from apparently dead and dusty 
tomes (Ladurie, 1978,1979,1980a, 1980b, 1981). In restoring the 
French eclectics and others to vision I hope to have breathed life 
back into people, texts and movements long ago consigned to the 
rubbish heap of history. From him I also discovered how to learn from 
apparently worthless sources, and even from those apparently 
antithetical to one's taste, by using them as unwitting testimony. 
Hence, just as medieval papal records of inquisitions give unwitting 
testimony to the existence of local heretical movements and suggest an 
alternative to a picture of a contemporary dominant ideology, so the 
very fact of Mill being so ruthless and preoccupied in his attacks on 
Cambridge and Edinburgh is unwitting testimony to their intellectual 
and cultural significance in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
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Appen ix III 
The Origins and Influence of the Thought of John Grote 
What I wish to do here is to say something more about the early 
origins and later line of descent of John Grote's ideas. The first 
task was relevant to this thesis while the second is peripheral to its 
main task, and is tackled only because it may help the next generation 
of scholars to identify lines for profitable research. Neither 
section will be extended, the first because key references have been 
made already and the second because the task is not central to the 
engagement of this work. 
i) Origins 
True originality in philosophy, John Grote argued, was impossible. 
Philosophy is primarily a thinking and rethinking, again and again, by 
generation after generation of philosophers, about issues of 
fundamental intellectual concern. No generation can think entirely 
like its predecessor, just as no historian can see the campaigns of 
Alexander exactly like earlier historians, because evidence, methods, 
language, and pictures change (Grote 1865,242-245). Again there are 
changes in contemporary cultural contexts to affect our views. Yet 
still the historian and philosopher, with even greater effort and 
intensity, struggle to make their questions 'more concise, their 
pictures and answers more coherent. Grote considered it the duty of a 
philosopher to enter into a conversation with philosophers past and 
present, to understand what they meant'or mean, and to add a voice of 
his or her own. Philosophy is a conversation with the living and the 
deadg to answer with more clarity and coherence problems and questions 
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inherited from the past. 
The line of descent of the minds that Grote engaged takes us from 
Plato to John Stuart Mill, but as in all conversations some minds and 
some voices attract more attention than others. So while mid-century 
Cambridge provides immediate background, and the arguments and debates 
between France, Scotland, London and Cambridge the gleneral context for 
understanding Grote's ideas we must identify the mindsl the voices, 
the problems, and the arguments which attracted and detained him. The 
first major influences were the Greeks, and especially Plato and 
Aristotle. 
Trained as a classicist and training others in Greek philosophy 
Grote engaged both men's ideas in depth. In an early essay Grote 
writes that Plato 
was and has been perhaps, on the whole, the greatest stirrer of 
the human mind and elevator of human thoughts that among inspired 
writers the world has seen' (Grote 1861,56). 
The real reason for this was that Plato tried with all the power of 
the Greek language to encounter, understand, describe and explain 
Being. In addition, for good or bad, he set philosophy on the road it 
was to take until first Hegel and then Heidegger objected, for instead 
of starting and finishing with existence or being Plato directed us to 
knowing (Grote 1900,88). Knowing and existence are the great 
co-notions', but existence must still be subordinated to knowing, 
because at the base knowing is all we have, knowing is the 
presupposition upon which we encounter being (Grote 1865,92). Plato, 
he tells us, therefore founded the problem of scepticism, and it is 
only going back to Plato and tackling this problem of the relationship 
of knowing and being that we can proceed to destroy, as we must# 
philosophical scepticism (Grote 1900,88). Yet, like Platol Grote 
identifies Being or Reality with the OIdea that is embodied in things, 
(Grote 1876; 387). Along with Plato this idea is found in the Omeaning 
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or purpose' of things, and in the reason, purpose, aim or ideal of 
actions (387; 1900,300-301). The growth of knowledge is 'a 
correction of error' in the identification of this meaning, reason or 
purpose in things or actions with the belief that in the end we will 
gain a clear and coherent understanding of them (Grote 1865,112). For 
this reason Grote calls Plato an idealist, and because his ideal is 
not God he is called a 'philosophical' rather than a 'religious 
idealist' (Grote 1876,374; 1900,296). 
But Grote hoped to heal the rift between knowing and being that 
Plato had established. Knowing and being to him are one and the same 
thing in our immediate awareness and consciousness of the world. 
Reflection and judgement cause a separation, but it is not an 
insoluble tension or breach as it was to Kant, -Mill., Hamiltong 
Spencer, Mansel and later Bradley. Reflection only differentiates 
within a given whole and perfect judgemental knowledge only completes 
our acquaintance with consciousness and existence, seeming and being. 
Grote was convinced that aý unrelenting study of nature, men and mind 
would produce a complete and coherent unison of knowing and being the 
Absolute. A realist belief in real facts, real objects, and a real 
universe in which we live would be united with an idealist 
epistemology and theory of action. 
But other similarities abound. Grote at one stage, in describing 
knowing as our mind meeting the mind or purpose embodied in things or 
actions, likens knowledge to 'recognition' and on one occasion to 
remembrance' (Grote 1900,292). Like Plato, Grote considers knowledge 
to be a social, not an individual, product and in interpreting Plato 
on this point, differs from his brother George (Grote 1900,275). 
Twice Grote argues that Plato's way of studying matters on a larger 
and social rather than a smaller and individual scale is an 
advantageous philosophical device (Grote 1865j204; 1876,393). ' That 
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truth emerges by conversation with others, or dialectic, is advanced 
and practiced by John Grote, not only in the Exploratio but in the 
Platonic dialogue form in the Discussion of 1889 (Grote 1889; 
1900,275). On ethical points two similarities are specifically 
referred to by Grote. Firstly, that in all moral questions the issue 
is always that of the interests or good of others and not of one-self, 
that justice for instance is a social not an individual matter (Grote 
1870,71-72). Secondly, like Plato, happiness is not the ultimate end 
of life but is a by-product of living the ideal or perfect life, the 
life in pursuit of the good (206). 
But the empathy between Grote and Aristotle is even more 
pronounced, to the extent that Michael Oakeshott has called Grote an 
'Aristotelian' (Oakeshott 1970, MS). Aristotle's ideas are said to be 
'full of energy of thought, suggesting views in every direction, and 
scattering seeds of after speculation' (Grote 1900,5). Grote exhibits 
Aristotles' general style and feeling for things, his moderate t one, 
his preference for synthesis, his respect for ordinary language, 
ordinary men and ordinary moral conventions. Indeed he once wrote 
that Aristotle was the greatest example of a philosopher and scientist 
whose whole life was an exemplar for those who followed (Grote 
1870,305). On epistemological themes Grote refers to Aristotle 
appreciatively on two topics. Firstly, just as Grote praised Plato 
for seeing the priority of the Idea so Aristotle has his method of 
teleology and his belief that the purpose a thing lies in its telos 
(Grote 1865,112). But in addition Grote learns that purpose presumes 
something which the aimed ior seeks to replace, and from Aristotle he 
reformulated the notion of want (Grote 1876,21). Secondly, Grote 
praises Aristotle for doing more than most modern philosophers to 
avoid 'mis-psychology': or the confusion of logical language and 
thought with psychological and scientific language and thought, on the 
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one hand, and 'notionalism', or the attempt to realise logical 
notions, on the other. In fact before launching into a long list of 
modern philosophers of the human mind who commit such errors, Grote 
starts the Exploratio Part Il with a brief and highly appreciative 
account of Aristotles' approach to psychology (Grote 1900,1-8). But 
if Aristotle is a model of how to avoid confusing philosophy and 
science, logic and psychology Grote learns more from his ethical. 
writings. 
An Aristotelian philosopher is also identified in part by his 
committment to a definite theory of human nature; a committment that 
Grote shared. In this theory man is an active creature and purposeful 
creature, who, in activity realises what is potential within him. 
Secondly, man is an imaginative creature able to conscience 
alternatives, many of which are moral in their nature. Finally man's 
purposes are numerous, there are many virtues and the summum bonum is 
the by-product of acting and living in accordance to these-basic moral 
and political roles and principles. 
In the field of ethics Grote concedes that Aristotle is 'the 
great master' (Grote 1870,110). Firstly, Aristotle adopted a viable 
methodg studying both the actual and the ideal, using the methods of 
science and philosophy, but avoiding confusion between them (Grote 
1876,141). For instance, while Aristotle argues that the summum 
bonumt the telos of life, is eudaemonia, he means by this not just the 
actual facts of 'faring well' and having pleasurable experiences, but 
'living well' according to some ideal (Grote 1870,347-348). 
Secondlyt while Aristotle s view of the summum bonum is limited to 
eudaemonia or happiness, the concept is so wide and so inclusive of 
other ideals such as virtue and duty that it is acceptable. Aristotle 
saw that happiness included virtue and wisdom as ideals and did not 
treat them as derivatives. He considered happiness as a by product of 
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'living well', of doing our duty and being virtuous as ends in 
themselves. Happiness would not result from a life self-consciously 
devoted to its pursuit. It was rather a by-product of virtuous and 
dutiful moral and political practice(Grote 1870,110,347-348). 
Aristotle, then, was no simple consequentalist; rather like Grote he 
considered the 'worth of an action' as a separate matter of moral 
concern, and he considered happy consequences to be the by-product, 
not the immediate aim, of moral life (Grote 1870,110-111). Grote used 
Aristotle as a foil for developing his own theory of virtue and 
character (Grote 1876,109,119,124,241,389g 399,445-449,459f 
462). But in the end we can leave Aristotle's influence where I 
started, in Grote's appreciation of everyday standards, recognizing 
the morality and wisdom embodied in everyday custom Grote felt 
affinity with Burke and later thinkers on this matter but in the 
Treatise it is Aristotle to whom the debts are paid (Grote 
1876,448-449). 
But on the evidence of Sidgwick we can gather that Cicero was 'a 
favourite moralist of Mr Grote', in particular the Cicero of De 
officils (Sidgwick 1871b, 197). Some evidence exists to support this 
view, if we relate Cicero to Stoicism in general and to his view of 
law and duty in particular. At the most general level Grote praises 
the Stoics for their kindly but single minded pursuit of moral 
go . odness (Grote 1870,184). Their ideal, in the form of a universal 
moral law, he regarded as a noble ideal and he refers, on several 
occasionsl to the coincidence of their idea of morality with that of 
Christianity. The Stoics, Cicero, Christians and Grote himself stress 
obedience to law and duty, charity and the pursuit of virtue and 
patience (Grote 1870,184; 1876,92,374,377,459,470). Grote claims 
that Cicero and Hooker later have the right notion of a lofty moral 
law to live by, and hence he recognises in them the analogy which 
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underpins his own jural ethics (Grote 1870,159). While to Stoics the 
moral law was a universal ideal that the actual law should seek to 
copy, they took a very practical view of how this could be achieved, 
and like them he saw that law should embody reason (Grote 1870,184). 
More obviously, Grote appreciated that Cicero and later stoics like 
Grotius were opposed to utilitarianism, and according to Mayor the 
last manuscript Grote wrote before his death was on the very 
Ciceronian topic of 'Honestarianism and Utilitarianism', a dialogue 
between the Roman ideal of honestius and that of happiness (Grote 
1870,24; 1900, xi). Again we find Grote praising Cicero for what he 
too exhibited, the possession of a liberal tone and attitude (Grote 
1870,42). Finally, there is the Stoic idea of the natural sociability 
of man and the notion of the cosmopolis, the universal brotherhood of 
mankind. Grote was unreserving in his praise of the Stoics for the 
former view and congratulated Mill for the concessions he made in its 
direction. On the latter he had reservations, seeing the natural unit 
as society not mankind, but as an ideal he saw the universalist 
doctrine as noble and compatible with Christianity. 
This brings us to the next major influence on Grote, that of 
Christianity, as revealed by the testaments of his apostles. We must 
not underestimate the influence of Christianity on the formulation of 
Grote's ideas, for though like Plato he produces a philosophical 
idealism from non-religious assumptions a religious idealism is always 
present as an option, in fact the option that Grote wishes us to adopt 
to complete philosophical idealism. This applies equally to the 
theories of being, knowledge and morality. We can look for temporal 
or religious grounds for being, but they are in the end complementary# 
if different (Grote 1876,65). Knowledge can be seen'as the meeting Of 
our minds or of ours with God's (Grote 1900,292-293). Tn morality we 
must have ideals and these have to be accounted for, but moral 
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philosophy and religion are different 0 manners of thought' and each 
has its own role to play in elaborating the moral world (Grote 
1870,215; 1900,324). Religion works from revelations, it claims to 
be authoritative, it preaches and is more practical, its language is 
more metaphorical and its visions more vivid. Philosophy, even moral 
philosophy, relies on ordinary knowledge, it works from the self not 
back from God, it claims no authority except rational acceptance, it 
explains and does not preach, it elaborates practice rather than being 
practiced, it has a language and a picture of its own (Grote 1862,3-5; 
1865, xiv-xvi, xxxviii, 39,58; 1870,102,115,201,333,342,351, 
356-360; 1871,13-17; 1876,65,111,3421 355-357,373-377,389, 
393,462; 1877,288; 1900,38-40,72r88,293-296,324). W. G. de Burgh, 
for one, praises Grote for his separation of the approaches of 
philosophy and religion (de Burgh, 1937) But still, even in ethics 
the two are complementary and should go hand in hand in elaborating 
the ideals of life (Grote 1870,214-220; 1876,469-70). 
Grote felt that on most occasions religion aýd the practice of 
morality ought to be kept seperate to avoid misunderstanding. 
Certainly, if religious views of divine providence undercut the 
preconditions of moral practice e. g. that we are free and reponsible 
moral agents, it should be banished back to its own terrain (Grote 
1870,357-360; 1877,288). In one beautiful passage, Grote argues 
that religion is a new 'temper' with which to apply the eternal moral 
truths discussed by all philosophers and embodied in our ordinary 
moral customs and practices (Grote 1876,123-5; Lasson 1872). 
What Grote learnt from Christianity can be stated simply. 
Firstly, God is one possible postulate of both knowing and being and 
is the ultimate hope of their reconciliation. Christianity offers, 
along with absolute idealism, a proposal for overcoming the problem 
bequeathed by"Plato (Grote 1865, xlv). Secondly, Christianity offers 
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an answer complementary to that of Plato and Aristotle, as to the Idea 
or Telos, the reason, meaning or purpose of things and events. Now it 
is God's intelligence, meaning and purpose that is embodied in things 
and events, not just those of some impersonal force or the 
intelligence of man and society (Grote 1865, xlv-xlvi; 39,58; ). But 
as Grote concedes, we must start and remain with ourselves when 
engaged in philosophy (Grote 1900,38-40). Thirdly, Grote had a lesson 
reinforced from Christianity: that as human beings we have free will, 
the ability to make choices and to act upon them; that we have 
intelligence, senses, reflective and creative powers to know and 
change the world. He learnt too that it was not only in our power to 
know and change the world but that we had a right and a duty to do so 
(Grote 1900,371). We should not fear knowledge in any form, not even 
science, because in having and gaining it, we exercise our free will, 
do our duty and discover God's truth. The biggest threat to both 
moral progress and Christianity was indeed the belief in an unknowable 
God of Mansel, or its temporal equivalent, the unknowable Absolute of 
Hamilton, Spencer and Mill and later Bradley, for it discourages free 
thought. Fourthly, from Christianity Grote learnt that our faith must 
not be based on revelation or blind trust in books or codes of duty, 
but on our beliefs in truth and right, of our knowledge of them, of 
our ability to act to gain knowledge and create a better society. In 
the end our higher beliefs are that we have an ordered, rational and 
purposeful world and existence, something we can never prove, but 
which is assumed in all our moral language and practice (Grote 
1876,373,516-518). 
In regard to his moral and political philosophy Christianity 
reinforced important aspects of his work. Man is a spiritual as well 
as a material bein g, he is active and creative not passive and 
obedient. Human beings are ideal forming, and in one place Grote 
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argues, like Feuerbach, that God is an 'ideal of perfection', an 
exemplar for moral conduct (Grote 1876,351,356-357). Again religion 
and Grote's moral idealism teach self-improvement, 
'And the work and business of the collective human race, it seems 
to me, is self-improvement; for the sake of the glory of God, if 
we take a religious view; for its own sake, if we do not' (Grote 
1870,351; 1876,351,356-357; 1900,293). 
Grote argues that Christianity therefore needs to be both 'reforming 
and conservative' teaching improvement but obedience to everyday moral 
rules, and indeed this equally describes his own views on moral and 
political reform (Grote 1870,358). 
As far as both textual and contextual readings go it is hard to 
trace any specific influences from philosophers between Cicero and the 
modern period, though the idea of the separate but complementary 
spheres of religion and philosophy suggest the work of Thomas Aquinas, 
and indeed Mayor left a record of a ninety page manuscript on him 
(Grote 190OIX). Without the lost lectures. on the history of 
philosophy it is hard to fill out any details prior to the seventeenth 
century, though two- small references to the Renaissance and 
Reformation suggest that Grote was generally unimpressed by the level 
of intellectual advance in either (Grote 1877,285-286). We do touch 
interesting ground however when we get to the seventeenth century, for 
here were some real revolutions in thought that were to shape the 
problems and battles of nineteenth century philosophy in general and 
Grote's in particular. 
There are two key forces that Grote refers to from which we. can 
learn. The first was the attempt to apply the Copernican revolution 
to philosophy in the hands of Hobbes and, later, Locke. This was 
associated with the new discovery of the inductive method by Bacon, 
studied so admirably by Robert Leslie Ellis. The second was : the 
creation of rationalist philosophical doctrine and deductive logic 
by 
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Descartes in France, by Samuel Clarke and the Cambridge Platonists, in 
England and by Leibniz in Germany and Spinoza in Holland. Grote's 
debt to Descartes is immense, despite Grote's criticisms and even 
rejections of several parts of his method and argument. It is to 
Descartes that idealism owes its modern origins, by taking as its 
starting point the proposition that I, am conscious (Grote 
1865,17-19). Grote indeed develops much of his thought by conversing 
with Descartes on the subject, on the truth and implications of his 
'Cogito' (Grote 1865,22; 1900,11-12,79,148-149,166-170,178-179). 
Grote found a comparison of the methods of Bacon and Descartes 
instructive. Both provided truths, but each was an abstraction. As 
with comparisons of their ideas of contingent and necessary truths, of 
inductive and deductive logic, of observational and a priori tests of 
truth, Grote felt that the ideas of each were a half truth. Grote 
felt that century needed a third major figure to synchronize the. two 
but had got- instead a series of one-sided rationalists and 
empiricists. Locke's epistemology Grote sees as the model of 
mis-phenomenalism and noo-psychology, typifying the mistaken 
'Philosophy of the Human Mind' that was to dog British thought down to 
Mill. Hobbes' moral and political philosophy detained Grote but there 
was little empathy between them, Hobbes' ideas on human nature, law 
and right being almost diametrically opposed to his. oddly for his 
time Grote does not refer to Samuel Clarke, though the latter's ideas 
do show some points of resemblance. Like Clarke, Grote felt that one- 
sign that a moral idea was right was that it 'fitted' the social facts 
and relations of things (Stephen 1927,1,119-125; Sorley 1921,155-158; 
Copleston 1966,5ll57-161). But Grote did not want to identify himself 
too closelyg as Whewell had done, with Clarke and the rationalist 
movement, as he wished to transcend them with idealism. The Clarke 
controversy w ith Hobbes was like the Whewell controvbrsy with mill, an 
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unlikely source of truth. 
From eighteenth century philosophers the line of influence to 
Grote is clear. The line of thought against which his mind rebelled 
was typified by the materialists, the utilitarians and moral sense 
schools. He was less disenchanted with the Scottish School which, 
after all, did try to mediate between Bacon and Descartes, but while 
he learnt much on epistemology from Reid, Brown and Stewart his 
comments on them are generally negative and we see no response to 
their ethical writings. The key ideas they developed which remain 
embedded in Grote's concerns were that we could know the external 
world using everyday knowing processes, and that immediate 
consciousness held the key to this; and the idea of the creative 
active powers of mind as expressed by Reid and Stewart (Reid 1846-63, 
1941; Stewart 1828,1854). But the other eighteenth century 
influences were Berkeley, Hume and Kant on knowledge, Butler on ethics 
and Rousseau on idealism generally. Lauchlin D. MacDonald at one stage 
describes Grote as a 'Berkelian', basing his claim on four points, 
that both are subjectivistic, idealistic, personalistic and both 
regard God's mind to be embodied in things and reality (MacDonald 
1966,194-196). Judgement on the accuracy of these claims depends on 
the meaning attached to each key term. Grote does start with self 
when describing knowledge but that does not mean that he is a 
subjective idealist. He is an. idealist but he distances himself 
considerably from Berkeley on key issues, such as the separation of 
primary and secondary qualities, the reliance of our ideas on God's, 
the grounds and support for'scepticism, relativism and the theory of 
vision (Grote 1865,4,108-109,114; 1876,63; 1900,36-40FI18-142,310). 
In particular Grote distances himself from the idea that the external 
world is only an 'immediate inspiration of the Deity' (Grote 1900,72). 
David Hume attracted Grote's critical attention but inspired 
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little or no positive response, though in ethics and politics Hume Is 
idea of 'prescriptive authority' has some echo in Grote's theory of 
custom and law. The connection with Kant is however certain and is 
attested to by Grote. But his influence is as much in terms of 
resistance as support, and Grote's Kant is mediated through the work 
of Whewell. Grote and Kant share a common approach to major 
philosophical problems, the analysis of the postulates or 
pre-conditions for thinking, judging, acting and talking. On 
epistemology Grote appreciates Kant's start with the 'manifold' of 
experience, but is opposed to Kant*s argument that reflection prevents 
us from ever regaining knowledge of the 'thing in itself* (Grote 
1865,60-67,74-75; 1876,362; 1900,157-158,202,246). The distinction 
between noumena and phenomena is rejected by Grote, a point that 
affected Mill's revision of his Logic (Grote 1665,181-183, 
1900,178,198 Mill 1961,39-40). Grote is attracted by Kant's 
solution to the problem of knowledge, which allows a place'both to 
-mind, with its constructive categories, and to the senses, but in the 
end finds it too simplistic. We cannot separate what the mind and the 
senses provide, experience is a whole from which mind discriminates 
(Grote 1900,24-26l157-158). In particular, Kant's account 
lof 
intuitions of space are considered defective (Grote 1865 74-8,109,114; 
1900,48,195). 
On moral matters, Grote sides with Kant' against Mill and 
utilitarianism but his own moral theory is vastly different to Kant'sl 
neither stressing 'motive*, nor proposing an ultimate 'golden rule' 
for providing the key to moral action (Grote 1870,116,193,275-6). In 
the end Grote departs from Kant's empty formulae and advocates a 
substantive relational theory of morality. Little need be said on 
Butler and Rousseau, but Grote did appreciate the former's attemptt 
like Kant's, to find a non-consequential ground for moral value, and 
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he appreciated that Rousseau set out to realize an ideal society f rom 
assumptions about human rationality and sociability. 
-In the nineteenth century the immediate context of Grote's 
thought, the battles between romantic and mechanistic thought, between 
the German-Coleridgians, the Scottish philosophers' and the 
philosophical radicals, has been well rehearsed above. From amongst 
these groups Grote admits those who influenced him to be James 
Frederick Ferrier, John Stuart Mill and Alexander Bain. The 
empiricists and phenomenalists he read and attacked included, as well 
as Mill, Herbert Spencer whom Grote seems to have preferred (Grote 
1900,91-113). 
From the Scottish school Grote admits debts to Hamilton and 
Ferrier, but it is to the last that the greatest of all debts needs to 
be paid. The Znstltutes had been published in 1854 and we know that 
in 1856 Whewell had told its author that John Grote intended writing a 
reply. While the published form had to wait until 1865 and it appears 
the two never met, it is in conversation with Ferrier's mind that I 
consider Grote formulated the specifics of his version of 
epistemological idealism(4). There is however an interesting reply to 
an anonymous critic named G. at the end of volume I of Ferrier's 
Works (Ferrier 1881). It is possible that Grote -is the original 
critic as both the style and sense of the criticism are similar. On 
some important points Grote and Ferrier differ. Grote denigrates the 
pretence at system which Ferrier (and later McTaggart) imposes, using 
his rigorous deductive argument form. Grote rejects Ferrier's 
abhorrence of ordinary language, but generally Ferrier's view of 
knowledge is held to be correct (Grote 1865l53-82 ; 1900 164-165). 
Idealism is recognised as the character of Ferrier's thought and Grote 
says his ideas are 'suggestive' of the thought in his own book (Grote 
1865, xxvi-xxvii). He absolves Ferrier from all charges of confusing 
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phenomenalism and philosophy and praises him for seeing that in regard 
to experience, 
'It is the projection of ourself into this confusion which begins 
to generate order in it' (Grote 1865,57). 
Most of the better authoritiep on Grote, but especially 
Segerstedt, Forsyth, Cunningham, Sorley, Seth, Copleston and Passmore, 
have noted the close similarity between the two and on this I concur. 
However, Grote is by far the better philosopher in terms of both 
expression and content, as Forsyth and Segerstedt note, and goes well 
beyond Ferrier in applying idealism to language, ethics, society, 
history and politics. Grote was indeed the figure described by 
Segerstedt who provides the final bookend to the problem of knowledge 
of Scottish philosophy. Where Ferrier failed to get support in his 
own country and retired to lick his wounds, Grote went on, and while 
no more successful in influencing future generations he completed a 
system and corpus of works that were more coherent and complete, and 
do more to answer the traditional problems of the British philosophy 
of mind than any other nineteenth century figure prior to T. H. Green. 
At Cambridge, Grote learnt most from his old master Whewell, from 
Henry Maine, from his friend Robert Leslie Ellis and from the milieu 
associated with Hare, Maurice, the Liberal Anglicans and the Cambridge 
Network. From Maine, or along with Maine, Grote learnt the lesson 
that modern society emerges from a state of primitive sociability by a 
process of rationalization or abridgement of status and custom. In 
this process rules, laws and ideals are only the custodians or 
embodiments of traditional wisdom, and individuals are social beings 
and social products. Modern rational constitutional arrangements are 
here to be treated with suspicion, traditional institutions with 
respect(Bowle 1963,248-257). From Whewell, Grote learnt a deep 
respect for the historical approach to ideas, for continental thoughtt 
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especially Kant, and for the rationalist and romantic line of 
opposition to empiricism, materialism, positivism, common sense 
philosophy and utilitarianism. Some interpreters even go so far as to 
argue that Whewell himself produced a synthesis that verged on 
idealism, though I feel Whewell's strident defense of the 'a priori' 
and of 'intuition" are barriers to such a view (Marcucci 1963, ButtS 
1967). Rebelling as he did against the dogmatism of Whewell's 
approach and such theories as the 'fundamental antithesis' of 
philosophy, Grote decided on a more moderate and conciliatory 
approach. The battle with Scotland and London was not to be fought to 
a conclusion but solved by diplomacy, by the devices of removing 
linguistic confusions, synchronizing truths from each, and 
synthesising them into a new and coherent system. Yet Whewell was 
both a first rate historian of ideas and a powerful moral philosophert 
as some recent studies have suggested (Butts 1965, ; Ducasse 1951; 
Blanche' 1935; Donagan 1977,452-459,1977,17-25,194-200; Schneewind 
1968). From him Grote learnt in ethics that there are some ideals and 
rules for morality that can be understood and known and valued 
independently of reference to consequences. But he was repelled by 
Whewell's pretence at making ethics into a system with certain a 
priori ethical axioms at its apex. Morality to Grote cannot be 
reduced to a system and pure a priori knowledge is no more possible in 
ethics than it is in science and epistemology. 
How great then was the influence of continental philosophy after 
Kant on Grote? One source I suspect to be very influential, are the 
French eclectics. Grote refers to only one of them, Victor Cousin# 
but his work shows striking similarities to othersl especially Maine 
de Biran. Cousin attracts Grote for his attack on Locke and the old 
mis phenomenalism, but at the heart it is the syncretic method of the 
eclectics and their attempt to mediate 'Kant and the Scottish school 
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that is likely to have been Cousin's main appeal. On ethics, a likely 
influence was Jouffroy. Lecture One of his introduction to Ethics 
spells out some key elements of a relational theory and lecture two 
contains both some elements of a jural theory of ethics, of an analogy 
of moral with physical facts, and of a theory of-human nature which 
the active self ascends from instinct, through will to self conscious 
reason(Jouffroy 1841,1., 24-62). , Maine de Biran is nnt mentioned at 
all by Grote but a whole line of connections can be made. Firstly, de 
Biran's notion of human nature opposes a sentient and an active side. 
Secondly, man's active nature is founded on the resistance that man 
finds to his mind and his physical powers in the world. Will and 
action are to be seen primarily as attempts to overcome this 
resistance and to assert ourselves in the world, rather than to be 
seen as responses to sense data. In epistemology de Biran had a. 
theory of 'Vaperception immediate', in which will ýs the key force in 
gaining knowledge from the original manifold of knowledge. Finally, 
while developing an appreciation of physio-psychology, de Biran 
insisted on a separation of science and philosophy, and doubted the 
former's ability to produce many useful results in the theory of mind. 
(Copleston 1975, ix, 19-50; Alexander 1922,540-544; Brehier 
1932,42-60). 
But what of German romanticism and idealism? With the present 
level of knowledge of Grote's reading any answer is going to be 
inconclusive. Grote would certainly have been aware at second hand 
and by hearsay of the work of several major German 
counter-enlightenment scholars, especially Niebuhr, the German 
theologian ' Schleiermacher, Strauss, and the romantic poets and 
novelists. Closer to philosophy he had available several good 
secondary sources on German idealist philosophy as recorded in chapter 
three, and especially the texts of Chalybaus and, Morell. Fichte, we 
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know, was available in part in translation in the 1850's and was 
placed as a set text for the moral science tripos. Hegel's Lectures 
on the Philosophy of History were translated by J. Sibree in 1852 and 
his Subjective Logic by H. Slamon and J. Walton in 1855 (Hegel 1852; 
1855). In addition, an excellent article on 'Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right' appeared in the Oxford companion volume to Cambridge Essa. ys by 
T. Saunders in 1855, and Grote could hardly have avoided this (Saunders 
1855). Schelling could have been approached via Coleridge, presuming, 
that is, that Grote did not read German. 
Here we have a crucial issue, again hard to resolve. We have no 
direct evidence that John Grote read German but we do have some clues. 
Firstly, John's brother George was fluent in German, and Whewell and 
Hare most certainly shared this skill. John's writings contain 
several German words and phrases, many of which are handled with the 
confidence of one versed in its intricacies. For instance he uses 
'kennen' and 'wissen' when referring to k'nowledge to 'Begriffe', 
*Vorstellung', 'mitgedach', 'Anschauung', das Mannigfaltige', 'das 
Verworrene' and 'das Unbestimmte' (Grote 1865,60,103; 
1900,145,147,157). In on Glossology Grote speaks of evidence gained 
by comparing some German and English words and refers to 'Wortbildung, 
and 'schlagen' (Grote 1874,178-179). Considering that from 1855' 
Julius Hare's library of over three thousand German books, 'by far the 
best in the country' was housed in the Wren Library at Trinity, a 
knowledge by Grote of German would have given him first hand access to 
all the major German idealists from Kant onwards (Hort 1896,1,308). 
However Grote mentions Schelling and Hegel only once, and Fichte not 
at all, so our argument must revert to looking at circumstantial 
evidence. 
The main evidence for a connection with Fichte revolves around 
the regular use by Grote of the contrast of ego and non ego, a device 
348 
regularly used by Fichte. Next, Fichte heralded objective and 
absolute idealism by insisting that what the ego affirms in its basic 
act of consciousness it imposes upon the world. Non ego is a 
construct of ego and the so-called objective world embodies ego. 
Fichte-'s contrast of 'idealism' and 'dogmatism' finds an echo in 
Grote's contrast of philosophy and phenomenalism, as is his siding 
with the former. In ethics other similarities abound: Fichte 
stresses man as a free and active moral being who can and does create 
his moral world. In an ideally moral act a person both does his duty 
and follows his conscience; in a good society the two are allowed to 
coincide and the citizens can fulfill t: heir 'moral vocation' (Adamson 
1881; Copleston. 1963, vii, 32-75; ). But it is in Grote's connection 
with Hegel that the real interest lies. 
As Cunningham notes there are remarkable similarities between 
Grote's Exploratio and Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, and Grote's 
objective and absolute idealism is in general ways reminiscent of 
Hegel's philosophy. The idealist argument about the growth of 
knowledge, from a basic immediate intuition to full self-conscious 
knowledge, that connects Grote and Hegel was discussed in chapter 
five. The next major similarity is the common assertion of mind in 
the world and of knowledge as the meeting of our own and society's 
mind with that of God. That man as an active and free being puts 
meaning into, and constructs, his world is a shared argument of both 
as is the idea of morality as a realization of both self and society. 
Closer to moral and political ideas, Grote shares with Hegel the 
notion that the 'real is the rational', that the actual contains the 
ideal in an immanent form and that law and custom embody spirit. Much 
else could be said along these lines to connect Grote and Hegell 
without taking us much further to resolve the question of Hegel's 
influence on Grote. We are left with afi interesting pattern or 
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paradox for later historians to try and solve, for now it seems that 
either we have in John Grote an English idealist philosopher well 
versed in German idealism before the conventionally set date of 1870, 
or England had in John Grote, as Scotland did in James Frederick 
Ferrier, an indigenous idealist who thought his way to a position 
similar to Hegel's from within the problems and materials of 
contemporary British thought! 
For myself I tend towards the latter, for while Grote whould have 
had some acquaintance with German idealist philosophers, we have his 
own testimony that the books discussed in the Exploratio 
I are the books from which I have 2earnt' (Grote 1865, xxiii). 
He added 
'I leave the philosophy of other countries and the ancient 
foundations of all philosophy to others more competent and more 
acquainted with them than I': (ibid, xxv). 
In addition John Grote was an eclectic, not a disciple of any one 
school. He prefered to learn philosophy in conversation not through 
reading books. His basic sources were the British philosophers of the 
human mind, from Locke to Mill, opposed by the rationalists and 
idealists from Clarke to Berkeley, from Reid to Whewell, and Hamilton 
to Ferrier, with only secondary association with German idealism after 
Kant as Bosanquet and Cunningham suggest. In addition if German 
idealism after Kant had a foothold in Victorian Cambridge it was that 
of Fichte not Hegel. Either way the 'Reception of Hegel' theory to 
explain the emergen&e of idealism in Victorian Britain seems flawed 
and in need of revision and modification. Grote's idealism was forged 
in the furnace of modern British philosophy from raw materials mined 
locally. 
ii) Influences 
The task of tracing John Grote's influence on later thinkers was not a 
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primary concern of this thesis but after coming so far it would seem a 
dereliction of duty to hold back from outlining briefly some possible 
lines for future research. Most suggestions here are hypotheses, not 
fully worked out arguments, but some have primary source evidence to 
support them and these can be given greater status. However, the form 
of presentation chosen is historical and I will show possible lines of 
connection under three headings: a) the period 1865 to'1880 when most 
of Grote's own contemporaries continued to live and writet b) the next 
generation from 1880 to'1900 and c) the period from 1900 to the 
present, the period of the real development of contemporary 
philosophy. 
a) 1865-1880 
As the obituaries to Grote testify, his work was known about by only a 
small circle at Cambridge at the time. This group included, apart 
from Mayor and Whewell, the logician John Venn, W. K. Clifford the 
philosopher, John Llewelyn Davies, Leslie Stephen and his brother 
James' Fitzjames, Frederick Denison Maurice, Thomas Birks, F. J. Hort and 
above all Henry Sidgwick. None of them did much to popularize or 
explore Grote's work except Joseph Mayor, Hort and Henry Sidgwick. Of 
them all Sidgwick is the greatest paradox. In some senses Sidgwick is 
the natural inheritor of Grote's mission and ideas. He too set out to 
reconcile utilitarianism, Scottish common sense and intuitional 
philosophy. He too insisted that utilitarianism could only be 
coherent if it accepted a fundamental intuition, that we ought to 
promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In his final 
book, Philosophy, Zts Scope and Relations he also expresses and 
develops several of Grote's epistemological theories, especially the 
ideas that science, history and philosophy are different but 
compatible modes of thought, that philosophy must deal with the 
ideal 
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as well as the actual, that much psychology of mind rests on 
fundamental confusions, and that sociology has a valuable but discrete 
role to play, one very different to that of philosophy (Sidgwick 
1902). In addition, we know that Sidgwick helped Mayor to edit both 
the Examination and the Exploratio Part II, and he reviewed two of 
Grote's central works. 
But why did he insist, against the evidence produced both here 
and by Cannon and Annan, that there was no intellectual coterie at 
Cambridge in the first six decades of the nineteenth century? What 
reasons can be given for Sidgwick's lack of recognition of the 
Cambridge rationalist tradition from the Platonists to Clarke and down 
to Whewell? Why did he repeatedly insist that German ideas were 
cold-shouldered at Cambridge, when in Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, 
Whewell and the moral science tripos we have contrary evidence? ' Why 
did Sidgwick, and Stephen, not recognise the romantic and idealist 
turn in John Grote's thought, when both circumstantial evidence of his 
respect for Ferrier and his explicit affiliation to idealism in the 
Exploratio supported this? Why did they both - Sidgwick and Stephen - 
ignore the consistent idealist thread from Coleridge to Whewell and on 
to Grote and Maurice, which was broken only by the appointment of 
Birks and later Sidgwick to the Knightbridge Chair? The answers are 
hazardous. 
one hypothesis is simply that they were right and that the 
fertile minds of Annang Cannon, Sanders, Forbes and myself have spun a 
web too fragile to sustain their claims. A second hypothesis is that 
they both lacked the insighi to see the Cambridge of their day as 
anything more than the home of rationalism and reaction. A third 
hypothesis is that Sidgwick's 1876 essay was a disguised attack on 
Thomas Rawlinson Birks, under whose chairmanship philosophy in the 
Cambridge of the 1870's languished. final hypothesis' is more 
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complicated and contentious and perhaps more dubious as it suggests 
that neither of them wished to advertise the idealism of Cambridge. 
This hypothesis has five elements all worthy of further research. 
Firstly, neither Sidgwick nor Stephen, for whom we owe thanks for 
the conventional inside picture of Victorian Cambridge, had any native 
youthful attachment to the subjective approach to philosophy. (5) We 
should remember here that it is to Leslie Stephen that we owe the 
castigation of Coleridge's idealist philosophy as a 'heap of 
fragments' and 'random disuasive hints', 'simply appropriated from 
Schelling' (Stephen 1906,11,373-374,380). While Grote stressed that 
his earliest feelings indicated mind, personality and thought to be 
the key to philosophy, Sidgwick and Stephen were attracted by Mill, 
positivism, Comte and utilitarianism. Neither was impressed by the 
anti-positivist and metaphysical tone of Cambridge philosophy which. 
they thought was out of touch, uninspired and even reactionary. 
Secondly, both were antipathetic towards idealism and German thought, 
and would probably have considered that associating it with Cambridge 
would put their university in even worse repute than it was already. 
It was better for Cambridge to be painted as scientific, mathematical 
and intuitional in philosophy than to be cast as metaphysical and 
idealist. Sidgwick-'s general antipathy to idealism is nicely 
illustrated in a passage from Lewis Nettleship's 'Re6ollections'. 
Nettleship confirms Sidgwicks own recollection of a trip to Germany in 
1862 in which T. H. Green and he renewed an old schoolboy friendship. 
Also in the party were Dakyns, Dicey, and Bryce. The entire group 
were fully devoted to absorbing German thought, with the *exeption of 
Sidgwick who was studying Arabic'., (NettleshipjN-# MSBalliol; 
Nettleship, R. L., 1888,111). 
Thirdly, Sidgwick saw himself as the future saviour Of Cambridge 
philosophy and the likely architect of a new school or movement in the 
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university. In his picture of the pastj present and future there was 
no place for alternative men of genius or novel philosophical. 
movements. In particular, Sidgwick had no interest in promoting the 
work and reputations of Whewell and John Grote; his interest lay in 
playing down their contributions, especially to external audiences and 
in particular to his friends at Oxford University, including Thomas 
Hill Green. This last point provides a fourth strand to this 
argument. Sidgwick felt embarrassed by Cambridge philosophy prior to 
1870 but after then he wished to see it steered in a direction set by 
himself and in competition to that of the Oxford of Jowett, Caird, 
Green and Bradley. It would have been of no help to Sidgwick in his 
effort to revive Cambridge philosophy in opposition to Oxford idealism 
to have idealist fellow travellers in his own university. A neutral 
label rather than a negative one would avoid hostages to fortune and a 
picture of a Cambridge steeped in classical, mathematical and 
scientific studies would suffice. 
Finally, a close textual study reveals that Sidgwick learnt more 
from both Whewell and Grote than he was willing to admit, especially 
in the fields of ethics and the criticism of utilitarianism. To have 
praised Whewell and Grote too demonstratively would have deflected 
attention from his own originality. The novelty of the Methods of 
Ethics Of 1874 is, as Sidgwick argues, in the rigorous analysis 'of 
the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what 
ought to be done' (Sidgwick 1907, V). In the more constructive 
context, however, we find Sidgwick developing, like Grote, an eclectic 
system, 
-taking 
the best elements of common sense, intuitionist and 
utilitarian systems, and blending them into what is later called 
'Ideal Utilitarianism'. Sidgwick, like Grote, asserts that 
utilitarianism can show that all men do seek pleasure but it needs the 
intuition that we 'ought to so seek it' before we can have a complete 
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theory (ibid, 98). Jerome Schneewind. argued in an early review 
'Their ethical views show striking similarities on important 
issues, and even Sidgwick's epistemology, as revealed fairly 
clearly if not in detail in his posthumously published works, can 
be seen as showing Grote's influence. If one adds Whewell to the 
line of succession, an interesting continuity seems. to become 
visible' (Schneewind 1968,172). 
Personally I feel a moderate version of the final hypothesis is 
correct. Whether consciously or unconsciously Sidgwick played down 
his mentor's associations, interests, ideas, originality and 
significance, and by successfully attaching the label he did to 
mid-Victorian Cambridge he has hindered a true appreciation of its 
significance for over a century. It must be remembered that Sidgwick 
was more disenchanted in 1876 than he was at any time. Birks had 
obtained the Knightbridge Chair in 1872 and Sidgwick bad to wait in 
anguish until 1883 to obtain satisfaction. The incumbent had in his 
youth been lauded at Trinity but after failure to get the chai r in 
1865 had pursued a prof. ession in the church. His evangelical fervour, 
his moralistic style and his almost total lack of originality nearly 
put the seal of death on the moral science tripos during his 
stewardship, which was only to be revived in 1883. Birks himself paid 
lip service to Grote in several works but never notices his true 
originality. For himself, his significance is in restoring the 
Whewellian imprint on Cambridge philosophy for another decade, most 
especially in regard to' religious rationalism. This conciliating 
attitude to science was most apparent in his 1858 lecture on 'Natural 
Science, The Handmaid of Revelation' (Birks 1858). According to Birks 
scientific discovery reveals the 'wonder' of God's creation which will 
help ripen religious faith' (ibid 43-44). Philosophy, like sciencer 
if studied in this spirit. 'becomes truly the handmaid of Christian 
faith' (ibid, 45). Life under Birks must have been an anguish for 
Sidgwick as well as for his students. 
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For his part, Maurice seems to have used Grote in two ways. 
Firstly, his relational theory in Social Morality is remarkably 
similar and in the lectures on Conscience the two's theories almost 
coincide. However, though Maurice pays great tribute to Grote in his 
inaugural lecture he would not have access to Grote's major works on 
ethics unless given sight of the manuscripts by Mayor, which is 
unlikely (Mdurice, 1866, Cam. d. 866,15; 1868,7-21; 1870). One last 
member of the Grote Club is of interest as well: William Kingdon 
Clifford, who graduated in mathematics in 1867 and who wrote several 
important texts on philosophy (Clifford 1879,1885,1886). Clifford, it 
appears, was well versed in Kant, Spinoza and Fichte during the period 
from 1864, and Stephen records one long conversation with him on the 
subject of the Absolute (Clifford 1879,14-15,35,38-39). Stephen calls 
Clifford's position idealist while being anti-Hegelian, rather 
striking for the t'ime (ibid 39-40,45: Stephen 1885). But despite 
this penchant for idealism Clifford is remembered most for his 
advocacy of psychological parallelism, the idea that physical and 
mental processes run along together in the cognitive process, and 
hence that an idealist philosophy a psycho-physiology can be parallel 
and equally fruitful enterprises. Neither study by itself would tell 
us all we needed to know, each would need the other to provide a 
complete picture. But equally neither should invade the terrain of 
the other or else confusion would reign. This theory, though 
different in many other ways, seems to be an interesting development 
of Grote*s distinction between the parallel explanations of philosophy 
and phenomenalism. The key development is that while Grote sees only 
one process that could be studied and described from two sides, 
Clifford sees two parallel processes (Clifford 1879l T, 254-340#* IT# 
31-80). 
In addition, while being famous for pressing on towards a more 
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coherent phenomenalist line of explanation, Clifford noted two 
interesting features of the mind picked up by Grote. Firstly, while 
my consciousness is composed of 'mind stuff* or impressions from 
objects that may exist outside of me, Clifford argues that once mind 
gets a hold of it, it 'ejects' both form and meaning into the world. 
Mind, in other words, has an active and constructive role to play in 
knowing. Secondly, the mind's constructions are not individual but 
social. Through the history of a group the attempts at understanding 
and the production of 'ejects' has resulted in the evolution of a 
group or 'tribal mind', in which certain objects are 'social objects'. 
This idea, that thought is social and that objects in the external 
world are socially humanised, is very reminiscent of Grote's teachingo 
as is Clifford's use of the term 'recognition' to explain what happens 
when individuals come to know an object or 'ejects' of the minds of 
others (Merz 1938,121-124). But the parallel gets even closer when we 
look at the fragments of Clifford's ethical writings. Here he rejects 
methodological individualist assumptions and premises his arguments on 
the idea of a fundamental social or 'tribal self' (Clifford 
1879,109-112; Metz 1938,125-126). While not going as far as 
Durkheim and positing a 'collective consciousness' we get the idea of 
the social self in each of us appearing in our individual 
consciousness and actions. Ethics is a social not an individual 
matter, moral action is distinguished by the self sacrifice of the 
individual for the common good of the group. Clifford explicitly 
opposes his theory to utilitarianism, even when it is presented in a 
historical disguise. The end of Ethics is not the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number; rather, like Grote, 
'A man must strive to be a better citizen, a better workman, a 
better son, husband or father' (Clifford 1879,121-130). 
In this support for the theory of 'my station and its duties' we may 
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agree with Metz that the theories 'contain a notable contribution to 
an Idealist social ethics'. This, I believe, has some continuity with 
the work of John'Grote, which both the Cambridge environment and the 
Grote Club connections would have fostered. William Kingdom 
Clifford's work is, I feel, one of the richest mines for profitable 
research on later developments of John Grote's thought. 
Unfortunately, both died young and before completing their work, and 
Leslie Stephen also had a hand in labelling both for good and for bad. 
Both, it seems to me, embraced the scientific advances of the day but 
refused to bow to the demands of positivists for an abandonment of 
metaphysics, non-utilitarian ethics and concrete history (Copleston 
1966,135-136). 
Outside Cambridge, Grote had little influence prior to 1880. In 
Avignon, Mill read Grote's Examination and wrote of it to Georg Braden 
in March 1872 but produced no reply (Mill 1972, IV1111). The 
Exploratio induced only minor revisions to the Logic, though I suspect 
more major changes were also made to Book six on the i. ogic of the 
social sciences than Mill admits. Alexander Bain, who was closer to 
Mill, saw the force of both the Exploratio and the Examination 
against his friend and forced a change in Mill's own attitudes on the 
subject (Bain 1882,1904). Leslie Stephen, after he had left 
Cambridge, also recognised the power of John Grote's arguments against 
Mill. Of the Exploratio he wrote, 
'This book is, I think, by far the most'interesting contemporary 
discussion of Mill, Hamilton and Whewell. It was, unfortunately, 
desultory and unfinished, but it is full of acute criticism, and 
charmingly candid and modest. Mill's Logic is especially 
discussed in chapters viii and ix. Grote holds, and I think 
truely, that Mill's attempt to divide metaphysics from logic 
leads to real confusion, and especially to an untenable mode of 
conceiving the relation between 'things' and thoughts. I cannot 
discuss Grote's views; but the book is full of interesting 
suggestionsl though the results. are rather vague' (Stephen 
1900,80). 
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A less known but most interesting metaphysician of the period 
also complimented Grote for the Exploratio. Shadworth Hollway Hodgson 
published four very original and astute works between 1865 and 1898 
which reflect concerns close to the heart of John Grote. Hodgson, in 
The Philosophy of Reflection, refers to John Grote as the 'only 
philosopher' handling metaphysics properly in England in the middle 
decades of the century, and before even that Mayor had noticed the 
similarity of Hodgson and Grote on at least one key issue (Hodgson 
1878, i, 5; Grote 1876,54). Mayor writes 
'on the view of Perception here given compare Exploratio 
Philosophica and Mr Shadworth Hodgson's Space and Time, and 
Theory of Practice'. 
However, as Hodgson*s work has been forgotten even more completely than 
Grote's, any claim for influence seems barren except in the context 
that both, as Forsyth noted, were working to develop a theory of 
experience which was central to the development of modern English 
philosophy (Forsyth 1910,145; 1904,408). 
In Scotland, David Masson noted the'existence of Grote's work in 
a second edition of Recent British Philosophy and John Vietch, in his 
analysis of Hamilton's philosophy, quotes Grote and refers to him as 
an 'astute metaphysician*(Vietch, 1882,31; Masson 1877,296). The 
intuitionist Henry Calderwood refers to Grote*s Examination on several 
occasions in his Handbook of Moral Philosophy of 1872, and to the 
Treatise in The Vocabulary of Philosophy. (Calderwood 1872j76j 
128,130; 1894,8,109,114,192,242,302; ). In one reference the 
similarity between Bradley and Grote's priority of right over good is 
noted (Calderwood 1894,302). A similarly appreciative set of 
references appear also in another popular textbook of the period, New 
and Old Methods of Ethics by F. Y. Edgeworth from oxford (Edgeworth 
1877,25,33,50-51). In this the similarity of Grote to Sidgwick on 
some points is noted (ibi: d, 39). In addition, as we have seen, the 
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implications of Grote's views on the need to separate science and 
philosophy, physio-psychology and the philosophy of the human mind 
were brought to the attention of the Anthropological Society in London 
in 1867 by J. Hunt(Hunt 1867, V, ccxvi). But most impressive of all 
prior to 1880 were the three reviews of the Treatise by Lasson, Krohn 
and Carrau. Each was longer, more rigorous and more recent than 
anything published in Britain at the time, and all three recognised 
the originality and power of Grote's thought. Grote was another case 
of a thinker being a prophet, in other than his own country (Carrau 
1877; Krohn 1878; Lasson 1878). 
b) 1880-1900 
on the surface Grote's work seems to have had little influence between 
the first flush of the Treatise in 1876 and the publication of the 
Exploratio Part 11 in 1900. New editions of Masson and Calderwood 
came out; Grote had some appreciative references in J. R. Thompson's 'A 
Dictionary of Philosophy'; and the Professor of Philosophy at London 
University, the early editor of mind and author of a neat book on 
Hobbesg George Croom Robertson, wrote his detailed and appreciative 
reference to John Grote for Leslie Stephen's Dictionary of National 
Bibliography (Thompson 1887, xxxix, 357,397,433; Robertson 1885). 
However I believe Grote*s work was having an effect in two places on 
two separate groups. In Cambridge, three decades of students were 
exposed to the Exploratio and the Examination at various times as set 
reading for the moral science tripos. Several of them were to become 
famous philosophers in their own right, whose work bears remarkable 
similarities to that of John Grote. Henry Sidgwick contrived to 
produce editions of the Methods and his History of Ethics, as well as 
regular lectures during this period, with his ideas gaining increasing 
credence after his election to the Knightbridge Chair in 1883. But 
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several other products of the Cambridge moral science tripos were 
educated in philosophy during this'period and later published work of 
relevance to this study. James Ward, who graduated in 1874 and was 
elected a fellow at Trinity in 1875; William R. Sorley, successful in 
1882 and elected a fellow at Trinity in 1883; G. F. Stout, the third to 
get a first and who graduated in 1883 as a member of St. John's 
College; John Ellis McTaggart, another Trinity man who graduated in 
1888 and was elected a fellow in 1891, J. S. Mackenzie from Trinity, who 
graduated in 1889. and was elected a fellow in 1890; Bertrand Russell, 
who graduated in 1894 and was elected a fellow at Trinity in 1895; 
and George E. Moore; who graduated in 1896 and was elected a fellow in 
1898. While I shall leave discussion of their work to the discussion 
of the period after 1900, when most of it was published, the early 
origins and connections with Grote should be noted here. 
Oxford University between 1870 and 1900 has been identified and 
labelled as the home of-English Idealism. From its early origins in 
Edward 
Jowett and Caird, to its realization in Green, Bradley and Bosanquet, 
and to its development in D. G. Ritchie, H. H. Joachim and others the 
history and philosophical character of late Victorian Oxford has been 
regularly analysed. One source of dispute amongst commentators has 
been the level of Hegelian influence upon the key figures in the 
movement. (Vincent 1986,7-10). Some observers, like Robbins, consider 
the Hegelian influence io be major, while others, like Richter, Metz# 
Passmore and Muirhead, consider it to be secondary. In the second 
hypothesis the argument is that the English Idealists were impressed 
by German ideas to the point of conversion, but that they had 
difficulty in reading and understanding them; that they recognised, 
as Metz says of Green, that what was needed was not 'refurbishing of 
foreign ideas' but a thinking it all through again, using English 
sources, conceptions, styles of argument and suiting the conclusions 
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to English circumstance, history and culture (Metz 1938,269-270; Seth 
1912j344-345). 
Such an interpretation has great merits when applied to Green and 
indeed to Ferrier, Grote and Jowett before him, and Bradley and 
Bosanquet after him. Engli'sh idealism was less an import from 
Germany, even less a story of the 'Reception of Hegel in England' and 
more an indigenous product, inspired perhaps by foreign achievements 
earlier, but constructed by philosophers concerned primarily with the 
British tradition, using materials forged in British philosophy, and 
aimed at a British audience, government, clergy and larger society 
with their own peculiar culture and needs. This point is well made by 
Robin G. Collingwood in his Autobiography when commenting on the 
pedigree of his Oxford idealist predecessors, 
'The philosophical tendencies common to this school were 
described by its contemporaries as Hegelianism. This title was 
repudiated by the school itself, and rightly. Their philosophy, 
so far as they had a single philosophy, was a continuation and 
criticism of the indigenous English and Scottish philosophies of 
the middle nineteenth century' (Collingwood 1944,16). 
In this sense Green and Bradley were followers in the tradition of 
their predecessors, and especially Ferrier, Grote and Jowett, rather 
than followers of Stirling and Caird. The origin of Oxford idealism 
was as firmly based in Hobbes, Hume, Berkely, Mill, Reid, Hamilton, 
Ferrier, Mansel, Whewell and Grote as it was in Kant and Hegel, a 
point often made in detailed literature but not taken sufficient 
notice of in histories and surveys of Oxford and the late Victorian 
period. 
Copleston gives equal weight to an indigenous British reaction to 
empiricism and utilitarianism; Muirhead considers the long Platonic 
tradition, revived in the seventeenth and eighteenth century by the 
Cambridge Platonists and rationalists, *to be of primary importance 
(Copleston 1966,177-176; Muirheaa 1965,13-16). John Passmore 
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sketches out the non-Hegelian origins of English Idealism and notes 
against the idea that Green was a 'neo-Hegelian', that 'it was the 
school of Caird, not Green, who stood firmly for Hegelian principles', 
a position reinforced by Bradley who wrote, 
'Green was in my opinion no Hegelian and was in some respects 
anti-Hegelian even' (Passmore 1966,57). 
Bradley himself, like Ferrier before him, repudiated the label of 
'Hegelian' (ibid, 60; Seth 1912,349-350). Collingwood saw Bradley's 
metaphysics as an indigenous reply to 'mill's Logic, Bain's psychology 
and Mansel's metaphysics'. Richter, Green's best biographer, 
considers Green's youthful trips with Sidgwick to Germany in the early 
1860's to be vitally important, but he notes that Green recognised 
that alien ideas would need Anglicanizing for domestic audiences 
(Richter 1964,87-91). Richter, in particular, notes that in religion 
Green drew from the Liberal Anglicans and Broad Church theologians 
with their connections with romanticism and christian socialism, and 
in particular he notes the influence of *Coleridge, Dr Arnold, 
Carlyle, F. D. Maurice and Kingsley', rather than of Germany (Richter 
1964,47). 
While all the early British idealists were influenced by Kant, it 
must be remembered that Kant was himself responding to Hume and other 
British philosophers and theories of the day, and that as I have 
shown, his own concerns were to some extent mirrored in the work of 
Reid and the Scottish philosophy. Finally, we otight to note the 
unwitting support for this general thesis given by James Stirling. 
Stirling forcefully argues that no scholars in Britain understood 
Hegel, and few even bothered to read him. The claim that German 
idealism was widely known about at the time was in his view spurious. 
While overstated, this view is testimony to support the thesis that if 
idealism was developed in Britain prior to the 1870's its origins lay 
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in the traditional concerns of English and Scottish philosophy, and of 
Cambridge and Edinburgh in particular (Stirling 1865; Seth 
1.912,341-343). A more historically accurate account of the origins of 
idealism in Britain must start there. 
But there are some interesting connections to be explored between 
Edinburght Cambridge and Oxford at the time. Scholars such as Caird, 
Bosanquet and Alexander migrated between Oxford and Edinburgh, 
producing interesting cross fertilization of ideas, and through 
Sidgwick at least, Cambridge had a direct link with Oxford (Harvie 
1976). Of primary source evidence we know only that Bradley had read 
Grote's Treatise by the 1880's and was siding with him against 
Alexander Bain. We know that Bosanquet had at least read 
theExploratio Part II by 1902 and was praising its virtues (Bradley 
1883; 1935,135-137); Bosanquet 1902,128-130,1927,158). T. H. Green 
would definitely have known about Grote through his long friendship 
with Henry Sidgwick. But there are no direct references to Grote in 
Green or secondary source evidence that he had read or been influenced 
by Grote, and hence we must rely upon circumstantial and textual 
evidence. Despite major differences between the two there is evidence 
for considering the similarity and even connection between the works 
of John Grote and Thomas Hill Green. The first case for comparison 
-was made by Forsyth when he wrote 
'Like the work of Ferrier and Grote, and even more distinctlyr 
Green's philosophy is of the character virtually involved in the 
procedure of English philosophy from its beginning - it is a 
critical philosophy, which sets out by inquiring not directly as 
to the nature of reality, but as to what is implied in the 
knowledge of reality, or in reality's being known'(Forsyth 
1910,147). 
The connections are even deeper than Forsyth indicates. Firstly# 
there are some biographical points. Both men were deeply religious 
and at the same time dedicated to philosophy; both were opposed to 
positivism, naturalismt empiricism and utilitarianism. Both died 
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young before completing major texts and relied for popularity on the 
efforts of their students. In the areas of metaphysics both were 
willing to explore idealist epistemology, ontology, and the 
relationship between them. They considered that there was no duality 
between knowledge and reality, only a unity (Green 1884, Sec. 34). The 
source of this unity is consciousness, which holds subject and object 
together. Knowledge grows out of this unity, out of consciousness 
(ibid Sec. 70). Green differs from Grote in one crucial way here: 
while Grote was able to show in his epistemology that there are 
non-theological premises and arguments to support this thesis, for 
knowledge starts in an undifferentiated whole called the immediatet 
which produces differentiated knowledge by reflection and judgement, 
with our consciousness putting mind into the objects of knowledge, 
Green, like Berkeley, has a single string bow. He posits a single 
eternal consciousness, that of God, in which our consciousnesses 
participate in experiencing and thinking. Grote considered, the'last 
idea to be an attractive possibility but he built his thesis on other 
than religious foundations. 
However, in other essentials the theories are similar. Both 
start with experience, as defined in the complete or idealist sense. 
Both start with the subject and object relationship within experience. 
Experience is a concrete whole, not an aggregation of sense 
experiences, with knowledge dependent upon them. Knowledge grows from 
within experiences not from without, or from sense data from objects 
(Selsam 1938,96-100; Green 1884, Sec. 36-37). Like Grote, Green 
however refused to be drawn into positing the unknowable 'thing in 
itself', or Bradley's later 'unknowable absolute' (Green ibid 38-42). 
Rejecting Hume's 'impressions', Mill's reality as 'a constant 
possibility of sensation' and Kant*s 'thing in itself'# Grote and 
Green see eye to eye, differing largely on the stress on God As the 
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only source of the unity of consciousness and reality, and Green's 
continued reliance on the argument of 'internal relations' (Green 
1884, Secs. 12-13; 26-30,34-37). If this argument about 'internal 
relations' was the sole criterion of an epistemology being called 
idealist, Grote's work would have to be re-considered. But it is not 
and in the end the epistemological concerns that unite Green and Grote 
are. substantial (Copleston 1966gl9l-198; Passmore 1966,56-60; Metz 
1938,268-278; Milne 1962,89-97; Forsyth 1910,147-155; Seth 
1912,344-349). 
In the field of ethics several similarities are striking. Both 
considered themselves anti-utilitarian and distanced themselves from 
other intuitionist philosophies. Both felt that their ethical ideas 
needed. grounding in epistemology and metaphysics and produced 
prolegomena to ethics to show the links. In their prolegomena three 
features stand'out: firstly, that in coming to know the ideals we are 
knowing in the same way that we do in all intellectual knowledge; 
secondly, that moral knowledge, like all other sorts, is social; and 
thirdly, that the metaphysical basis of all action, including the 
moral, is want (Green 1884, Secs85-114; Richter 1964,195-196). Next 
is the recognition that the other preconditions of being a moral 
person are the presence of free will and th6 capacity for action to 
satisfy our wants and realise our ideals. Moral beings are not 
animals and are not self-seeking, but are ideal-seeking beings for 
whom the well-being of others is central(Green 1884, Secs234-237). 
This again presumes that man is a future orientated being and that 
moral knowledge and decisions are teleological (Richter 1964, 
196-197). Of the ideals Green argues that there are several, all of 
value in themselves, but the linking and overarching ideal, that 
indicates the realization of our want is 'self-realization' or 
perfection' (Milne 1962,97-110). As with Grote life is seen to 
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progress towards this but progress cannot be guaranteed (Richter 1964, 
198-199). Noticing the similarity here Jean Pucelle noted that both 
Green and Grote tried to explain how the ideal and the actual did 
relate and how they could in practice be brought closer together and 
he quotes Book IV of Green's Prolegomena as the continuence of Grote's 
task (Pucelle 1955.84-85). He writes that Grote's mind can also be 
traced in Green's idýeas on want and on the relation between the lower 
facts of sensations and the higher ideal and ontological facts 
(Pucelle 1955,83). But this is not all; Pucelle writes of Grote in 
his conclusions 
'we find again in Green and E. Caird many of these views but set 
forth and ordered with incomparably greater skill; the cyclical 
action between the environment and the individual and progress 
through social activity to the incarnate morality beyond, and of 
individual inspiration, a dynamic value and fruitfulness of want 
and the hope for a union of nature and mind' (Pucelle 1955,86). 
Where I disagree with Pucelle is an the next point. Green's work may 
be better ordered, but I do not agree that Grote's reconciliations 
were only 'empirical', that his idealism was only of 'intention' while 
Green's is complete. Grote, I have revealed, had a very complete and 
largely coherent idealist system, that linked together the key 
elements noted above, and in not insisting on a universal mind of God 
working in nature, but rather in positing it as one possibility, his 
synthesis is far better founded than that of Green. 
Similarities of some interest also emerge when comparing the work 
of Francis Herbert Bradley and John Grote, though there is little 
primary source evidence of direct influence. Already I have argued 
about the similarity of some key themes in Ethical Studies (Bradley 
1876)., In this book, published six years after the Examination we 
find a thorough going defence of free will; a rigorous attack on 
utilitarian ethics in Essay III; the idea that the moral end in life 
is social self realization; the argument in Essay V that this 
is 
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achieved by accepting 'My Station and its Duties'; an argument that 
above duty morality demands the pursuit of higher ideals, in Essay VI 
on 'Ideal Morality'; and a defence of the idea that morality 
ultimately requires self-sacrifice rather than selfishness in Essay 
VII. So far, no other commentator has picked up these points, nor the 
significance of Bradley's defence of Grote's central hypothesis that 
evil is an error(Bradley 1883,1935). But the points of similarity 
and contrast in the two metaphysics are even more remarkable. 
Bradley's whole system is founded on the same concerns as Grote: to 
explain the relationship between subject and object; experience, 
knowledge and reality, and to explain the course of knowledge to the 
true and the right. As I argued in chapter five, Bradley elaborates a 
theory of the development of knowledge out of immediate experience but 
differs from G rote in concluding that the unity of knowing and being 
and the grasping of the absolute truth is impossible, as what 
reflection distinguishes can never be reassembled coherently. (Bradley 
1893; 1914,157-191). However in a late essay on Relations Bradley 
reverts to a position very similar to that of Grote. There are, he 
argues, three levels of consciousness, but the third and highest, the 
absolute, unites the lowest level or immediate feeling and the 
intermediate level of judgement or reflection. The absolute can be 
known and can unite knowledge, and knowledge with being (Bradley 1835, 
vol. II). Finally in sharing the idea of truth as coherence the two 
can be seen to progress in thought together on another key issue. 
With Bosanquet the connections are less pronounced though we do 
have his identification of Grote as an objective idealist. Grote 
wrote little on logic, which separates him from a major concern of 
Bradley and Bosanquet, and there is little in the Philosophical Theory 
of the State to attract comparative attention. comparison is 
justified of the different roles they ascribe to philosophy and 
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science, and sociology and philosophy; there are some similarities in 
their theories of obligation; in the general agreement that the self 
is a social self, who realises itself only in social activity, and the 
point that the effort of life is in making the actual fit the ideal 
and not vice-versa (Bosanquet 1923). However there are more striking 
connections in the less famous collections of essays. Firstly, in the 
defence of idealist epistemology in The Distinction Between Mind and 
Its Objects and Contemporary Philosophy, and secondly, in some attacks 
on positivist psychology in The Psychology of the Moral Self and 
elsewhere. (Bosanquet 1913; 1924; 1897). 
In all of these cases my aim is not to prove a connection with 
Grote but to suggest similarities which could be lines for future and 
more detailed research. Historically, I consider it highly likely 
that the Oxford idealists would have read John Grote's major essays, 
even if their friend Sidgwick, had not provided them with a good 
recommendation. However, what is of real interest to me are the 
similarities that emerge, even coincidentally', at the time between 
different individuals struggling from within similar philosophical 
traditions to solve traditional philosophical problems. Grote, 
Sidgwick, Green and Bradley are all very much English philosophers 
solving British problems, but from within two universities with very 
different traditions. 
c) 1900 to the Present 
In 1900 John Grote's reputation received a mini-boost and between 1910 
and 1934 several texts emerged that either described and evaluated his 
work or which built upon its central arguments. In the first category 
we have from within the Scottish philosophical tradition three major 
reviews that have already been extensively referred to. The first, 
and one of the best was by Thomas Forsyth from St. Andrews University 
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which locates Grote alongside Ferrier, Green and Bradley as the key 
figures in the development of mid Victorian English philosophy 
(Forsyth 1910,139-147). The second was by James Seth(the brother of 
Andrew(Seth) Pringle Pattison) who locates Grote in the idealist line 
as an 'Absolute Idealist' and relates him to Ferrier, I'Stirling, Caird, 
Green and Bradley (Seth 1912,339-341). Finally, in 1934, a Danish 
scholar studying in Scotland, T. T. Segerstedt set out to write a 
history of The Problem of Knowledge in Scottish Philosophy and 
discovered that John Grote was not only part of the story but the 
synthesiser who wrote the last chapter. In later works Segerstedt 
wrote on the general history of idealism in England but did little 
else to popularise Grote's work (Segerstedt 1934). 
However it was from within the idealist movement itself that the 
most interesting developments took place. At Cambridge James Ward, a 
proto idealist, developed a scathing series of attacks, firstly, on 
positivist psychology of mind and se condlyon naturalism in all its 
forms. Ward was versed both in science and in German idealist 
philosophy (Broad 1957,35). Ward had obviously read Grote and had 
committed his private views on him to Charles Whitmore in an untraced 
letter. The contextual evidence is all that we now have to go on, but 
the two sources which quote Grote on the knowledge of acquaintance and 
judgement, and Naturalism and Agnosticism have elements of Grote, in 
the patient and analytic style, the anti-naturalist contents and, as 
Passmore notes, on some points of detail (Ward 1885,1919# 1915; 
Passmore 1966,83; ). William R. Sorley (1855-1935) was another 
original idealist with a Trinity College background. He was the only 
Cambridge contributor to Essays in Philosophical criticism, dedicated 
to T. H. Green in 1883. Sorley wrote a neat review of Grote's work for 
his A History of British Philosophy to 19oo (Sorley 1921b, 264-265). 
Grote is not associated with any khool but Sorley makes two points of 
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great truth: that Grote strove to clear his own thotight. and thought 
generally an key topics and, a point I have reiterated in this thesis, 
that 
'He did not seek reputation as a philosophical writer, and he has 
not gained it. His direct influence has been restricted to a 
limited number of other thinkers, through whom it has passed to 
wider circles without any definite trace of its origin' (Sorley 
1921b, 264). 
In other words, Grate's influence as recorded in notes and references 
do not reflect his actual influence; while his ideas have had impact 
they were not always traced and attributed to their original author. 
Sorley's own publications were extensive. Like Grote, he set out to 
destroy The Ethics of Natura2ism and its place to espouse the The 
Moral Life and Moral Worth and Moral Values and the Idea of God, 
(Sorley 1884; 1911; 1911,1921a). C. D. Broad considered Sorley to 
have little influence on Cambridge philosophy, despite his holding the 
Knightbridge Chair, but his ideas do show a continuity with earlier 
elements in the tradition, and Sorley quotes Grate twice in the Ethics 
of Naturalism (Sorley 1884,195,206). Like Broad and McTaggart he 
developed a version of what became known as 'personalist idealism', in 
which persons or selves are not only the source of all knowledge but 
also 'the bearers of value' (Copleston 1966,281). 
Somewhat closer to Ward, and in the idealist 'tradition at 
Cambridge, was George Frederick Stout(1860-1944). Stout's thought 
covered the fields of epistemology and ontology, where he wrote to 
unite thought and being. He wrote several texts on psychology which 
were distinctly anti-positivist and anti-phenomenalist and in later 
life he produced two texts of great interest to idealists, the Gifford 
lectures on Mind and Matter and God and Nature (Stout 1931,1952). 
Both challenge the idea that idealism was dead by the 1920's for as 
Broad argues 
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'His doctrine is thus a very subtle and highly elaborate blend of 
realistic and idealistic elements, culminating in a peculiar form 
of philosophical theism' (Broad 1966,42). 
Certainly, as Passmore notes, Stout argued against Russell that 
experience was a concrete unity, and that objects are 'embodied mind' 
- two ideas close to John Grote's heart (Passmore 1966,309-311). 
Two other Cambridge philosophers of the period had an intimate 
acquaintance with Grote's metaphysics, which can be proved. John 
McTaggart Ellis and C. D. Broad himself. John McTaggart (1866-1925), 
really a member of the illustrious Ellis family, had, like Broad, a 
copy of the Exploratio in the private library he left to Trinity 
College. Tradition has it that he was the only major idealist at 
Cambridge during the period of its ascendency but we already have 
evidence to contradict this. He was, however, the most thorough, the 
most rigorous and definitely the most Hegelian of all the Cambridge 
idealists (McTaggart 1896,1901,1921-1927g 1934). McTaggart's view 
of his own position has already been quoted and related to Grote - 
both could be called in some general senses, idealists', 
personalists' and 'realists'. More significantly both were thorough 
metaphysicians and products of the Trinity College philosophical 
milieu. Idealism, a rigorous-application of Hegelian dialectics and 
cosmology typify McTaggart's synthesis, but like the output of the 
whole Cambridge line his work had a real stamp of originality, of 
having been thought ouý from first principles and having been 
developed and refined over a life time. Like John Grote, McTaggart 
saw two sources of mind in the world, one the self and the other 
society, but unlike Grote, ' he saw no place for a divine mind. 
McTaggart's 'absolute' is the plurality of minds that make up society; 
the group is a substance with its own character and'qualities. 
Knowledge and reality are both spiritual, and it is the mind of the 
self and society which go to make up reality (Copleston 1966,270-277; 
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Passmore 1966,75-81, Broad 1933-1938). 
While-remaining very much'independent of all schools of thought 
Charles Durbar Broad (1887-1971) was clearly associated with 
McTaggart, editing some of his work and writing the most complete 
account of his system of idealism. There is a heavily annotated 
edition of John Grote's Exploratio in his private library, stored at 
Trinity College, and Broad refers to Grote on several occasions in his 
various works (1930,12; 1966,14; 1952; 54). Broad's own 
philosophical position is eclectic, taking the best from both the 
realist and idealist traditions and adding some of the common sense 
rigour he picked up from his colleague George Moore (Broad 1914,1923, 
1925,1930; Schilpp 1939; Passmore 1966,347-350). One last 
idealist of the early period is J. S. McKenzie of Trinity College and 
later Professor at University College, Cardiff who produced numerous 
texts of 'an idealist character but little originality in the early 
decades of this century (McKenzie 1.893,1902,1917,1918). A 
reference to Grote's use of the two kinds of knowledge distinction 
appears in Flements of Constructive Philosophy (Mackenzie 1917,130). 
Little need be said but to suggest in summary that alongside 
Coleridge, Rare, Whewell, John Grote and Maurice we now have a much 
longer idealist line at Cambridge, which includes James Ward, William 
Sorley, G. F. Stout, John McTaggart, Ellis and J. S. Mackenzie at least, 
and perhaps Broad too. Idealism did not die at Trinity or Cambridge 
with Grote in 1866, but lived on for a long period thereafter. 
Also at Cambridge are two other figures of major stature whom I 
consider to be connnected- with John Grote in some way: Bertrand 
Russell and George Edward Moore. Both were products of the Cambridge 
moral science tripost and ' both would have been exposed at least to 
Grote's Examination. We know that Russell used -the distinction 
between knowledge Of acquaintance and judgement in his best seller, 
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The Problems of Philosophy, and we know that one of George Moore's 
closest friends at Cambridge was Joseph B. Mayor's sonj Robert John 
Mayor. As the godson and true inheritor of the phenomenalist mantle 
from John Stuart Mill it is hardly likely that Russell would speak of 
Grote with admiration if he knew his work well, but in a personal 
letter late in his life Russell replied that he could not remember 
hearing of Grote in his early Cambridge days (Russell., 1969, M. S. ). 
But we must remember that in his early days Russell (1872-1970) was 
convinced by the idealism of contemporary Cambridge and was always 
alive to the difficulties inherent in his sophisticated and modified 
form of phenomenalism. In style, in care for language, and in rigour 
of argument he resembles Grote and the later lineage, and in reacting 
to idealism, to the coherence theory of truth, and to the social and 
even state-orientated moral and political philosophy of the idealist 
he is unwittingly conversing with Grote and confirming the importance 
of idealism to him and the Cambridge of his day (Russell 1953,1963, 
1967). While it is completely beyond the scope of this thesis to say 
any more on the subject interested readers could well now re-acquaint 
themselves with the whole of the Problems of Philosophy,. and 
especially the Chapters 4,5l 11 and 12, as well as Chapter 10 of 
Mysticism and Logic. 
The case of George E Moore (1873-1958) is far more complicated. 
A product of the same Cambridge milieu, it would be easy to rush to 
judge Moore as a direct receptor of the Grote - Sidgwick inheritence. 
As Passmore notes the key link lies in the 'spirit' of Moore and 
Cambridge's philosophy, the rigorous analysis, the great care for use 
of language, the faith in common sense and the dislike of joining or 
creating schools of thought. At the general analytic level three 
elements in Moore's thought meet those that John Grote bequeathed: 
fir*stly,. the preference for ordinary language in philosophy, secondlyg 
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a desire to synthesise utilitarianism and intuitionism in ethics, and 
the wish to preserve the best in the common sense realist tradition in 
epistemology while rejecting empiricism. In a more negative vein 
Moore was, like Russell, reacting to idealism and metaphysics in 
general, but he remained, like Grote, a devout anti-naturalist. But 
his assertion that our ordinary knowledge is quite good enough and 
that the world can be known directly harks back to Grote. The 
preference for 'ordinary language' is again reminiscent of Grote's 
attack on Ferrier and the idea that philosopers need to create their 
own pure and technical language. In ethics 'Principia Fthica' is 
really a very modern version of the Examination, in which the old 
Grotian distinction between 'is' and 'ought' statements is reaffirmed, 
and utilitarianism caught in the trap of being either intuitionist or 
a captive of the naturalistic fallacy (Moore 1903). In Ethics'Moore 
is more conciliatory towards utilitarianism, rather like Sidgwick 
before, doing as much as he can to defend it by adding as little from 
intuitionism as was needed. Put alongside the idea that if we clarify 
our questions and our language many problems will just go away we have 
some remarkable affiliations with Moore and Sidgwick and Grote (Moore 
1966; Warnock 1966,11-29; Warnock M, 1960,11-38; Passmore 1966, 
54,201-239). - 
Two other Cambridge philosophers will be taken as later 
inheritors of the Cambridge tradition and of some aspects of Grote's 
work, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and Michael Oakesh9tt 
(1901- The former was another in a long line of brilliant 
Trinity College philosophers and along with Russell, Moore and 
McTaggart the fourth leg of the table on which most contemporary 
British philosophers feast. There is no evidence that Wittgenstein, 
who came to Cambridge in 1912, ever read Grote, though it is possible 
that he did. But on several points the Cambridge line links them. 
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Firstly, there is Passmore's 'Cambridge Spirit'. Secondly, there are 
the similarities in theory of language, and in particular the argument 
that 'words mean what they are used to mean and are understood to mean 
by users in everyday language', which links Grote's on Glossary and 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953). 
Thirdly, there is the link provided by the argument that there is a 
latent idealism in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which if true 
links him to the Cambridge idealists from Coleridge to McTaggart and 
Sorley (Gellner 1973 Williams 1974; Malcolm 1982). Finally, there 
is the crucial argument of Wittgenstein that as language is social, so 
is meaning and with it thought. On all points the similarities may be 
pure coincidence, or could be based on conflating uses of such key 
words as 'use' and 'idealism'. On all points Wittgenstein could just 
as easily be related to other thinkers, and there is no evidence to 
link him directly with Grote, but the suggestion should remain to be 
explored by late. r researchers (Malcolm 1958, Pears 1971, Kenny 1973, 
Warnock 1969,62-93; Passmore 1966,424-465). 
Michael Oakeshott studied and taught at Cambridge with short 
interruptions from 1923 until his appointment to the Chair of 
Political Science at the L. S. E. in 1951. Like R. G. Collingwood at 
oxford, Oakeshott's studies and mind turned to the relationship 
between philosophy and history and then on to the relationship between 
philosophy and all other 'modes of experience', including science, 
poetry, religion and practice. In his first major publicition 
Experience and Its Modes Oakeshott sketched out the precondition of 
each of these attempts to comprehend or encounter experience and to 
map out a role for philosophy in relationship to them (Oakesbott 
1933). But it is to Chapter II on Experience and Its Modes that any 
researcher interested in the continuity of the Cambridge line should 
go. In chapter six I explored some of the similarities between Grote 
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and Oakeshott on the unity of immediate experience, the effect of 
reflection and judgement on the concrete whole of experience, and the 
interdependence of subject and object in experience and thought. Now 
we can note that Oakeshott argues that in 'experience a given world of 
ideas is transformed into a world which is more of a world, the 
criteria of achievement everywhere being one of coherence' (ibid 41). 
Like Grote, he considers that the growth of knowledge is one of 
'distinction' within the 'concrete whole of experience', each 
judgement is'a newly observed part of, a previously conceived whole', 
brought about by the mind's demand for coherence (Grote 1900,299). 
Oakeshott discusses the impossibility of rigorously separating 
knowledge of acquaintance and judgement, as Grote formerly argued, and 
he rejects the notion of an unknowable reality (Pakeshott 1933, 
48-54). In the end Oakeshott, like Grote, binds knowledge and reality 
together in experience, for reality is only experience and nothing but 
experience made coherent (ibid 54-61). Facts are products not 
posti! lates of this process and carved out of experience, by a process 
of*discrimination. Again, there is a scale of knowledge with degrees 
of truth and reality (ibid 61-67). 
What is real to both men is the complete and coherent whole of 
experience, any shortfall from which they call an abstraction. 
History, science, poetry, religion and practice are all abstractions 
to Oakeshott, all try to grasp the totality of reality but from 
presuppositions or postulates that will never allow that to be 
possible. Each 'mode of experience' or 'language' of analysis is a 
distinct manner of thought,. with a language, logic, and purpose of its 
own. Each is as Grote believed, 'sui generis'. Like Grote, one of 
the biggest sources of error in reasoning is the confusion of the 
languages, logics and purposes of two or more manners of thought which 
should be kept distinct, or the taking of one as sovereign and the 
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reduction of its fellows to the role of slaves. To Oakeshott and 
Grote this is precisely what was happening in modern thought; the 
languages of history, philosophy and science were becoming hopelessly 
muddled, and both practice and science were making a takeover bid for 
the whole terrain of explanation (Oakeshott 193j; 1962,1-36,80-167, 
197-247,301-333; 1983,45-96). Much else could be said here to 
suggest further lines of research, especially related to Groteos and 
Oakeshott's rejection of 'rationalism' or 'abridgement'; their basic 
idealism; the common Cambridge concern for clarity and rigour of 
argument; and the common respect for custom and tradition, for what 
we have as well as for what ought to be, but it would serve little 
further purpose. Michael Oakeshott is undoubtedly one of the most 
original and elegant writers of this century, who needed little else 
to help him think than a tradition. That tradition may be idealist as 
Greenleaf suspects, but it was not solely the 'idealism of Oxford, but 
of Hegel and Cambridge. It was also the tradition of English 
philosophy back to Hobbes, the reconstruction of whose ideas Oakeshott 
devoted so much of his time. 
Michael oakeshott read and was impressed by the thought of John 
Grote. He is the modern thinker whom we must thank for maintainingi 
wittingly or unwittingly , that tradition of thought, wittingly or 
unwittingly which has made the retrieval of John Grote's thought 
possible. In a letter of 1970 Oakeshott recounts buying the 
Exploratio in a second hand bookshop in Cambridge in the 1920's and 
being impressed by the author as 'a vastly interesting and remarkably 
independent thinker'. It is observed that 
'Grote stands out as one of the most careful critics of 
utilitarianism, and there is so much in the Moral Ideals which 
is 
profound and original'. 
But'on the whole, Oakeshott considered that it was the Exploratio and 
its example of how to think which is of most benefit to later 
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philosophers (Oakeshott 1970). Michael Oakeshott possessed copies of 
both the Treatise and the Examination in the 1920's and was much 
impressed by them (Oakeshott 1985, MS). 
At Cambridge the most recent intellectual inheritor of this line 
is Quentin Skinner, the Professor of Political Science. In early 
essays he eclectically pieced together the use theory of language, the 
interpretative notion of history developed by Collingwood and 
Oakeshott, and the concern for clarity and coherence embedded in the 
Cambridge tradition. Alongside Anthony Giddens, anti-positivism, 
respect for German and French metaphysics, for hermeneutics and action 
theory, the two, probably unwittingly, carry on a tradition at 
Cambridge that has now survived for over one hundred and fifty years 
(Skinner 1969,1970,1972(a), 1972(b), 1974; Giddens, 1976,1977). 
In Oxford during the first half of the twentieth century 
philosophical studies underwent A profound change, but it would be 
wrong to'underestimate the level of continuity. The generation after 
that of 1870 to 1900 contained an assortment of1figures interested in 
the traditional British problems of philosophy, and they answered them 
in often traditional ways. Of those whom we could call idealist, 
whose work either refers to or resembles Grote's, we must include 
A. E. Taylor, Hastings Rashdall, Samuel 
-Alexander, 
H. W. B. Joseph, 
Edward de Burgh, J. A. Smith and R. G. Collingwood. Oddly enough, it was 
from Oxford, and New College in particular, that the request for a 
second part of the Exploratio was made in 1898 and another 
contemporary fellow, Anthony Quinton, has done much to inspire a 
re-reading of Grote. Of the signatories, to the request we only know 
of H. W. B. Joseph (1867-1943). Joseph refers to Grote's work twice in 
his various works but on all occasionsl as in his enigmatic Some 
Problems in Ethics, a respect for the kind of style and issue 
discussed by the latter is present (Joseph 1916,55n; 1935,8; 
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1931). In his Logic, Joseph wrote that the Exploratio is by an 
I author less known than he deserves to be'. In the Problems Joseph 
writes to distinguish and clarify the ideals of right and good, duty 
and freedom, in a vein similar to Grote. In taking up the issue of 
tfie difference between the primary ideals of right, good, and duty, 
Joseph is entering into an old debate but with new conversationalists. 
The most famous were H. Rashdall, H. A. Pritchard, WA. Ross and E. F. 
Carritt. Only Rashdall amongst them was an idealist, the rest all 
returned to intuitionism to nourish themselves for the debate (Hudson 
1983,87-100). 
Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924) was another New College scholar and 
a likely signatory of the letter to Major. In his early essay on 
'Personality, Human and Divine' in H.. Sturt's Personal Idealism he 
set out the case for the personal idealism that was to sustain his 
thought and which identifies him to some extent with John Grote (Sturt 
1902t 369-393). In the Theory of Good and Evil there is no direct 
reference to Grote but in the development of ideal utilitarianism, in 
the defence of self-realization and self sacrifice and in the attempt 
to link metaphysics and ethics, we have several Grotian themes 
developed (Rashdall 1907). Harold Pritchard (1871-1947), another New 
College product and later Professor of Moral Philosophy, went further 
than Joseph and Rashdall towards intuitionism and towards the 
separation of the primary moral ideals. For him right, good and duty 
were independent 'ideals which, along with their sub ideals, could be 
immediately recognized to be of value. In his famous essay 'Does 
Moral Philosophy Rest on 'a Mistake' we also get an argument from 
analogy between the theory of knowledge and the theory of morality, 
both of which share a source in the intuititional theory of immediate 
knowledge (Pritchard, 1968). What we ought to do, Pritchard, like 
Grote, considers to arise from our unreflecting consciousness and 
is 
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only brought out, clarified and rationalised by reflection. We do not 
need teleological or other justifications of morality; our duties are 
embedded in our everyday relations, practices and intuitions. 
However in 'Duty and the Ignorance of Fact' Pritchard distances 
himself from the relational theory of Grote and Bradley. The 
recognition of duty is almost entirely a subjective and intuitional 
matter, not a recognition of facts entailed in our relationships 
(Pritchard 1968,18-39). W. D. Ross held views roughly equivalent to 
Pritchard's on the key issues of ethics (Hudson 1967,1970; 
Warnock, M. 1960,39-55; ). Ross considers The Right and the Good to be 
moral ideas of independent value and he considers it possible to find 
out what is right and good, both by examining what is entailed by 
moral situations, and by appeal to a plurality of ideals and-the 
self-evident principles governing them (Ross, W. 1930). His whole 
enterprise of carefully distinguishing and relating the key ideals of 
rightl duty, good and happiness is directly comparable* to that o'f 
Grote in the Treatise. E. F. Carritt has argued in a similar vein but 
in at least one of his textbooks he has grappled directly with Grote's 
account of the ethical ideals, to some useful effect (Carritt, 1928; 
Secs 41-44,52-52). John Grote is also mentioned in several texts by 
William George de Burgh (1866-1943 another Oxford graduate who 
praises Grote for distinguishing right, good and happiness; for 
introducing aretaics or a philosophy of activity into the 
philosophical conversation; and for separating philosophy and 
religious discourse. (de Burgh 1938,44-45,49,70; 1937,44n, 227). 
Two pioneers of 'new realism', Samuel Alexander and John Laird 
both Scotsmen with contacts at Oxbridge, also shared and recognized 
Grote's value in separating the moral ideals and in refusing to submit 
them all to the sovereign power of happiness. The latter studied 
briefly at Cambridge between 1911 and 1912 and came into contact with 
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Grote's corpus. John Laird (1887-1946) quotes Grote in four of his 
ethical texts on topics ranging from the independence of right, good 
and happiness, the notions of 'want' and 'egence', the value of a 
science of aretaics and the discussion of duty and conscience (Laird 
1928, IX-XIV; 1929,109; 1935,169,265; 1940,256; 1965,219). 
In epistemology, Laird supported John Grote's claim that we know what 
is the world directly - that we know that external objects exist, and 
he quotes Grote in a key chapter heading in his A Study in Realism 
(Laird 1920,15; 1924,219). Similarly Samuel Alexander (1859-1938), 
one of Green's students at Balliol, moved gradually from idealism to 
realism in epistemology and intuitionism in ethics. In his Moral 
Order and Progress, originally of 1889, he quotes John Grote 
eýtensively on the difference between right and good, on duty and 
conscience and on character (Alexander 1906, i57-158; 215,244). 
These quotations in turn seem to have effected an unlikely convert, 
the moral relativist and evolutionist E. A. Westermarck, who again 
quotes Grote on duty, conscience and character (Westermarck 1906, T, 
149,214; 11,113,266; 1932,224). Other Oxford realists who seem to 
use or quote Grote are G. D. Hicks and H. H. Price (Hicks 1938,124, Price 
1932,1953). Price defends the idea of the 'given'; various types of 
knowledge of acquaintance, types of belief and the idea that knowing 
is a kind of 'recognition'. 
But it was amongst Oxford's later idealists that a minor Grotian 
influence was nurtured. A. E. Taylor (1869-1945), an idealist of 
immense range and scholarship, covers just about all the topics 
touched on by Grote: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and the moral 
ideals (Taylor 1901,1912). Only one reference is made to Grote, but 
its single existence reveals a link into the heart of Taylor's 
idealism - an appreciative reference to Grote's distinction between 
what the philosopher and the scientist takes as 'given' (Taylor 1932, 
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1# 58). In Taylor's Metaphysics we get a Grotian style argument that 
reality and experience are inseparable and that both are grounded in 
'immediate experience'. The unity found in the immediate can be 
reproduced in conceptual thought, but the absolute also requires 
realization in a practical form, as the achievement of human purpose 
and will. Unlike Bradley, Taylor's argument that reality and the 
absolute are realizable in thought and practice coincides with that of 
Grote (Taylor 1912,18-41,50-75,152-153). In ethics, Taylor engages 
in the conversation about the metaphysical foundations of morality and 
of the nature of the moral ideals. on the latter he departs from 
Grote and Bradley in seeing that self-realization and self-sacrifice 
are ultimately irreconcilable moral ideals. (Taylor 1901,421-425). 
Three later Oxford philosophers, all of whom have used Grote and - 
one of whom has helped popularize his work, can be mentioned, 
J. A. Smith, R. G. Collingwood and A. Quinton. John Alexander Smith 
(1863-1939), was another Balliol idealist who eventually' became 
Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Phi3osophy. In a 
philosophical reminiscence published in 1925, revealingly entitled 
Philosophy as the Development of the Notion and Reality of Self 
Consciousness' Smith noted Grote as a more significant mentor than 
Green, Caird, 'Bradley and Bosanquet. After saying ho w disappointed he 
had been with his Oxford predecessors and the English moralists 
generally, including Mill and Spencer he wrote 
'Green and Bradley passed over my head, Kant alone seemed to 
afford a solid framework of ethical theory (but a framework 
only). I am bound here to refer to the works of John Grote, all 
of which greatly affected me; in them I found, not indeed, a 
system, but a clear grasp of fundamental principles illuminating 
a wealth of detail' (Smith 1925,229). 
Only Benedetto Croce receives recognition greater than Grote and that 
for his revelation that 
'Reality (or, as I prefer to name it more concretely, the whole 
383 
and sole Real) is not stationary or immobile, but essentially in 
change or process' (Smith 1925,235). 
John Grote, like Bradley and Green, considered reality to be the 
concrete whole*of experience, but unlike Hegel each of them had held 
back from any kind of historicism. By making history itself 
spiritual' Smith was able to add a dynamic to Groteos idea of a 
stable, but gradually emerging, reality. Whereas Grote's 'puzzle' is 
a 'picture coming out', to Smith and Croce the picture is still being 
painted. But much of Grote's metaphysics remains intact. Mind is- 
active and creative-in the knowing and acting processes, reality is 
spiritual, and hence active mind meets creative mind in the knowing 
process (Smith 1910,1914). 
Smithos successor in the Waynflete Chair was another 
metaphysician and close friend, who also resisted the new positivist, 
phenomenalist, and realist tides: Robin. G. Collingwood 
(1889-1943). Collingwood,. like Smith, shared a'deep affiliation to 
idealism, to Croce and to the idea that philosophical history offers 
us the best hope for explaining the complexities of human experience. 
In many ways Collingwood and Oakeshott are parallel figures in the 
oxford and Cambridge of their day, for while both mapped out the 
perspectives or . 
experience of aesthetics, religion, science, 
philosophy and history, both also considered the last two to be of the 
greatest explanatory value. In general terms Collingwood's detailed 
texts on Philosophical Method, The Principle of Art, The Idea of 
Nature and The Idea of History are fuller elaborations of the map he 
set out in Speculum Mentis, just as many of Oakeshott's later essays 
develop arguments about history, poetry, religion and practice 
discussed in Experience and Its Hodes (Collingwood, 1924,1933,1938, 
1940,1942,1945,1966). Collingwood knew of Grote and quotes him once 
in The Idea of History as a Ojudicious critic' who tried to lead 
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philosophers out of the blind alley which was the traditional 
philosophy of the human mind' (Collingwood, 1966,208). 
But the associations are deeper, and include the careful 
separation of science, history and philosophy as different forms of 
experience, the role of philosophy being to elucidate the logic and 
role of each and to act as 'boundary commissioner' (Passmore 1966, 
303). In this the main task was to unravel the presuppositions behind 
the operation of an explanation and to check for changes, 
developments, contradictions and confusions in and between them 
(Collingwood 1940). However, while each discipline has its own 
definition and criteria of truth the universalizing test is, as his 
colleague H. H. Joachim and John Grote argued, always coherence (Donagan 
1962; Ayer 1982,191-213). Reference to Anthony Quinton from New 
College Oxford is provided not as evidence of influence but rather as 
witness to his efforts to restore Grote to modern attention (Quinton 
1958,1967,1982). Not only'- does he briefly . analyse Grote's 
epistemology as a case of absolute idealism but he also gives a 
valuable survey of his critique of utilitarianism (Quinton 1972,21; 
1973,63-87). 
Apart from, the two recent historical reviews- from France by 
Pucelle and Chevalier the-only remaining area of influence has been in 
North America. The first evidence of influence was admitted by 
William James in an article in Mind of 1885 and then in the first, but 
not in succeeding, editions of the. Principles of Psychology (James, 
1885; 1901,221). Apart from later references to Grote's role in 
distinguishing knowledge of-acquaintance and description, the next 
major American references can be found in the work of Edgar Sheffield 
Brightman (1884-1953). As indicated by MacDonald, there is then a 
sustained course of references to Grote by others such as the realist, 
Roy Sellars, and Daniel Somner Robinson (Brightman 1925,83; Sellars 
385 
1920,257-259; Robinson 1930,109). But the three key figures in 
America are Geo; ge Watts Cunningham, Charles Whitmore and Lauchlin D. 
MacDonald. 
Charles Whitmore is something of an enigma. He was a literary 
theorist, sometime Professor of Literature at the University of 
Michigan, and author of numerous texts including The Supernatural in 
Tragedy (1916), The Nature of Tragedy (1919), A Definition of Lyric 
(1918) and Approaches to LiteraryTheory (1929). Just how he came to 
show an interest in Grote is never revealed but his essay on The 
significance of John Grote is readable, rigorous and generally 
accurate (Whitmore 1927,307-337). Unfortunately, the review does not 
cover the minor writings or the Examinations in any detail. The moral 
works are covered very briefly and the author holds back from 
attempting either to locate or to characterize Grote's writing. But 
that i's to be forgiven, for Whitmore properly notes that Grote wanted 
to avoid sectarian squabbles and his work is in many ways original. 
(Whitmore 1927,336-337). 
George Cunningham, the Professor of Philosophy at the University 
of Texas, was both insightful and brave in placing Grote at the 
beginning of The Idealist Argument in Recent British and American 
Phi-IOSOPhY. (Cunningham 1983t 63-77). An idealist himself, Cunningham 
writes with both sympathy and insight into Grote's mind, and his 
judgement that Grote's ideas while 'independently conceived' yet 
'Hegelian' in spirit, alongside the judgement that they are 'the 
earliest formulation of this type of argument to be found in British 
philosophy' must be taken as authoritative (Cunningham 1933,65). 
But we must finish this survey of later references and influences 
with the one full length text on Grote by Lauchlin D. MacDonald 
(MacDonald 1966). On numerous occasions I have found it necessary, 
along with MacDonald's two reviewers, to criticize heavily his work, 
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for containing conceptual confusions, for reading contemporary 
American personalism back into John Grote, for being badly organized, 
for failing to locate key texts and for undervaluing Grote's moral and 
political philosophy. However, after saying all this, MacDonald must 
be congratulated for his courageous effort to analyze Grote's 
epistemology and for his recognition of its general idealist 
character. My strategy has been to avoid engaging MacDonald too often 
as this would break the flow of my own argument. Overall T have been 
little influenced by this book except in one crucial and negative way. 
Reading MacDonald revealed that, without a historical re-construction 
of the intellectual context within which Grote thought, any attempt to 
assess his intentions and significance would be bound to fail. Now 
the historical task has been completed I trust a more rigorous 
critical analysis and assessment of John Grote's influence can now be 
engaged. 
387 
John Grote Thesis 
N-o-te s 
In accordance with modern convention, to aid the reading of this 
thesis and to facilitate the use of word processing facilities the 
notes in this thesis have been reduced to a minimum and. presentation 
left to the end of the thesis. Most references have been included-in 
the main text as suggested by the Modern Humanities Researct 
Association regulations MHRA 1981 Style Book; 3rd edition, London. 
Remaining notes refer to minor but interesting points of detail, to 
biographical details# and to reading where the number or length of 
references-would interrupt the normal flow of the text. 
Chapter I 
I Biographical details on John Grote are scarce.. The main sources 
are the D. N. B article on him by G. Groom Robertson, and the 
Obituaries in the' ýGentleman's Magazine', "The Times' and 'ChurCh 
Gaurdian"of August 1866. Additional information comes from the 
various introductions to John Grote's books written by Joseph 
Bickersteth Mayor. Unwitting evidence on Grote's childhood comes 
from various biographies of his brother, George Grote, written by 
his wife Harriet, his biographer for the Encyclopaedia Britanics 
and George Groom Robertson for the D. N. B. The excellent 
biography of George Grote by Michael L. Clarke is the best of 
the latter type of source (Clarke 1962), supported by the 
introduction to W. McIlwraith's The Life and Writings of George 
Grote (McIlwraith 1885). 
2 Details of the development of the Moral Sciences Tropos at 
Cambridge can be found in Henry Sidgwick's article on 'Philosophy 
at Cambridge', in the books by Winstanley, Rothblatt, and 
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Garland; and in the article by Collini in That Noble Science of 
Politics (Sidgwick 1879 Winstanley 1940,1945; Rothblatt 
1968 ; Garland 1980 Collini, Winch, Burrows 1983, 
339-363). Useful details can be found in the various editions of 
the Students Guide to the University of Cambridge; from 
1862-1893 (Mayor 1862). 
3 MS. Anon., 1957 'Discussion of the Terms of Reference for the 
Professorship of Horal Philosophy', Cambridge Chronicle, 11th 
Dec. 1957, Cam. a. 500.5. (167) 
4 See the obituaries to John Grote in the Church Gaurdian and 
Gentleman's Magazine's (Anon. 1866 a. 1866b). 
5 The study of philology at Oxford and Cambridge mirrored its 
development in Germany at the time. The key history apart from 
3. Burrbw'The Uses of Philology in Victorian England is H. 
Pedersen, Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century, though 
it is weak on Cambridge (Burrow 1967, Pedersen 1931). 
6 This lengthy section on Grote's work on language is included here 
for three reasons. Firstly, it fits with the plan of the chapter, 
to explain Grote's general literary output. Secondly, it raises 
one central and original feature of Grote's thinking, which 
throws light on most of his other work and hence needs to be 
understood early in the thesis. Thirdly, as most of the detail of 
Grote's philosophy are left until the historical preliminaries 
have been completed, it was considered to be a good strategy to 
reveal at least one aspect of the originality and'significance of 
Grote *s philosophy at an early stage. This section is intended, 
not only to. set the context and enlighten butg to excite, interest 
in the succeeding work. 
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7 'For a good account of the early origins of German philology see 
Pedersen (1931); Muller '(1891); Jespersen (1922). On its 
connections to German philosophy of the time, see Tenneman 
(1852); Chalybaus (1854), Flint (1971). 
8 John Kemble (1807-185i) studied at Cambridge and under Jacob 
Grimm at Gottingen. He translated. and interpreted several major 
medieval manuscripts (Kemble 1833-37; 1839-48; 1876). Richard 
Chenavix Trench (1807-1886) was a poet and theologian as well as 
a'philologe'r'and had a major impact on Trinity and Cambridge in 
Grote*s day (Trench 1861). On both see C. Brookfield, The 
Cambridge Apostles (1906). 
9 On the 'use of the comparative method in philol. ogy and 
anthropology see A. C. Hidden' (1934); M. Harris (1968); M. 
Mullen (1891), Collini et al (1983,209-246). 
10 Christian Kaul Josias Bunsen (1791-1860) was a diplomat in Rome, 
Bern and London. He wrote extensively on the history of the 
church, theology and history, as well as philology (Bunsen, 1854; 
1869; 1868-70). Barthold George Niebuhr (1776-1831) was a 
Danish born colleague of Bunsen, a historian and'diplomat as well 
as a philologer. He pioneered the practice of the rigorous 
referencing of sources (Niebuhr 1827; 1852a; 1852b; 1870). 
Marx Muller popularized philology in England with a series of 
lectures, articles and books published in the second half of the 
nineteenth century-the first collection of which appeared in 1861 
(Muller 1891). 
Farrar was elected as a fellow at Trinity in 1856 'and Donaldson 
in 1835, two years before Grote's elevation. 
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12 Leslie Stephen records over forty references to the coinages of 
John Grote in the complete Oxford English Dictionary. Many of 
these words such as hedonics, intuitivism, unitary, relativism, 
personalism, felicific, phone and noem have entered in everyday 
language. 
13 In a biographical note in the Exploratio Grote wrotel 'Myself, 
not owing much I think to any philosophical teaching ... I owe 
almost all'such interest as I take in philosophy, to what is next 
best to teaching, if it is not better, to companionship* (Grote 
186; xxxv). 
14 'Remarks on the Proposals of the Syndicate in reference to the 
Moral Science Tripos' (Grote 1860, Wren Library, LL 696. c. 127 
18); 'Remarks on the proposal to Grant the Degree of B. A. to 
persons who have obtained honours in the Moial Science Tripos" 
28 (Mayor 1860, Wren Library, LL. 696. c. 117 More details can be 
found in Winstanley(1945 , 186-190). 
15 'A Draft Scheme of the Examinations in Moral Sciences' (Grote 
1860, Wren Library LL. 696. c. 117 27). 'Remarks, on Mr Grote's' 
Proposals for Books for the Moral Sciences Tripos' (Whewell 1860, 
Wren Library, Whewell Papers Add. Mss. a. 62 61). 'Remarks on 
the Criticism of Whewell and Professor Grote on the list of Books 
which have been laid before the Board of Moral Sciences' (Roby 
1860, Wren Library, -LL. 696. c. 127 17). 
16 'A Few words on Statute XVIII of the New Body of Statutes sent 
under their seal by the Commissioners to the College' (Grote 
1859a, Wren Library, MS. Adv. c. 16.57 
29). 'Remarks on the 
Revised Code of Statutes' (Grote 1859b, C. U. L., Cam. a. 500.5 
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174 'A letter to the Master and Seniors of Trinity College on 
the relation of fellows under the old and new statutes' (Grote 
1863, Wren Library, LL. 696. c. 127.19 'Remarks on College 
Reform' (Roby 1858, Wren Library, LL. 696. c. 1117 
18 
'Remarks on Mr Grote's Proposal 
'to 
reduce the electorate for 
Masters and Seniors of Trinity College from eight to six' 
(Whewell 1857, Wren Library, Whewell Papers, Add. MS. a. 62 
61 ). 
17 Grote had become a senior fellow in 1854 as the result of an 
unfortunate incident recounted by Winstanley. In this an 
existing senior fellow and Regiu$ Professor of Greek, W. H. 
Thompson had been removed from his post. Joseph Edleston, a 
radical liberal, had petitioned the Home Secretary, concerning 
the propriety of his election to and retention of both a Senior 
Fellowship and a Regius Chair (Winstanley 1940,303-312). Grote 
himself supported reforms to the rules concerning election of 
Regius Professors in 1857 and Seniors and fellows in the next few 
years, becoming, particularly heavily involved in the latter, 
writing two printed flysheets on reform of the statutes in 1859 
(Grote 1859a, 1859b). In May 1857 Grote was elected onto a 
Governing Body Committee set up to propose reforms to the whole 
college statutes, which went on to propose, according to Joseph 
Romilly, absolutely 'drastic changes' (Romily 1857; Winstanley 
1949,343). Grote was a persistent critic of the College 
establishment and Romily once records after a long meeting, that 
Grote was 'infinitely tiresome' (Romilly 1853-1864, Diaries Ms. 
Cam. 6804-6842)., 
18 On this point Grote stayed loyal to Whewell. 's old dreams. -The 
two had fallen out on most other matters by 1860, as the new, and 
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even more liberal professor challenged one after another of the 
Masters, once liberal but now, old and reactionary looking 
reforms of three decades'earlier. 'Siding with the Commissioners 
and Edleston, Charles King and Wesflake, Grote engendered the 
sustained wrath of'- the aging master. As Winstanley notes, when 
Grote in 1857 proposed that-there shall be an annual meeting of 
the Master and the whole body of the fellows-6n the Commemoration 
Day, with power of adjournment, ` and that any representative, 
petition or enactment to be made by the colleges of any time for 
ammendment of I the existing statutes, proceed from that body', 
democracy was considered to have overlapped the 'bounds. Romily 
called the proposal hateful and mischievous, Sedgwick claimed 
that 'Such a measure would put in the hands of every fellow, soon 
after he was elected a iorch, with the invitation to try its 
efficd-c'Y'. * (Winstanley 1940,343ý 348). Grote's proposal was 
carried twelve years later (Winstanley 1945,252). Oh'a related 
issue of the election of seniors and fellows Grote proposed'that 
six of the senior fellows should constitute the appointment board 
and that they should be able to elect 'without the consent of the 
Master'. In a virulently worded reply the Master demanded for 
himself 'Such powers as may enable him to promote the well-being 
of the Body over which he presides' and adds 'When' there i's a 
question of power between sixty persons on one side and one on 
the other, to refer 'it to the whole body of sixty one, each 
person having an equal vote, is a palpably absurd proceeding' 
(WhewelI Cam. c. 857,15). 
19 1 must thank Dr Andrew Brereton of Northallerton for advice on 
these medical matters. 
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Chapter 11 
(1) Of the many texts on Foucault's approach to history the most 
usefullare H. L., Dreyfus and P. Rabinow Michael Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1982); Mark, Cousins and Athar Hussain, Michael Foucault (Cousins 
and Hussain, 1984); and Karlis Racevskis, tlichael Foucault and 
the Subversion, of intellect (Racevskis, 1983). On Derida, 
deconstruction and recent French philosophy see Vincent 
Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (Descombesi 1979); 
Christopher Norris The Deconstructive Turn (Norris 1983) and 
Robert Young Untying the Text (Young 1981). 
(2) Other useful primary sources on the history of mid Victorian 
philosophy are Robert Blackey (1833,1848); Sir James 
Mackingtosh (1830 ); Sir William Hamilton (1858-1860). 
(3) The best historical accQunts of British philosophy from 1800-1860 
are by Seth (1912); Sorley (1921); Metz (1938); Copleston 
(1966); Passmore 1966; Brehier (1932,1969) and Mandelbaum 
(1971). 
(4) On the Philosophical Radicals read Halevy (1952), Stephen (1900), 
Plamenatz (1958), Thomas (1979). 
(5) Ryan (1974,111-113); McCloskey (1971,56-64); Halliday ( 1976, 
51-52,61-64); Schneewind (1965,17-19). 
on the positivist view of history the most useful secondary texts 
are Mill 1961, Annan 1959; Simon 1963, Giddens, 1974, Buckley 
1966. 
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(7) Whewell TCC Add MS. a. 62 
(8) For an interesting account of romantic political theory see 
Jonathan Mendilou (1986), The Romantic Tradition in British 
Political Thought, London. 
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(9) Henry Sidgwick defined three types of intuitionism, the 
perceptual or ultra intuitionism, dogmatic or common sense 
intuitionism and philosophical intuitionism (Sidgwick 1963, 
100-104). He places the Scottish philosophers and Whewell in the 
second group, but both Schneewind and Donagan question whether 
Whewell should be with Sidgwick himself in the third (Donagan, 
1977; Schneewind 1974). 
(10) To my knowledge therels no text in English dedicated to the work 
of either the French Eclectic. % or to eclecticism as a wider 
movement. 
(11) On British philosophy between 1650 and 1860 the best sources are 
Sidgewick (1967); Sorley 1921; Stephen (1927); Copleston 
(1959-1967); Raphael (1947,1969), Carrel (1949). 
Chapter 
--- 
TTT 
(1) The various lines of this wider Cambridge challenge to 
ýmpiricism, positivism and utilitarianism will receive 
amplification in chapter ten section II. 
(2) Julius Hare became a close friend of both Niebuhr and Bunsen the 
latter become his neighbour. 'Any attack an Luther, Neibuhr, 
Bunsen or Coleridge would have called forth his sword from its 
scabbard', (Augustus Hare 1872,198). 
(3) The main secondary sources for, the idealist interpretation of 
Whewell are, Morell 1846,111 238-247; Thilly 1914,70,513-514; 
Segerstedt 1934,103-113; Ducasse 1951; Marcucci 1963; Butts 
1967,1968; Donogan 1977,447-465,. 
(4) A new collection of essays on Whewell which aims to re-assess his 
contribution to many areas of academilc life is due for 
publication by O. U. P. in 1987 edited by Simon Schaffer 
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(Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge). It 
wilý contain an essay on 'The Cambridge Milieu' by Harvey Becker 
one by Gerd Buchdahl on 'Whewell against Mill', and 'Whewell's 
Legacy' by Joseph Agassi. 
Chapter IV 
On existentialism see Mary Warnock's two books, '(1967). 
Existential Ethics, London; (1970) Existentialism, London. For 
a recent introduction see T. L. S. Sprigge (1984) Theories of 
Existence, Harmondsworth. Grote's existential theory is 
discussed in chapter six below. 
(2) For a discussion of succeeding thinkers who identify Grote as an 
idealist see Appendix III below. 
(3) For useful recent accounts and typologies of idealism see Milne 
1962,11-25; O'Sullivan 1969,47 Vesey 1982,1-18; Sprigge 
1963; 1984,56-76: For further discussion -see chapter ten, 
section one below. 
(4) For other attempts in this direction, both discussed in Appendix 
III below; see also M. Oakeshott (1933) and R. G. Collingwood 
(1924). 
(5) On mathematics and philosophy see Grote, (1865) xxvii; on 
history, (1856) xxviii-xxx; on psychology, (1865), 150-151; on 
religion, (1862); (1870), 214-220; on sociology, (1870) 
310-313. 
Chapter V 
other references to the wrong psychology. appear in Grote (1865, 
73,192), Grote also tries, with some difficulty, to separate 
logic and psychology (1865,151-153). 
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(2) In regard to epistemology Grote treats positivism and 
phenomenalism interchangeably (Grote 1865,1). 
Cha; )ter, VI 
(1) The enemies here appear to be certain Greeks, probably Plato, who 
considered imagination to deflect reason. For his part Grote 
insists that the distinction ordinarily made between reason and 
imagination is 'entirely fallacious' '(Grote 1876,42). 
(2) The establishment of the criterion for judging the adequacy of a 
moral axiom establishes a style to be used and made famous by 
Sidgwick later (Sidgwick_1963,337-343). The four criteria he 
sets are, 1) clarity, 2) self evidence, 3) conformity with other 
truths, 4) supported by a 'consensus of experts'. 
(3) A parallel chapter exists in the Examination (Grote 18701' 
171-182). 
(4) For elaboration of Grot6's argument see' (Grote 1870, '171-172, 
180). For similar reflexive arguments see (Oakeshott '1975, 
1-107; Ritchie 1893,22-27; Hart 1955,175-191). 
(5) Grote left the details of this argument very unclear and even 
confused. Phenomenalists, Plato and Christians are said 'to 
believe in an objective world, but phenomenolists are said not to 
be committed to an objective moral order. Again many 
intuitionists and rationalists deny moral subjectivism and posit 
an objective moral order. Grote seems to be 'comparing 
0 objective' and 'subjective' idealists here rather than 
* phenomenalists' and *intuitionists'. 
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Chapter VII 
(1) That Grote recognized the value of ordinary language analysis 
and applied it to the notions of right and wrong can be seen 
through examination of 'On Glcvsolpgy' $Grote 1874,162-169). 
(2) On this issue see (Grote 1900,271-283). 
(3) For elaboration see (Hudson 1970,317-320). 
(4) A contempory defence of this identification of virtue with' an 
existing social practice see (MacIntyre 1981 ) 174-181 
Bernstein 1986,121-127). 
Chapter VIII 
(1) The literature on Mill's utilitarianism is now too extensive to 
summarize adequately here. One useful collection and 
bibliography is in J. B. Schneewind's collection mill: 
Collection of Critical Essays '(Schneewind 1969). However the 
most helpful source for literature on Mill's Utilitarianism is 
the various volumes of The Mi12 News Letter edited by J. M. Robson, 
M. Laine and B. L. Kinzer and published by the University of Toronto 
Press. Each issue contains a section on 'Recent Publications' 
which is comprehensive. 
One recent text to locate the debate between the philosophical 
Radicals and the Whigs, especially the Scottish Whigs is by 
B. Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: the 
'Edinburgh Review'. 1802-1832 (Fontana, 1985). * Another useful 
text is by S. Collini, D. Winch and J. W. Burrow , That Noble Science 
of Politics (Collini 1983). 
(3) The Oxford English Dictionary attributes the coining of 
'Hedonics: The Doctrine of pleasure, that part of ethics which 
treats of pleasure' to John Grote (Grote 18701 181;. 1876,14). 
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Similarly the original coining of 'hedonology', the science of 
measuring human pleasure is attributed (Grote 1870,345). Also 
attributed to Grote are 'felicific', 'felicificability', and 
'felicificativeness' (1986,33,205). 
(4) This argument appears most regularly'. and forcefully in chapters 
III, V and IX of Grote's Examination (Grote 1870). 
(5) Other contemporary reviews of Mill's 1861 essay are in the 
Saturday Review, (12 Oct. 1861,373-4); Spectator (5 Oct 1861, 
1095); Spectator (19 Oct. 1861,1144-6)r Spectator (11 April 1863, 
1868-9); macmillans magazine (viii, June 1963,152-160). 
(6) On this point see Moore's Principia Ethica (Moore 1903,67-68); 
Everett Hall (Hall, in Schneewind 1969,154-158); McCloskey 
(McCloskey 1971,61-63); M. Warnock in (Schneewind 1969, 
197-203). 
(7) The-twentieth century debate on act and rule utilitarianism can 
be located in the following J. D. Mabbott 'Interpretations of Mills 
Utilitarianism'; J. O. Urmson 'The Interpretations of 
utilitarianisný; J. Rawls 'Two Concepts of Rules', and J. J., C. 
Smart 'Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism' all, in P,. Foot (ed) 
1967 Theories of Ethics, Oxford. Useful debates can be found in 
J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, 1973 Utilitarianism; For and 
Against, Cambridge; J. Smith and E. Sosa 1974 Hill's 
Utilitarianism: Critical Studies, Belmont; D. Lyons 1965 Forms 
and Limits of Utilitarianism, London. 
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Chapter IX 
The key, texts on Politics and philosophy within the Moral Science 
Tripos are Winstanley 1940,1947; Sidgwick 1870,1876; Ingleby 
1870;, Cannon 1964; Rothblatt 1968,1976; Garland 1980; Roach 
1959, Robson 1967, Collini 1985 
(2) Copies of Syllabi for the Classics Tripos can be found in the 
Cambridge University Calenders, for various years located in the 
University Library and in Trinity- College Library. Copies of 
Fellowship Examination papers can be found in variousIcollege 
libraries but the most helpful for, philosophy and politics are 
the Trinity and St, John's College papers. Details of periodic 
reforms. to the Classics Tripos can be found in Winstanley 1940. 
(3) For a useful critical review of Patriarchial Theory (though not 
Relational Theory) see Rosalind Coward 1983, Patriarchial 
Precedents: Sexuality and Social Relations, London, pp 17-45. 
(4) Barthold Georg Niebuhr was a Danish born historian and diplomat 
who spent most of his active years working in Germany and 
Britain. His work is not widely appreciated in modern British 
scholarship, though his History of Rome was a widely used model 
of historical research and analysis in the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. Like Savigny, Niebuhr was most popular 
amongst scholars associated with the romantic movement (Haddock 
1980,104-105). 
(5) John R. Seeley (1834-1895) was a student and later fellow of 
Christs College Cambridge, a senior in classic and Professor of 
Latin at University College London from 1863 to 1869 -before 
becoming Professor of Modern History at Cambridge (Seeley 1866, 
1883,1895). John F. McLennon (1827-1881) graduated at Cambridge 
in 1853 and was'a fellow of Trinity College. He was in Cambridge 
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at the same time as Grote and Maine 1849-1857. (McLennon 1857, 
1865,1885; Burrow 1970,230-235,238-241). 
Bury 1955, The Idea of Progress, New York; Becker, K., 1932, The 
Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment; New Haven; 
Pollard 1968, The Idea of Progesss, Harmondsworth. 
Chapter X 
The remaining reasons for limiting my coverage of MacDonald's 
book are that his book fails to provide both a methodology and a 
historical context. The benefits likely to be derived from 
further study than that given in the Introduction above and 
here below, are judged not to justify the labour. Further points 
are made at the end of Appendix III below. 
(2) Grote's position on this latter issue is close to that of 
G. E. Moore in his 'Refutation of Idealism' (Moore 1922). Both 
argue that idealists and some of their opponents get confused 
when they run together descriptions of the act of seeIng and 
knowing with descriptions of the thing or object known. 
(3) The deconstruction of false dichotomies is a trademark of the 
recent work of Richard Rorty. He uses the method to undermine, 
as does Grote, the distinction between 'necessary and contingent' 
(Rorty 1980,169-170; Bernstein, 1986,34-35). 
(4) There is an interesting reply to an anonymous critic named G. at 
the end of Volume I of Ferrier's WorksThis could refer to Grote 
and an earlier reply to Ferrier as both the style and criticism 
suggest Grote's later work (Ferrier 1881). 
(5) We should remember here that it is to Leslie Stephen that we owe 
the castigation of Coleridge's idealist philosophy as a 'heap of 
fragments' and 'random dissuasive hints', 'simply appropriated 
from Schelling (Stephen 1900, IT, 373-374,380). 
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Biblioqraphies 
These bibliographies have the purposes of providing an up to date list 
of available works by John Grote, of works which make some reference 
to him, and of books of special value used in the preparation of this 
thesis. Many texts other than those referred to in the last section 
were used but considerations of space precludes their insertion. 
All referencing has made use of the M. H. R. A. Style Book citation by 
the author-dating system (M. H. R. A. Style Book, Notes for Authors, 
Editors and writers of Dissertations, Third edition, edited by 
A. S. Maney and R. L. Smallwood, London, 1981,40-42). 
There are four bibliographies 
Part I Works by John Grote, with additional reference to original 
publisher and locations of rare texts. 
Part II a) Manuscripts by John Grote 
b) Manuscripts refering to John Grote 
Part III Books, articles and thesis that make7 reference to John 
Grote 
Part IV Books, articles, reviews and thesis used in preparation of 
this thesis. 
Enclosure I contains a copy of Mayor's account of the 
manuscripts remaining unpublished in 1900, An account of 
my unsuccessful search for these can be- found in 
Appendix I to the main text above. 
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Part I WORKS BY JOHN GROTE 
(Square brackets denote where the rarer volumes can be found] 
Grote, J., 1849 Commemoration Sermon, Cambridge. Deighton Bell & Co. 
1851 Remarks on a pamphlet by Hr Shilleto entitled 'Thucydides or 
Grote", Cambridge: Deighton, Macmillan & Co., [Durham University 
Library]. 
1854 'On the Dating of Ancient History', Journal of Classical and 
Sacred Philology, I, 52-82 [Glasgow University Library]. 
, 
1855 'On the Origin and Meaning of Roman Names'. Journal of 
Classical and Sacred Philology, 11,257-270 [Glasgow University 
Library] 
1856 'Old Studies and New'. Cambridge Essays, IT, 74-114 London: 
John W. Parker & Son. [Durham University Library]. 
1860 'Robert Leslie Ellis', The Athenaeum, 205-206. 
1861 A few Words of Criticism a propos of the Saturday Review of 
April 20,1861, Upon Dr. Whewell's Platonic Dialogues for English 
Readers, Cambridge. Macmillan, 1-5,6 [University of Aberdeen 
Library]. 
1862a An Examination of some portions of Dr. Lushington's judgement 
in the cases of the Bishop of Salisbury v Williams, and Fendall v 
Wilson (re. Essays and Reviews), Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co.. 1 
-101 [University of Aberdeen Library]. 
1862b A few Words on the New Education Code, Cambridge. Deight'y 
Bell & Co. 1-48 [Bristol University Educational Departmer'i 
Library]. 
1865 Exploratio Philosophica. Rough Notes on Modern Zntellectua. 1' 
Science, Part I, Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co. (Republished in. 
1900 with Part II by Cambridge University Press). 
1867 'What is Materialism', Macmillan's magazine, 15,370-381. 
1870 An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy (edited by Joseph 
Bickersteth Mayor), Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co. 
1871a 'On a Future State', The Contemporary Review, 18,133-140. 
1871b 'Thought versus Learning'. Good Words, 12,818-823. 
1872a Sermons by the Late Rev. J. Grote, edited by Joseph 
Bickersteth Mayor, Cambridge. Deighton, Bell & Co. [Aberdeen 
University Library). - 
1872b 'Memoir of (Robert) Leslie Ellis', Contemporary Review, 20, 
56-71. 
403 
1872c 'Papers on Glossology', Journal of Philology, 4,55-66; 
157-181 (Durham University Library]. 
1874 'Papers on Glos 
, 
sology', Journal of Philologyj 5j 153-182 
(Durham University Library]. 
1876 A Treat'Ise on the Moral Ideals, (edited by Joseph Bickersteth 
Mayor), Cambridge. Deighton Bell & Co. 
1677 'Pascal and Montaigne', Contemporary Review, 30,285-296. 
1889 'A Discussion between Professor Henry Sidgwick and the Late 
Professor John Grote on the Utilitarian Basis of Plato's Republic', 
The Classical Review, 3,97-102. 
1900 Exploratio Philosophica, Part II (edited by Joseph Bickersteth 
Mayor) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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Part II MANUSCRIPTS 
The surviving manuscripts on and about John Grote are of 
minor significance to understanding his philosophical ideas. 
However they contain useful historical evidence about his 
liberal, even radical role in college and university 
politics. There are six manuscript sources, 
University Library Cambridge, abbreviated as C. U. L. 
Trinity College Library (Wren Library), T. C. C. 
Ellis Papers 
Myers Papers 
Whewell Papers 
British Library, abbreviated as B. L. - (George Grote 
Collection) 
Bodeleian Library, - Oxford, abbreviated as Bodleian - (Bryce 
Collection) 
NottingL;.;. m University Library, - (Marley Collection) 
Balliol College Library (Green Papers) 
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MANUSCRIPTS. 
- 
FLYSHEETS, CTRCULARS, PETTTIONS 
AND LETTERS CONCERNING JOHN GROTE. 
Section a) MANUSCRTPTS-BY JOHN GROTE. 
1850's 'Letters from John Grote to Charles Brinsley Marley 
(1829-1912) with regard to the health of Robert Leslie Ellis' 
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PREFAQE BY THE EDITOR. 
T HE First Part of the Exploratio appeared in 1865. In 
p. xxx of his Introduction the Author expresses a hope 
that the Second Part might be completed in a month or two. 
He mentions, as to be there discussed, the views of Prof. Bain, 
Mr Herbert Spencer (pp. - 54,70), J. D. Morell (p. xxi), Sir W. Hamilton (p. 87), and J. S. Mill (p. 166), with special 
reference to his Examination of Sir TV. HamiltOns Philosophy. 
He also speaks of dealing more at length with the- Th, 6o*ry-of 
Vision (p. 40); and concludes the book (p. 258) as follows: 
" The next chapter (or one soon to follow) will have reference 
principally to Mr Mill. In the other chapters I shall follow 
out'the scheme indicated in the Introduction and discuss the 
remaining works there inentioned. I may add some others to 
them, 'and I hope to finish by putting the views here given in 
a clearer manner than I have been able to do in the course of 
the 'exploratioij, ' in consequence of the additional hold upo! i 
them whicli, I trust, this may have given. " 
Unhappily, the Second Part was still unfinished at the time 
of ýhe Author's death -in August 1866, the 54th year of his 
age. He left to his literary executor a great mass of mss. to 
be published or otherwise, as, and how, he might think fit. In 
the exercise of the discretion thus allowed to me, I brought 
out the Examination of the Utilitarian Philo8ophY in 1870, 
explaining in the Preface my reasons for beginning with this 
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rather than with the Second Part of the Exploratio. The 
reasons there stated are (1) the very unfinished condition of 
the latter, (2) the fact that the Author attached more import- 
ance to his ethical than to his metaphysical writings, (3) the 
probability that a larger number of readers would be found for 
the easier and more popular subject. 
The Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy was followed 
in 1876 by the Moral rdeals, to which allusion is made in the 
Exploratio, p. vii, in the words, "I determined to put together 
in an uncontroversial form what seemed to me to be the truth, 
in opposition to what I thought error. " 
Besides these treatises the follcmiing papers were published 
from time to time in the periodicals named below: 
An article on Materialism (printed as chapters I and II of 
Book III in the present volume). Macmillans Magazine, 1867. 
On a Future State. Co7itentporary Beview, 1871. 
__Thought versus 
Learning. Good Yords, Dec., 1871. 
Memoir of Leslie Ellis. Cont. Bav., * June, 1872. 
Papers. on Glossology. Journal of Philology, 1872 and 
1874. 
Montaigne and Pascal. Cont. Rev., July, 1877. 
Imaginary Conversation between Mr Grote and Socrates. 
Ckssical Rev., March, 1889. 
A small selection of Sermons was, also published in 1872 by 
Messrs Deighton. 
The very limited circulation attained by the three philoso- 
pbical treatises gave little encou . ragement to publishing anything 
more of the same character; but every now and then I received 
letters asking what was being done about the continuatiop 
of the Zxploratio; and early in 1898 INIr H. W. B. Joseph, 
Fellow of New College, Oxford, who had already written to me 
on the subject some three years before, made another appeal, 
stating that it was felt by many in Oxford that the publication 
of the Second Part of the Eaplo? -atio would be ofservice to the 
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cause of philosophy in England, and asking whether it would 
be . possible for the Ms. to be deposited for a time in one of 
the Oxford libraries, with a view to its being consulted by 
persons approved by the Librarian. I felt that I had no right 
to resist an appeal of thiskind, which, coming, as it did, from 
members of the sister University after a lapse of 35 years, I 
believe to be almost unprecedented in the annals of philosophy, 
and in answer promised Mr Joseph that, if he could let me 
have a list of those who felt with him in the matter, I would 
forward it to the S3, ndics of the Cambridge University Press, 
offering to prepare the ms. for the Press if they would make 
a grant towards the expense of printing. The result was (1) a 
letter to me signed by twenty-three Oxford Graduates, almost 
all of them Fellows or ex-Fellows of Colleges, in which they 
expressed their desire that t4e book might be published, and 
(2) a most generous offer on the part of the Cambridge Press 
to defray the whole cost of publication. 
I proceed now to give a short account of the papers which 
form the material of the present volume. -In the first instance 
I had to deal with those which were evidently intended to be 
included in the 'rough notes' entitled Exploratio Philosophica. 
These make up some twenty parcels, with nothing to mark 
their intended order, and most of them without any title or 
heading. After repeated perusal I was able to some extent to 
make out the order in which the several parcels were written, 
and marked them accordingly with the letters of the Greek 
Alphabet; though it seemed desirable in some cases to adopt a 
different order for the final arrangement in chapters. Thus the 
Ist parcel, containing 65 pages, numbered 210 to 274 (amount- 
ing to about half the same number of the printed pages), seemed 
like a rough draft of what had already appeared in Exploratio, 
Part 1: pp. 275-315 were missing, having probably been used 
as copy for the same: then came pp. 316-342, marked by me 
(a), which form a kind of introduction to two parcels, marked 
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by me (j9) and (-/). These three parcels correspond to Chapters 
I, IX, X of the present volume. The parcel marked (8), which 
contains 40 pages on the Psychology of Locke, Stewart, &c., and 
parcel (6), containing 10 pages on Stewart's account of Percep- 
tion, were used for Ch. II. Parcel marked (ý), which is headed 
'A propos of Cousin's Lectures on Locke, &c., ' contained 18 
pages, and constitutes the present Ch. III. Parcel (71) contains 
64 pages on Berkeley, and constitutes Ch. XII. Parcel (0), 
containing 24 pages on Scepticism, is the present Ch. VIII. 
Three parcels (t, K, X), entitled 'Impression, Imagination, Idea, ' 
contain together 68 pages, and are now divided into Chapters 
IV, V, VI, and VII. Parcel (v) on Sight, containing 6 pages, 
is the present Ch. X1. Parcel (7r) entitled 'Aphorismi 
Finales' contains 17 pages, and is printed below on pp. . 325 
foll. Parcels ju, ý, o, p, containing together about 30 pages, 
were omitted, as adding nothing new. 0 A second set of papers written a little later than the above, 
but dealing with the same subjects, were divided into two 
parcels, one of 113 pages entitled 'Self-self and Thought-self, ' 
the other of 59 pages entitled 'Perception, etc. ' These now 
make up Book II, to which I have given the general title 
'Immediateness and Reflection, ' and have divided it into eiaht 
chapters. 
A third set of papers of about the same date bore the title 
'What is Materialism V They were divided into two parts, 
containing respectively 38 and 17 pages. These make up the 
three chapters of Book Ill. That which appears as the Fourth 
Book was written as a comment on Mr Cope's criticism of the 
view given in Grote's Plato of the argument in the Theaetetus. 
The ms. consists of 58 pages, and was written, as I learn from 
the Author's diary, between June 29 and July 2,1866, that is 
less than two months before his death. It will be seen that I 
have divided it into three chapters, using the Protagorean 
maxim as the general heading. Though it was probably 0 
written without reference to the Exploratio, yet it contains an 
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allusion to Part 11, and, I think, will be felt to be a fitting 
supplement to the preceding Books. Indeed, in my opinion, 
nothing in this volume is inore characteristic of the Author, or 
likely to be of more value at the present time, than* the remarlm 
on the Right and Duty of Private Judgment contained in Ph. II. 
The Fifth Book is taken from a series of papers headed 
'Idealism and Positivism, ' containing about 120 pages, which 
were originally intended to form an Appendix to the Examin- 
ation of the Utilitarian Ploilosophy, but the Author, as is titated 
in Exploratio, p. vii, changed his mind, thinking it better 'to 
put together in an uncontroversial form the intellectual views 
on which the moral view rested! As, however, there is much 
in this earlier draft which is not included in the First Part of 
the Exploratio, I have thought it well to append it to the 
Second Part, dividing it into three chapters. Of the I Aphor- 
ismi - Finales-, I- ha*ve already spoken. The I Epilogue' was 
written, I fancy, before the publication of Part L, and would 
no doubt have been considerably added to, if the Author had 
lived to completoe Part II. 
In reading the criticisms passed by the Author on the 
writings of other philosophers, it is important to remember 
his own account of the reasons which led him to give so much 
space to such criticism. "I care not in the least, " he/*8ays2, 
"to dispute what anyone says, except with a view of clearing 
up my own thoughts and those of others. " "Let us suppose 
Mr Mill to be A, a character in a philosophical discussion, and 
if the actual Mr Mill has changed his views, or (which is 
exceedingly likely) I have misunderstood him, then let it not 
be supposed it is Mr'Mill 1 am discussing with at all*. " Again, 
speaking of his doubt as to the exact force of certain statements 
of Prof. Ferrier, he says4,11 When I say that I agree with him, 
I interpret him in my own way, and if anyone disputes that 
being his* meaning, I have no care to maintain that it is. 
1 See below P. - 272.2 P. Xxiii. 
3 p. XXX. 4 p. 69. 
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What I say then is not applicable to him. I have observed 
on the inutility of lengthened controversy as to whether a 
philosopher means this or that. Let us see only how what 
it may be thought he means, helps the truth, and suggests 
thought in us. " 
It may be well for me to take this opportunity of giving 
some account of the remaining mss. left by Prof. Grote. They 
were arranged by hirn in the following groups: 
I. Four volumes containing about 900 pages. The earlier a 
part consists mainly of lectures, or notres for lectures, on Moral 
Philosophy and the Relation between Thought and Action. 
Among the most important sections are the chapters marked 
N (='Noematism'), containing about 80 pages on the subject of 
_'Glossology, 
' or the chanaes in the meaning of words. Part of 
has, ', 
'been' printed'(as mentioned above) 
in the Journal of 
Philology. There is much of interest-also in the section marked 
S, containing 60 pages on the classification of the different kinds 
of History; in T, containing 70 pages on Practical Ethics; in 
V, containing 148 pages on Ethics and Religion; and in Z, 
containing 200 pages on Christian Ethics, with discussions on 
International Law and Casuistry. 
II. Consists of one volume of 270 pages, containing lectures 
on Morality, Society, Progress, etc. 
III. Comprises three volumes of Essays and Reviews, and 
contains about 800 pages. The most important sections here 
are 263 pages on Froude's History of England, 82 pages on 
Manse], 30 on Temple's Essay, 30 on Goldwin'Smith, together 
with papers treating of Dante (50 pages), St Gregory on Job 
(25 pages), Thomas Aquinas (90 pages), Mill on Sedgwick, 
Whewell, Bentham, etc. What is now p9blished under the 
title Examination of the . Utilitarian Philosophy originally 
formed Vols. IV. and v. of this group. 
IV. Comprises four volumes of about 1200 pages, bearing date 1861. It is made up of Notes, Essays and Lectures, and 
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includes articles on Bentham (. 5 -0 pages), Pascal (55 pages), 
Channing (40 pages), Antoninus (20), Charles Lamb (18), 
Forster's Great Rebellion (20), Comte and Buckle (130), Plato's 
Gorgias (30), Place of the Individual in History ( 50), Law of 
Honour illustrated from Beaumont and Fletcher (20), etc. 
V. One volume on MoTal Philosophy, containing 317 pages, 
(apparently a preliminary sketch of Jforal Ideals). 
Series 31. Two volumes of 590 pages on Morality and the 
History of Moral Philosophy. 
Language. One volume of 422 pages, part of which has 
been already printed in the articles on Glossology, and in Good 
Words under the title I Thought versus Learning. ' 
The Authorized Versioii, tracing its changes up to the 
present time, 138 pages (used by Dr Scrivener). 
There are a number of smaller parcels on various subjects 
and a -quantity of -notes on Philology, on Architecture, on 
Ruskin, etc., together with note-books innumerable, touching 
on all conceivable topics, from the humblest incidents of village 
life to the highest flights of philosophical or religious medi- 
tation : some of these might supply material for an interesting 
collection of miscellaneous Aphorisms. Probably, however, it 
will be thought that his latest ethical writings have the first 
claim to be printed. These are 'Honestarianism and Utili- 
tarianism, ' of 217 pages, finished June 5,1866; 1 The two 
HoXtTeFat, ' of 18 pages, and other shorter papers written in 
the same month. 
To complete the getieral view of Prof. Grote's literary work, 
I will add a list of Pamphlets and Essays printed before the 
publication of the First Part of the Exploratio. 
Commemoration Serinpn preached in Trinity College Chapel 
Dec. 15,1849. Deighton, 1849. 
I Series 1 and 2 had been incorporated in the preceding groups with an 
altered title. 
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Rem, arks on a Pamphlet by Nr Shilleto entitled' Thucydides 
or Grote. ' Deighton, 1851. % A fiw Tord8on Criticism cl propos of the Saturday Review. 
Deighton, 1861. 
Examination of some portions of Dr Lushington's judgment 
in the cases of the Bishop of Salisbury v. Williams, and Fendall 
v. Wilson. Deighton, 1862. 
Old Studies and New in Cambridge Essays, 1856. 
On the Dating of Ancient History in Journal -of Classical 
and Sacred Philology, vol. i. pp. 52-82. Camb. 1854. 
On the Origin and Meaning of Roman Names, Ib. vol. ii. 
pp. 257-270. Camb. 1855. 
A few Words on the New Education Code. Deighton, 1862. 
only remains for me to return my warmest thanks to, 
Prof. - Henry Sidgwick, who has gone through the proofs with 
the Utmost care, and whose advice throughout has been of the 
greatest service to me; also to Mr H. W. B. Joseph, to whom 
the publication of this volume is really owing, and who has not 
only helped to revise the proofs, but has himself compiled the 
Index; lastly to the Syndics of the Cambridge University 
Press, who have shown, by their readiness to undertaký the 
expenses of publication, that the name of John Grote is still 
not without honour in his old University. 
P. S. The portrait of the Author which fonns the frontis- 
piece is a copy of a photograph taken when he was about 50 
years old. 
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15 December, 1969.. 
John R. Gibbins, Esý., 
Department of'Politics University of Newcastl; -upon-Tyne, NE1 7RU. 
Dear Mr. Gibbins, 
Lord Russell asks me to thank you for your letter of December 10. He does not have any idea where the pýapers of John Grote might be. He al so knows very little of Grote's 
work or of Mayor. He thinks that his father, Lord Amberley, 
had some correspondence with Grote's elder brother, George Grote, the historianland that some of this may have survived 
in the Bertrand Russe 1 archives at McMaster Uhiversit Hamilton Ontario, Canada. The Librarian there would 
ýe' 
pleased to advise you about this and might be able to help 
your enquiries about John Grote and Mayor. 
I am very sorry that this letter is not more-helpful to 
you. 
Yours sincerely, 
/I /. -. po 
Christop er arley (Secretary) 
Teesside Polytechnic 
Viddlesbrough. Cleveland TS I 3BA 
Telephone 0642 218121 Ext. 
Department of Administrative 
and Social Studies 
Head of Department 
LJ Tasker GSc (Soc. Sc. ) 
When telephoning, please ask for 
John R. Gibbins 
From: John R. Gibbins B. Sc M. A. 
To: Internal and External Examiners 
and Dr Tim Gray (Superviser) 
Date: 16th March, 1987. 
Title: John Grote, CambridEý_211iversity_ýýal_. ýhe Devel, opE! ýýn. ý_2f 
Victorian Ideas 
The enclosed thesis has taken sixteen years to research 
and write. Its presenz form is set out in the synopsis, contents 
and introduction. It is designed both for submission as a doctoral 
degree and as a subsequent- publication. The the-sis has been 
produced on a word processer. However, the manuscript is still 
approximately 
. 
190,000 words in length (including the appendices) and 
this requires, in my view, some justification. 
The justificatlons for presenting this thesis in its present 
s ltý- - -aý-- -. - -, ---, -- -- , orm are s follows: - 
1. The size of the task John Grote is a philosopher 
of immense interest and significance whose life and works 
have riot yet received a comprehensive treatement. His 
corpus contains four major books plus eighteen other 
major publications. Grote wrote on a wide variety of 
subjects and disciplines and in addition the parts form 
a coherent whole or system, the form and character of which 
has eluded previous commentators. The analysis of only 
one subject or discipline area or one part of this 
system without the others would then be ineffective if the 
aim was to discover the meaning and significance of 
Grote's work. Several authorities with similar ambitions 
to my own have required a similar length to achieve the 
desired results, e. g. J. B. Schneewind, 1977 Sid. EHI. SýR 
Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosopý, y_, 
_CUP 
(1ý1,000 words): 
N. Kemp Smith, 1966 The Philosopý-y_2f_David Hume 
Macmillan (205,000) 
2. Methods and, assumptions At one time this thesis only 
intena-ed to provide an interpretation of Grote's phil. osophy. 
Once it was decided that methodologically this task could 
not be realised without an attendant analysis of ccntexts, 
its size and scope consequently increased. To allow for 
these interpretative and hermeneutic priorities the author 
has been at pains to reduce to the minimum the demands 
of two other possible aims, critical analysis and the 
assessment of influence, but the remaining manuscript is 
still lengthy. 
3. The_absence of reliable sec, ondary_jý, IýR A third major 
reason for the length and scope of this thesis lies in 
the absence of a large and reliable body of secondary 
texts on various aspects of Grote's work. There is only 
one booklength study of Grote and that is both analytically 
flawed and then orientated primarily to his epistemology 
(MacDonald, 1966). Most of the s. econdary texts on Grote 
are brief, fragmentary in terms of subject, and not 
linked by any argument or debate. So where most authors 
in intellectual history can confidently refer their 
re'aders to competent secondary sources that deal with special 
arguments of significance, this has here proved impossible. 
I have had to research, analyse and write up on every" 
aspect of Grote's life, writings and his intellectual 
environment to arrive at a coherent synthesis. 
4. The unavailability_2f_pEIMAEy_sources The relative 
unavaiYability OT primary sources ýas-necessitated a higher 
than normal resort to textural quotations in this manuscript, 
several of which are lengthy. All of Grote's books are 
out of print and are available only in the longer established 
university and academic libraries. Several of the minor 
works have only one known location. In these circumstances 
frequent and sometimes lengthy quotation seems justified 
when in a normal thesis a simple footnote or reference 
may serve the Purpose. The author hopes to edit some of 
Grote's major works in the near future to * 
help solve this 
problem for future researchers. Finally, the length of many 
thesis' are disguised, as much of the material is contained 
, 
in lengthy footnotes. This thesis is designed to reduce 
footnotes to-the, absolute minimum (only ten in most chapters) 
with all`referýnces-and quotations contained-in the main 
ýbody-of-the-th'&-sis . -^ II 
inion 5. Originality and the challe. naS_ý2_tstablished_02 - In h1s oo 1 es a 
--ý--'He Literary Thesis: A Guide to R--e-rch, 
George Watson correctly counsels against excessive ambition 
and length in a literary thesis, but he provides one 
convincing exception. 
'Only conclusions which are profoundly contrary to 
established opinion need, on the whole, to be 
protected by a battery of all the evidence' 
(Watson 1970,30). 
The whole subject and various contentions of this thesis 
challenge conventional views about the significance of 
John Grote, the origins of idealism in Britain and the 
role of Cambridge University in nineteenth century 
thought and therefore require lengthy support and 
substantiation. 
6. The 
, 
recovery_2f_S2ntexts and sources. A final 
justiTication refers to the problem discovered when the 
author began to research the context within which 
Grote's though was to be located. Nineteenth century 
intellectual history was found to be only understood 
in fragments around certain classical thinkers and 
theories. Before recovering John Grote,. the author had to 
recover William Whewell, Julius Hare, Frederick Maurice, 
Henry Maine, Thomas Birks and a mass of other writers, 
movements and theories - largely lost to twentieth 
century scholarship. These sources have been detailed and 
written up in this thesis and a new paradigm for under- 
standing Victorian ideas presented for the guidance of other 
scholars in chapters -two , 
WNý, Qo_ and ten. ' 
Finally I must make good an o*mission to the 
acknowledgem. ents to this thesis. There I thanked Dr 
Gray, but did not acknowledge that he was the Supervisor 
of this project, nor that in this capacity, as in all 
others, his performance exceeded all my hopes. 
John R. Gibbins 
